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ABSTRACT
The basic question motivating my dissertation is whether it is possible to consciously 
perceive objects in the world without possessing any concepts for those objects. Standard 
phenomenological and epistemological approaches to the issue of non-conceptual perceptual 
content have presumed that concept-possession entails mastery of a concept's linguistic and 
inferential usage. I depart from these approaches by developing a naturalized account of 
perceptual concepts, one which is further informed by theories of perception in the Nyāya 
tradition of Indian philosophy. Perceptual concepts on a revised conceptualist account can be 
understood as attention- and memory-based capacities for predicating sensory features to objects.
With this account in place, I draw upon recent scientific models of visual processing to argue that
essentially non-conceptual, pre-predicative perceptual contents do not phenomenally appear in 
conscious visual experience. 
To make plausible the idea that perceptual contents can be both conceptual and non-
linguistic in nature, I demonstrate in Chapters 1 and 2 how perceptual contents can have a 
compositional, predicative structure in the absence of linguistic formatting. Similarly, I advance 
several criteria for perceptual concept possession in the absence of explicit linguistic or 
inferential mastery. I further support my revised account of perceptual concepts by drawing upon
insights from Buddhist and Nyāya philosophers, developed in their centuries-long debates over 
the relation between perception, concepts, and language.
 In Chapter 3, I then offer a reconstructive reading of Immanuel Kant and the Navya 
Nyāya philosopher Gȧgesa, which extracts from their theories of perceptual concepts and 
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apperception a thesis to the effect that intentional, object-directed perceptual representations 
must be conceptually structured in order to have a subjective phenomenal character. Kant and 
Gȧgesa broadly agree on a set of reasons why we lack any phenomenological evidence for the 
existence of perceptual states with exclusively non-conceptual content. I take these reasons to be 
pointing toward several conditions responsible for the integration of perceptual contents into a 
subject's unified conscious experience.
The fourth chapter reframes my reading of Kant and Gȧgesa in naturalized terms, by 
demonstrating how phenomenally accessible perceptual contents arise through the conceptually 
modulated activity of attention and visual memory. I show how a unified theory of perceptual 
attention and conceptualization undercuts the phenomenological intuitions underlying both 
classical Buddhist and contemporary defenses of non-conceptualism, and further resolves several
dilemmas facing recent theories of consciousness. 
Lastly, the fifth chapter shifts to a discussion of classical Chinese epistemology and 
psychological studies of perceptual expertise, in order to further characterize perceptual concepts
as capacities for allocating attention which we can actively and skillfully exercise in experience. 
Ultimately, a theory of perceptual concepts as attentional skills allows us to understand 
perceptual experience itself as an activity which is both skillfully absorbed and permeated with 
rationality.
v
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Chapter 1
 Perceptual Content as Non-Linguistic and Conceptual 
Perceptual non-conceptualism—the view that it is possible for one to perceive an object 
without needing to possess any concept of what one perceives—holds a great deal of intuitive 
plausibility. It seems uncontroversial that perceiving the world is much different from thinking or
talking about the world. I might describe to you in vivid terms the brilliant sky of last evening's 
sunset, but my description is no match for actually seeing the sunset for yourself. No matter how 
precise or evocative my description would be, it could not possibly convey to you every detail of 
the scene—every shade of color in the sky, or every contour of the clouds—which I perceived 
effortlessly. Indeed, my own conceptual vocabulary seems too limited to describe my experience
of the sunset, and my thinking at the time of how I would describe what I am seeing to you was a
different activity than the seeing itself. What's more, creatures like human infants and a wide 
range of non-human animals would be totally unable to understand my description of the sunset, 
and yet we would presume that they would have still have an acute sensory awareness of the 
same scene. These sorts of phenomena have been taken by philosophers—both in recent times 
and over a thousand years ago in India—as supporting evidence for the existence of non-
conceptual mental states, especially understood as conscious perceptual experiences whose 
occurrence is independent of a perceiver's possession of relevant concepts, and whose 
representational content is different in kind from the contents of conceptual thoughts.
In this chapter, I want to challenge the intuitive force that classical and contemporary 
advocates of perceptual non-conceptualism have taken such phenomena to have, by questioning 
some of their underlying presuppositions concerning the relation between language, concepts, 
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and perception. Shedding light on these presuppositions is crucial because, as a negative notion, 
non-conceptual content can only understood against a background understanding of what 
concepts and conceptual content are. I claim that many defenders and opponents of perceptual 
non-conceptualism alike have prematurely restricted the terms of debate by assuming that 
concepts are inextricably linked with language, and that concept possession is bound up with 
exercise of linguistic and higher-order cognitive capacities. Instead, I suggest that an alternative 
theory of concepts which admits the existence of abilities for non-linguistic discrimination and 
categorization would enable us to give a revised account of conceptual content in perception. 
More specifically, I will argue that the conceptual abilities implicated in perceptual 
experience should be construed as capacities for identifying an object through the visual 
predication and classification of that object's properties. I will further claim that the exercise of 
such abilities for perceptual classification need not in every case be verbally mediated. A 
suitably capacious understanding of concepts will thus allow that conceptual abilities do not 
necessarily amount to linguistic abilities, and that perceptual content can be conceptually 
structured independently of being linguistically structured. To ward off the charge that such a 
capacious conceptualism would be unfairly shifting the goalposts of the non-conceptual content 
debate, I follow the lead of several contemporary non-conceptualists in holding that the thesis of 
perceptual non-conceptualism is only viable if non-conceptual content is viewed as being 
essentially different in kind from conceptual content. This gives us a principled way to 
demarcate the logical space between non-conceptualist and conceptualist views, and allows the 
account of perceptual concepts I am proposing to be counted as a legitimate, non-trivial version 
of conceptualism. I do not deny the existence of non-conceptual states as such; however, I will 
2
argue in later chapters that we are not directly aware of perceptual states with non-conceptual 
content in conscious visual experience.
1.1 Setting the Bar for Perceptual Concept Possession
The debate over the existence of non-conceptual content courts the possibility of being 
merely terminological and hence trivial, as the dividing lines between conceptualist and non-
conceptualist positions can shift according to the different theories of concepts and mental 
content that these positions respectively adopt. Take, for instance, the issue of concept 
possession: The criteria used for judging whether a subject possesses the concepts needed to 
articulate the content of some mental state will determine whether that content counts as being 
non-conceptual or conceptual in nature. Adopting too relaxed a standard for concept possession 
will unfairly co-opt non-conceptual content as being conceptual, thus making the 
conceptual/non-conceptual distinction meaningless and the debate between the two camps 
philosophically uninteresting (Smith 2002: 111; Toribio 2007: 449; Roskies 2008: 649). In the 
case of perception, such an overly relaxed standard would hold that a subject possesses a concept
for some property F just if it can perceptually discriminate Fs from non-Fs. So on this relaxed 
account, if a perceiver's representation of a straight line is different than its representation of a 
curved line, then that is all it takes for us to attribute the perceiver with a concept of straightness 
that accounts for its ability to discriminate between the two objects, and to thereby undergo 
perceptual states with different representational contents. However, proponents of non-
conceptualism would claim that, in taking every instance of perceptual sensitivity to different 
objects in the world to require the antecedent possession of relevant concepts, a relaxed standard 
for concept possession has defined the possibility of non-conceptual content out of existence. 
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Instead, they will point to the vast range of instances where non-human animals, as well as non-
adult and adult humans alike, demonstrate the ability to perceptually represent their environment 
in the obvious absence of any higher-order cognitive or linguistic abilities. While the 
rudimentary ability to distinguish Fs from non-Fs may be a necessary condition for possessing a 
concept of F, it is by no means sufficient (Toribio 2008: 353).
1.1.1 Restrictive Views of Concept-Possession: Peacocke and McDowell
In considering whether or not the representational content of perception must be structured 
or specified by concepts possessed by the perceiver, both conceptualists and non-conceptualists 
have typically restricted the attribution of concepts to only those subjects who can rationally 
employ them in inferential/linguistic thought. Christopher Peacocke (1992) has defended the 
existence of non-conceptual content by way of offering a broadly Fregean theory of concepts and
concept possession, according to which the possession of a certain concept entails that a thinker 
grasps what it is for something to be that concept's semantic value, i.e., what it is for a 
propositional thought containing that concept to be true. Peacocke's theory of concepts is broadly
Fregean because it holds that concepts, as semantic constituents of propositional contents, serve 
to determine the semantic value and cognitive significance of those contents.1 The concepts 
contained in a propositional expression capture the manner in which that expression represents 
its referents or extensions. Concept possession, then, allows a thinker to understand what an 
expression is about, and further to form judgments about the expression's truth or falsity. 
1 Of course, Peacocke takes the meaning of the term "concept" to be distinct from Frege's technical usage of 
"concept" (Begriff) (Peacocke 1992: 2). For Frege, concepts are functions that map objects onto truth-values. An 
"unsaturated" predicative expression, such as "___ is a horse," refers to a concept, or an abstract function that, 
when filled with an object-referring term like "Seabiscuit," yields the truth-value True (Frege 1960). Peacocke's 
understanding of concepts, however, draws from Frege's notion of sense (Sinn). Rather than themselves being 
the referents of predicative expressions, concepts instead align with an expression's sense or mode of 
presentation. See Gunther 2003: 6-14 for further discussion of concepts qua Fregean senses.
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Thinkers hence manifest their possession of a concept in their ability to take different 
propositional attitudes to contents containing that concept. The taking of such attitudes stands as 
a rational activity because of the link between concept possession and semantic value. It is in 
grasping a concept's semantic value—i.e., what determines the truth of an expression containing 
that concept—that a thinker's belief-forming practices are guided by normative considerations. In
other words, our mastery of a concept will enable us to recognize the circumstances where we 
have good reasons to adopt one attitude over another. These circumstances which "primitively 
compel" the adoption of certain attitudes can be inferential or perceptual in character. For 
example, a thinker who possesses the logical concept of conjunction would be compelled to 
make an inferential transition from the premises, "Pigeons are birds; Quails are birds" to the 
conclusion, "Pigeons and quails are birds," and would be disposed to make a transition in the 
opposite direction to eliminate the conjunction. As for perception, someone who possesses an 
observational concept would be able to form an appropriate belief based on a perceptual 
presentation of the relevant object. For instance, someone who grasps the concepts man and bald
would take a passing perceptual confrontation with a bald man to provide good reason to believe 
"That man is bald." Were a perceiver to also have a mastery of the concept spy, she would not 
find that her perceptual experience licenses her to believe "That spy is bald" (Ibid.: 126). Of 
course, Peacocke and other non-conceptualists will hold that ultimately one need not possess the 
relevant concepts to experience a perceptual representation of the bald man.
While opponents of non-conceptualism would argue that the formation of beliefs on the 
basis of perceptual experience is possible only if the representational content of perception is 
conceptual in character, they have similarly understood concept possession to entail a capacity 
on the part of a perceiver for appreciating the reasons that justify one's epistemic judgments. 
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John McDowell has argued that perception is part of an overall process of "active empirical 
thinking," whereby a rational agent is obliged to self-consciously reflect on how one's thoughts 
cohere with experience. The concepts which may be passively employed in structuring the 
contents of perceptual states are of a piece with those actively employed in judgments; indeed, 
one would not properly possess a perceptual concept if one did not also have the capacity to use 
that concept in judgments independently of its immediate sensory context. In exercising the 
ability to form judgments and thereby draw the contents of perception out of their sensory 
domain, perceivers evince a background understanding that the contents of perception represent 
states of affairs which can obtain independently of their immanent sensory experience. 
McDowell gives the example of making empirical judgments based on the perception of color: 
"No one could count as making even a directly observational judgment of colour except against a
background sufficient to ensure that she understands colours as potential properties of things…. 
The necessary background understanding includes, for instance, the concept of visible surfaces 
of objects and the concept of suitable conditions for telling what colour something is by looking 
at it" (McDowell 1994: 12). To understand perceptual contents as having normative significance 
within a whole web of concepts and thought-contents is to thus recognize their place in what 
McDowell, following Wilfrid Sellars (1991: 169), calls "the logical space of reasons," where 
relations between beliefs may be formed according to considerations of justification or 
coherence. McDowell additionally holds that the space of reasons maps onto "the space of 
concepts." The only sort of contents eligible for having normative significance are those which 
are conceptually structured, and so the norm-governed activity of rational thought that takes 
place within the space of reasons will thus involve the exercise of one's conceptual capacities. 
Finally, the twin spaces of reasons and concepts are for Sellars and McDowell inseparable from 
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language; as Sellars states, "I wish to emphasize… the denial that there is any awareness of 
logical space prior to, or independent of, the acquisition of a language" (Ibid.: 162). Through the 
acquisition of a language and the initiation into a linguistic community—developments which 
occur in tandem with the acquisition of conceptual capacities—knowers can participate in the 
discursive practices of articulating reasons for their beliefs and evaluating the reasons of others. 
In fact, the ability to express language claims about the world makes possible the appreciation of 
reasons as such; McDowell explains, "It is the ability to say how things are that enables one to 
hold a circumstance with a tendency to influence one’s motivations at arm’s length, so as to be 
able to ask oneself whether it constitutes a reason for doing what it inclines one to do" 
(McDowell 2006).
With a high standard of concept possession being presumed as a starting point for the 
non-conceptual content debate, it is no surprise that the conceptualist position has faced serious 
challenges in accounting for how the content of perceptual experience could be conceptual for 
those perceivers who, due to their evident lack of linguistic and inferential capacities, would fail 
to possess the concepts required for articulating that content. One response by the conceptualist 
may be to reaffirm the necessary involvement of conceptual/linguistic capacities in perceptual 
experience, and thereby accept that non-linguistic perceivers do not have genuinely contentful 
perceptual representations. McDowell has previously taken this tack: Glossing Kant's dictum that
sensory intuitions without concepts are blind, he claims that the perceptual experience of non-
conceptual animals cannot purport to be "an awareness of a feature of objective reality" (Ibid.: 
54). These animals lack the ability to conceive of themselves as being located in an objective 
spatial world wherein objects are perceived in relation to, but as still existing independently of, 
one's egocentric perspective. Without the ability to self-consciously conceive of the relation 
between perception and reality in this way, perceivers would fail to have an "'outer experience' of
features of their environment" in a strict sense; their experience would be unable to disclose 
things in the world as being "thus and so," and hence would not rationally support judgments 
about the world's being thus and so (Ibid.: 50). 
1.1.2   Noë’s “Vacuous” Conceptualism  
However, there can be alternative brands of conceptualism which, while still taking the 
possession of conceptual capacities to be a necessary condition for having perceptual experience,
take issue with the overly restrictive understanding of concepts being presumed by conceptualists
and non-conceptualists alike. For instance, Alva Noë has criticized the tendency on both sides of 
the non-conceptual content debate to "overintellectualize" the prospect of conceptual 
involvement in perceptual experience. To be sure, Noë is advocating for a kind of conceptualism 
because he also takes perception to entail an understanding of how our experience presents the 
world as being, such that one must in some sense have concepts for the features and states of 
affairs that are presented (Noë 2004: 181). Yet, he moves away from the view that the concepts 
involved in perceptual understanding are of the sort found in self-conscious judgments about the 
content of experience, and whose possession requires an explicit grasp of their semantic value 
and rational relations to other concepts. Although non-human animals may apparently lack the 
kinds of linguistically mediated conceptual and inferential capacities required by McDowell for 
having contentful perceptual experience, it does not follow that such perceivers do not exercise 
any concepts at all. By abandoning a "much too exalted conception of our own conceptual 
skills," we can come to recognize that conceptuality is a matter of degree. On the lower end of 
the spectrum, we may still find perceiving and thinking creatures who, through their own form of
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practical rationality and intentional behaviors, display at least a situational awareness of the 
normative constraints being placed upon them by their experience of the world (Ibid.: 187). 
Identifying the sources of our misguided reluctance to attribute non-human animals and 
infants with the possession of conceptual and inferential skills, Noë points to the flawed notion 
that concept possession must require a thinker to know the criteria which govern and justify a 
concept's application; in fact, we often correctly apply concepts in judgment without being able 
to articulate our reasons for doing so. Additionally, philosophers have taken an overly simplified 
view of what it is in the first place to make use of a concept in thought and experience, assuming 
that concept application must take the form of an "explicit deliberative judgment" (Ibid.: 186). 
Perceptual experience is not akin to judgment or belief, a fact illustrated by the persistence of 
certain perceptual illusions in spite of our knowing them to be illusions. Nonetheless, there are 
more fundamental conceptual capacities which enter into experience not through being applied in
a judgment, but through serving as preconditions for having experience in the first place. The 
most basic of these capacities, according to Noë's "enactive" approach to perception, are the 
sensorimotor skills upon which our ability to perceive the world crucially depends. On this 
account, perceptual experience acquires content due to the perceiver's skillful bodily engagement
with its environment, and its implicit practical knowledge of how bodily movement gives rise to 
changes in sensory stimulation. To cite just one example, Noë argues that the perceptual 
experience of shape depends on our implicit grasp of how the perceived shape varies as our 
perspective on an object varies; this grasp, he claims, constitutes "our grasp of what it is for 
something to be presented as cubical, or spherical", and thereby demonstrates our rudimentary 
possession of the observational concept cube or sphere (Ibid.: 198). Thus, having more broadly 
construed concepts as a range of practical skills brought to bear in understanding how experience
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presents the world, Noë suggests that sensorimotor skills are themselves a kind of simple 
concept, in which case all perceptual experience would depend on at least a primitive form of 
conceptual understanding (Ibid.: 184). As the most fundamental sort of observational concept, 
sensorimotor skills form the basis of our ability to perceptually represent objects and their 
properties as being given in a certain way, thus granting our experience with world-directed 
intentional content. Just as we would not have a visual experience "as of" an anteater if we did 
not to some degree understand the concept anteater, we would also not have a visual experience 
"as of" the world were we to lack the simple concepts involved in sensorimotor understanding 
(Ibid.: 184, 187).
But Noë's revisionary conceptualism has invited the charge by non-conceptualists like 
Robert Hannah and Monima Chadha that it can only offer a "vacuous" theory of concepts. They 
consider a theory of concepts to be vacuous if it identifies all mental content with conceptual 
content by resorting to the following sort of argument:
1) All mental content is normative and rule-governed.
2) Only conceptual representations can be normative and rule-governed.
3) Therefore all mental content must be conceptual, and nothing will ever count as real 
mental content unless it is conceptual. (Hanna & Chadha 2011: 205).
Hanna and Chadha's main complaint against the vacuous theory of concepts is that it rules out 
the possibility of non-conceptual mental content from the outset, making a genuine debate 
between non-conceptualists and conceptualists impossible (Ibid.: 206). If we ought to preserve a 
legitimate distinction between non-conceptual and conceptual content, we should then recognize 
that the sort of sensorimotor knowledge which Noë posits as being the root source of our 
contentful perceptual experience is instead "inherently pre-reflective, non-propositional, non-
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epistemic, and situated—in a word, essentially non-conceptual" (Ibid.: 207). For Hanna and 
Chadha, such characteristics capture the way in which the semantic structure and psychological 
function of essentially non-conceptual content is necessarily distinct from the structure and 
function of conceptual content (Ibid.: 188). But by taking sensorimotor knowledge to be 
conceptual in character, Noë commits himself to a vacuous form of conceptualism, which Hanna 
and Chadha find especially ironic in light of his own insistence that sensorimotor knowledge 
cannot be analyzed in propositional terms (Noë 2004: ch. 3). While Noë has in places 
acknowledged the existence of mental representations that are purely non-conceptual (e.g., Noë 
1999: 262), he nonetheless denies that such representations have intentional content. Because 
intentional content for Noë involves a conscious experience "as of" an object, or of an object as 
seeming to be a certain way, he claims that experience can only present things as being a certain 
way if one possesses the concepts relevant for appreciating what that way is. Hence, we are able 
to have conscious perceptual experience of objects and properties in the world because our 
experiences is linked to conceptual capacities for judgment and discrimination; as he explains, 
"Experiences are not takings or judgments, but they are internally related to takings and 
judgments, and it is incoherent to suppose that there could be experiencers who could not grasp 
thoughts about how they experience things as being" (Ibid.: 259). Of course, Noë further lowers 
the threshold for what counts as grasping a thought about experience by viewing sensorimotor 
skills to be conceptual capacities, the exercise of which through our bodily engagement with the 
environment itself stands as a kind of thoughtful activity (2004: 205). Thus, Noë's understanding 
of intentionality puts him at odds with non-conceptualists, who would take his denial of non-
conceptual representations as having intentional content to be an outright denial of the possibility
of non-conceptual representations. All mental states, non-conceptual or otherwise, have 
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representational content insofar as that content is intentional and object-directed. Because Noë 
unduly restricts intentional content to experiences for which one is able to entertain thoughts 
about its content, his vacuous conceptualism prematurely rules out the core thesis of non-
conceptualism, i.e., there is "representational content [that] is neither solely nor wholly 
determined by a conscious animal's conceptual capacities, and that at least some contents are 
both solely and wholly determined by its non-conceptual capacities" (Hanna and Chadha 2011: 
185).
Still, we can continue to revise the conceptualist position in a way that retains some of 
the core insights of Noë's model, without thereby upholding a vacuous theory of concepts that 
would trivialize the non-conceptual/conceptual distinction. The conceptualist account I propose 
is one which construes the concepts implicated in visual experience as perceptual categories that 
are individuated by a perceiver's capacities for identifying an object through the visual 
classification and predication of the object's properties. Affirming with Noë that concept 
possession is a matter of degree, I also claim that the application of perceptual concepts in 
experience need not involve an explicit deliberative judgment reflectively formed by a perceiver 
in self-conscious appreciation of a concept's semantic value. Despite lacking the ability to 
articulate how concepts figure into content of one's experience, or to explicitly draw that content 
into inference, a perceiver might still demonstrate the possession of certain concepts through its 
flexible behavioral responses to the environment. These responses can begin to suggest the way 
in which a perceiver experiences an object as being, since the appropriateness of the perceiver's 
response will depend on how it has classified that object as belonging to a category of things 
which ought to solicit such a response, with the identification of that object's category 
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membership itself depending on which properties have been attributed to the object by the 
perceiver. 
Therefore, I suggest that in order to capture the manner in which conscious visual 
experience presents objects to perceivers, we should acknowledge that concepts are involved in 
granting the representational content of visual experience with a propositional, predicative, 
object-property structure. Concepts may be employed in structuring conscious perceptual content
without the perceiver's explicit awareness or control; as I will argue, by the time an object enters 
into the stream of perceptual awareness such that one could consciously judge, "That object is 
F," the visual system has already carried out a conceptually modulated process of object 
identification and classification. With regards to non-conceptual content, I depart from Noë's 
account by accepting that there can be perceptual content which is both non-conceptual and 
intentionally object-directed, thereby avoiding a vacuous form of conceptualism. However, 
another central thesis of my account is that perceptual states with non-conceptual, pre-
predicative content are found only in the subpersonal and preconscious stages of visual 
processing, and hence cannot be directly accessed in conscious visual experience. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I will further explicate how perceptual states can have conceptual 
content that is propositional in structure without a perceiver necessarily having linguistic mastery
over the concepts involved in structuring that content. In subsequent chapters, I examine how the
conceptual structure of certain perceptual contents is related to their presence in conscious visual 
experience. 
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1.2 Non-Conceptual Contents: Scenarios and Protopropositions
Now, it might appear as though the form of conceptualism I am proposing would still 
render the non-conceptual/conceptual distinction merely terminological, since there is an 
apparent overlap between the propositional perceptual content that I claim is conceptually 
structured even in the absence of a perceiver's linguistic/inferential mastery over the relevant 
concepts, and the "protopropositional" content that Peacocke counts as non-conceptual precisely 
because it can be represented by a perceptual state in the absence of the linguistic/inferential 
mastery that he takes to constitute possession of a concept. Peacocke explains that a 
protoproposition contains objects, properties, and relations themselves, whereas a proposition 
contains concepts of those entities. An experiential state has protopropositional content when it 
"represents the property or relation in the protoproposition as holding of the individual or 
individuals it also contains" (1992: 77). Thus, representations of protopropositions are non-
conceptual, as the representation's content is fixed by the objects themselves and not by the 
concepts that one would need to possess in order to entertain a propositional thought about those 
objects. 
Protopropositional content is thought by Peacocke to supplement a more fundamental 
layer of non-conceptual content known as "scenario content." Briefly, a perceptual representation
with scenario content maps out a visual scene through specifying the location of sensory features
at minimally discriminable points in perceptual space. With the origin and axes of the map being 
fixed in spatial relation to the perceiver's body rather than to objects in the real world, this 
perspective-dependent visual scenario is filled out by determining at each point the presence of 
rudimentary sensory features such as texture, hue, saturation, brightness, degree of solidity, 
orientation, and motion. Peacocke refers to the way in which a scenario fills out the space around
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the perceiver as a "spatial type" that can be instantiated by the world itself, in which case a 
representation with scenario content is correct when the scenario's way of spatially locating 
sensory features in a visual scene maps onto how those features are actually located in the space 
around the perceiver. Scenario content is also non-conceptual because its point-by-point 
specification of features like color and shape is not constrained by the concepts that a perceiver 
possesses, nor are concepts constituents of this sort of representational content. Accordingly, 
Peacocke's notion of scenario content lends support to the central non-conceptualist argument 
from "fineness of grain," an argument first expressed in recent times by Gareth Evans, though 
anticipated in spirit centuries earlier by the Indian Buddhist logicians Dignāga (6th cent.) and 
Dharmakīrti (7th cent.).2 To Evans's question, "Do we really understand the proposal that we 
have as many colour concepts as there are shades of colour which we can sensibly discriminate?"
(1982: 229), the non-conceptualist answer is negative—perception can discriminate sensory 
features at a level of fine-grained detail that outstrips a perceiver's capacity to fully conceptualize
that detail, in which case perceptual states have non-conceptual content.
But Peacocke posits the existence of protopropositional content because scenario content 
alone cannot account for certain elements of perceptual experience, such as our experience of 
Gestalt shifts. It is possible for two perceivers to share the same scenario content-based spatial 
map of sensory features, and still perceive the same object differently; not only that, it is possible
for a single perceiver to perceptually experience the same visual scenario as switching between 
the presentation of different objects. Peacocke cites Mach's well-known example of a figure that 
can be seen either as a diamond or as a tilted square (fig. 1.1):
2 I will examine the Buddhists' formulation of the fineness of grain argument in chapter four.
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  Fig. 1.1 - Mach's (1957) square/diamond
We can experience the figure differently as being a diamond or a square even though, at the level
of scenario content, the spatial configuration of sensory features remains constant. Peacocke 
therefore claims that the difference between the two ways of experiencing the figure must arise 
at the level of protopropositional content, where objects, properties, and relations themselves are 
represented. Specifically, the difference between the square-type and diamond-type experiences 
owes to a difference in the properties of shape and relations of symmetry that they respectively 
represent: we experience the figure as a diamond when we perceive the figure as symmetrical 
about the bisector of its angles, whereas we experience the figure as a square when we perceive 
the figure as symmetrical about the bisector of its sides. While being distinct from scenario 
content, protopropositional content is again non-conceptual because it represents properties like 
square, and relations like symmetrical about, without requiring that a perceiver have mastery 
over the concepts of squareness or symmetry. Rather, there is a converse dependence of concept 
possession on non-conceptual content, in that our protopropositional experiences of the 
straightness of a square's lines, the rightness of its angles, etc., are what give us good reasons to 
apply the observational concept in forming the judgment, "That's a square." A protopropositional
content's correct representation of a square will thus ensure that the object of conceptual thought 
will actually be a square (1992: 74-80).
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1.2.1 The Incoherence of State Non-Conceptualism
I will address the apparent overlap between non-conceptual protopropositional content 
and what I claim is conceptually/propositionally structured perceptual content, and thereby dispel
the threat of triviality looming over the non-conceptualist/conceptualist debate, by first 
examining how clarification of the debate has revealed two possible interpretations of the non-
conceptualist's thesis. According to Richard Heck, the claim that perception is non-conceptual 
may be viewed as pertaining to either the content of perception or the relation that perceptual 
states bear to a perceiving subject. The “content view” asserts that perception is non-conceptual 
because the representational content of perception is different in kind from the content of 
conceptual states like beliefs and judgments. On the other hand, the “state view” holds that a 
perceptual state is non-conceptual when a perceiver stands in a concept-independent relation to it
due to not possessing the concepts that would characterize its content. As a result, the state view 
does not admit that there is an essential difference between the content of perception and 
conceptual thought—it is possible to have a concept-independent or concept-dependent relation 
to the same mental content. Of interest here are the claims by certain non-conceptualists that 
state non-conceptualism is not a viable option for defending the existence of non-conceptual 
content. Even as he is laying out the distinction, Heck voices his suspicion that the state view is 
"indefensible—even incoherent, if coupled with the claim that the contents of beliefs are 
conceptual" (2000: 486 fn. 6). 
Validating Heck's suspicion, José Luis Bermúdez illustrates how an incoherence arises 
particularly when the content shared by non-conceptual and conceptual states is characterized in 
Fregean terms, that is, as a complex of concepts toward which we can take various propositional 
attitudes in light of our possessing those concepts. It makes sense to attribute subjects with a 
17
belief on the assumption that they possess the relevant concepts—for instance, we would think 
that someone could legitimately hold the belief "The piano is out of tune" only if they had some 
notion of what a piano is and what it would mean for it to be out of tune. If we especially admit 
that concept possession is a matter of degree, then we can understand how, through the exercise 
of their respective conceptual capacities, the same belief could have a different cognitive 
significance for a novice piano student and an expert piano tuner. The concepts possessed by a 
thinker serve to mediate the relation that the thinker has to the propositional content of their 
belief, a relation which conditions how the thinker represents the world as being. However, if the
representational content of perception is also understood in a Fregean manner, then the state 
view of non-conceptualism would be committed to saying that a perceiver, who does not possess 
any of the concepts which are contained in the content of a perceptual representation, thereby 
stands in a "concept-independent" relation to a complex of concepts. For Bermúdez, such a view 
"makes the idea that perception is a relation to a complex of concepts becomes [sic] completely 
mysterious" (2007: 67). Put another way to sharpen the incoherence, if we understand concepts 
as cognitive abilities that are employed whenever a subject entertains some mental content that 
contains those concepts, then Fregean state non-conceptualism would entail that a perceiver, in 
entertaining the content of a non-conceptual state, would have to exercise cognitive abilities 
which it does not possess (Toribio 2008: 360). This incoherence facing the Fregean account can 
only be removed by admitting that a subject's concept-independent or concept-dependent relation
to some mental state is indicative of a difference in the kind of content that state has, in which 
case state non-conceptualism would actually entail content non-conceptualism (Ibid.).
Additional problems face the state view if we instead take the shared content of 
perception and thought to be Russellian propositions, which are structured out of worldly 
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objects, properties, and relations themselves. On a Russellian account, propositions have "coarse-
grained" content, in that two mental states could not represent the same objects, properties, and 
relations arranged under the same sort of structure, and still differ in content. Russellian content 
hence stands opposed to Fregean content which is individuated in a "fine-grained" manner, that 
is, with respect to the modes or guises under which they present objects, properties, and 
relations.3 However, some non-conceptualists have argued that framing the shared content of 
perception and belief in Russellian terms prevents us from recognizing any essential respect in 
which non-conceptual content differs from conceptual content, in which case the collapse of the 
non-conceptual/conceptual debate into triviality seems inevitable. Even if we cache out 
perceptual content as a complex Russellian proposition comprised of many objects, properties, 
and relations, such a content could still be captured by a thought with a similarly complex 
content, so that there would be no difference in kind between the two contents (Speaks 2005: 
365-6; Toribio 2008: 354-5). Michael Tye has defended a Russellian account of perceptual 
content as a form of content non-conceptualism, since he distinguishes the coarse-grained non-
conceptual content of perception from the fine-grained conceptual content of thought. Still, he 
admits that the fineness of grain (meant here in the sense of its determinacy of detail) found in 
visual experience could still be presented conceptually in demonstrative judgments based on that 
experience (2006: 525 fn. 17). Hanna and Chadha worry that such an admission "gives the game 
away" for the Tye's account as a form of content non-conceptualism—"For Tye," they explain, 
"has thereby explicitly admitted that his robustly non-conceptual content could still be 
conceptually presented. This means that any robustly non-conceptual content could also be a 
3 It should be pointed out that this sort of fineness of grain relative to whether or not a content is individuated by 
Fregean senses is to be distinguished from the fineness of grain purportedly characterizing the representational 
content of perception, which discriminates the world at a level of detail far surpassing our conceptual abilities. 
Tye wants to argue that non-conceptual content is coarse-grained in the former sense of grain and fine-grained in
the latter sense; see Tye 2006: 519-20.
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proper part of the content of a whole mental act or state that also contain [sic] a set of 
corresponding Fregean senses for specifying just those Russellian contents" (2009: 195). 
A deeper criticism of the Russellian approach to content is that it cannot adequately 
capture how the content attributed to some mental state should reflect how that subject grasps the
world as being.4 Josefa Toribio explains, "If content attribution did not reflect the way the subject
grasps the world as being, and if how the subject thus grasps the world were not connected to the
subject's discriminative abilities, content attribution couldn't explain the subject's intentional 
behavior," which would ultimately lead to the explanatory uselessness of representational 
content itself (2008: 353). Fregean content, with its distinction between sense and reference, is 
more straightforwardly sensitive to the way a subject grasps the world as being—even though a 
is actually identical to b, a subject might not realize that identity because its thought of a could 
have a different sense than its thought of b. On the other hand, the presentational aspects of 
objects that are captured by Frege's notion of sense would not be included within coarse-grained 
representational content, since a Russellian proposition only includes objects, properties, and 
relations themselves. We would then be hard-pressed to explain how two subjects could perceive
the same object and still form different perceptual beliefs by just citing the Russellian content of 
perception alone. 
1.2.2 Protopropositional Content is Non-Essentially Non-Conceptual
Peacocke's characterization of protopropositional content seems to avoid the problems 
facing the Fregean- and Russellian-based state views of non-conceptual content. Being 
4 The same criticism is applicable to those who would apply a possible worlds semantics to perceptual content; as 
Bermúdez puts it, “The notion of perceptual content is supposed to reflect how the distal environment 
perceptually appears to the perceiving subject. But what could it possibly mean to say that the distal environment
perceptually appears as a set of possible worlds?” (2007: 67).
20
constituted by objects, properties, and relations themselves, rather than by concepts of those 
objects, protopropositional content differs in kind from conceptual content, and therefore avoids 
the dilemma of entailing a concept-independent relation to conceptual content. Nonetheless, 
Peacocke does not consider protopropositional content to be purely coarse-grained. 
Protopropositional content is also able to capture the particular way in which a perceiver 
represents the world, because included within the content are also non-conceptual modes of 
presentation or "manners of perception" (1989: 303). Peacocke explains, "We will not do justice 
to the fine-grained phenomenology of experience if we restrict ourselves to those contents which 
can be built up by referring to the properties and relations which the perceived objects are 
represented by the experiences as possessing. We must, in describing the fine-grained 
phenomenology, make use of the notion of the way in which some property or relation is given in
the experience" (2000: 240). The perception of ambiguous figures like Mach's square/diamond 
helps illustrate for Peacocke the difference between the way in which a property like shape is 
perceived and the way an object is actually shaped; in the case if Mach's figure, the square and 
diamond have the same way of being shaped, i.e., of occupying space, and yet there can be two 
phenomenally distinct perceptual experiences of the same shape. Introducing a non-
conceptual/visual mode of presentation into protopropositional content serves to capture the 
distinct ways in which the same sets of objects, properties, and relations can be perceived. These 
modes or manners of perceptual presentation are analogous to the Fregean senses found in 
conceptual content, but they are considered by Peacocke to be distinct—and hence non-
conceptual in nature—because they don't abide by Frege's criterion for distinguishing senses. In 
brief, two senses have a different cognitive significance if a thinker who understands both can 
still doubt that they refer to an identical thing. Peacocke (1989: 307) illustrates the difference 
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between manners of perception and Fregean senses with the following intuitive example: You 
look at both a line and a bar on a wallpaper pattern, and they appear to have the same length; 
accordingly, the line and bar are, with respect to length, perceived in exactly the same "manner." 
Yet, you could nonetheless suspect that the line and bar are not actually the same length—
perhaps you think that you might notice a few moments later that something else in the wallpaper
appears to be the same length as the bar but not the line—and so you form the perceptually 
demonstrative judgment, "This line's length is not actually the same as that bar's length." Now, if 
manners of perception were equivalent to the modes of presentation found in conceptual 
judgments, then the judgment of suspicion would not be possible, since according to Frege's 
criterion, if one could doubt that the length of the line is identical to the length of the bar, then 
the respective modes of presentation for the two lengths must not be identical. But, the two 
lengths are perceived as being identical, so their modes of perceptual presentation must be 
different than those modes which are contained in the content of the demonstrative judgment 
(Ibid.: 357).
However, I would suggest that protopropositional content also succumbs to the sorts of 
difficulties facing the different state views of non-conceptual content, such that it ultimately 
should not be accepted by the content non-conceptualist. Hanna and Chadha's rejection of 
Russellian content as essentially non-conceptual would seem to extend a fortiori to 
protopropositional content: if Russellian content cannot be essentially non-conceptual because it 
could be captured by a conceptual state whose content also contains a corresponding Fregean 
modes of presentation, then protopropositional content should be similarly disqualified, since its 
quasi-Fregean manners of perception should be even more amenable to being specified in 
conceptual thought. Indeed, Peacocke's example of judging the line and bar to be different than 
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how they are perceptually presented does not overturn the many instances in which a perceptual 
demonstrative judgment captures and accords with the way in which objects are perceived. 
Furthermore, the example itself does not conclusively show that manners of perception must be 
distinct from the modes of presentation found in perceptual demonstrative judgments. When 
faced with the clear perceptual appearance of the two objects as being equal in length, one's 
judgment that the line and bar are not the same length would reflect some other reason for 
suspicion that is found outside one's perceptual experience. The judgment of suspicion would not
then be a genuinely perceptual judgment, and so the example would not actually illustrate that 
manners of perception are different than the modes of presentation found in genuinely perceptual
judgments (Fernández Prat 2002: ch. 6.4). At best, it could show that perceptual modes of 
presentation are different than non-perceptual modes of presentation, which only serves the non-
conceptualist's point on the prior assumption that conceptual contents are non-perceptual, an 
assumption which is precisely at dispute for conceptualists. 
Moreover, it is questionable whether, when applied to protopropositional content, 
Peacocke's account of perceptual manners of presentation adequately captures the 
subjective/phenomenal aspect under which an object and its properties are grasped by a 
perceiver. Although Peacocke holds that the properties of an object and the way those properties 
are perceived are distinct constituents of protopropositional content, his explanation of why we 
perceive Mach's figure as a square or as a diamond ends up just citing an objective feature of the 
figure, namely its symmetry about its bisectors or angles, as the reason for why we perceive one 
shape or another. But, since the symmetry relation is an objective feature of the figure, we would
need to find another way of accounting for the manner in which that symmetry is perceived. If 
Peacocke would again cite an objective feature of the figure to explain why the symmetry is 
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presented as being about the bisectors of the shape's sides, such as the way in which the 
symmetry of the figure's bisectors is presented as being rotated in a certain direction, then yet 
another property of the object would need to be introduced to explain the way in which that 
rotation is perceived, and so on. Thus, if the manners of perception present in protopropositional 
content are only cached out in terms of the objective features of an object, then there would be an
infinite regress of ways in which those features are perceived (Jacob 2012: 57-58). Peacocke 
won't be able to stop the regress by claiming that the modes of presentation needed for the 
objective features can be somehow sourced from scenario content—protopropositional content is
introduced precisely because scenario content alone cannot determine our experience of the 
square/diamond figure as presenting one shape or another. Yet, completely excising modes of 
perceptual presentation from protopropositional content would raise for Peacocke's account the 
same difficulties that were posed by content non-nonconceptualists for Tye's Russellian view—
not only would protopropositional content fail to be sufficiently different in kind from 
conceptual content, but it would also fail as an account of representational content, since it would
not capture the distinct way in which a perceiver grasps the world as being.
1.3 The Propositional Structure of Perceptual Content
Given the inability of protopropositional content, along with the various forms of non-
conceptual content posited by state views in general, to be characterized as essentially non-
conceptual, we might instead frame the difference between conceptual and non-conceptual states
in terms of the propositional/predicative or non-propositional/pre-predicative nature of their 
respective contents. The non-propositional character of non-conceptual content has been cited as 
capturing several of the ways in which perceptual content differs in kind from the content of 
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thought. For instance, the content of perceptual states lacks the requisite propositional structure 
needed to satisfy the Generality Constraint posited by Evans (1982) as a necessary condition for 
any mental state to count as having conceptual content. According to Evans, 
conceptual/propositional thought possesses a compositional structure that allows a subject to 
understand new thoughts by recombining the components of previously understood thoughts. So,
for example, if on the basis of understanding the thoughts, "The chair is brown" and, "The floor 
is white," a subject is also able to understand what it means to think, "The chair is white," and, 
"The floor is brown," then we can consider the subject to possess the concepts chair, brown, 
floor, and white that enable it to entertain these thoughts and comprehend their contents. 
Perceptual content, however, purportedly lacks such a compositional structure, and so 
cannot be considered to be conceptual. Instead, perceptual content has been taken by non-
conceptualists to be iconic and imagistic, rather than propositional, in nature. As with pictorial 
representations like maps or photographs, perceptual representations are not decomposable into 
semantically significant constituents in the way that propositions are (Fodor 2007, Heck 2007). 
In other words, whereas the thought "I see the yellow square" must be "canonically" decomposed
into the semantically central constituents "I," "see," "yellow," and "square," the actual perceptual 
image of the yellow square has no canonical method of decomposition. While there is only one 
correct way to subdivide the semantic parts of the sentence "I see the yellow square"—the 
meaning would not be recoverable if one thought "see the" was a proper semantic unit of the 
sentence—there is no incorrect way to subdivide the parts of a perceptual image (Laurence & 
Margolis 2008: 302). Instead, there are an indefinite number of ways in which an image could be
decomposed into component parts, because iconic content is holistic. Being a mere spatial array 
of sensory qualities, there is no way to "carve up" or individuate parts of the array according to 
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whether they are semantically more significant or not. Unlike in the sentence, "I see the yellow 
square," where "square" is a more semantically central part the sentence's content than "the," the 
parts of the square-image are all equally images of the square-parts—no part of the image is any 
more central in determining the representation's image-content. The yellow square could be 
decomposed into two adjoining images of yellow rectangles, or could be further decomposed 
into a grid of minimally discriminable points/pixels of yellow. The image itself, however, does 
not require that it be understood as being representation as of a yellow square, or as of two 
adjacent yellow rectangles, etc.—such a "representation as" would only arise through a concept-
guided interpretation of the image.
I would argue, on the other hand, that the characterization of perceptual content as 
imagistic or pictorial is not adequate, and that the structure of conscious perceptual 
representations is ultimately propositional—and hence conceptual—in nature. Now, there is an 
obvious sense in which perceptual content fails to satisfy the Generality Constraint. Part of the 
upshot of a conceptual content's compositional structure is that it enables a thinker to form new 
thoughts by recombining the content's constituent elements in an indefinite number of ways with 
other relevant concepts in its possession. This indefinite recombinability of thought contents 
mirrors the generative capacity of language, in which grammatical sentences can be decomposed 
and recombined to produce an infinite number of novel grammatical sentences (Fodor & 
Pylyshyn 1988: 34; Bermúdez 1998: 92). Perceptual content, on the other hand, is not considered
to be indefinitely generative, given that it lacks the sorts of syntactic and semantic features which
bestow conceptual content with a language-like combinatory structure. In addition, perception 
lacks the abstractness and context-independence that facilitate the theoretically unbounded 
recombinative capacities of thought and language. Nonetheless, to grant that perceptual 
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representations are non-linguistic is not to accept that they have no compositional structure at all.
Though lacking the unbounded productivity of thought sufficient for fulfilling the Generality 
Constraint, perception still satisfies a necessary condition of the Constraint by sharing with 
thought and language the feature of systematicity, or the ability to entertain semantically related 
representations through the reordering of their constituent elements.5 Jerry Fodor and Zenon 
Pylyshyn illustrate systematicity in the case of thought and language: "What does it mean to say 
that thought is systematic? Well, just as you don't find people who can understand the sentence 
'John loves the girl' but not the sentence 'the girl loves John,' so too you don't find people who 
can think the thought that John loves the girl but can't think the thought that the girl loves John" 
(1988: 39). 
Yet, as Michela Tacca suggests, we can find similar demonstrations of systematicity within
perception as well; for instance, the ability to see a red vertical bar to the left of a green 
horizontal line entails the ability to see a green vertical bar to the left of a red horizontal line 
(2011: 6). (Mohan Matthen (2005a: 80) points out that the same sort of entailment should also be
evident when we try to mentally reproduce such visual scenes in imagination.) Both of these 
perceptual representations share the same basic sensory features but differ according to how 
those features are conjoined, which thus suggests, contra the pictorial model, that perceptual 
content is compositional in structure. The pictorial account of perception would deny that 
perceptual content is systematic because, in having a holistic character and failing to have any 
canonical decomposition, visual representations seem to lack a structure that is constituted by 
primitive elements. Tacca, however, points to empirical accounts of perceptual processing which
have shown how visual representations of objects are in fact constructed through the binding 
5 It is worth noting that Hanna and Chadha do not ultimately accept the failure to satisfy the Generality Constraint 
as being a sufficient condition for a content’s being essentially non-conceptual; see Hanna & Chadha 2011: 193-
5.
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together of primitive sensory features that are separately specified by corresponding patterns of 
neuronal activation (2011: 3-7).6 Just as the constituents of sentences or thoughts remain the 
same as they are syntactically reorganized, the sensory constituents of visual representations 
remain the same even as they are spatially reorganized—in the example above, the same sense 
feature red, with its attendant pattern of neuronal activation, is present in both visual scenes 
while being placed at different locations in each scene (Ibid.: 8). What's more, this process of 
feature binding grants visual representations with a predicative structure that amounts to more 
than the mere conjunction of sensory elements. Take the previous example of seeing a red bar 
next to a green line versus seeing a green bar next to a red line: if the visual system just detected 
the joint occurrence of the features green, red, line, and bar, it would be unable to distinguish 
between these two different scenes. For these scenes to be perceived differently, then, sensory 
features must be tied to their respective bearers, which is to say that they must be attributed 
(veridically or non-veridically) to objects. We can thereby consider perceptual content as akin to 
other sorts of propositional contents in being composed of both referential and descriptive 
elements; the former are involved in directly picking out an object, while the latter serve to 
classify that object by identifying the features it possesses (Matthen 2005a: 78). Thus, by virtue 
of its systematic recombinability and predicative structure, perceptual content evinces a type of 
compositionality that is analogous to the content of thought and language. This commonality in 
structure between perceptual and higher-order cognitive content may ultimately make it easier to 
6 We should clarify that the sort of visual representation that involves feature integration occurs at an intermediate 
stage in the perceptual process, intermediate in the sense that it follows after an early stage of vision where the 
presence of sensory features are separately registered, and precedes a later stage of visual object identification 
and recognition. Perceivers have conscious awareness only of representations formed at the intermediate and late
stages of vision. Hence, the kind of perceptual content I defend as being compositional is the kind that is found 
in conscious visual experience. Scientific accounts of these stages of visual processing, and their relation to 
visual phenomenology, will be discussed in chapter four. 
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understand how representational contents can be shared or communicated between the brain's 
perceptual and cognitive systems (Tacca 2011: 9).
1.4 Perceptual Concept Possession
The propositional nature of perceptual content invites a further comparison with higher-
order cognitive content, in that entertaining both forms of propositional content requires grasping
the concepts which constitute the proposition. In the case of visual perception, those concepts 
stand as the variety of low-level and high-level perceptual categories involved in detecting the 
presence of an object's features through encoding perceived stimuli as belonging to a certain 
type. This view of perceptual concepts aligns with what Matthen terms the "Sensory 
Classification Perspective," understood as the conjunction of two major theses defended at length
in his work (see Matthen 2005a, 2005b). First, sensory systems operate by sorting and assigning 
perceived external objects according to classes (the "Sensory Classification Thesis"). Second, the
conscious phenomenal appearance of a sensory feature serves to indicate how a sensory system 
has classified a stimulus as falling under a certain category (the "Sensory Signaling Thesis")—as 
Matthen explains, "A thing looks blue because once the sensory system has assigned it to that 
colour-class, it signals that it has done so by tagging it with a blue 'look'" (2008: 392-3). Within 
this perspective on perceptual content, the sensory features which figure in the phenomenal 
appearance of a perceptual representation are considered to be concepts that are fundamentally 
similar to the concepts found in the propositional content of sentences. As Matthen writes, "Like 
the concepts that we use in linguistic communication, sense-features have extension. Blue is 
repeatable; more than one thing can visually seem to be blue; more than one thing can seem 
visually to be any given shade of blue" (2005a: 80). 
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Of course, though sensory concepts resemble linguistic concepts in the way they figure as
constituents of compositional/propositional content, perceptual content is not identical with 
linguistic content. Likewise, the criteria for possessing perceptual concepts will both parallel and
diverge from the possession conditions of linguistic concepts. Matthen suggests that a perceiver 
could be said to visually grasp a sensory feature if its response to that feature can be subjected to 
operant conditioning, whereby a perceiver learns to respond to stimuli in a new way through 
positive or negative reinforcement. In the case of primitive representational systems like 
thermostats or bacteria, their rigid responses to stimuli cannot be altered by operant conditioning,
so that attributing these systems with a grasp of the concepts constituting their representational 
contents would be superfluous for explaining their rudimentary behavior. Matthen gives an 
example of what a test of perceptual grasp might look like: "Suppose that some creature – a 
butterfly, say – is rewarded with sugar-water when it tastes from a yellow dish, but not when it 
tastes from a blue dish (which contains unflavored water). Suppose that as a consequence it 
comes to try out yellow dishes in preference to blue dishes. Then scientists are inclined to say 
that it senses the difference between yellow and blue. They do not draw this conclusion when a 
creature simply responds differentially to these colours, but only in ways that cannot be modified
by operant conditioning" (2005b). We might further suppose that the butterfly would still prefer 
to try out the water in yellow dishes even if it is now served in dishes of shapes and sizes 
different from the original. Hence, in developing this sort of novel and flexible behavioral 
response to perceived stimuli, the butterfly not only demonstrates that it extracts the class or 
feature yellow out of visually available information, but also that it retains a memory-trace of the 
feature which modifies its responses to subsequently encountered yellow things (Ibid.).
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Matthen's account of perceptual grasp in terms of the identification and retention of 
sensory features tallies well with the account of perceptual concepts proposed by Albert Newen 
and Andreas Bartels. Responding to the disparate and largely skeptical literature on whether 
animal minds possess concepts, they offer necessary and sufficient conditions for the attribution 
of concepts to animals who display a minimal level of behavioral complexity. They write, 
"Conceptual representation systems must have at least three features: (1) the capacity to identify 
and reidentify objects and properties, (2) the (relative) independence of stimuli, and (3) the fact 
that an adequate level of abstraction is involved in the classification (a classification that is not 
only based on the simple stimulus generalization, which is characteristic of nonconceptual 
representations, but involves class formation). This is implies the existence of minimal semantic 
nets" (2007: 295). To explain each feature in turn: Concepts enable the identification and re-
identification of objects through the classification of them as having a certain property. Two 
conditions need to hold if a perceiver is to identify an object under the certain concept, such as 
red: first, a perceiver must be able to represent the same property of redness across different 
instantiations of red, and second, a perceiver must represent an object as having properties other 
than redness. If the former condition is not satisfied and the perceiver can only recognize the 
redness of only one kind of object, then it could not be said to perceptually grasp red as such, or 
classify things as being red. The latter condition is necessary to distinguish identification under a 
concept from the mere detection of a feature, and conceptual classification from simple stimulus 
generalization. A rudimentary device that simply differentiates between the presence and 
absence of red light displays a capacity for stimulus generalization, or discrimination that is 
responsive to a single basic stimulus—yet, the function of this device can be explained without 
assuming that it possesses any concepts (Ibid.: 286-7). To surpass mere stimulus generalization 
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of a single property, a perceiver must be able to perceptually identify an object as having more 
than one property, which further suggests that their perceptual representations can have a 
systematic, compositional structure characteristic of conceptual content. 
Relative stimulus independence requires that a perceiver's responses are not rigidly tied to 
one kind of stimulus; rather, it is possible for many different stimuli to produce the same 
behavior. The necessity of stimulus independence is meant to capture the intuition that "a 
conceptual representation can be used in a novel situation with a variety of stimuli" (Ibid.: 297). 
(The sort of stimulus independence typical of perception-based conceptual representations is 
qualified as "relative" to contrast it with the "strong" stimulus independence—i.e., the indefinite 
recombinability and productivity—of higher-order thought (Ibid.: 298-9)). Newen and Bartels 
suggest that the behavioral flexibility which relative stimulus independence makes possible can 
be discerned through testing whether a neutral stimulus or cue can trigger a response that evinces
the perceiver's identification of a certain perceptual feature; for instance, an animal could 
respond correctly to a stimulus that cues the selection of a red object from amongst a group of 
variously colored objects. The notion of a minimal semantic net expresses the intuition that 
conceptual categories are at least partly interconnected, so that understanding the intensional 
features of some concept will involve understanding a minimal set of other concepts. For 
instance, having a concept of red would require that one could also represent some other 
contrastive color. In addition, red would have to perceptually grasped as being an instance of the 
category color, as opposed to other determinable categories such as shape, material, and 
location. A perceiver could be tested as to whether it recognizes the similarity or dissimilarity of 
a certain feature with respect to a certain determinable category (Ibid.: 297). 
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Finally, in contrast to those theories which link concept possession with linguistic mastery, 
Newen and Bartels specify that each of the proposed criteria for perception-based conceptual 
representations can be satisfied in the absence of linguistic competence or the use of linguistic 
symbols. Accordingly, they write, "Theories of perception-based concepts can explain a level of 
representation that is more elaborate than perceptual discriminations and more basic than 
language(-like) representations" (Ibid.: 302). To be sure, there is a great deal of empirical 
research that establishes close links between linguistic competence and what perceptual 
psychologists refer to as categorical perception, i.e., the phenomenon whereby the categories 
possessed by a perceiver influences perceptual discriminations towards heightening (and 
processing faster) the differences between objects belonging to different categories, and 
diminishing the differences between objects of the same category.7 Several studies have shown 
the categories bestowed by the vocabulary of one's own native language as affecting how we 
perceptually categorize objects. Indeed, cross-linguistic differences in vocabularies have been 
found in some cases to cause differences in color perception. For instance, Winawer et al (2007) 
notably found that speakers of Russian, who express the color category of blue by using two 
basic color terms for either light blue or dark blue shades, were faster than English speakers in 
discerning the difference between dark and light shades of blue, and slower in matching shades 
of blue that both fell under the one of the two lexical categories. For English speakers, all the 
shades were classifiable under a single term "blue," and so they did not display the same 
categorization effects.
7 Goldstone & Hendrickson (2009) give some illustrations of categorical perception. For instance, our perception 
of rainbows is a striking example of categorical visual perception. Color categorization in visual processing is 
responsible for why we perceive rainbows as distinct bands of color even though the frequencies of light present 
in the rainbow vary smoothly from top to bottom. Further examples can be found in speech perception, where the
phoneme categories of a listener's natural language can greatly increase or decrease the ability to discriminate the
physical differences between two speech sounds.
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Nonetheless, there is also evidence of categorical perception effects that emerge from 
categories which are not associated with verbal labels, and which occur without recruiting 
language-processing areas. Different studies have detected the presence of categorical color 
perception in non-linguistic infants and non-human animals, while others have found that, for 
human adults, the left hemisphere's propensity for perceptual categorization may underlie both 
language-driven and language-independent categorical processing (see Holmes & Wolff 2012; 
Collins & Olson 2014 for further discussion). It seems, then, that categorization is a 
fundamentally perceptual activity, and retains its perceptual character even as it is recruited and 
shaped by the subsequent acquisition of linguistic concepts.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued for two basic claims. First, perceptual contents can be 
conceptually structured without being linguistically structured. Second, the possession conditions
for perceptual concepts are different than the conditions for possessing lexical concepts. These 
claims are at the core of the revised conceptualism being defended in this dissertation. The 
second claim differentiates my account from both overly and insufficiently restrictive accounts 
of concept possession, while the first claim sets the account against essentialist forms of content 
non-conceptualism. We have seen why state non-conceptualism ultimately must resort to the 
content view, and why the content view ought to be cast in essentialist terms. With the lines of 
the debate thus drawn, a revised conceptualism stands to give a more plausible explanation of 
how perceptual representations can be both non-linguistic and conceptual in nature, and how 
perception grounds the intelligent behavior of human and non-human perceivers alike. 
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In the next chapter, I will show how thinkers in the Nyāya tradition of classical Indian 
philosophy also came to acknowledge the possibility that perceptual states can be concept-laden 
and non-linguistic. These thinkers further suggested that concept-laden perceptual states arise 
through the joint activity of attention and memory, a view which I incorporate into my revised 
conceptualist account in order to later establish in subsequent chapters the links between 
concepts, attention, and the contents of conscious visual experience.
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Chapter 2
 Language and Concept-Laden Perception in Classical Indian Philosophy
 
In this chapter, I will examine the precedent for my revised version of conceptualism which was 
set especially by the theories of non-conceptual and concept-laden perception found in the Nyāya 
tradition of Indian philosophy. More than a thousand years before coming into scrutiny by philosophers
and psychologists in the West, the existence and nature of non-conceptual content were subjects of 
sustained debate among the various schools of classical Indian philosophy. Underlying both Indian and 
contemporary philosophical perspectives on non-conceptual content is a shared preoccupation with 
questions relevant to our discussion of language, concepts, and perception: Is linguistic understanding 
an essential element of conceptual cognition, so much so that they are equivalent? Are linguistic and/or 
conceptual categories able to adequately capture the content of perception, or is that content ultimately 
ineffable? Could linguistic/conceptual capacities play any causal role in the generation of perceptual 
content? If so, would it be possible for non-linguistic and linguistically competent perceivers to share 
the same perceptual content? A survey of some of the answers given by Indian philosophers will be 
instructive for a number of reasons. As I will show, Nyāya philosophers developed an account of non-
linguistic and concept-laden perceptual cognitions that anticipates in many respects the revised 
conceptualism I am advocating here. While many classical Indian philosophers, together with many 
modern analytic philosophers, view concept possession as entailing a cognitive grasp and linguistic 
mastery of a concept's semantic value, the Nyāya tradition—along with certain Buddhist philosophers
—eventually came to articulate a naturalistic account of concept possession which prioritized the 
employment of attention- and memory-based capacities involved in generating conceptually structured 
perceptual cognitions.
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I will also show how the Nyāya understanding of non-conceptual content started to evolve from a
basic state view—according to which perception is non-conceptual if a perceiver does not possess a 
verbal label for a perceived object—to a sophisticated content view that takes non-conceptual states to 
not only have a different kind of intentional structure than concept-laden states. While the very first 
Nyāya thinkers, or Naiyāyikas, implicitly recognized that perceptual content could be both non-verbal 
and predicative, it was not until later in the tradition that linguistic structure was more clearly 
differentiated from predicative or qualificative structure. Predicative perceptual content is in principle 
linguistically expressible without being reducible to linguistic content. 
A similar shift takes place for the Nyāya theory of concept possession. In developing the earlier 
view that knowledge of a word's semantic value is a prerequisite for entertaining concept-laden (i.e., 
language-laden) perceptual states, authors like Vācaspati Miśra (10th cent.) came to elaborate a 
complex causal account of the roles that mental factors such as attention and memory play in 
synthesizing perceptual inputs to form concept-laden, propositionally structured cognitions. Though 
this causal model was at first intended to show how a perceptual cognition could be associated with a 
linguistic expression and still retain its sensory character, the abiding acknowledgment by Naiyāyikas 
that language is not responsible for generating perceptual cognitions led them eventually to extend 
concept-laden perceptions, and the causal processes underlying their production, to even non-linguistic 
perceivers. Accordingly, we can view the exercise of attention- and memory-based capacities for 
perceptual identification as taking the place of linguistic competence in grounding the Nyāya 
explanation of how a perceiver may come to perceptually grasp sensory features as 
predicating/qualifying an object.
The concept-laden perceptions postulated by Nyāya are propositional in nature despite the fact 
that classical Indian philosophy never posited the existence of propositions, i.e., abstract entities which 
are the bearers of truth values and are shareable across attitudes like belief and doubt. Instead, the basic
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unit of analysis for Nyāya logic and epistemology is a cognition, or jñāna.1 In the Nyāya scheme, 
cognitions are transitory awareness-episodes belonging to a conscious self, and are generated by 
reliable sources or instrumental causes of knowledge (pramāṇa), the four accepted sources of 
knowledge for Nyāya being perception, inference, testimony, and analogical comparison. Every 
cognition is intentionally directed towards some object (viṣaya), and cognitions become veridical 
cognitions or knowledge (pramā) when they accurately represent their objects. More specifically, a 
cognition corresponds with reality when its qualificative structure matches that of the object—a 
cognition which presents object a as F is veridical when a is in fact F. According to the Navya ("Neo") 
Nyāya tradition, the basic form of a qualificative cognition (viśiṣṭajñāna) is structured into three parts: 
a qualificand (viśeṣya), qualifier (prakāra), and the relation between qualifier and qualificand 
(saṃsarga). Each of these three parts of a qualificative cognition is meant to directly pick out a 
substantive object (dharmin), a property possessed by that object (dharma), and the relation between 
the property and object (sambandha), respectively.2 Qualificative cognitions are linguistically 
expressible in a sentential form, but key components of the cognition's qualificative structure will go 
unmentioned in an ordinary sentence (Matilal 1968: 18).3 For instance, the qualificative cognition one 
has upon seeing a cow could be expressed by the sentence "This is a cow"—or by just the utterance of 
the single word "cow" (gaur iti)—but what the expression does not directly capture is that the cognition
itself takes as its objects the particular cow, the general property cowhood (gotva), and the relation of 
inherence that binds cowhood to the particular cow. Indeed, it is because the cow is presented to the 
cognition as being qualified by cowhood that it is seen as being a cow rather than some other sort of 
1 See Matilal 1986: ch. 4.2 for a discussion of how the notion of jñāna differs from the Western epistemological notion of
belief.
2 In chapter two, we will discuss an added element of qualificative content, namely the guises or modes (avacchedaka) 
under which the qualificand, qualifier, and relation may be presented in a cognition.
3 The qualifier-qualified structure of cognitions is logically distinct from the grammatical subject-predicate structure 
(uddeśya-vidheya-bhāva) of sentences, and the topic-comment structure (also understood as uddeśya-vidheya-bhāva) of
inferential and verbal cognitions—see Matilal 1968: 14 and Shaw 2010.
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entity. Hence, although the content of qualificative cognitions is neither identical with linguistic 
sentences or abstract propositions, it is nonetheless analyzable into the compositional, object-property 
structure that is typical of propositional content (see also Mohanty 1966: 27-29).
In the remainder of this chapter, we will examine the philosophical context in which early Nyāya 
thought came to identify qualificative, propositional structure as the defining feature of conceptual 
cognitions, i.e., savikalpaka jñāna, and account for the presence of such structure in the content of 
perceptual states. But first, I will take a detour through Buddhist theories of concepts, language, and 
perception, in order to set the context for later developments in Nyāya. The Yogācāra thinkers Dignāga 
and Dharmakīrti defended a form of essentialist content non-conceptualism which claimed that 
perceptual contents are non-propositional, pre-predicative, and linguistically inexpressible. Their 
distinguishing between the contents of non-conceptual and conceptual states would be adopted by 
subsequent Nyāya thinkers. I will also show how Dignāga and Dharmakīrti departed significantly from 
the state non-conceptualism of earlier Abhidharma thinkers like Vasubandhu. Though Vasubandhu 
ultimately could not draw a tenable distinction between non-conceptual and concept-laden states of 
awareness, he and other Ābhidharmikas gave a more sophisticated account of how attention and 
memory are involved in pre-linguistically conceptualizing perceptual contents. Later Nyāya thinkers 
like Vācaspati would take on the idea that perceptions could be pre-linguistic and still conceptually 
structured by the activity of attention and memory, while also departing from earlier Nyāya views that 
did not sharply distinguish between non-conceptual and concept-laden states at the level of content.
2.1 Language and Conceptualization in Indian Buddhist Philosophy
Just as Indian philosophers understood cognitions (jnāna) to be propositional without positing the
existence of abstract propositions, they also took concepts (vikalpa) to be involved in propositional 
thought without considering them to be abstract, mind-independent constituents of thought-contents. 
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For every school of classical Indian philosophy, concepts are distinctly mental entities, or are tied to 
distinctly mental processes. Deriving from the verb root kḷp, which can mean “to form, fashion, 
construct, arrange, invent, or imagine,” the words “vikalpa” and the related word "kalpanā" captured 
for many these schools the imaginative, constructive, and fabricating nature of mental activity. 
Accordingly, the earliest sustained discussions of vikalpa and kalpanā were taken up by Buddhist 
philosophers; for them, concepts are fictional entities that the mind ignorantly constructs and 
superimposes onto our direct perceptual experience of reality, perpetuating the mental/linguistic 
proliferations (prapañca) and delusional attachments that are the source of our entrapment in the 
misery-filled cycle of rebirths (saṃsāra). Whereas pure perceptual or meditative awareness puts us into
contact with a reality (paramārtha-sat) constituted by a dynamic flux of bare, momentary, and utterly 
unique particulars (svalakṣaṇa), conceptual constructions inevitably distort this reality by hypostatizing
momentary particulars into persisting objects, and imaginatively attributing to them abstract class-
characteristics (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa). Given that language traffics in these fictional generalities, concepts 
and language were thus seen by Buddhists to be integrally related: Conceptualization extracts out of the
flux of experience stable referents for language to designate; the designations of language in turn 
contribute to the reification of these referents by providing categories under which entities are to be 
classified according to their imagined similarity and dissimilarity with other referents; linguistic 
classifications drive the further proliferation of mental concepts and discriminative thought that 
bifurcate the world into those things which do and do not fall under a concept; and these mental 
concepts, by grounding our identification of particular objects as the kind of thing which may satisfy 
some practical interest, give rise to intentional actions and obsessive desires that defile the mind 
(karma-kleśa).4 Ultimately, linguistic/conceptual constructions proliferate to such a degree that they 
4 This condensed picture of the Buddhist model of linguistic conceptualization is drawn from Williams's (1980) synoptic 
survey of early Abhidharma and Madhyamaka Buddhist accounts. He importantly qualifies this picture: "The 
vocabulary and stages of the production of conceptual diversification and construction are by no means unambiguous; 
terms with slightly different nuances of meaning are sometimes used interchangeably and even the orders of occurrence 
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give rise to a separate level of pseudo-reality, wherein the entities we take to be real in fact owe their 
existence to our linguistic/conceptual conventions (prajñapti-sat). 
2.1.1 Dignāga – Perception is Essentially Non-Conceptual, and Concepts are Essentially Linguistic
Since language is deeply involved in the mental construction of propositional cognitions with a 
predicative object-property structure, and since we do not directly perceive real entities as having such 
a structure, the Buddhists therefore came to understand the distinction between conception and 
perception in terms of a distinction between propositional/linguistic cognitions and non-
propositional/non-linguistic cognitions. Aptly enough, the laconic definition of perception given in the 
Pramāṇasamuccaya by Dignāga (6th cent. CE), the founding thinker of the Buddhist epistemological 
tradition, is: "pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham"—"Perception (pratyakṣa) is devoid of conceptualization 
(kalpanā)" (PS 1.3c). As for the conceptualization which perceptual cognitions lack, Dignāga claims 
that kalpanā amounts to the "connection of a name, genus, etc. [with a cognized object]" 
(nāmajātyādiyojanā). Dignāga's auto-commentary (PSV 1.3d) elaborates this statement by referencing 
five types of words: arbitrary proper names (yadṛcchā-śabda), generic nominal terms (jāti-śabda), 
adjectival trope terms (guṇa-śabda), verbal terms (kriyā-śabda), and substance terms (dravya-śabda). 
Words of each type are used to linguistically designate an object that appears as qualified or 
distinguished (viśiṣṭa) by the purported denotation of the word. In the case of genus terms, for instance,
an object that is qualified by a universal cowness is called "cow" (gaur iti); in the case of trope terms, 
an object that is distinguished by a white color trope is called "white" (śukla iti). 
However, because Dignāga denied the realist metaphysics of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools, 
who considered universals, tropes, actions, and substances to be among the types of real existents to 
are reversed. This is principally because we are not dealing with a chronological process of falsification but rather with 
an unraveling of a complex situation in terms of objective and subjective poles, names for events and names for 
(pseudo) entities" (26). We will have occasion in chapter four to directly examine the sophisticated causal model of 
perceptual and conceptual awareness given in later Yogācāra Buddhism.
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which our words can refer (padārtha), he therefore claimed that words such as names, genus terms, and
so on do not actually designate any real entities in the world. Consequently, our use of predicative 
expressions to identify and refer to objects does not stem from our experience of those objects as 
actually being qualified or distinguished by universals, tropes, etc., as the realists would have it. 
Instead, an object is distinguished by nothing more than the non-referring terms themselves 
(arthaśūnyaiḥ śabdair eva viśiṣṭo 'rtha ucyate), such that the very act of connecting or applying these 
terms to an object is what subjects it to conceptual/linguistic predication and classification. 
In a later interpretation of Dignāga's definition of kalpanā, the Buddhist philosophers 
Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla (8th cent.) took special efforts to interpret the compound 
"nāmajātyādiyojanā" in such a way that wards off the mistake of understanding the phrase "connection 
of a name, genus, etc. [with a cognized object]" as implying that, apart from linguistic proper names, 
there are real, non-linguistic entities like universals, tropes, actions, and substances that can also be 
connected with an object.5 In Śāntarakṣita's final analysis, the definition of kalpanā should instead read,
"[The connection] of a name [with a cognized object] by means of a genus, etc." (nāmno jātyādibhiḥ 
seyam) (TS 1225cd, 370). That is to say, conceptualization involves the application of a name to an 
object, where that name can come in the guise of a term for a genus, trope, etc.6 Hence, since every act 
of conceptually attributing a feature to an object is concomitant with the application of a word to that 
object,7 and since such features are not ontologically related in any way to real objects, Śāntarakṣita and
Kamalaśīla argued that there there would be no conceptual construction—i.e., no propositionally 
5 These efforts by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are also directed at squaring Dignāga's definition of kalpanā with one of 
the definitions offered by Dharmakīrti (7th cent.), which takes kalpanā to be a "cognition which is characterized by 
linguistic expression" (abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpanā) (PVin 1.4).
6 In fact, even proper names themselves are applied in the manner of a genus term. The denotation of a proper name such 
as "Ḍittha" is actually the fictional Ḍittha-hood that the man named Ḍittha is thought to possess throughout his whole 
life. Proper names have to be taken as referring to such fictional generalities because they are unable to uniquely 
capture the real object itself which is different at each moment—cf. TSP 1227, 371: "ye 'pyete ḍitthādayaḥ śabdā 
yadṛcchāśabdatvena pratītās te … pratikṣaṇabhedabhinnam asādhāraṇabhedena vastu gamayitum aśaktāḥ…." 
7 TS 1233ab, 372: "jātyādiyojanā śabayojanāvyabhicāriṇī"; TSP 1230-1233, 371-2: "… śabdayojanayā sarvā 
yojanāvyāptā…."
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structured cognition that identifies objects according to their distinguishing features—in the absence of 
the predicative relation between object and feature that is supplied by language.8
2.1.2 Vasubandhu – Non-Linguistic Conceptualization is Inherent to Perceptual Awareness
Yet, Buddhists prior to Dignāga had a more nuanced understanding of conceptualization as not 
essentially linguistic, acknowledging that conceptualization can be subtly operative even in perceptual 
experience, and need not coincide with the actual utterance or possession of a linguistic term. 
Abhidharma Buddhist accounts pointed to saṃjñā (Pāli: saññā)9—one of the four constitutive elements
(skandha) of the mind—as the faculty responsible for conceptually identifying and categorizing the 
inputs of sensory and mental consciousness (vijñāna). Representing the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma 
tradition, Vasubandhu (4th cent.) defines saṃjñā as consisting in the grasping a sign, or nimitta, a 
notion which the commentator Yaśomitra glosses as a "particular state of an object, such as blueness, 
the grasping of which amounts to discrimination."10 That is to say, the discrimination of an object's 
nimitta or characteristic feature enables the object to be distinguished as being in a certain state, and 
consequently allows us to identify the object through using a verbally expressible predicative judgment.
8 cf. TSP 1230-1233, 371-2: "jātiguṇakriyādravyayojanāyām api kalpanāyāṃ parair abhyupagatāyāṃ nāmayojanaiva 
kalpanā / tathā hi—jātyādivyavacchinnaṃ vastu nāmnaiva viśiṣṭaṃ gṛhyate, anyathā hi 
svātantryeṇānekapadārthagrahaṇavadyojanābhāvāt kathaṃ kalpanā bhavet, tataśca mūkam eva jagat syāt." "Even 
though conceptualization is admitted by others to be the connection of a genus, trope, action, and substance, 
conceptualization is just the connection of a name. Accordingly, an object which is distinguished by a genus, etc. is 
grasped as qualified by a name alone. Otherwise, [if the connection of a genus, etc. with an object were not accepted to 
be just the connection of a word] then due to the absence of a connection—as with independently grasping several 
different objects—how would there be any conceptualization? In that case, the world would be dumb." On this last 
point, Toru Funayama clarifies, "In this context, conception as that which connects a name is a basis to distinguish a 
variety of things in the world" (1992: 85-86).
9 Whereas the word "saññā" as it occurs in the Pāli Nikāyas is often translated as "perception," several scholars have 
pointed out that the term instead captures the mental functions of recognition and conceptual identification (see Kuan 
2008: 13-14). As Rupert Getchin illustrates, "A saññā of, say, 'blue' then becomes, not so much a passive awareness of 
the visual sensation we subsequently agree to call 'blue', but rather the active noting of that sensation, and the 
recognising it as 'blue'—that is, more or less, the idea of 'blueness'” (1986: 144). Further discussion of saññā as a 
component of all conscious sensory experience can found in Del Toso 2015 and Ganeri 2017.
10 AK 1.14, 10: "saṃjñā nimittodgrahaṇātmikā"; AKBV 1.14, 41, : "nimittaṃ vastuno 'vasthāviśeṣo nīlatvādi 
tasyodgrahaṇaṃ paricchedaḥ." Examples of nimittas given by Vasubandhu include "blue, yellow, long, short, female, 
male, friend, enemy, pleasant, unpleasant, etc." (AKB 1.14, 10).
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In speaking of a predicate as an object's sign or characteristic mark, Abhidharma thinkers thus 
recognized that we form and articulate such judgments on the basis of an object's perceptual 
appearance11; Williams explains: 
The pre-verbalised perception of a blue patch is thus perceived as blue on the basis of an 
abstraction from a number of individual momentary flashes of blue, which is thereby verbalised
not due to the identification of the patch of blue but rather its identification as having blueness, 
that is, the quality of being blue. The saṃjñā 'x (is) blue' does not identify this blue patch as 
having this particular case of blue but rather verbalises the membership of this blue patch in the 
class of blue. The nimitta is thereby a sign of class membership, and the articulation of a 
perception is only possible on the basis of class-inclusion. (1980: 16)
For the early Ābhidharmakas, then, it would seem that an object is judged as falling under some class 
because the object perceptually appears as belonging to that class, and hence that perceptual 
classification can precede linguistic classification.
In accounting for the pre-verbalized perception of an object as belonging to a class, Vasubandhu 
held the view that all conscious sensory awareness is accompanied by a rudimentary yet inherent form 
of conceptualization (svabhāva-vikalpa; AKB 1.33), which stems from the presence of a weak form of 
saṃjñā in each of the five types of sensory awareness.12 Vasubandhu identified this inherent 
conceptualization accompanying all sensory awareness with vitarka,13 a type of thought (caitta) that is 
concomitant with sensory awareness and responsible for initially directing the mind toward a perceived
object.14 Vitarka was standardly described in Sautrāntika and Yogācāra texts as "mental discourse that 
11 Cf. the description of nimitta in Dhammapāla's commentary on Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga: "The sign [i.e., nimitta] 
is the mere appearance of formations, as if graspable entities… and which, owing to perception of unity in continuity 
and mass, it is assumed to be temporarily enduring or permanent" (Ñāṇamoli 2010: 656, cited in Williams 1980: 16).
12 Cf. Yaśomitra (AKBV 1.14, 42): "na hi pañcavijñānasamprayogiṇī saṃjñā paṭvī."
13 AKB 1.33, 22: "svabhāvavikalpo vitarkaḥ." See Dhammajoti 2007: 105-107 and Jaini 1959: 83-88 for discussion of the 
differences between Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika accounts regarding whether the vitarka and vicāra which accompany 
every thought are distinct in kind or only in degree. 
14 Among the vivid analogies he uses to illustrate the difference between vitarka ("initial thought") and vicāra ("sustained 
thought"), Buddhaghosa compares the application of vitarka to sensory awareness with the first striking of a bell, upon 
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inquires [about an object]";15 according to one gloss by Sthiramati, that inquiring takes the form of 
determining, "What is that?"; the mental discourse consists in "narrating" an object.16 A fuller 
description of vitarka is given by the author of the Vaibhāṣika text Abhidharmadīpa (6th cent.): 
"Vitarka is characterized by a grossness of thought; a second name for it is 'conception'; it conceptually 
discriminates types of nimitta belonging to an object; its function is stirred up by the wind of saṃjñā; it
is the cause of the activity of the five gross sensory awarenesses."17 In K.L. Dhammajoti's words, 
vitarka evidently causes sensory perception in the sense that "it makes the main contribution in such a 
rudimentary discrimination as regards the object's appearance (nimitta) that constitutes the grasping of 
an object by a sensory consciousness" (2007: 109). Thus, the picture of svabhāva-vikalpa emerging 
from these descriptions of vitarka is that of an inchoate, proto-linguistic classification embedded in 
perceptual awareness, which serves as a precursor to the outright identification of an object under a 
name in a verbal judgment. 
Vasubandhu (AKB 1.33, 22) nonetheless claims that sensory awareness is non-conceptual 
(avikalpaka) despite its concomitance with inherent conceptualization, because apart from the weak 
presence of saṃjñā in perceptual awareness, there is also the absence of two further forms of 
conceptualization, namely determination (abhinirūpaṇā-vikalpa) and recollection (anusmaraṇa). These
more robust forms of conceptualization specifically belong to mental awareness (manovijñāna) not 
originating from the five sense organs, even though the faculties of understanding (prajñā) and 
memory (smṛti) from which they arise are also concomitant with every sensory awareness. 
Determination is distinguished from its sensory counterpart in virtue of its dependence on language 
(nāmāpekṣā). Understanding or judgment enters into sensory awareness in the form of vitarka18 as a 
which arise reverberations of thought that sustain the mind's preoccupation with the object (see Ñāṇamoli 2010: 136).
15 Cf. ABKV 2.33, 57: "atra pūrvācāryā āhụ. vitarkaḥ katamaḥ …paryeṣako manojalpaḥ…."
16 TrBh 14, 89: "paryeṣakaḥ kim etad iti nirūpaṇākārapravṛttaḥ …. jalpo 'rthakathanam."
17 ADV 2.3.123, 81: "vitarko nāma cittaudāryalakṣaṇaḥ saṃkalpadvitīyanāmā viṣayanimittaprakāravikalpī 
saṃjñāpavanoddhatavṛttiḥ audārikapañcavijñānakāyapravṛttihetuḥ."
18 AKBV 1.33, 74: "cetanāprajñāviśeṣa eva vitarka…."; "Vitarka is a particular instance of volition or understanding."
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first indeterminate and generic grasping of an object and its features, whereas abhinirūpaṇā amounts to
an examination and analysis through which one can determinately identify an object and say, "It is 
that."19 As for memory, it in some way enables conceptual determination, given that identifying an 
object as belonging to a certain class requires mentally pinning down an ultimately momentary object 
long enough to examine it and compare with other instances of a property that may not be presently 
perceived. Accordingly, memory is defined by Vasubandhu (AKB 2.24, 54) as the retention of a 
cognitive object (ālambana-asaṃpramoṣaḥ). Yet, there is also a dependence of memory on the faculty 
of understanding (prajñā) responsible for perceptual and non-perceptual determination, in virtue of 
which the same word "smṛti" is used by Abhidharma Buddhists to express both the memory of a 
previously experienced object as well as the practice of mindfulness in meditation, which involves 
attentively (and/or verbally) taking note of an object just as it is observed.20 These retentive and 
attentive functions of memory were also thought by Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Buddhists to be operative 
in each moment of sensory awareness; indeed, Saṃghabhadra (4th cent.) argues that the retaining and 
attentive fixing/noting of a perceived object makes it possible for the mind to subsequently recollect 
that object.21 
19 Ibid.: "kasmād abhinirūpaṇāvikalpa ityucyate. tatra tatrālambane nāmāpekṣayābhipravṛtteḥ. 'rūpaṃ vedanā anityaṃ 
duḥkham' ityādyabhinirūpaṇācca." With abhinirūpaṇa occurring at the level of mental awareness, we can understand 
its function as tied to the operation of vicāra—see ADV 2.3.123, 81: "vicārastu cittasaukṣmyalakṣaṇo 
manovijñānapravṛttyanukūlaḥ"; "Vicāra is characterized by a subtlety of thought; it is conducive to the activity of 
mental consciousness." Paralleling the definition of vitarka, vicāra is understood as "mental discourse that reflectively 
examines" (ABKV 2.33, 57: "… pratyavekṣako manojalpaḥ…." In TrBh 14 (p. 89), Sthiramati brings out the 
recognitional aspect of vicāra, stating that it amounts to reflective mental discourse in light of its determining a 
previously known object through a cognition of the form, "It is that" ("pratyavekṣako manojalpa eva. 'idaṃ tad' iti 
pūrvādhigatanirūpaṇāt." 
20 AKB 6.15, 342: "smṛtir anayopatiṣṭhata iti smṛtyupasthānaṃ prajñā yathādṛṣṭasyābhilapanāt." "'One applies 
mindfulness by means of this [understanding]'—thus, the application of mindfulness is understanding, because of the 
mental notation/verbal expression of [an object] as it is observed." Vasubandhu gives this explanation of the dependence
of smṛti on prajñā as a contrast to how the Vaibhāṣikas understood prajñā to be dependent on smṛti. According to them,
understanding is the application of mindfulness in the sense that prajñā functions with respect to an object through 
employing the force of smṛti ("smṛtibalādhānavṛttitvāt"). Yaśomitra clarifies the Vaibhāṣika stance: "If smṛti fixes upon 
a cognitive object then prajñā thusly discerns it"; "yadi hi smṛtir ālambanaṃ dhārāyatyevaṃ prajñā prajānātīti" 
(AKBV 6.15, 530). For further discussion of how Buddhists variously conceived the relation between prajñā and smṛti, 
as well as an investigation into the ambiguous usage of abhilapana to mean attentive mental notation and/or verbal 
expression, see Cox 1992. 
21 See Cox 1992: 84.
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The same line of thought can be drawn with respect to the presence of conceptual determination
and identification (saṃjñā) in sensory awareness; as Williams suggests, 
The Sarvāstivādin point in talking of a weak saṃjñā even in immediate sensual  apprehension is
that if I apprehend a bare blue patch then inasmuch as the strong saṃjñā 'x (is) blue' is possible 
so in my previous apprehension I must have not only apprehended a blue patch but also 
somehow known (non-verbally) that x is blue. Inasmuch as all cognition must involve some 
conceptualisation in order for further conceptualisation to take place, so the effective opposition
is between verbalisation and non-verbalisation, and not between saṃjñā and non-saṃjñā. 
(1980: 18)
Thus, even with the distinction between non-verbalized and verbalized states providing Vasubandhu 
and early Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmakas some basis for distinguishing non-conceptual states from 
conceptual states, their acknowledgment that conceptual identification plays a role in every instance of 
perceptual awareness indicates that they could not be offering an account of what we are calling 
essentially non-conceptual perceptual content, since there would be an overlap in psychological 
function between perceptual and mental awarenesses given the presence of conceptualization in both. 
As a result, we should conclude that their defense of non-conceptualism would court the possibility of 
making the "non-conceptual/conceptual" distinction merely terminological.22 
22 In fact, Vasubandhu (AKB 1.33, 22) and Yaśomitra (AKBV 1.33, 75) evidently anticipated such a charge, and responded 
with a linguistic evasion. Despite there being at least one type of conceptualization inherent to each sensory awareness 
(svabhāvavikalpa), sensory awareness is still considered to be non-conceptual (avikalpaka) in the same way that a one-
legged horse is still called "legless" ("yathā ekapādako 'śvo 'pādaka iti"). It is worth noting that the same sort of tactic 
was also used in the converse manner by the school of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, which denied the existence of non-
conceptual/non-predicative perceptions while nonetheless categorizing some perceptions as being nirvikalpaka. 
According to them, all cognitions have a qualificative structure; even nirvikalpaka perceptions identify an object by 
means of some qualifier or distinguishing characteristic, and so are experienced as taking the form “This is of such a 
kind” (idam ittham iti). Later, after perceiving some more instances of the same kind of object, one can realize that the 
particular configuration of distinguishing features encountered in one’s first nirvikalpaka cognition of the object are 
actually common properties indicative of the object’s class character (see ŚrBh 1.1.1, 29). That being so, Vedānta 
Deśika acknowledges the use of the word “non-qualificative” to be a bit of hyperbole, akin to using the word 
“penniless” to describe someone who is merely not affluent. The Viśiṣṭādvaitin’s appropriation of the term 
“nirvikalpaka” is meant to deny the view put forth by other schools that so-called non-conceptual perception must have 
non-qualificative content. Though, to avoid the looseness of terminology that results from using the privative term 
“non-conceptual” to refer to cognitions whose lack of conceptualization is just a matter of degree, nirvikalpaka 
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At the same time, we can also appreciate how the early Ābhidharmakas offer a Buddhist 
alternative to Dignāga's extreme brand of perceptual non-conceptualism. Keeping the complexities of 
the Abhidharma account in mind allows us to thereby reinterpret a canonical statement found in the 
Sarvāstivāda text Vijñānakāya of Devaśarman (2nd cent. BCE), which was often cited by Buddhists as 
an authoritative source for their respective views on non-conceptual perception: "The visual 
consciousness can only apprehend a blue colour (nīlam), but not "it is blue" (no tu nīlam iti). Mental 
consciousness can also apprehend a blue colour. [But] so long as it is not yet able to apprehend its 
name, it cannot apprehend "it is blue". When it can apprehend its name, then it can also apprehend "it is
blue."23 As we have seen, the early Sarvāstivāda Buddhists gave a nuanced account of memory- and 
attention-based conceptualization operative in sensory awareness. With conceptual identification being 
present even in non-verbalized perceptual awareness, the appropriation of this statement by Dignāga 
and his followers in support of their definition of perception as devoid of conceptualization should 
therefore be found unwarranted.24 In so judging, we would be in agreement with the Madhyamaka 
Buddhist Candrakīrti (7th cent.), who criticized Dignāga for relying on the textual authority of a 
statement whose original purport he has misinterpreted. According to Candrakīrti, rather than being 
perception is instead more precisely defined by Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta as a cognition which is produced by the sense 
organs independently of any memory-traces left by previous cognitions—SS 4.32, 543: “kathaṃ tasya 
nirvikalpakaśabdavācyatvam. vivakṣitavikalpābhāvamātrāt; alpadhane daridravyavahāravat. nanu 
kalpanābhāvatāratamyāt vyavahārāniyatiḥ syāt; na ca vyavasthāpakaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ dṛśyate; tatrāha tasmāditi. 
aviśiṣṭaviṣayaṃ pratyakṣaṃ nirvikalpakamiti paroktāsaṃbhavādityarthaḥ. saṃskāranirapekṣedriyajanyā 
matirnirvikalpeti lakṣaṇasiddhernoktadoṣa iti bhāvaḥ.” 
23 Translated in Dhammajoti 2008: 108. Cf. AKBV 1.33, 74: "katham avikalpakāḥ ityucyanta iti. cakṣurvijñānasaṃsargī 
nīlaṃ vijānāti no tu nīlam iti vacanāt." Cf. also AKB 3.30, 144, which cites a variant form of the statement in a 
discussion of the particular type of "contact" (sparśa) between an object, a sense-organ, and awareness that 
accompanies mental consciousness; in the case of mental consciousness, the contact will involve the mind taking a 
name (adhivacana) as its object, or will involve the mind cognizing a perceived object with reference to its name: 
"yathoktaṃ 'cakṣurvijñānena nīlaṃ vijānāti no tu nīlaṃ manovijñānena nīlaṃ vijānāti nīlam iti ca vijānāti' iti". In a 
discussion of sparśa, Poussin (1991: 520 n. 246) cites the canonical statement and parenthetically adds, "One should 
explain that without doubt one should understand by cakṣurvijñāna [in the canonical statement] the vijñāna with the 
caittas, sparśa, etc., which necessarily accompany it."
24 PSV 1.3: "abhidharme 'pyuktam - cakṣurvijñānasamaṅgī nīlaṃ vijānāti no tu nīlam iti…." Cf. TSP 3, 12, where 
Kamalaśīla takes the apparent inability of visual awareness to know blue by the expression "It is blue" as thereby 
demonstrating that perception lacks conceptualization, since such an inability stands opposed to a conceptual cognition 
that is shot through with language: "tathāhi cakṣurvijñānasaṅgī nīlaṃ vijānāti no tu nīlam iti…. 'no tu nīlam' ityanena 
nāmānuviddhārthagrahaṇapratikṣepāt kalpanārahitatvam."
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introduced for the purpose of describing the defining characteristics of perception, the statement is 
actually meant to demonstrate the insentient nature (jaḍatva) of the five sensory awarenesses (pañca-
indriyavijñāna).25 To paraphrase the illuminating explanation of Candrakīrti's line of thought given by 
Mark Siderits (1981: 155), the insentience of sensory awareness refers to the fact that awareness 
(vijñāna) alone is not sufficient for producing a full cognition of an object; rather, every instance of 
cognition necessarily arises through the cooperation of many mental factors (caitta), including 
conceptual identification (saṃjñā).26 Consequently, it would be inappropriate to posit a distinct kind of 
perceptual cognition which is totally devoid of conceptual identification.
2.1.3 Dhamakīrti – Non-Linguistic Creatures Have Implicitly Linguistic Concepts
As for the Buddhist logicians who followed Dignāga, while they were more clearly positing a 
form of essentially non-conceptual content in taking perception to be totally devoid of even 
rudimentary conceptualization and linguistic structure, they also acknowledged the possibility that 
some conceptual states might also appear to be non-linguistic in nature, particularly those belonging to 
creatures who display no linguistic mastery or ability for verbalization. In such states, there might not 
be any explicit application of a name to an object, which is what Dignāga primarily took kalpanā to 
consist in. Therefore, in order to exclude even those seemingly non-linguistic conceptual states from 
counting as perception, Dharmakīrti offered in his Nyāyabindu another definition of kalpanā: 
"Conceptualization is that awareness in which there is a phenomenal representation which is fit for 
association with words."27 The commentator Dharmottara (8th cent.) explains that the association with 
25 PP, 25.17-19: "cakṣurvijñānasāmaṅgī nīlaṃ jānāti no tu nīlamiti cāgamasya 
pratyakṣalakṣaṇābhidhānārthasyāprastutatvāt, pañcānāmindriyavijñānānāṃ jaḍatvapratipādakatvācca nāgamādapi 
kalpanāpoḍhasyaiva vijñānasya pratyakṣatvamiti na yuktametat."
26 See AKB 2.24, 54 for a list and discussion of the ten mental factors found in every moment of conscious awareness: 
"vedanā cetanā saṃjñā cchandaḥ sparśo matiḥ smṛtiḥ / manaskāro 'dhimokṣaśca samādhiḥ sarvacetasi // " "Feeling, 
volition, conceptual identification, desire, contact [of sense-organ, object, and awareness], understanding, memory, 
attention, resolve, and concentration exist in every cognition."
27 NB 1.5, 25: "abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā"; cf. Dharmottara's gloss in NBṬ 1.5, 25: "abhilāpena 
saṃsargaḥ—abhilāpasaṃsargaḥ…. abhilāpasaṃsargāya yogyo 'bhidheyākārābhāso yasyāṃ pratītau sā tathoktā." The 
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words here involves the uniting in a single cognition of a nameable object with a name, with both 
appearing as part of the cognition's graspable, objective content.28 Yet, in stating that a cognition is 
conceptual if it simply is "fit" for being associated with words, Dharmakīrti's definition will count as 
conceptual even those cognitions in which a word and object do not appear as associated; in that case, 
even a newborn infant (aharjāta-bālaka), who obviously has no mastery of language, and is 
specifically ignorant of the linguistic conventions (avyutpanna-saṅketa) that govern how certain words 
are supposed to signify and name certain objects, could have conceptual cognitions (NBṬ 1.5, 26). 
To the question of how we can determine whether a non-linguistic cognition is nonetheless 
capable of being associated with with words, Dharmottara answers by essentially offering the same 
kinds of criteria for the attribution of conceptual capacities that are proposed by Newen and Bartels: 
Again, a subject has conceptual representations if it has (1) the capacity to identify and re-identify 
objects and properties, and if its representations display (2) relative stimulus-independence, as well as 
(3) an adequate level of classificatory abstraction. Dharmottara's adoption of these criteria is evident in 
his treatment of the newborn infant example. In the absence of a scientific understanding of infant 
reflexes, he reasoned that a newborn would not know to stop crying and place its mouth on a breast it is
seeing for the first time were it not for a recognition, based on its previous experience in past lives, that 
this presently perceived breast is identical in kind with that past breast which was a source of 
anonymous author of NBṬṬ (1.5, 25) also asserts that Dharmakīrti's intent in offering a new definition of kalpanā was 
to preserve the strictly perceptual nature of sensory awareness, since previous Vaibhāṣika and early Yogācāra accounts 
of kalpanā attributed conceptualization with a pervasive influence throughout all cognition: "tathā hi - vaibhāṣikā 
indriyavijñānaṃ vitarkavicāracaitasikasamprayuktaṃ kalpanāmicchanti.| yogācāramatena ca 
tathāgatajñānamadvayaṃ muktvā sarvajñānaṃ grāhyagrāhakatvena vikalpitaṃ kalpanā. jātyādisaṃsṛṣṭaṃ tu 
manojñānaṃ kalpanetyanye kathayanti. abhilāpetyādinā śabdasaṃsṛṣṭasya vikalpasya grahaṇaṃ 
nāgamaparipaṭhitānāmiti darśayati. teṣāṃ grahaṇe satīndriyavijñānasya pratyakṣatvānupapatteḥ." "The Vaibhāṣikas 
accept that sensory awareness is associated with the mental factors of vitarka and vicāra. According to Yogācāra 
thought, excepting the Tathāgata's awareness which is non-dual, kalpanā amounts to every cognition being divided in 
terms of grasper and grasped. Others [i.e., Dignāga] explain that kalpanā is a mental cognition that is associated with a 
genus, etc. With the expression 'words' and so on, [Dhamakīrti] shows his acceptance of conception as connected with 
words, not of the traditional accounts. That is because of the implausibility of sensory awareness's being perceptual if 
there is an acceptance of those [accounts]." For relevant citations of Vaibhaiṣika and Yogācāra texts, see Funayama 
1993: 63, n. 49.
28 NBṬ 1.5, 25: "abhilāpasaṃsargaḥ—ekasmin jñāne 'bhidheyākārasyābhidhānākāreṇa saha grāhyākāratayā milanam."
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nourishment.29 For Dharmottara, the infant obviously displays the capacity for re-identifying different 
instances of the same type of object, where the type in question is also sufficiently abstract—not only is
it identifying a previously and presently perceived physical object as being the same, but it would also 
be abstractly classifying that object as a source of nourishment, or as perhaps having the general 
property of iṣṭa-sādhanatā, i.e., the property of fulfilling what is desired.30 Moreover, the infant's 
cognition displays stimulus independence: Unlike perceptual content, which is causally fixed according
to the presence of a stimulus in the environment, the phenomenal content of a conceptual cognition is 
not rigidly fixed (aniyata-pratibhāsa) to, and hence arises independently of, an immediately present 
object (asannihita-viṣaya). That is because conceptualization involves synthesizing prior and 
subsequent perceptions of an object, and—especially for believers in the momentariness of reality—
previously perceived objects are no longer present.31 Though, it is because conceptual representations 
29 Later Buddhist texts (e.g., TSop, DhPr, MTaBh) clarify that our knowledge of a non-linguistic infant's conceptual 
cognitions is based on an inference from an effect (kārya-hetu) to its cause. Here, the effect is the infant's intentional 
activity, e.g., its advancing toward the mother's breast and avoidance of her finger or other body parts which wouldn't 
provide nourishment. (TSop, 278: "kutaḥ punar bālakasya kalpanā siddheti cet. tatkāryasya pravṛttyādilakṣaṇasya 
pradarśanāt. tathā hi bālako 'ṅguryādiparihāre stanādau pravartate.") For any non-linguistic creature, we can infer 
from their evident behavior of taking desired objects and giving up undesired objects that their action is the effect of a 
conceptual cognition. (MTaBh, 20: "vikalpakāryād iṣṭāniṣṭopādānaparihārāt. dṛṣṭaṃ cedaṃ kāryaṃ bālamūkādau, 
īpsitārthasvīkaraṇam anīpsitārthatyajanaṃ nāma.") In drawing this conclusion about the infant, we are relying on a 
general rule that states, "Whatever rule-governed intentional activity there is which belongs to a living being, that 
activity is preceded by conceptual cognition"; this rule is exemplified by the intentional activity of linguistically 
competent agents, whose motivating cognitions would presumably be more obviously associated with linguistic 
expression. (DhPr, 49: "yā niyamavatī pravṛttiḥ kvacitprāṇinaḥ, sā vikalpapūrvikāḥ. yathā 
vyutpannasaṅketavyavahārasya annādiviṣayā pravṛttiḥ. niyamavatī ca taditaraparihāreṇa stanādau pravṛttir 
bālakasyeti kāryahetuḥ.")
30 Newen and Bartels’s point that sufficiently abstract classification entails the presence of a minimal semantic net, i.e., an 
understanding that the intensional features of conceptual categories are connected with the features of other categories, 
could be congruent with the Buddhist theory of concept formation as exclusion of others, or anyāpoha. We will review 
some of the details of this complex theory in chapter four, but the basic idea is that our concepts pick out objects like 
cows not by capturing some real common property like cowhood. Rather, individual cows are classed together through 
a mental act of excluding everything other than what are not those cows; they are thus conceptually represented as “not 
non-cows.” In that case, we could perhaps say that our concepts would be intensionally interconnected in terms of the 
networks of exclusion they cast in relation to each other.
31 NBṬ 1.5, 27: "pūrvadṛṣṭāparadṛṣṭaṃ cārthamekīkurvad vijñānamasannihitaviṣayam, pūrvadṛṣṭasya asannihitatvāt. 
asannihitaviṣayaṃ cārthanirapekṣam. anapekṣaṃ ca pratibhāsaniyamahetor abhāvād aniyatapratibhāsam. tādṛśaṃ 
cābhilāpasaṃsargayogyam." "A cognition which unites what is previously and subsequently perceived into one object 
has as its content what is not present, because what is previously perceived is not present. A cognition which has what is
not present as its content does not depend on an object. Due to the absence of a cause for the restriction of its 
phenomenal content, the independent cognition has a phenomenal content which is unrestricted [by any presently 
perceived object]. Such a cognition is fit for association with words."
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are not rigidly fixed to a perceived object that a creature can respond to a stimulus by undertaking some
intentional activity.32 
Still, having granting that non-linguistic creatures can have conceptual cognitions in the absence
of any overt linguistic competence, Yogācāra Buddhists nonetheless reverted back to their belief that 
conceptualization and language are inseparably related, leading them to claim that even the 
linguistically innocent conceptualization of infants must be linguistic in both nature and origin. 
Evidently for Śāntarakṣita, to say that a conceptual cognition is merely capable of being associated with
words did not thereby imply that there are conceptual cognitions which are not actually characterized 
by any connection with words. According to him, "That [cognition] which is fit for the connection of a 
word with an object, even when there is no usage of words in the form of 'tree' etc., arises as if 
accompanied with linguistic expression."33 He further makes clear that conceptual cognition does not 
exist prior to a connection with linguistic expression, as though there is first a non-linguistic cognition 
with conceptual content that then gives rise to linguistic expression.34 The cognition of a linguistic 
32 Indeed, the Yogācāra Buddhists presume that all intentional activity (pravṛtti) is preceded by conceptualization, and 
specifically by a conceptual process of "determination" (adhyavasāya). Briefly, the Buddhists will claim that 
conceptualization necessarily precedes intentional action for two basic reasons. First, given the theory of 
momentariness, the object one perceives and then desires to obtain will not exist at the time one actually obtains it; 
hence, in order to motivate a practical effort towards obtaining an object which, strictly speaking, will not exist by the 
time one acts, conceptualization is needed to establish a continuity between the object perceived in the present and and 
the object to be obtained in the future. Second, while Yogācāra Buddhists supported idealism and denied the existence 
of external objects, they admitted that no ordinary person would ever be practically motivated to act if a desired object 
were known to exist only as an internal image in the mind. Hence, conceptualization motivates action by also 
superimposing an external appearance onto that which only has a mental existence. For further discussion of how the 
Buddhists understood the relation between conceptualization and action, see Dunne 2004: 298-309, McCrea & Patil 
2006, Patil 2009: ch. 5, and McAllister 2011.
33 TS 1215, 367: "śabdārthaghaṭanāyogyā vṛkṣa ityādirūpataḥ / yā vācāmaprayoge 'pi sābhilāpeva jāyate // " Having 
accepted in TS 1214 Dharmakīrti's concise definition of kalpanā as abhilāpinī pratītiḥ, Śāntarakṣita seems in this verse 
to be alluding to Dharmakīrti's other definition of kalpanā as abhilāpasaṃsargayogya-pratibhāsā pratītiḥ. Śāntarakṣita 
could thus be understood here as establishing not only the compatibility of the two definitions, but also the primacy of 
the concise definition over the expanded definition.
34 TS 1214b-d, 366: "… abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpanā kḷptihetutvādyātmikā na tu." "Kalpanā is a cognition characterized by 
linguistic expression, but it does not have the nature of being the cause of verbal expression, etcetera." The translation 
of kḷpti as "verbal expression" follows Funayama (1993: 62), who himself is following Kamalaśīla's gloss of kḷpti as 
meaning vyapadeśa, or verbal designation, while noting that the precise meaning of the term is uncertain; see Ibid., n. 
46. Kamalaśīla (TSP 1214, 366-7) explains that the word "etc." is intended to include the Abhidharma notions of 
vitarka and vicāra, as well as the early Yogācāra notion of conceptualization as generating a subject-object dualism, his 
point being that the new definition of kalpanā offered by Dharmakīrti ought not to be associated with previous Buddhist
accounts.
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designation (vyapadeśa) would be causally dependent on the presence of predicable attributes such as a
universal or trope quality, etc.; but since no such attributes actually exist, their presence in the content 
of a conceptual cognition must itself be a product of linguistic designation.35 When it comes to newborn
infants, then, the conceptual cognitions that we infer them to have on the basis of their skillful 
intentional behavior must ultimately be tied to language as well. 
In fact, although the Buddhists on the one hand could be seen as proposing a theory of innate 
concepts which precede the later acquisition of fully linguistic/conceptual abilities, they nonetheless 
took those conceptual cognitions which are present at the time of the infant's birth to originate from, 
rather than simply precede, an acquaintance with language; that is to say, infant conceptualization 
arises due to the persistence of memory traces produced by the repeated acquaintance with words and 
their referents in previous lives.36 In explaining Śāntarakṣita's statement that even the rule-governed 
activity (iti-kartavyatā) of an infant is due to the conceptualization which stems from these memory 
traces, Kamalaśīla approvingly cites the view of Bhartṛhari, a 5th century linguistic theorist and 
member of the so-called "Grammarian" school (vaiyākaraṇa/śābdika), who took all purposive action 
(artha-kriyā) to be based in language.37 Having specified the linguistic origin of infant 
conceptualization, Kamalaśīla then goes on to describe the linguistic character of its content: 
"Manifesting an object which exists only internally as if it were external, and which is distinguished by 
35 TSP 1214d, 367: "kḷptihetutvaṃ jātyādīnāmiti boddhavyam, yato jātyādiviśeṣam antareṇa na vyapadeśo 'sti." 
Kamalaśīla is apparently responding to those Buddhists who might have taken Dignāga's definition of kalpanā as 
nāmajātyādiyojanā to imply that aside from proper names, there are real universals, tropes, events, and substances 
whose predication to objects by conceptual cognition would serve to cause subsequent linguistic expression (kḷpti-hetu).
(Cf. DhPr, 47: "yadi jātyādiyojanātmikā kalpanā. sā jātyādyabhāvādeva na sambhavati.") This would be another 
erroneous Buddhist understanding of kalpanā in addition to the Abhidharma and Yogācāra views suggested by the term 
"etc." in Śāntarakṣita's verse. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla seem to address those Buddhist realists about universals in 
TS(P) 1219-1221; see Funayama 1993: 70-76, and Franco 1984.
36 TS 1216, 367: "atītabhavanāmārthabhāvanāvāsanānvayāt / sadyojāto 'pi yadyogāditikarttavyatāpaṭuḥ // "; see 
Kamalaśīla's gloss in TSP, Ibid.
37 VP 1.113, 187: "itikartavyatā loke sarvā śabdavyapāśrayā / yāṃ pūrvāhitasaṃskāro bālo 'pi pratipadyate // " See also 
Bhartṛhari's Vṛtti (Ibid., 186-7): "samāviṣṭavācāṃ ca svajātiṣu bālānāmapi 
pūrvaśabdāveśabhāvanāsaṃskārādhānāttāsu tāsvarthakriyāsvanākhyeyaśabdanibandhanā pratipattirutpadyate." 
"Knowledge regarding purposive actions, which is based on incommunicable words, arises also on the part of infants 
who are endowed with the language of their own species, due to their possession of memory traces of a past endowment
with words."
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a sound that takes the form of faint syllables, that conceptualization arises also for newborn infants, by 
means of which they later become competent for grasping linguistic conventions."38 Finally, if we can 
establish the deep connection between conceptualization and language at the level of infant cognition, 
then the existence of such a connection should be all the more evident when it comes to our own 
cognition; as Śāntarakṣita claims, "It is impossible to deny that the conceptualization which is clearly 
made known at the time of thought, imagination, etc., is as if shot through with words."39 In speaking of
conceptual cognitions as "shot through" or "penetrated" (anuviddha) by words, Śāntarakṣita is directly 
quoting a well-known verse by Bhartṛhari that encapsulated the Grammarian's account of language as 
being operative in all cognition: "There is no awareness in the world which is devoid of a connection 
with language; all cognition appears as if shot through with language."40 Of course, given their account 
of direct perceptual awareness as being free from the fictional abstractions of language, the Buddhists 
would dispute the universal scope of Bhartṛhari's claim.41
2.2 Classical Nyāya Views on the Non-Linguistic Nature of Perception
2.2.1 Vātsyāyana – All Perception is Non-linguistic (A  vyapadeśya)  
Nyāya thinkers also took exception to Bhartṛhari's view of language as permeating all cognition;
we can trace their opposition to such a view back to how perception is defined as a reliable source of 
38 TSP 1216, 367: "sā punaḥ sanmūrcchitākṣarākāradhvaniviśiṣṭam antarmātrāviparivartinam artham bahirivādarśayantī
teṣāṃ samupajāyate, yayā paścātsaṅketagrahaṇakuśalā bhavanti." See also TSop 278.4-6. 
39 TS 1217, 368: "cintotprekṣādikāle ca vispaṣṭaṃ yā pravedyate / anuviddheva sā śabdair apahnotuṃ na śakyate // "
40 VP 115, 188: "na so 'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte / anuviddhamiva jñānaṃ sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsate // " For 
more on the complex relation between Bhartṛhari and the development of the Buddhist epistemological school, see 
Herzberger 1986
41 Cf. MTaBh, 21-2: "ata evoktam 'śābyāṃ buddhāvarthasya pratyakṣa iva pratibhāsābhāvāt nāsti kalpanāyāḥ 
arthasākṣātkāritvam' iti etena yaduktaṃ pareṇa ['na so 'sti….'] tannirastam. tathā hi—ghaṭe purovartini uccāryamāṇe 
tatsamīpavartibhūtalādijñānam uccāraṇarahitam anubhūyata eva. na ca tathā tatra śabdānugato 'sti." "So it is said, 
'Conceptual cognition does not have the property of producing a direct awareness of an object, since in a linguistic 
cognition, there is no phenomenal representation of an object like there is in perception [which does produce a direct 
awareness of an object]'; therefore, what said by another [i.e., the above cited verse by Bhartṛhari]… is rejected. For 
example, When [the word 'pot'] is being uttered in the presence of a pot, a cognition of the nearby ground etc. that is 
free from the utterance [of words such as 'ground'] is still experienced. And so in that case, there is no association with 
language."
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knowledge in the root text of the tradition, the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama (2nd cent.): "Perception is a 
cognition which is produced from the contact of a sense-organ with an object, and which is non-
linguistic, non-erroneous, and determinate in nature."42 Of central importance for our discussion is how 
the tradition variously understood the qualifier "non-linguistic," or avyapadeśya, which can also be 
literally translated as "not to be linguistically designated." Vātsyāyana (5th cent.), author of the primary
commentary on the Nyāyasūtra, explains that the inclusion of the term "avyapadeśya" in the sūtra's 
definition of perception is meant to deny the thesis that our ability to verbalize a perceptual cognition 
implies the linguistic nature of perceptual cognition itself. He fashions the proponent of such a thesis as
reasoning in the following way: As many objects as there are, there are names for them; it is by means 
of these names that there is a clear notion of an object (artha-saṃpratyaya),43 and it is due to this 
notion of an object that we can use words to express it. Now, we find that even our cognition of a 
sensory object is accompanied by the name of that object; for instance, cognitions of sensory qualities 
like color and smell take the verbal form "This is a color" (rūpam iti), or "This is a taste" (rasa iti). And
since objects are cognized in association with their names, we are further able to use those names to 
speak about and designate the cognitions themselves; that is, in verbally reporting that one is aware of 
some object, one would indicate that awareness through employing the words that designate the object 
of that awareness. In the same way that we have a clear notion of an object through its association with 
words, then, we may get a clear notion of the awareness itself through its association with a name, such
that the awareness can be linguistically designated and communicated to others. In sum, we therefore 
find at every level that our cognition is inseparably associated with language, and is hence verbal in 
nature (śābda).44
42 NS 1.1.4, 197: "indriyārthasannikarṣotpannajñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam."
43 Cf. MBh 14, 5: "yenoccāritena sāsnālāṅgūlakakudakhuraviṣāṇināṃ saṃpratyayo bhavati sa śabdaḥ."
44 NBh 1.1.4, 197-8: "yāvadarthaṃ vai nāmadheyaśabdāstairarthasampratyayaḥ, arthasampratyayācca vyavahāraḥ. 
tatredamindriyārthasannikarṣotpannamarthajñānaṃ rūpam iti vā, rasa ityevaṃ vā bhavati, rūparasaśabdāśca 
viṣayanāmadheyam. tena vyapadiśyate jñānam—rūpamiti jānīte, rasa iti jānīte. nāmadheyaśabdena vyapadiśyamānaṃ 
sat śābdaṃ prasajyate."
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This Śābdika, pan-linguistic argument as presented by Vātsyāyana is characterized slightly 
differently in the commentary of Vācaspati Miśra (10th cent.), who points out that the Grammarian is 
actually making a kind of idealistic argument to establish the identity of objects with their names. We 
can presumably reconstruct the argument in the following way: If an object and its name were not 
identical, then we would be aware of an object apart from its name; but no object is ever cognized as 
separate from its name; so the object must be identical with its name.45 The Śābdika draws additional 
evidence for the identity of name and object from the fact that statements of identity in Sanskrit involve
putting two nouns into apposition by giving them the same case inflection. Hence, when one says in 
Sanskrit, "The object is called 'cow'"—"'gaur' iti artha iti"—the case agreement in the sentence 
between the name "cow" (gauḥ) and some object being mentioned (arthaḥ) signifies that there is a co-
referentiality (sāmānādhikaraṇya) between the two terms, which is to say that we are speaking of the 
same thing when the sentence mentions the object and when it mentions the object's name.46 This case 
agreement between name and object also shows that the name is not merely the means by which a 
distinct object is known. By contrast, we wouldn't expect grammatical agreement when mentioning 
sensory objects and the sense-organs that are the means of knowing them, since they are obviously not 
identical; if we were to say in Sanskrit, “He sees the color with his eyes,” the words “eyes” and “color” 
would take different case endings to distinguish their respective roles as instrument and object.47 
Finally, Vācaspati cites one more argument given by the Grammarian, to the effect that a cognition of 
an object is enhanced or diminished in clarity depending on the clarity with which an accompanying 
word is cognized. For example, a musical expert who knows the names of musical notes may be able to
more clearly discern the differences between each note in a given musical phrase, whereas a novice 
45 NVTṬ 1.1.4, 220: "sarve 'rthāḥ sarvathā sarvadā sarvatra nāmadheyānvitāḥ. nāsti so 'rtho yaḥ kadācit kvacit kathañcit 
nāmadheyena viyujyate. tadanena nāmadheyatādātmyam arthānāṃ pratijānīte.
46 Ibid.: "arthā pratīyamānā nāmadheyairupetāstatsāmānādhikaraṇyenāvagamyante gaurityartho aśva ityartha iti."
47 Ibid.: "na copāyatayā sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ ghaṭate. na hi cakṣurādisāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ rūpādyanubhavati."
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listener who doesn't know the names for the notes might only hear a indistinct jumble of sounds. For 
the Śābdika, then, this specific dependence of object on name is further proof that they are identical.48
In thus explaining how the qualifier "avyapadeśya" is intended to refute the Grammarian view 
that even perceptual cognition is linguistic in nature, early Nyāya thinkers came to evince their support 
for a kind of state non-conceptualism about perception—which, to remind of the arguments given 
above, is an ultimately untenable form of non-conceptualism and so would not stand as an obstacle to 
the revised conceptualism I am proposing. This support can also be implicitly found in the views of 
Vātsyāyāna and Uddyotakara (7th cent.), even though they made no mention of a distinction between 
non-conceptual and conceptual cognitions. Nor did they give any indication of adopting the 
controversial position of Vācaspati that the qualifiers "non-linguistic" and "determinate in nature" in 
Gautama's definition of perception are actually meant to distinguish between two types of perception—
non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) and conceptual (savikalpaka)—rather than apply equally to all instances 
of epistemically valid perceptual cognition. Perhaps the distinction between non-conceptual and 
concept-laden perceptual cognitions was not drawn by Vātsyāyana because, in writing prior to 
Dignāga's account of perception as strictly non-conceptual, he would not have been impelled to 
separately defend the existence and epistemic validity of concept-laden perceptual cognitions in the 
way that post-Dignāga Naiyāyikas were. Nonetheless, Vātsyāyana's treatment of perception as non-
linguistic set a precedent for the subsequent development in early Nyāya of state non-conceptualism 
regarding perceptual cognition. Again, the state view of non-conceptualism holds that a mental state is 
non-conceptual if a subject's relation to a representational content is not mediated by concepts, which is
to say that the occurrence of a non-conceptual state does not depend on whether a subject possesses the 
concepts relevant for articulating the state's content. Though, since it does not draw the non-
48 Ibid.: "kiṃ ca gavādiụ ṣaḍjādiṣu ca śabdāpakarṣe 'rthapratyayāpakaṛṣāt tadutkarṣe tvarthapratyayotkarṣāt 
pratyayasya ca pratyetavyotkarṣādhīnotkarṣatvāt nāmadheyotkarṣeṇārthasyotkarṣaḥ arthasya tādātmyaṃ gamayati." 
Cf. VP 111, 182: "ṣaḍjādibhedaḥ śabdena vyākhyāto rūpyate yataḥ / tasmādarthavidhāḥ sarvāḥ śabdamātrāsu 
niśritāḥ //", as well as the Vṛtti thereon. 
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conceptual/conceptual distinction at the level of content, the state view thereby allows that the same 
representational content could be shared between concept-independent and concept-dependent states. 
For Vātsyāyana, a concept-independent relation to a perceptual cognition would amount to a language-
independent relation, in keeping with the general tendency of classical Indian philosophy for equating 
concept possession with linguistic competence. To characterize perception as being non-linguistic is to 
therefore claim that perceptual cognitions occur independently of whether one knows the words for 
what one is seeing. Moreover, even when perceivers do come to grasp the name of a perceived object—
a grasp which, contra the Grammarian, is accompanied by the recognition that the object is distinct 
from its name—their perceptual cognition of the object does not itself differ from the perception they 
would have had of that object prior to knowing its name.49 And so whether one is linguistically 
competent or not, language is not operative at the time when one perceptually cognizes an object; it is 
only operative when one communicates that cognition to others.50 
Yet, although Vātsyāyana's explanation of non-linguistic perception anticipates subsequent 
developments of Nyāya non-conceptualism, many of those developments are innovations on, and in 
that sense departures from, his account. For instance, from his statement that the linguistic perceiver's 
cognition is just like that cognition of an object which belongs to a non-linguistic perceiver ("tādṛg eva
bhavati"), we may draw the implication that Vātsyāyana would not have taken there to be any 
representational or phenomenological difference between their cognitions. Moreover, there is nothing 
in Vātsyāyana's discussion to suggest that non-linguistic perceptions are non-predicative, or that non-
conceptual perceptions play a causal role in generating concept-laden perceptions. Indeed, if each term 
in the sūtra's definition of perception is to equally apply to all veridical perceptual cognitions, then a 
non-linguistic perception should also be determinate in nature, which is to say that it should be 
49 NBh 1.1.4, 198: "yadidamanupayukte śabdārthasambandhe arthajñānam, na tat nāmadheyaśabdena vyapadiśyate, 
gṛhīte 'pi ca śabdārthasambandhe asyārthasyāyaṃ śabdo nāmadheyamiti. yadā tu so 'rtho gṛhyate, tadā 
tatpūrvasmādarthajñānāt na viśiṣyate, tat arthavijñānaṃ tādṛgeva bhavati." Cf. also NVTṬ 1.1.4, 222-3.
50 NBh 1.1.4, 198: "tadevamarthajñānakāle sa na samākhyāśabdo vyāpriyate, vyavahārakāle tu vyāpriyate."
58
predicative. Vātsyāyana interprets the term "vyavasāyātmaka" as being included in the definition in 
order to prevent from counting as a veridical perceptual cognition the kind of perceptual doubt 
(saṃśaya) that occurs when one sees something at a distance and wonders, for example, "Is that a 
person or a post?" Such an uncertain awareness (anavadhāraṇa) is also generated by sense-object 
contact, and yet differs from straightforward instances of misperception or perceptual illusion such as 
seeing a mirage, which are excluded from veridical perception by the qualifier "non-erroneous." The 
inability to determinately identify the specific object that one is perceiving is not merely a product of 
the mind. Instead, one's deliberation regarding the specific identity of the perceived object is preceded 
by an indeterminacy in the perceptual cognition itself, which would presumably be manifest in the 
cognition's phenomenological character.51 This type of perceptual doubt especially arises when one 
perceives a generic feature of an object—e.g., a certain height and width which would be common to 
both a person and a post—without perceiving the particular feature that, once known, would allow one 
to ascertain the object's identity with certainty.52 For Vātsyāyana, then, a veridical perceptual cognition 
that is both non-linguistic and determinate in nature would identify an object through the perception of 
its general and particular features, without that identification having to come in the form of a verbal 
judgment. In that case, we thus find in Vātsyāyana a precursor to the revised conceptualism being 
proposed here.53
2.2.2 Jayanta Bhaṭṭa – Non-Conceptual and Concept-Laden Perceptions Share the Same Contents
The early Naiyāyika who most closely followed Vātsyāyana in advancing a notion of perception
51 Cf. Ibid.: "… evam indriyeṇānavadhārayan manasā nāvadhārayati. yacca tadindriyānavadhāraṇapūrvakaṃ 
manasānavadhāraṇaṃ tadviśeṣāpekṣaṃ vimarśamātraṃ saṃśayaḥ…."
52 See NBh 1.1.23, 464.7-11
53 In arguing that the qualifier "avyapadeśya" is not alone sufficient for preventing doubt and erroneous misperception 
from counting as veridical perceptions, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (NM 233) helpfully points out that that since doubt and 
straightforwardly erroneous cognition (viparyaya) also arise from sensory perception, they must also be non-verbal just 
as veridical perceptions are: "samyagjñānavat saṃśayaviparyayāvapi śabdollekhaśūnyau saṃvedyete…. 
samyakpratyayavattasmāt vācakollekhavarjitau / akṣavyāpārajau na staḥ na saṃśayaviparyayau // " 
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as both non-linguistic and predicative is Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (9th cent.), whose Nyāyamañjarī contains a rich
exposition of different competing interpretations of the term "avyapadeśya" and its role in the 
definition of perception. Out of the complex exchange between these interpretations emerges a more 
clear understanding of where the distinction between between non-conceptual and conceptual 
perception might lie, as well as how both forms of perception can be compatible with the sūtra's 
definition. To give an abridged summary: The first interpretation of "avyapadeśya" that Jayanta surveys
is accepted as being attributed to the "elder Naiyāyika," i.e., Vātsyāyana; on this view, the qualifier is 
meant to exclude cognitions which have become the object of a linguistic expression (śabda-karmatā-
āpanna) from counting as instances of valid perception. A sensory cognition that has been designated 
by a name such that one can say, "This is a cognition of color," is at best a byproduct of perception qua 
epistemic process (pratyakṣa-phala), rather than itself being the source of perceptual knowledge 
(pramāṇa), which is what is supposed to be captured by the sūtra's definition.54 Jayanta eventually 
settles on this explanation of "avyapadeśya" as the being the best available, but he initially admits for 
the sake of argument that the view faces a problem, namely that cognitions which are generated by a 
reliable source of knowledge do not lose their epistemic validity just because they become verbally 
expressed—the Naiyāyikas are not Buddhists in this regard. 
A second interpretation of "avyapadeśya" is thus introduced, this time attributed to unnamed 
"teachers" (ācāryāḥ).55 They take the term to be excluding those cognitions which are produced both 
from the contact of sense-organs with an object as well as from verbal testimony; an example of such a 
cognition born from both sources (ubhayaja-jñāna) is that knowledge which arises when, while looking
at some tree, a child is told by an elder, "This is a breadfruit tree." Though this cognition has a sensory 
54 NM 203: “tatra vṛddhanaiyāyikāṣtāvadācakṣate—vyapadiśyate iti vyapadeśyaṃ śabdamakarmatāpannaṃ 
jñānamucyate. yat indriyārthasannikarṣādutpannaṃ sat viṣayanāmadheyena vyapadiśyate—rūpajñānaṃ rasajñānamiti,
tat vyapadeśyaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣaphalaṃ pratyakṣaṃ mā bhūditi avyapadaśyagrahaṇam….”
55 These ācāryāḥ are thought to be followers of Adhyayanapāda, alleged author of a now-lost commentary on the 
Nyāyavārttika known as the Ruciṭīkā. For more discussion, see Marui 2006.
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origin since it arises while perceiving the tree, the verbal testimony of the elder is what is primarily 
responsible for the child's knowledge of the presently perceived object as being the semantic value of 
the words "breadfruit tree." Because words are here the primary instrument (karaṇa) for producing this 
cognition, the cognition would be considered to be derived from language (śābda), and hence would be
excluded as an instance of genuinely perceptual cognition by the qualifier "non-linguistic." 
At this point, a third camp of "commentators" (vyākhyātāraḥ)—later referred to as followers of 
Pravara (pravarāḥ), an author of a lost commentary on the Nyāyabhāṣya—steps in to disagree, arguing 
that there is no good reason for counting this sort of hybrid perceptual/verbal knowledge as exclusively 
verbal rather than perceptual, in which case the previous explanation of "avyapadeśya" as just 
excluding such hybrid cognitions is no longer tenable. Instead, these commentators claim that 
"avyapadeśya" is included for the sake of warding off a fault of incompatible applicability 
(asambhava-doṣa), or a fault consisting in a definition's failing to apply to any instance of what ought 
to be defined. As an example, we might say that to define a bachelor as a married man is to commit this
fault of asambhava, as a married man cannot possibly have the property of being a bachelor. In the case
of the Nyāya definition of perception, these commentators allege that if the qualifier "non-linguistic" 
were left out, then this flaw of incompatible application would befall the definition, because it would 
thereby be possible to count as genuinely perceptual those cognitions whose contents are linguistically 
structured and which therefore cannot be said to originate from the sense-organs. The term 
"avyapadeśya" hence excludes all cognitions that can be considered as instances of concept-laden 
savikalpaka perception—a typical example is "This is a cow" (gaur iti jñāna)—and not merely hybrid 
cognitions which are produced just at the time of being verbally taught the name of a perceived object. 
We can understand these commentators as essentially claiming that a verbally expressed cognition like 
"This is a cow" actually amounts to saying "This is called 'cow'"; as they put it, the cognition is 
structured such that its object is explicitly predicated as being the semantic value of a signifying word 
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(vācaka-avacchinna-vācya-viṣayatā). A genuinely perceptual cognition, on the other hand, does not 
have this sort of linguistically structured content; for one, the eyes literally don't see the name that 
qualifies the object, and the ears on their own do not hear which object the name is picking out.56 
Accordingly, given the presence of the qualifier "avyapadeśya" in the definition of perception, only the 
cognition which occurs at the first contact of the sense-organ with an object, before a signifying word 
for the object can be recalled, should be counted as perceptual. At the time of such a non-conceptual 
perception, no mention of generic words like "This is something" is experienced by anyone, whether 
linguistically competent or not.
But the Teachers reply that concept-laden perceptual cognitions like "This is a cow" cannot be 
verbal in nature, and do not present an object as being expressed by a qualifying word. The 
Commentators are evidently claiming the cognition is verbal because it is both produced by means of a 
word, and that same word qua qualifier appears as part of the objective content of the cognition. But 
this is a contradiction: If the word is fulfilling the role of an instrument employed in the act of 
producing the cognition, then the same word cannot also be the patient of that action; that is, the word 
itself is not grasped again when the cognition is produced and one grasps the word's referent. The word 
instead is just a means for understanding something other than itself. We would never come to know a 
word's semantic value if the savikalpaka perceptual cognition that shows us the referent were itself 
verbal, that is, if it had the word as part of its content. If the savikalpaka cognition “This is a cow” did 
have a word as its content, then we would be left to think that the word "cow" is its own semantic 
value, rather than the perceived cow itself.57 So the Teachers propose that the primary instruments for 
56 NM 207: "na hīndriyakaraṇakamidaṃ jñānaṃ bhavitumarhati cakṣuṣo viśeṣaṇāviṣayatvāt, viśeṣye ca 
śrotrasyāsāmarthyāt." Nor could both sense-organs make up for each other’s respective limitations by functioning 
together to produce a single audiovisual cognition with a linguistically structured content. According to Nyāya (NS 
1.1.16), we do not simultaneously experience cognitions produced by different sense-organs, because the mind (manas) 
attends to sensory inputs in a serial manner; literally, the mind is an atomic substance that makes contact with one 
sense-organ at a time. So we could not experience a single cognition as arising simultaneously from the auditory and 
visual sense modalities. (Ibid.: “na ca yugapadindriyadvayadvārakam ekamutpadyamānaṃ jñānaṃ kvacit dṛṣṭam.”)
57 NM 214: “na ca śabdoparakte ‘rthe sambandhaṃ buddyate janaḥ / gośabdavācyo gośabda iti hi grahaṇaṃ bhavet //”
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the production of a savikalpaka cognition are still just the sense-organs, which are causally assisted by 
the memory of a word. That the memory of a word is involved in producing the cognition "This is a 
cow" does not in any way diminish the perceptual nature of the cognition's content, nor cut it off from 
its sensory origin—the savikalpaka cognition is as much a perception of the cow as the initial 
nirvikalpaka perception that triggered the memory of the word "cow." Since the remembered word does
not itself become part of the perceptual content, we should not hold that the content of a nirvikalpaka 
cognition is by nature distinct from that of a savikalpaka cognition. 
A debate then takes place over the issue of what accounts for the difference between non-
conceptual and conceptual cognitions. The Commentators propose that the difference must lie in their 
having distinct contents; without a distinction at the level of content, there could be no distinction at the
level of a cognition's phenomenological appearance.58 For instance, given a certain state of affairs in 
which there is a man holding a staff, it is possible for three sorts of perceptual judgments to occur: One 
can come to judge, "This is a man who has a staff"; "This is a man"; or, "This is a man and a staff." The
first cognition appears differently than the rest because the man is perceived as being qualified by the 
staff, i.e., he is identified in terms of his possessing a staff, whereas the other cognitions take on the 
appearance that they do because they aren't structured in terms of a qualifier/qualified or 
subject/predicate relation. The first cognition's appearance would further be distinct from other 
cognitions which identity the same man in a different way, such as "This is a man wearing a white 
robe." Thus, just as the first cognition differs from the others because of its qualificative structure, the 
savikalpaka cognition "This is a cow" appears differently than a nirvikalpaka cognition because it 
cognizes the cow as being qualified or identified by the word "cow."59 A nirvikalpaka cognition, on the 
other hand, appears differently than a savikalpaka cognition because it does not involve the verbal 
58 NM 216: "na hi viṣayātiśayamantareṇa pratibhāsātiśayo bhavitumarhati."
59 Cf. NM 206: "tatra yathā daṇḍīti śukla[?vāsā] iti vā pratyayo viśeṣaṇāvacchinaviśeṣyaviṣayatayā sātiśayatvam aśnute, 
tathā gaurityādipratyayo 'pi vācakāvacchinnavācyaviṣayatvāt sātiśayaṃ bhajate."
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identification of its content. In response, the Teachers argue that the phenomenological difference 
between the two cognitions can also stem from the different means by which they are produced, rather 
than from an essential difference in their contents. Unlike the perception of just the man unspecified by 
any attributes, the perceptual cognition of the man as being qualified by the staff is produced by a prior 
cognition of the qualifier—one has to be aware of the staff before one is aware of the man as having the
staff. But whether or not they are caused by a prior awareness of a qualifier, our perceptual cognitions 
take the man himself as their primary object. To extend this reasoning to savikalpaka perceptions, the 
recollection of a name 'cow' is part of the causal conditions that give rise to the awareness appearing in 
the form, "This is a cow." Whether or not they are preceded by the memory of a name, however, the 
savikalpaka and nirvikalpaka cognitions still take the perceived cow as their primary object. The debate
thus concludes with the Teachers having the last word—the content of savikalpaka cognitions are not 
linguistically structured, and so do not pose a threat of being incompatible with the definition of 
perception and the term "avyapadeśya."
After again rehearsing the Teachers' claim that "avyapadeśya" is intended to exclude hybrid 
cognitions produced by the sense-organs in conjunction with verbal instruction, a final challenge to the 
perceptual nature of savikalpaka cognitions is given: If such hybrid cognitions are non-perceptual 
because they are generated by verbal instruction, then the same must be the case for cognitions like 
"This is a cow," because the judgement that a perceived object is a cow is preceded by a memory of the
name that one was taught at the time of learning that this sort of object is to be called "cow"—thus, all 
verbally expressed savikalpaka cognitions must similarly stem from verbal instruction, whether that 
instruction is presently being heard or is being remembered. No successful rejoinder is offered on the 
part of the Teachers. But the admission that savikalpaka cognitions cannot be perceptual in nature is 
ultimately not a desired outcome for any Naiyāyika. Indeed, concept-laden perceptions are the "life-
breath" of Nyāya philosophy: its metaphysical understanding of the world as structured in terms of real 
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objects and their properties is vivified, as it were, by the epistemological fact that our predicative 
perceptions of these objects are directly and correctly representing the structure of the world as it is, 
rather than concocting such structure out of linguistic fictions.60 Moreover, all of the non-perceptual 
sources of knowledge—inference, testimony, and analogy—depend in some crucial way on concept-
laden perceptions which identify objects as having certain properties. Hence, because adopting the 
Teachers' interpretation of "avypadeśya" as excluding hybrid verbal cognitions inevitably leads to a 
denial that concept-laden perceptions can be perceptual at all, and because such a denial leads to dire 
consequences for Nyāya philosophy as a whole, the interpretation must be rejected. Even hybrid 
cognitions should not be counted as being verbal in nature—when one is learning for the first time that 
a certain perceived object is the referent of some word, one is still perceiving that object all the same.
Though Jayanta claims that the deficiencies of the Teachers' and Commentators'61 respective 
interpretations of "avyapadeśya" leave Vātsyāyana's original view as the most suitable explanation,62 he
surveys one last interpretation and does not raise any criticisms against it. According to some unnamed 
"other" scholar (aparaḥ), the author of the sūtra uses the term "avyapadeśya" to show that concept-
laden perceptions like "This is a cow" are also non-linguistic in nature. Four brief reasons are given in 
support of their being perceptual: First, these perceptual judgments only arise in tandem with the 
60 See Chakrabarti 1998: 318-9; 2001: 4.
61 Jayanta explicitly rejects the view of the Commentators/followers of Pravara that all perception is nirvikalpaka at NM 
232: "pravarapakṣaḥ pratikṣipta eva, yataḥ śabdānuvedhajātamapi pratyakṣamupapāditam."
62 Jayanta also claims that Vātsyāyana's position—namely, that "avyapadeśya" excludes those cognitions which have 
become the object of linguistic designation from counting as perceptual sources of knowledge—does better justice to 
the literal meaning of the term. To the extent that the gerundive suffix in the word "vyapadeśya" is being used 
specifically with a respect to some object that "ought to be linguistically designated," the negative term "avyapadeśya" 
would in that case be referring to some object—here a perceptual cognition qua source of knowledge (pramāṇa)—
which ought not to be linguistically designated; NM 223: "tatra tāvat karmaṇi kṛtye kṛte vyapadeśyaśabdo 
yathārthataro bhavati." We can thus temper Chakrabarti's (2001: 5) worry that a literal translation of "avyapadeśya" as 
"unmentionable" would make perceptual cognitions ineffable, and thereby flout the general Nyāya view that every 
existing thing is denotable by words. Jayanta's point (which Chakrabarti acknowledges) is just that the linguistic 
verbalization of a perceptual cognition is superfluous to its being a reliable source of knowledge; when the cognition is 
verbalized, then it turns from a source of perceptual knowledge into an object of verbal knowledge. NM 224: 
"rūpādiviṣayagrahaṇābhimukhaṃ hi tadakṣajaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇaṃ phalaṃ vocyate. yadā tu tadeva śabdenocyate 
rūpajñānaṃ rasajñānamiti, tadā rūpādijñānaviṣayagrahaṇavyāpāralabhyāṃ pramāṇatām apahāya 
śabdakarmatāpattikṛtāṃ prameyatāmevāvalambata iti…."
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operation of the sense-organs; in the absence of functioning eyes, one would generally not be able to 
have a savikalpaka cognition which visually identifies an object in some way. Second, the savikalpaka 
cognition is as phenomenally vivid as a non-conceptual perception. Third, no signifying word appears 
in the cognition. And fourth, ordinary people would agree that savikalpaka judgments are perceptual.63 
Finally, to illustrate how savikalpaka perceptions remain non-linguistic even though it arises from the 
recollection of a word, an analogy is given. The causal assistance that the memory of a word provides 
to the functioning of the sense-organs is akin to that of a lantern; just as a lantern's illumination can 
help us to see an object without us needing to see the lantern itself, a recalled word can similarly shine 
light on an object even though the word itself is not the object of perception.64
The sum result of Jayanta's discussion is that the qualifier "avyapadeśya" must apply to both 
nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perceptions—the latter is non-linguistic even as it is verbalized, because 
verbalization is ancillary to its perceptual origin and character.65 Non-conceptual and concept-laden 
perceptions are distinct from each other only on account of the different causal conditions that give rise 
to them—savikalpaka cognitions are preceded by a nirvikalpaka perception that triggers the memory of
a relevant name, whereas a nirvikalpaka perception arises at the first moment of sense-object contact. 
This association with words brought about by memory is the only additional element to concept-laden 
perceptions; otherwise, nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perceptions do not differ in terms of their content 
or phenomenology. Both cognitions share the same content, in that they perceive real substances and 
their properties alike. The phenomenological implications of this shared content can be further drawn 
out in light of the Nyāya view that cognitions are "formless" (nirākāra) or transparent. On this view, 
cognitions do not access objects through an intervening mental image; instead, we instead see 
"through" the cognition directly to the object itself. Put another way, when one perceptually cognizes 
63 NM 224: "spaṣṭatvāt vācakābhāvāt indriyānuvidhānataḥ / lokasya sammatatvācca pratyakṣamidamiṣyate //"
64 Ibid.: "sabdānusmṛtijatve 'pi na śābdaṃ jñānamīdṛśam / sabdasmṛtiḥ sahāyaḥ syāt indriyasya pradīpavat //"
65 See also NM 256-7.
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an object as being blue in color, it is not that one's cognition is itself blue. Since the phenomenal 
properties of a cognition would be dependent on the cognition's representational content, and the 
representational content of concept-laden perceptions does not differ from that of non-conceptual 
perceptions, it should follow that non-conceptual and concept-laden perceptions share the same 
essential phenomenological character. The savikalpaka perception is just as perceptually vivid as the 
nirvikalpaka perception; the former is not a faint copy of the latter, as Buddhists were inclined to think. 
Another suggestion that this is Jayanta's own conclusion comes at a point in his defense of savikalpaka 
perception against challenges by the Buddhists. He addresses an objection that since conceptual 
cognitions involving demonstrative perceptual concepts (idantā-grāhi-vikalpa) follow after non-
conceptual perceptions, the phenomenal vividness with which they appear would just be borrowed 
from the non-conceptual perceptions. Jayanta answers by pointing out that cognitions have no form 
apart from their contact with an object, so the vivid phenomenal appearance of the conceptual cognition
must be due to its object being directly accessed; the conceptual cognition wouldn't be a mere shadow 
of a non-conceptual cognition.66 
2.2.3 Vācaspati Miśra – Non-Conceptual Perceptions Are Non-Propositional
Though the interpretation examined by Jayanta of "avyapadeśya" as applying to both non-
conceptual and conceptual perceptions seems to accord better with the original intent of the definition 
in the Nyāyasūtra, this interpretation ultimately was not upheld in the Nyāya tradition. Instead, later 
Naiyāyikas deferred to the account of Vācaspati Miśra, who notably argued that the qualifier "non-
linguistic" covered only non-conceptual perceptions, while the term "determinate in nature" only 
qualified concept-laden perceptions. One of Vācaspati's chief motivations for postulating this internal 
66 NM 250: "na ca nirvikalpapṛṣṭhabhāvitvakṛtameṣāmetadrūpam; viṣayasaṃsparśamantareṇa svatassvaccharūpāṇāṃ 
jñānānāmevamākāratvānupapatteḥ kiṃ nirvikalpapṛṣṭhabhāvitā kariṣyati ? tadanantarabhāvinī hi smṛtirapi 
kvaciddṛśyata eva; na ca sā tacchāyāvatī iti durāśāmātrametat."
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division within the definition was the development among non-Buddhist philosophers of the view that 
non-conceptual perceptions are phenomenologically distinct from savikalpaka cognitions, insofar as 
the former cognize an object in an indeterminate, inchoate manner. A nirvikalpaka perception sees the 
general and specific properties of an object, but does not clearly disambiguate or identify them; a 
savikalpaka perception, on the other hand, determinately identifies an object as having some attribute, 
and evinces this identification through the verbalized judgment that accompanies it. Vācaspati's 
understanding of non-conceptual and conceptualized perceptions had its most immediate precedent in 
the thought of the Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (7th cent.). Kumārila claimed that, in the 
course of perceiving an object, there is first a non-conceptual perceptual cognition which, similar to 
how infants and other non-linguistic creatures perceive, merely sees a "pure", undifferentiated object. 
At the non-conceptual stage, one sees just an individual object together its generic (sāmānya) and 
unique (viśeṣa) features, but one does not experience those features as being generic or unique.67 John 
Taber explains: 
Prior to any determinate, conceptual awareness of an object there occurs a bare awareness, a 
“mere seeing,” of the object, which consists simply in looking at it or otherwise sensing it 
without yet fully discriminating it. In such an awareness one sees something – indeed, as 
Kumārila will explain… an object endowed with various properties – but does not explicitly 
identify its properties nor ascertain its sameness or difference from other objects. One identifies 
it, for example, neither as a “cow” that is the same as other cows, nor as a “white cow.” The 
object is present, rather, simply as some individual with various features whose relationships 
to other objects are unclear. (2004: 94)
The identification of a perceived object comes at the stage of conceptualized perception, wherein the 
object's unique and common identity is determined through an act of conceptual comparison with other 
67 ŚVpp 112-113, 156: "asti hyālocanajñānaṃ prathamaṃ nirvikalpakam / bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam // 
na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṃ tadānīm anubhūyate / tayor ādhārabhūtā tu vyaktir evāvasīyate // "
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objects.68 Consequently, memory is integral to conceptualization; one needs to retain the perceived 
features of an object in order to compare them with previously experienced objects. Of course, 
Kumārila will defend against the Buddhists the genuinely perceptual nature of such concept-laden 
cognitions: conceptualized perceptions arise due to the functioning of the sense-organs, even if they are
also preceded by the memory of an object's name.
With a phenomenological distinction between non-conceptual and concept-laden perceptions 
now being more clearly recognized by non-Buddhist philosophers, there needed to be another way to 
explain their difference other than to suppose that they cognize two different types of objects. The 
Buddhists could link the distinction between phenomenally vivid perceptions and unclear conceptual 
cognitions to the causal relations they bear to their respective objects—unique, momentary particulars 
versus (fictional) general properties—but such an explanation would not be available to the Naiyāyikas,
who maintained that nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka cognitions are causally related to the same sorts of 
objects. Vācaspati's response was to more directly suggest what had been implicit in previous non-
Buddhist accounts like Kumārila’s, namely that the objects of perception are to be distinguished from 
the manner in which they presented in the representational content of a perception. With this distinction
between the object and content of perception, Nyāya began to move away from the basic state view of 
non-conceptual perception put forth by Vātsyāyana—they no longer held that the same perceptual 
cognition could be non-conceptual or conceptual depending on whether the perceiver possesses the 
linguistic concepts that would articulate the perceived object. Rather, a non-conceptual perception is a 
distinct type of cognition because its content is structured differently than the content of concept-laden 
perceptions. 
In particular, Vācaspati interpreted the non-linguistic/avyapadeśya nature of nirvikalpaka 
perceptions in terms of their lacking a qualificative structure. This interpretation is significantly based 
68 Cf. Śvpp 119, 156 which refers to a nirvikalpajñāna: "na hyasādhāraṇatvena paravyāvṛttyakalpanāt / 
viśeṣānugamākḷpteḥ sāmānyam iti nāpi tat // "
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on a conceptual and etymological analysis of the term "avyapadeśya" used in the sūtra. First, a 
linguistic designator (vyapadeśa) is identified as any kind of qualifying attribute that can be predicated 
to an object; Vācaspati follows Dignāga in taking such attributes to be names, universals, quality-
tropes, actions, and substances. To say these attributes are linguistic designators is just to say that their 
predication to an object is what allows for verbally articulated propositional expressions like "This is a 
cow" or "This is white." All savikalpaka cognitions engage with their objects by virtue of a qualifier-
qualified relation (which, as we will also see for Vācaspati, need not always be verbally expressed). 
Then, having understood the notion of a linguistic designator in terms of predicable attributes which are
not themselves words, Vācaspati identifies the object of such linguistic designation—i.e., what is 
vyapadeśya—as being a qualificandum (viśeṣya), i.e., that object which is to be qualified by such 
predicable attributes. In that case, when the sūtra speaks of a perceptual cognition as avyapadeśya, it is 
referring to that cognition in which an object to be linguistically designated, i.e., predicatively 
qualified, is absent. Here in Vācaspati's subtle analysis, we catch where he has departed from the 
interpretations of "avyapadeśya" given by Vātsyāyana and Jayanta. In order to respond to the Śābdika 
argument that the verbal expression of perceptual cognition demonstrates perception’s essentially 
linguistic character, Vātsyāyana understood the term "non-linguistic" as referring to the perceptual 
cognition itself. In support of Vātsyāyana, Jayanta pointed out that "avyapadeśya" is included in the 
definition of perception qua epistemic source of knowledge, because a perceptual cognition which has 
become an object of a linguistic expression/designation is not itself doing the epistemic work of 
apprehending a sensory object—instead, perceptual cognitions can furnish us with knowledge without 
themselves needing to be verbalized. 
Vācaspati's interpretation of "avyapadeśya," however, more directly addresses the Śābdika 
belief in the inseparability of object and name by shifting the inexpressibility of perception from the 
cognition to its objective content. A cognition now counts as non-linguistic when it does not identify an
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object as being qualified by some predicable attribute. The objects of a nirvikalpaka perception are 
ontologically the same as a savikalpaka perception—both are caused by real universals, tropes, etc. Yet,
a nirvikalpaka perception presents the qualifying attribute on its own, rather than in a qualificative 
relation with its bearer.69 Even though they are metaphysically related, both a property and property-
possessor are represented in a nirvikalpaka perception merely by themselves, and not as being a 
property and a property-possessor respective to each other.70 In this way, Vācaspati brought Nyāya 
closer to a content view of perceptual non-conceptualism—nirvikalpaka perceptions are distinct from 
savikalpaka perceptions because they present their objects in a pre-predicative, non-propositional 
manner.
2.2.4 Concept-Laden Perception Can Be Propositional and Non-Linguistic
However, while Vācaspati argued for restricting the scope of term "non-linguistic" to just 
nirvikalpaka perceptions, he nonetheless suggested that the propositional structure of savikalpaka 
perceptions also need not be linguistically realized, and that savikalpaka perceptions do not necessarily 
owe their propositional structure to the causal involvement of language. Following the Buddhist and 
non-Buddhist tradition of understanding concept possession in terms of knowing the semantic value of 
a word, he posited a causally assistive role for the recollection of an object's name in generating a 
conceptualized perception of that object. In the case of a linguistically competent perceiver, there is 
first the non-conceptual sensory perception of just an object devoid of any association with its name; 
then, because of the perceiver's knowledge of that object as being the semantic value of a word, a 
memory trace (saṃskāra) of the word is activated in the perceiver's mind; the activated memory trace 
69 NVTṬ 1.1.4, 220: "tatra vyapadeśo viśeṣaṇamupalaḳṣaṇaṃ vā nāmajātyādi, tat karma vyapadeśyaṃ viśeṣyaṃiti yāvat. 
tadyathā ḍittho 'yaṃ gaurayaṃ śuklo 'yaṃ kamaṇḍalumānayaṃ gacchatyayamiti sarvaṃ hi savikalpakaṃ 
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvena vastuṣu pravartate. avidyamānaṃ vyapadeśyaṃ yasmiṃstadavyapadeśyaṃ 
jātyādisvarūpāvagāhi, na tu jātyādīnāṃ mitho viśeṣaṇāviśeṣyabhāvāvagāhīti yāvat." 
70 Cf. Ibid., 234: "arthau hi rūparūpibhāvena sthitāvapi nāpātajanmanā jñānena tathā gṛhītau, api tu svarūpamātreṇa."
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then gives rise to a recollective awareness of the word, which would further lead the perceiver to apply 
that word to the object in a perceptual judgment.71 Yet, Vācaspati goes on to clarify that linguistic 
recollection does not ultimately serve a functional role in producing sensory cognitions with conceptual
content, since infants and other non-linguistic creatures also have savikalpaka perceptions in the 
evident absence of any prior knowledge and recollection of some linguistic convention.72 (In this way, 
Vācaspati rejected the theory of innate linguistic concepts put forth by the Grammarians and the 
Buddhists.73) Consequently, he specifies another language-independent type of memory involved in the 
production of savikalpaka perceptions. In order for linguistically competent perceivers to recollect the 
name of an object, they must first recognize that the object they are perceiving is of the same type as 
the object they saw at the time of learning its name; only then do they realize that the name they 
learned applies to the currently perceived object. Thus, sensory concepts are involved in a more 
fundamental task of recognizing the identity of an object’s past and present states. Indeed, it is through 
figuring in the content of a sense-born conceptual cognition that the past and present states of an object 
are perceptually manifested as unified.74 This more basic form of conceptual recognition and synthesis 
would presumably be responsible for generating the savikalpaka perceptions that belong to non-
linguistic creatures. But, whether or not a perceiver knows an object as being the semantic value of a 
word, the recollection of the object’s name is merely incidental to this more primary type of sensory 
conceptualization.
71 Ibid., 222: "yattu śabdānupāye 'pi jñāne śabdaḥ pūrvaṃ bhavati tadgṛhītasaṅketasya prathamam 
indriyārthasannikarṣādālocanena śabdasaṃsargarahitenālocite 'rthemātre tasyārthabhedasya śabdabhedena 
sambandhāt śabdaviṣayaḥ saṃskāraḥ prabodhyate. prabuddhaḥ śabdasmṛtiṃ janayati."
72 Ibid., 229: "na tvidriyajavikalpotpādaṃ pratyastyupayogaḥ kaścit śabdasmaraṇasya. anyathā bālamūkādīnāṃ 
nendriyajaḥ syādvikalpaḥ śabdasmaraṇābhāvāt." 
73 See Ibid., 222: “na ca teṣāmapi prāgbhavīyaśabdabhāvanānugamena tatsāmānādhikaraṇyamiti sāṃpratam. na khalu 
rūpādyātmanaḥ śabdasya rūpādivaiśadyenāvaiśadyaṃ saṃbhavati. yugapad 
vaiśadyāvaiśadyarūpaviruddhadharmayogena bhedaprasaṅgāt. vaiśadye tu vyutpannavadavyutpanno ‘pi śabdaiḥ 
vyavaharet, na tu saṃbandhagrahaṇamapekṣeta.”
74 See Ibid., 222-3: “saṅketasamayavartyavasthāsmaraṇaṃ tūpayujyate, vastunastadānīntanedānīntanāvasthābhedavata 
ekasyendriyajena vikalpenākalanāt. śabdastu saṃpātāyāto na niveśayatyātmānam indriyaje vikalpe.... anena hi 
piṇḍasya pūrvāparāvasthāvartinīmekatāmindriyajavikalpagocaratvena darśayati nu tu śabdaniveśanam.”
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To conclude, Vācaspati made two major impacts on the Nyāya theory of perceptual cognition. 
First, he drew Nyāya closer to a more tenable form of perceptual non-conceptualism, by explaining the 
distinction between non-conceptual and conceptual perceptions in terms of how their respective 
representational contents are differently structured. At the same time, the move toward adopting a 
content view of non-conceptualism also allowed him to advance beyond previous Nyāya accounts of 
savikalpaka perception, because it clarified how predicative structure is more central to the nature of 
concept-laden cognition than verbal articulation. Vācaspati accordingly added further nuance to the 
Nyāya account of perceptual concept possession by specifying a language-independent role for 
memory in perceptually identifying objects.
2.3 Conclusion
This chapter has surveyed how classical Buddhist and Nyāya philosophers variously understood
the relation between language, concepts, and perception. For Buddhists, language and 
conceptualization are inherently disposed to distorting our perceptual experience of the world as it is. 
Nyāya takes the exact opposite stance – conceptual and linguistic categories can directly map onto the 
ontological categories of real existents. Nonetheless, I have suggested that there is a common trend in 
the development of Buddhist and Nyāya views on nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa, from Vasubandhu to 
Dignāga, and from Vātsyāyana to Vācaspati Miśra. Earlier Buddhists and Naiyāyikas either explicitly 
or implicitly assumed some form of state non-conceptualism, according to which a mental state is non-
conceptual if a subject does not possess the concepts necessary for articulating that state's 
representational content. Vasubandhu and Vātsyāyana can both be read as having adopted a state view, 
insofar as what makes a perceptual state non-conceptual is whether a perceiver employs conceptual 
capacities needed for forming and expressing a determinate judgment about what one perceives. At the 
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same time, both thinkers allow that the perceptual state itself is not fundamentally different when 
experienced by either non-conceptual or concept-possessing perceivers.
Yet, as we saw in Chapter 1, the state view on its own cannot plausibly sustain the distinction 
between non-conceptual and concept-laden states. Appropriately enough, we find that Buddhists and 
Naiyāyikas later shifted towards a content view in claiming that non-conceptual and concept-laden 
states differ in terms of their respective contents. Buddhists after Dignāga believed that perception 
cognizes a completely different type of object than conceptual states, while Vācaspati and later 
Naiyāyikas held that, unlike concept-laden perceptions, the contents of non-conceptual perception are 
not propositionally or predicatively structured. This distinction gets explicitly formalized in Navya 
Nyāya through the claim that non-conceptual states have a different type of intentional content 
(viṣayatā) than conceptual states.
A second shared development emerging from Buddhist and Nyāya debates was a move to ground 
concept possession upon the possession of memory-traces (saṃskāra), rather than on explicitly 
linguistic capacities. Correctly applying a word to an object requires that one remember previously 
learned linguistic conventions, as well as the type of object that has been associated with that word in 
past experience. But memory can also play a similar and more fundamental role in enabling non-
linguistic perceptual classification: The capacity for correctly identifying an object under some 
perceptual category requires that one remember how previously experienced objects were categorized 
as being of the same type. Present sensory input triggers and then is synthesized with categorical 
information stored in the memory-traces of past experience; once activated, these memory-traces 
ultimately contribute to an occurrent perception’s predicative content and the identification of a 
perceived object’s category membership. For both Buddhists and Naiyāyikas, memory thus came to 
play a more fundamental role in the classification of perceived objects than language as such. This 
more refined, memory-based theory of perceptual concept possession closely anticipates the sort of 
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revised conceptualism I am advocating in the dissertation. In the next two chapters, I will look to later 
developments in Nyāya’s content view of non-conceptual perception, and its refined memory-based 
theory of perceptual concepts. To Gaṅgeśa and subsequent philosophers in the Navya Nyāya tradition,  
Vācaspati’s revised account of non-conceptual and concept-laden perceptions did not go far enough in 
realizing that there is an important connection between the conceptual structure of perceptual contents 
and the possibility of our experiencing them in conscious visual experience.
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Chapter 3
 Concepts and Conscious Perceptual Content: A Revised Nyāya/Kantian Approach
3.1 Introduction – Phenomenal Character and Non-Conceptual Perception
What would it be like to have an experience that you could never be aware of? What 
would be the phenomenological character of a mental state that you could in principle never 
notice you were having? And most importantly, how could we even find the answers to questions
about the phenomenology of such states if we can never introspectively detect their presence? 
One contemporary set of responses to these questions has been offered by Ned Block (1995, 
2007, 2011), by way of famously distinguishing between phenomenal consciousness and access 
consciousness. To briefly explain, phenomenal consciousness entails that there is a “what-it-is-
likeness” to undergo a certain mental state; in other words, a phenomenally conscious state 
possesses experiential properties that constitute what it is like to be in that state. The phenomenal
character of a conscious state can be further divided into two components: qualitative character 
and subjective character (Kriegel 2009). A phenomenal state's qualitative character is comprised 
of the sensory properties—i.e., its phenomenal content—that determine what it is like to, say, 
taste green tea or touch velvet, while the subjective character of a phenomenal state refers to 
what it is like for me to undergo such experiences from within a first-personal perspective. 
Phenomenal states may differ from each other in terms of their respective qualitative characters, 
but they are all thought to share the same subjective character of being “for me”, or what Block 
calls a property of “me-ishness” (1995: 235), which is common to all phenomenally conscious 
states. 
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Access consciousness, on the other hand, is logically distinct from phenomenal 
consciousness, as it can be explained in purely functional, non-phenomenal terms. According to 
Block, a mental state is access-conscious when its representational content is available or poised 
for use by cognitive faculties involved in rational processes of reasoning, speech, and action 
(Ibid., 231). He links his notion of access consciousness to the Global Workspace theory of 
consciousness developed by Bernard Baars (1988); on Baars's model, perceptual representations 
become conscious through being attentionally filtered and selected for “broadcast” to a global 
storage space of working memory, where they are accessible to cognitive mechanisms 
responsible for reporting, reasoning, evaluating, deciding, and remembering (Block 2007: 491).
However, Block disputes the implication of the Global Workspace theory and similar accounts 
that representational states are endowed with a conscious phenomenal character just by virtue of 
their being cognitively accessible. In theory, there need not be anything it is like for a state to be 
accessed; the state's representational content could be taken up by other cognitive states without 
itself ever appearing to a subject.
To that end, Block has pointed out cases which are phenomenally conscious without 
being access-conscious, or cases where there is “phenomenal experience that the subject not only
does not know about, but... cannot know about” (Ibid., 498). He provides an intuitive example of
one such case: 
Suppose you are engaged in intense conversation when suddenly at noon you realize that 
right outside your window there is—and has been for some time—a deafening 
pneumatic drill digging up the street. You were aware of the noise all along, but only at 
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noon are you consciously aware of it. That is, you were P-conscious of the noise all 
along, but at noon you are both P-conscious and A-conscious of it. (1995: 234). 
Before noon, you were unable to know about your phenomenal awareness of the drill noise 
because the awareness was unattended, and therefore unavailable to be introspectively reported. 
Yet, we shouldn't conclude from the fact that an awareness of the noise was unknowable to you 
at the time that you didn't have that awareness to begin with. Instead, Block argues that your 
ability to report an impression of having had an awareness of the noise before noon indicates that
you must have had a conscious but unattended, unintrospectible experience of the drill noise. 
Subjective reports of such impressions, when combined with inferences to the best explanation 
of certain neuroscientific evidence which we won't canvass here, establishes for Block that richly
detailed phenomenal states can occur in the absence of attention and cognitive access. 
Of special interest is Block's claim that non-conceptual perceptions would be 
paradigmatic examples of access-independent phenomenal states (2014: 170-2). Block's interest 
in non-conceptual perception stems from his concern with the so-called “measurement problem,”
or the problem of distinguishing the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural 
basis of cognition. This problem presents itself because our primary means for knowing whether 
a subject has had a conscious experience is through the report that the subject gives about having
that experience or not – but if an experience can be reported, then it must have been globally 
broadcast for higher-order cognitive processing. The neural correlates of this experience would 
be tied up with the correlates of cognitive access mechanisms. On the other hand, if we want to 
detect the neural correlates of phenomenally conscious states, we will need to find a different 
source of evidence for their existence that doesn't rely upon a subject's introspective reports. 
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To that end, Block suggests non-conceptual representation as a target for neuroscientific 
investigations of phenomenal consciousness. He distinguishes non-conceptual and conceptual 
representations at the level of their contents – non-conceptual contents are intrinsically distinct in
structure and function from the conceptual contents. He briefly glosses a concept as “a 
constituent of a thought or judgment that applies to something,” in the way that the concept 
“circular” applies to a plate in the judgment, “That plate is circular” (Ibid., 171). Perception on 
his account is non-conceptual because it doesn't apply concepts to objects: A perceptual 
representation may pick out an individual plate and the property of circularity, but the 
representation itself does not assert that the plate is circular, that is, it “does not say that anything
is so or is the case” about the plate and its circularity (Ibid.). Such an assertion only arises in the 
conceptual judgments like “That is circular,” or “That is a circular plate,” which one makes on 
the basis of the non-conceptual perception. Thus, the content of these judgments are 
propositionally structured, whereas perceptual content is iconic and non-propositional. As for the
functional difference between perceptual and conceptual representations, Block writes that they 
have distinct computational roles: “percepts are to a first approximation elements in a modular 
system whereas concepts have a much wider role in thinking, inferring, deciding and the like” 
(Ibid.). Block argues that since creatures can have conscious perceptual representations 
independently of their having or exercising any of corresponding conceptual abilities, these non-
conceptual representational states would hence count as instances of phenomenal consciousness 
existing in the absence of cognitive accessibility.
In this chapter, I want to challenge the theoretical links that Block draws between non-
conceptual perception and phenomenal consciousness, by examining how the 14th century Navya
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Nyāya philosopher Gaṅgeśa and the 18th century German philosopher Immanuel Kant 
understood the role of concepts in structuring conscious perceptual experience. Both Kant and 
Gaṅgeśa could agree with Block that there are essentially non-conceptual perceptions, i.e., 
sensory representations which are pre-predicative and do not classify an object as having some 
general property. Yet, I argue for a reading of both thinkers according to which they claim that 
the intentional, object-directed content of conscious perceptual experience must be predicatively 
and hence conceptually structured; and conversely that essentially non-conceptual perceptions do
not have a conscious phenomenal character. I motivate this reading by examining the reasons 
why both thinkers held that there is no phenomenological evidence for the existence of 
essentially non-conceptual perceptions, as these perceptions, unlike other conscious 
representations, can never be apperceived. I propose a revisionary interpretation of their accounts
of apperception and perceptual concepts as laying out the causal conditions responsible for 
integrating perceptual contents into a subject's unified conscious experience. These conditions 
crucially include the conceptually modulated activity of attention and memory. I conclude that in
the absence of the attentional integration of their contents, essentially non-conceptual perceptions
would hence fail to take on a phenomenal character of first-personal givenness.
In section 2 of this chapter, I explain how Navya Nyāya distinguishes the contents of non-
conceptual and concept-laden states of awareness. Then, to provide context for my interpretation 
of Gaṅgeśa’s stance on the phenomenal character of non-conceptual perception, I discuss the 
suggestive descriptions of non-conceptual phenomenology offered by Kumārila. Gaṅgeśa, 
however, denies that it is ever possible to give a first-personal report of what it is like to 
experience a non-conceptual perception. Gaṅgeśa and later Naiyāyikas further offer two basic 
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reasons why non-conceptual perceptions can never be apperceived, and are ultimately 
inaccessible to the faculty of attention. In the final analysis, I suggest that non-conceptual 
perceptions for Gaṅgeśa ought to be interpreted as being subpersonal, subdoxastic, and 
ultimately subconscious states.
After considering the merits of Monima Chadha’s Kantian reading of Gaṅgeśa, I move in 
section 3 to develop a revised conceptualist reading of Kant, one which highlights how Kant 
more explicitly connects the non-apperceptibility of non-conceptual perception to their lacking a 
subjective character of first-personal givenness. I then answer objections from non-conceptualist 
interpretations of Kant from a revised conceptualist framework, according to which the 
perceptual concepts are capacities for identifying an object through the visual predication and 
classification of that object's properties. This framework is more consistent with Gaṅgeśa's 
theory of perceptual concepts, and further ameliorates some of the unwanted consequences that 
arise from Kant's sharp division between sensibility and understanding. The fifth section 
concludes with suggestions about how a naturalized Kant-Gaṅgeśa account of perceptual 
concepts may account for the role of attention and memory making perceptual representations 
phenomenally accessible.
3.2   Navya Nyāya on the Contents of Non-Conceptual and Concept-Laden Perception  
However implausible it was in capturing the original intent of the Nyāyasūtra's definition 
of perception, Vācaspati Miśra's innovative interpretation of perception's non-linguistic nature 
was widely influential for subsequent thinkers of the Nyāya tradition. Later Naiyāyikas not only 
concurred with Vācaspati's reading of the definition's qualifier “non-linguistic” (avyapadeśya) as
applying to nirvikalpaka perceptions alone—more importantly, they adopted Vācaspati's view 
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that non-conceptual perception is non-linguistic to the extent that its content is linguistically 
inexpressible. This linguistic inexpressibility was ultimately taken to be indicative of an essential
difference in how the respective intentional contents of non-conceptual and conceptual 
cognitions are structured. The difference between non-conceptual and conceptualized 
perceptions no longer hinged merely on whether a perceiver possesses the linguistic competence 
required for verbalizing the content of a perceptual state. Instead, a perceptual state was 
considered to be non-conceptual if its content lacked a propositional/predicative structure 
altogether. Appropriating the view of the Buddhist logician Dignāga, Vācaspati characterized the
non-propositional nature of non-conceptual perception in terms of its being free from any 
association of objects with predicable attributes (nāma-jātyādi-yojanā-rahita). In other words, a 
non-conceptual perception does not identify or categorize an object according to the properties it 
possesses; the object's properties are not cognized as qualifying, or being predicated to, the 
object. Being cognized in a pre-predicative or unqualified fashion, the objective content of such a
non-conceptual cognition thus cannot be linguistically designated or expressed, especially given 
that Nyāya semantic theory took the referents of nominal terms to be propertied particulars—on 
their account, words refer to particular objects through descriptively predicating properties to 
them (see Ganeri 2011: ch. 3.4). Furthermore, since an object is not cognized by a non-
conceptual state in a way that allows for its linguistic designation, the linguistic inexpressibility 
of non-conceptual content would extend to the non-conceptual state itself; as Vātsyāyana pointed
out (NB 1.1.4, 198), we speak about our cognitions through naming the objects cognized, so that 
without designating the latter, we could not communicate the former (Mandal 1987: 130).  
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Concept-laden perceptual states (savikalpaka-pratyakṣa), on the other hand, are amenable
to linguistic expression because they are qualificative cognitions (viśiṣṭa-jñāna), i.e., they 
cognize their objects as being qualified by some distinguishing features. The content of 
savikalpaka cognitions hence implies the compositional, object-property structure that we are 
taking to constitute conceptual/propositional content. Specifically, Navya Nyāya caches out the 
content of a savikalpaka cognition as a structured complex composed of a qualificand (viśeṣya), 
a qualifier (viśeṣaṇa/prakāra), and the relational tie between the qualificand and qualifier 
(saṃsarga/vaiśiṣṭya). Though these same objects may be presented in a nirvikalpaka perception, 
a savikalpaka perception takes the extra step of seeing these objects as actually being structured 
in a predicative relation. For Navya Nyāya, it is in a savikalpaka cognition that these three types 
of object are bestowed with “objecthood” (viṣayatā), i.e., the property of being an intentional 
object of cognition. Corresponding to these three types of objects, then, are three ways in which 
an object can figure in a cognition's intentional content. In a conceptualized perception of a blue 
pot, for instance, the blue color will be perceptually attributed with the property of being a 
predicate (prakāratā) of the pot; the pot will be seen as being what is predicated/qualified 
(viśeṣyatā) by the blue color; and the metaphysical relation of inherence will be cognized as 
being what connects or relates (saṃsargatā) the blue color to the pot. B. K. Matilal (1985: 374) 
accordingly suggests that savikalpaka perceptions should be understood as instances of “seeing-
as,” insofar as they perceptually identify objects as looking or being a certain way. The word 
“prakāra,” which literally means a sort, kind, way, manner, or mode, is thus aptly used in 
referring to a perceptual cognition's predicative content—predicating a feature to an object is 
what distinguishes it as being one sort of thing and not another. 
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Moreover, Navya Nyāya articulated another level of cognitive identification which is 
technically distinct from the identification achieved through predication. Like Frege, Navya 
Nyāya thinkers employed a notion of cognitive senses or modes of presentation that specify the 
manner in which a cognition picks out an object, in order to account for how two words could 
share the same extensional referent but have a different intensional meaning, and how a single 
object could be seen in two different ways (see Ganeri 2011: ch. 5). When it comes to the 
intentional contents of a qualificative cognition, there can be specifying or delimiting features 
(avacchedaka) that determine how the objective components of the cognition are presented. To 
see a blue pot as being a blue pot entails that the pot which serves as the qualificand of the blue 
color is being delimited by a further property of potness which inheres within it—otherwise, if 
some other property like substancehood is thought to be what specifies the qualificand 
(viśeṣyatā/dharmitā-avacchedaka), then the intentional content of the cognition will change and 
the object will be perceptually identified as being a blue substance rather than as being a blue 
pot. Similar specification can take place in a savikalpaka cognition for the entities serving as the 
qualifier and the relational tie. Taken together, these two forms of cognitive identification—i.e., 
the awareness of an object under the guise of a qualifying predicate, and the further specification 
of a cognition's intentional contents in terms of delimiting modes of presentation—constitute 
what Matilal calls Navya Nyāya's “theory of identification of objects through descriptions or 
information about them” – that is, “I cannot identify an object unless I already possess some 
information about it” (1986: 350). We will soon explore the Nyāya account of how we come to 
acquire and possess such identifying information about objects.
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As for nirvikalpaka cognitions, we can appreciate how Navya Nyāya reformulated 
Vācaspati's definition of non-conceptual perception in light of its characterization of qualificative
cognition. According to the 14th century philosopher Gaṅgeśa, whose Tattvacintāmaṇi was 
considered to be the root text of the Navya Nyāya tradition, to say a cognition lacks a connection
with attributes like names, universals, etc. (nāma-jātyādi-yojanā-rahita) is to say that it is a 
cognition in which the relational tie between qualifier and qualificand does not figure (vaiśiṣṭya-
anavagāhin). That is, the qualifier and qualificand are present in a non-conceptual perception, 
but they are not seen as being related. Moreover, absent an awareness of such a relation, the two 
entities that would putatively serve as qualifier and qualificand in a savikalpaka cognition would 
not be seen in a nirvikalpaka perception as being a qualifier or a qualificand. Consequently, 
Gaṅgeśa also characterizes non-conceptual cognition as devoid of predicative content 
(niṣprakāraka)—a non-conceptual cognition fails to endow entities with either the property of 
being a qualifier or the property of being a qualificand, properties which they come to possess 
when they become the intentional contents of qualificative cognitions.1 Though, since the three 
kinds of intentional objects endemic to conceptual/predicative contents are not found in a non-
conceptual cognition, later Naiyāyikas posited that nirvikalpaka cognitions have a fourth kind of 
intentional contenthood (viṣayatā) distinct from that of savikalpaka cognitions, since they could 
1  Even though Gaṅgeśa's term “niṣprakāraka” literally means “devoid of a predicate/qualifier,” the term is 
understood to imply that the qualificand and relation also are not presented in a non-conceptual cognition under 
the modes of qualificandhood or relationhood. Cf. TarSD, 135: “niṣprakārakamiti. 
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandhānavagāhi jñānamityarthaḥ”; TarSNP, 136: “tathā ca jñānatvaghaṭitaṃ 
viśeṣyatvaśūnyatvam, viśeṣaṇatvaśūnyatvaṃ saṃsargatvaśūnyatvaṃ ceti lakṣaṇatrayaṃ paryavasitamiti 
bhāvaḥ.” However, even though nirvikalpaka cognitions also do not present a qualificand as being a qualificand,
nirvikalpaka cognition is still referred to primarily as “devoid of a predicate/qualifier” (niṣprakāraka); as 
Tatacharya explains, this is to specifically show that nirvikalpaka perceptions are not themselves caused by a 
prior cognition of a qualifier. TarSDBP, 23: tathā ca nirviśeṣyakaṃ jñānaṃ nirvikalpakamityapi śakyate vaktum.
tathā anuktvā niṣprakārakamiti vadatāṃ maṇikārāṇām ayam āśayaḥ—yathā savikalpakasya viśiṣṭajñānatvāt 
tataḥ pūrvaṃ viśeṣaṇajñānaṃ kalpyate, tathā nirvikalpakahetutayā jñānāntaraṃ nāpekṣitamiti.”
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not accept the existence of totally contentless, non-intentional cognitions.2 This fourth type of 
non-conceptual viṣayatā hence represents for Navya Nyāya a way to draw an essential, and 
therefore non-trivial, distinction between non-predicative (niṣprakāraka) structure of non-
conceptual contents and the predicative (saprakāraka) structure of conceptual contents.
Gaṅgeśa's central inference for the existence of non-conceptual perception can be 
rendered as follows: One's very first concept-laden perceptual cognition of a cow, expressible in 
the form “That is a cow,” is generated by a prior cognition of the qualifier such as cowhood, 
because the perceptual cognition is a qualificative cognition.3 This line of argument rests upon 
the general causal rule that every qualificative cognition (viśiṣṭajñāna) is produced in part by a 
prior cognition of the qualifier (viśeṣaṇajñāna) that is being predicated to some object.4 The rule 
relates back to the Nyāya understanding of qualificative cognitions as identifying objects through
descriptions or information about them—such information must be known beforehand in order 
for it to be used in identifying some particular entity. Gaṅgeśa gives other examples of cognitive 
identification that would be based on the prior awareness of a relevant qualifier: For instance, 
one may infer from a distance that a mountain is on fire because of the visible presence of smoke
there. In the inferential knowledge that the mountain has fire (“parvato vahnimān”), the fire is 
2 Cf. NSMD 58, 432: “na caivaṃ nirvikalpasya nirviṣayakatvāpattisturīyaviṣayatāyā eva tatra svīkārāt.” See 
Bhattacharya 1990: 52-59 for Gadādhara's discussion of why the viṣayatā of nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka 
cognitions must be distinct.
3 TCM, 864: “prāthamikaṃ gauriti pratyakṣaṃ jñānaṃ janyaviśeṣaṇajñānajanyaṃ janyaviśiṣṭajñānatvāt 
anumitivat.” The adjective “generated” (janya) is added to the probandum (“janyaviśeṣaṇajñānajanyam”) and  
the probans (“janyaviśiṣṭajñānatvāt”) to make an exception for God's cognitions, which for Nyāya are eternal 
and so could never be causally produced by some prior cognitions. The rule that qualificative cognitions are 
produced by cognitions of a qualifier holds just for mortal, non-omniscient beings.
4 Gaṅgeśa's own definition of perception as “jñāna-akaraṇaḳam” (TCM 595) allows that a viśiṣṭa-jñāna can be 
perceptual even though it is directly preceded by another cognition, and not by a sensory connection with 
objects. That is, any cognition which does not have another cognition as its chief instrumental cause (karaṇa) 
counts as an instance of perception. A chief cause is understood as bringing about its effect through the  
operation of some intermediate cause (vyāpāra); in the case of perception, the connection of an object with the 
sensory organs gives rise to a nirvikalpaka cognition, which in turn produces a savikalpaka cognition. See 
Phillips & Tatacharya 2009: 334-335 for more discussion.
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cognized as qualifying the mountain. For this qualificative cognition to arise at the conclusion of 
the inferential process, one has to have an antecedent understanding of the probandum (sādhya-
prasiddhi)—i.e., fire—as existing everywhere that the probans—i.e., smoke—is present; 
understanding fire in this way is what leads one to have a qualificative cognition that identifies 
the mountain as having a fire on it. Another example comes from the Nyāya theory of perceptual 
illusion, according to which erroneous perceptions involve a memory-based misattribution of a 
qualifier to an object (Phillips & Tatacharya 2009: 615). In order to misperceive, say, a rope as a 
snake, one has to have seen snakes before, which is to say that one has to have a prior 
acquaintance with snakehood. The present case of misperception arises due to the activation of a 
memory trace left by one's past experience of snakes, upon which the remembered property 
snakehood becomes available to be mistakenly experienced as qualifying the perceived rope.
Navya Nyāya postulates the existence of nirvikalpaka perceptions because not all prior 
acquaintance with a qualifying feature can come from past experience and memory; for direct 
realists such as the Naiyāyikas, perception must at some point enter into the picture of how we 
acquire knowledge of the external world. With that in mind, Gaṅgeśa restricts the scope (pakṣa) 
of his inference to one's first concept-laden/qualificative perception of a cow—if one has never 
seen a cow before, then one could not depend on the memory of previously seen cows for 
identifying the presently perceived object as a cow, that is, for seeing the cow as qualified by 
cowhood. Therefore, the prior acquaintance with the qualifier cowhood required for seeing the 
object as a cow must come from perception itself, specifically in the form of a pre-predicative, 
unqualified, nirvikalpaka perceptual cognition that arises immediately after the eyes make 
contact with the object, and immediately prior to the arising of the qualificative cognition. 
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Gaṅgeśa gives a powerful argument for why this perceptual cognition of a qualifier must be non-
conceptual, i.e., pre-predicative and unqualified: If it is established that all qualificative 
cognitions are produced by prior cognitions of a qualifier, then an infinite regress would result if 
the prior cognition of a qualifier must itself be conceptual/qualificative. In other words, if the 
qualifier cowhood must itself be cognized as qualified by some other property, then this 
qualificative cognition of cowhood would require as its cause another prior cognition of that 
qualifying property; and if this latter cognition is again qualificative, then the regress of 
cognitions continues, leading to the undesirable consequence that an infinite series of cognitions 
would have to occur before a single qualificative perception could arise. To stop the regress, 
Gaṅgeśa thus claims that before one can for the first time perceive a cow as a cow, one must 
have a direct perceptual acquaintance with cowhood itself, shorn of any other qualifying 
features, any delimiting modes of presentation, and any cognized association with the particular 
cowhood-possessing cow.
3.2.1 Pre-Gaṅgeśa Views on the Purported Phenomenology of Non-Conceptual Perception
What is of immediate interest to us in this chapter is Gaṅgeśa's denial that we can have 
any phenomenological or introspective evidence for the existence of non-conceptual perceptions.
The Navya Nyāya stance that non-conceptual perceptions are phenomenologically inaccessible is
a significant byproduct of their move toward more clearly adopting a form of content non-
conceptualism, and is a further point of departure from earlier non-Buddhist views on non-
conceptual perception. Whereas the Buddhist logicians characterized nirvikalpaka perception as 
being more phenomenologically vivid and direct than conceptual cognitions, non-Buddhist 
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thinkers like Kumārila and Vācaspati understood non-conceptual perceptions to be 
phenomenologically indeterminate. This indeterminacy in the phenomenal appearance of non-
conceptual cognitions was evidently linked to the indeterminacy of their representational content.
On the non-Buddhist account, the object of a non-conceptual perception is merely seen to be an 
undifferentiated particular; such a non-conceptual awareness does not overtly discriminate or 
identify the generic and unique features of the object that would mark its commonality with, and 
distinctness from, other objects. Kumārila hence likened non-conceptual perceptions to the 
perceptual states of newborn infants or non-linguistic creatures, who lack the concepts that 
would enable them to classify an object according to its universal or particular nature.5 
A more illustrative example of non-conceptual perception's indistinct phenomenal 
character comes during an argument against the Buddhist view that no concept-laden state can 
also be a genuinely perceptual state. For the Buddhists, one reason why conceptualized states 
could not be perceptual is because, being preceded by non-conceptual perceptions, they do not 
occur immediately after the sense-organs make contact with an object; hence, if the Nyāya and 
Mīmāṃsā schools take the defining feature of a perceptual cognition to be its being produced 
through sense-object contact, then only non-conceptual perceptions should be admitted as 
genuinely perceptual, since they are the most obvious candidates for being the direct causal 
output of the sensory process (Taber 2005: 100).6 To this objection, Kumārila responds by 
pointing out certain cases where we would regard the cognition that follows after an initial 
perception of an object as being just as genuinely perceptual as the initial perception: When one 
enters into a dark room after coming out of bright sunlight, for example, the objects in the room 
5 9Vpp 112-113, 156: "asti hyālocanajñānaṃ prathamaṃ nirvikalpakam / bālamūkādivijñānasad:śaṃ 
śuddhavastujam // na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṃ tadānīm anubhūyate // tayor ādhārabhūtā tu vyaktir evāvasīyate // "
6 See also Taber 2005: 51-61 for more discussion of the characterization of perception given in Mīmāṃsāsūtra 
1.1.4.
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might not distinctly appear even though they are being seen in one's field of vision; after one's 
eyes adjust to the dim light, one is then able to clearly perceive the objects in the room and 
identify their various attributes.7 This latter awareness is obviously no less perceptual than the 
initial indistinct awareness, which thus shows for Kumārila that, so long as there remains a 
causal link between objects and the sense faculties, a conceptualized cognition that arises some 
moments after an initial non-conceptual perception can nonetheless be considered as a genuine 
output of the perceptual process. 
But beyond generally contributing to the plausibility of concept-laden perceptual states, 
Kumārila's argument gives us a vivid glimpse into the vague phenomenal character of non-
conceptual perception. In comparing non-conceptual perceptions to the experience of momentary
blindness that occurs when one's eyes abruptly adjust to dim light, Kumārila seems to suggest 
that the absence of conceptual identification is responsible for the phenomenally indiscernible 
appearance of objects in a nirvikalpaka perception. Conversely, the possession of conceptual 
abilities enables a perceiver to skillfully discriminate objects in cases where they would not be 
noticed by the untrained eye; for instance, a novice radiologist may be confused by the similarity
that a cancer patient's X-ray shares with images from normal patients, and thereby fail to discern 
in the X-ray the presence of a tumor. Kumārila's own example is that of an untrained music 
listener who merely hears a song and cannot distinguish between the different notes. 
Though, we may perhaps be over-interpreting Kumārila in taking his examples to show 
that, on his account, there is a direct correlation between concept possession and the phenomenal
determinacy of a perceptual image. Indeed, given that Kumārila and the early Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika 
7 9Vpp 126-7, 157: “na hi praviṣṭamātrāṇām uṣṇād garbhag:hādiṣu / arthā na pratibhāntīti g:hyante nendriyaiḥ 
punaḥ // yathā tv ābhāsamātreṇa pūrvaṃ jñātvā svarūpataḥ // paścāt tatrāvabudhyante tathā 
jātyādidharmataḥ // ”
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thinkers subsequent to him had not fully developed an essentialist form of content non-
conceptualism, and because they still understood concept possession primarily in terms of 
linguistic mastery, they retained traces of the state non-conceptualist view that a perceiver who 
does not possess any relevant concepts could still undergo a cognition with the same perceptual 
content as a perceiver who does possess such concepts. As far as the state view is concerned, 
both perceivers could be aware of an object in the same phenomenal manner, ceteris paribus; but
the non-conceptual perceiver would not be able to conceptually identify the object as being of a 
certain type—to use a modern distinction, the non-conceptual perceiver could see a cow without 
seeing that it is a cow. Kumārila states that novice music listeners, who lack musical training and
therefore do not know the names of specific musical notes, still hear the same distinctions 
between notes as expert listeners would hear, though they would be unable to identify the notes 
as distinct. Similarly, someone who is seeing a cow for the first time and does not know the word
“cow” could still perceive the universal cowhood resident in the cow, without actually seeing 
that the the object is a cow.8 Hence, it seems that Kumārila's account is ambiguous as to whether 
there ultimately is a phenomenological difference between non-conceptual and concept-laden 
perceptions that would principally stem from a difference in their contents. Whereas the previous
analogy of being blinded while entering a dark room could be read as giving credence to the idea
that nirvikalpaka perceptions look or appear differently than concept-laden perceptions—that the
phenomenal appearance of non-conceptual perceptions would itself be indistinct and 
indeterminate—Kumārila's example of listening to music seems to suggest that the 
8 9Vpp 237cd-242, 162: “vimanaskā yadā kecit sambaddham api ceindriyaiḥ / na budhyate tathā cānye 
sād:yśādivimohitāḥ // tatra yo 'rthaṃ vivekena kauśalāt sad:śeṣv api // sūkṣmaṃ vāpi prapadyeta tasya bhrāntir 
na tāvatā / yathā ṣaḍjādibhedena gāne laukikavaidike // vivekenāvagacchanti yeṣām tatsaṃsk:tā matiḥ / 
gānamātraṃ vijānanti tatrānadhik:tās tu ye // tadajñānān na mithyātvaṃ vaktuṃ śakyaṃ vivekinām / te hi 
ṣaḍjādiśabdebhyo vināpy eṣāṃ viviktatām // yathāvad adhigacchanti tadvad gotvādivastv api / saṅkīrṇam 
arthamātraṃ tu budhyante 'bhyāsavarjitāḥ // ”  
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discriminative clarity which concepts introduce to awareness is merely discursive or epistemic in
nature (Taber 2005: 144).9 That is, the object of a non-conceptual perception appears in a 
“mixed” or “confused” manner (saṅkīrṇam10) just to the extent that some specific attribute has 
not yet been conceptually highlighted, i.e., linguistically designated.
3.2.2 Gaṅgeśa on the Attentional Inaccessibility of Essentially Non-Conceptual Perception
Leaving aside the uncertainty in Kumārila’s account regarding the phenomenology of 
non-conceptual perception, the thesis I wish to unambiguously attribute to Gaṅgeśa is this: If a 
perceptual cognition's content has a conscious phenomenal character at all, then it must not be 
essentially/genuinely non-conceptual. From the outset of his discussion, Gaṅgeśa offers an 
implicit rebuke of Kumārila's non-conceptualist account by explicitly rejecting (albeit in the 
voice of his own opponent) the sort of phenomenological or introspective evidence that it rests 
upon. That evidence may take the form of an experiential report like, “This object wasn't clearly 
discerned by me before, but now I distinguish it clearly”; Kumārila's interpretation of such a 
report would be that the perceiver initially had a non-conceptual perception which, after the 
perceiver better distinguished the object's properties, then gave way to a conceptualized 
9 Kumārila's commentator Umveka confirms that a non-conceptual perception grasps a distinct object without the 
help of the object's name. He further suggests that it is somewhat misleading for Kumārila to say that non-
conceptual perceivers cognize the mere object in an indistinct or confused manner (“saṅkīrṇam arthamātraṃ tu 
budhyante 'bhyāsavarjitāḥ”), since even in a nirvikalpaka cognition, the conceptualizable attributes (universals, 
qualities, actions, etc.) of an object also distinctly appear, just as any sensory quality would. Umveka explains 
that Kumārila considers the object of a non-conceptual perception to be indistinct by virtue of its not appearing 
as being designated by a name; the discrimination (viveka) that he goes on to mention stems from the object's 
appearing as linguistically designated upon the recollection of its name. 9VVT, 180: “nanu nirvikalpake 'pi 
jātiguṇakriyādayo vivekenaivāvabhāsante yathā rūpasparśagandhādayaḥ; saṅkīrṇārthāvagame tu 
śabdaviśeṣasmaraṇaṃ na syāt;  ataḥ kimidamucyate “saṅkīrṇamarthamātraṃ tu” iti? satyamevametat; 
saṃjñitvābhānena tu saṅkīrṇatāṃ manyate. śabdasmaraṇottarakālaṃ tu saṃjnitayā pratibhāsanādvivekamāha.”
10 See also Vācaspati's mention of a propertied particular as being non-conceptually perceived in a vague/confused 
manner (saṃmugdham); NVTṬ 1.4, 233.20-1: “sa khalvindriyārthasannikarṣādālocya jātimantaṃ 
saṃmugdhamartham....”
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perception of the same object. For Gaṅgeśa, however, if a perceptual cognition is genuinely non-
conceptual, then it lacks predicative content whatsoever—in a non-conceptual perception, the 
object is not seen as qualified by any of its attributes. On the other hand, the initially indistinct 
cognition reported by the perceiver need not be interpreted as having been totally devoid of 
predicative content; like the subsequently more determinate perception, the initial cognition 
could also have identified its object under some qualifier. The latter cognition would differ from 
the former just insofar as the perceiver came to more clearly discern the identity of the object by 
having come to cognize more of its properties.11 The indeterminacy of the reported initial 
cognition is due to the paucity of information at its disposal for identifying its object; according 
to the characterization of nirvikalpaka perceptions given by the Naiyāyika Keśava Miśra (13th 
cent.), the initial cognition might simply take the form, “This is something” (kiñcid-idam iti).12 
Sparse as it may be, the initial indistinct perception still has predicative content all the same, and 
therefore cannot be a genuinely nirvikalpaka, i.e., niṣprakāraka, cognition on Gaṅgeśa's 
account.13 What's more, it turns out that introspective reports can never serve as proof for the 
existence of non-conceptual cognitions, since only savikalpaka cognitions can bring about, and 
thus be inferred from, verbal reports.14 Though it is possible to infer from the statement, “There 
is a cow,” that a subject just had a perceptual cognition of the cow as qualified by cowhood, it is 
not possible to similarly infer the presence of a nirvikalpaka cognition on the basis of such a 
report—no one can ever talk about the nirvikalpaka cognition they just experienced. 
11 TCM, 857: “nāpīdaṃ na vivecitaṃ pūrvamadhunā vivecayāmītyanubhavapramāṇakālocanavikalpau, 
bahuviśeṣaṇajñānājñānābhyāṃ tadupapatteḥ.”
12 KTaBh, 33: “tato 'rthsannik:ṣṭendriyeṇa nirvikalpakaṃ nāmajātyādiyojanāhīnaṃ kiñcididamiti jñānaṃ jāyate.”
13 Tatacharya (1992: 320) confirms that a nirvikalpaka cognition could not properly be said to have the form, “This
is something,” as “somethingness” would become the cognition's predicative content/prakāratā, thereby 
rendering the cognition to be savikalpaka in nature: “tathā sati kiṃcittvaprakāratvena tasyāpi [i.e., 
nirvikalpakajñānasya api] savikalpakatvāpatteḥ.”
14 TCM, 857: “na ca vyavahāraḥ, tasya savikalpakasādhyatvāt.”
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As a matter of fact, it is not possible for perceivers to even notice that they are having a 
non-conceptual perception such that they could be in the position to report its existence, because 
nirvikalpaka cognitions are introspectively undetectable. This tenet of Gaṅgeśa's non-
conceptualism bears explaining, as it is crucial for our overall development of the theoretical link
between the conceptual structure and conscious accessibility of perceptual cognitions. Now, it is 
not as though Gaṅgeśa took the conscious character of a cognition to depend on its being 
introspected—while Naiyāyikas were broadly committed to understanding cognitive states as 
essentially conscious,15 they were equally committed to the idea that there are many cognitions 
which are consciously experienced and yet pass unnoticed by the subject.16 It is also worth noting
that Nyāya (and its sister school, Vaiśeṣika) further distinguished states of conscious 
awareness/cognition (jñāna) from other inner mental states such as pleasure, pain, desire, and 
aversion: Since the latter states were regarded as lacking intentional contents of their own, and 
since Nyāya understood all conscious awareness to be intentional, such states could figure in 
conscious awareness only insofar as they become the objects of cognition, rather than being 
essentially conscious states themselves.17 
To explain how inner mental states—cognitive or non-cognitive—become introspectively
detected by the subject, Nyāya posited a distinct mental sensory faculty known as manas that is 
responsible for a wide variety of mental activities, including the perception and apperception of 
15 To support his claim that “consciousness” and “jñāna” are synonymous for Nyāya, J.N. Mohanty (1989: 25) 
cites NS 1.1.15 (435): “buddhirupalabdhirjñānamityanarthāntaram”, along with Vācaspati's comment (NVTṬ 
1.1.15, 437), “buddheḥ svābhāvikaṃ caitanyamāstheyam”; “consciousness should be regarded as the inherent 
nature of buddhi” [and thus we should construe the notion of buddhi as a conscious state, not as an unconscious 
instrument of cognition as Sāṃkhya thought].
16 The Nyāya view thus stands opposed to other Indian reflexivist accounts which took the conscious character of 
cognitions to be constitutively tied with self-awareness, either in the sense that the first-person “I” is always 
aware of its own cognitions (according to Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā), or that each individual cognition is aware of 
both its objective content and itself (Yogācāra Buddhism). For an entry into the complex debates in Indian 
philosophy over the nature of self-awareness, see Matilal 1986: ch. 5 and Ram-Prasad 2007: ch. 2.
17 See Matilal 1986: ch. 9 and Ganeri 2012: ch. 10.
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inner mental states.18 Apperception, or anuvyavasāya, specifically refers to an introspective 
second-order cognition that takes a first-order perceptual cognition (vyavasāya) as its own 
cognitive object. For instance, one initially perceives some silver object and has a cognition 
expressible in the form, “This is silver”; with this cognition being completely object-directed, the
perceiver would take notice of just the silver and not of the cognition itself. Subsequent to the 
initial perception, the perceiver can then become introspectively aware of its perception of silver,
and thereby have a cognition of the form, “I am aware this is silver.” Nyāya took such 
introspective awareness of mental states to be itself perceptual in character, that is, to be 
instances of mental perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa).19 Given the inability of external sense organs
to directly perceive inner mental states, there must be a distinct sensory faculty by means of 
which the self cognizes its own mental states; that faculty is manas.
More fundamentally, manas was also understood as being the faculty of attention, 
determining what the knower becomes conscious of by mediating between the multitude of 
simultaneous inputs provided by the external sense organs. Naiyāyikas pointed out that even 
though each of the external senses may be receiving information about their respective objects at 
the same time, we generally attend to, and hence consciously cognize, just a select set of those 
objects at any given time. They took this phenomenon to be especially evident in cases of what is
now called inattentional blindness (see Simons & Chabris 1999), where a perceiver remains 
18 Vātsyāyana in NBh 1.1.16, 438 enumerates the functions of manas by way of listing the various mental states 
and faculties from which we can infer its existence: memory, inference, linguistic understanding, doubt, 
intuition, dreaming, cognition, reflection, the perception of states such as pleasure, and states such as desire, etc. 
In his discussion of doubt (saṃśaya; NBh 1.1.4, 198), Vātsyāyana also points to manas as the means by which 
the knower apperceives (anuvyavasāya) a determinate perceptual cognition (vyavasāya): “sarvatra ca 
pratyakṣaviṣaye jñāturindriyeṇa vyavasāyaḥ, paścānmanasānuvyavasāyaḥ....”
19 Viśvabandhu Tarkatīrtha (Shaw 1996: 236) emphasizes that while the content of the apperceptive cognition, like 
all other determinate cognitions in the Nyāya scheme, is propositionally structured and hence linguistically 
expressible, the cognition's content is not identical with its linguistic expression, nor does language play a 
necessary role in the cognition's generation. The fact that the anuvyavasāya state is perceptual in nature implies 
that it is to be distinguished from the verbal report that may follow from it.
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unaware of what would seem to be obviously noticeable objects in a visual scene, due to its 
attention being fixed elsewhere.20 The selective function of manas can also be triggered 
involuntarily, as when a sensory stimulus of particular intensity—e.g., a loud noise, or stepping 
on a thorn—grabs one's attention and thereby forces its way into the conscious awareness of a 
perceiver who had no intention or desire to become aware of it.21 Both types of cases exhibit to a 
more extreme degree what is going on in all moments of perceptual experience, namely that 
certain sensory inputs become privileged and thereby rise to the level of conscious awareness 
over other simultaneously present stimuli.22 In serving as an attentional filter responsible for 
regulating which inputs are consciously accessible to a knowing self, the operation of manas was
thus implicated as a necessary condition for the generation of all conscious cognitions, despite 
itself being an unconscious sensory faculty.23 Given the role of manas as an intermediary 
between the senses and the self, the involvement of attention in producing a conscious cognition 
was correspondingly taken to occur at an intermediate stage of the perceptual process. Within the
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scheme, the process by which a perceiver comes to cognize an object was 
expressed in terms of three kinds of “contact” (saṃyoga/saṃnikarṣa): first, the external sense 
organ (indriya) comes into contact with an object (artha); second, manas makes contact with the 
sense organ; and third, manas becomes conjoined with the self (ātman).24 These supposed 
20 NS 3.2.7, 817: “apratyabhijñānaṃ ca viṣayāntaravyāsaṅgāt”; “Non-apprehension [of some object] is due to the 
fixation [of attention] on a different object.” NBhu, 185: “kiṃ ca suptavyāsaktamanasāṃ 
cendriyasaṃnik:ṣṭārthasyāpyapratibhāsanānna manonirapekṣasyendriyasyāpi vyāpāraḥ saṃbhavati.”; “The 
operation of the external sense organs independent of the mental sense faculty is not possible, since, for those 
whose mental sense faculties are fixated or asleep, there is no phenomenal appearance even of an object that is in
contact with an external sense organ.”
21 NBh 2.1.27, 457-8; 2.1.30, 460-1; and 3.2.32, 862.
22 VS  3.2.1, 114: “ātmendriyārthasannikarṣe jñānasya bhāvo 'bhāvaśca manaso liṅgam.” “The evidence for the 
mental sensory faculty is the presence and absence of a cognition amid the contact of sense-organs, objects, and 
the self.” NS 1.1.16: “yugapajjñānānutpattirmanaso liṅgam.” “The evidence for the mental sensory faculty is the
non-arising of cognitions simultaneously.”
23 See PDS/NK, 182-3, 237-8.
24 NBh 1.1.4, 94: “... ātmā manasā saṃyujyate, mana indriyeṇa, indriyamartheneti.” See also VS 3.1.16, 111.
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instances of contact can be said to represent stages in the transfer of sensory information from 
the external senses to the self—or, from what we could consider a sub-personal level of 
perceptual processing to a consciously accessible, personal level of awareness. Before the subject
becomes consciously aware of a perceptual object, the manas must make contact with a certain 
sense organ, i.e., must selectively attend to a certain sensory stimulus. To explain the fact that 
one cannot attend to every sensory object at once, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers claimed the manas 
to be an atomic-sized substance that flits from one sense organ to the other, gathering data to be 
synthesized into a sequence of conscious representations.25 Having done so, manas then makes 
contact with or transfers its sensory data to the self, which can then experience a conscious 
cognition of the attended stimulus. This last contact between manas and the self was additionally
taken to be a causal prerequisite of all conscious cognitions, perceptual and otherwise, indicating 
that attention is a necessary condition for all conscious awareness on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika 
model.26 
It is against the context of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of manas as a faculty of attention 
and introspection that Gaṅgeśa denied the possibility of our having any experiential evidence for 
the existence of nirvikalpaka cognitions. Whereas a subject ordinarily can gain self-ascriptive 
knowledge of determinate, concept-laden cognitive states through apperception, there is 
evidently no such perceptual means of knowing whether one has undergone a genuinely non-
conceptual cognition.27 According to Gaṅgeśa and subsequent Navya Nyāya thinkers, 
nirvikalpaka cognitions are imperceptible or supersensible (atīndriyatva), which is to say that 
25 See NS/B 3.2.56-59, 896-9; VS 7.1.23, 211.
26 NV 2.1.26, 456: “indriyārthasannikarṣaḥ pratyakṣasyaiva nimittam; ātmamanaḥsannikarṣaḥ pratyakṣasya 
cānyasya ceti.”
27 TCM, 857: “na pratyakṣam, asiddheḥ, atīndriyatvācca.” BP 58ab, 431: “jñānaṃ yannirvikalpākhyaṃ 
tadatīndriyamiṣyate.”
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they are imperceptible to the mental sensory faculty that is manas. In the same way that 
ultraviolet light may make physical contact with the human eye and still remain imperceptible, 
non-conceptual cognitions which exist as attributes of the self are in “contact” with manas and 
yet cannot be perceptually detected. Beyond the phenomenological fact that we never seem to 
have introspective reports of the sort, “I see the pot and potness but separately,” there are at least 
two principled reasons why the Navya Nyāya account could not allow nirvikalpaka cognitions to
be introspectively accessible. For one, nirvikalpaka cognitions occur at too early a stage in the 
perceptual process to be the targets of apperception. Nyāya recognized that our conscious 
representational states are transient, lasting only for a short while. For reasons of parsimony, the 
tradition thus came to stipulate the duration of cognitions to be two moments long: A cognition 
arises in the first moment t1, persists for a second moment t2, and goes out of existence by the 
third moment t3.28 Were another cognition to follow immediately after the arising of the initial 
cognition, its moment of origination would overlap with the first cognition at t2, and would push 
the original cognition out of existence by t3 , given the Nyāya tenet that multiple cognitions 
cannot exist simultaneously for more than a moment.29 Now, a nirvikalpaka perceptual state must
invariably precede the savikalpaka cognition for which it serves as a cause. Apperceptions 
(anuvyavāsa) must also follow after concept-laden cognitions (vyavasāya); one must have a 
determinate perception of an object before one can introspect that perception and ascribe it to 
28 NS 3.2.42, 881 cites our experience of motion to show that cognitions are momentary. See also NSM 108, 698: 
“... jñānānāṃ dvikṣaṇamātrasthāyitvaṃ....”; Shaw 1996: 258, n. 12, 259, n. 16. Phillips & Tatacharya 2009: 604.
An exception to the rule that cognitions last two moments is made in the case of the cognitive act of counting 
(apekṣābuddhi); see Sastri 1951: 91-3.
29 Gaṅgeśa clarifies that the talk of moments (kṣaṇa) is not to be taken too literally, as though cognitions last for 
only two atomic units of time—such infinitesimally short atomic units, like physical atoms themselves, cannot 
actually be directly perceived. Rather, the moments of a cognition's duration are to be construed as “thick” 
(sthūla) intervals with some (unspecified) temporal persistence; TCM, 854: “jānāmīti vartamānatvena sthūla 
upādhirbhāsate na tu kṣaṇa, tasyātīndriyatvāt.” See Phillips & Tatacharya 2009: 603-4.
98
oneself. Consequently, since a nirvikalpaka state would only last for two moments t1 and t2, and a
savikalpaka state would arise in the subsequent moments t2 and t3, the nirvikalpaka cognition 
would have already ceased to exist by the time that an apperception can arise at t3  – therefore, a 
nirvikalpaka cognition cannot be the target of an apperceptive cognition.30 
More to the point, a non-conceptual perception cannot be immediately targeted by an 
apperception because it lacks the structured content required for an apperception to identify the 
perception as belonging to the self. The apperceptive cognition “I am aware of a pot” (ghaṭaṃ 
jānāmi iti) is a doubly qualificative cognition (viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-avagāhi-jñāna), in the sense that 
the qualifying feature which identifies the qualificand is itself identified by a further qualifier. 
Here the qualificand is the self, which is being identified as having the first-order cognition, 
“This is a pot”; additionally, this first-order cognition is itself identified according to its objective
content, i.e., the pot which has been perceptually classified as having the property of pothood. 
Just as in the case of a first-order qualificative cognition (viśiṣṭa-jñāna), a prior cognition of a 
relevant qualifier is a causal prerequisite for the production of a doubly qualificative cognition; 
however, because the relevant qualifier will itself be qualified in a doubly qualificative cognition,
the prior cognition must also be a qualificative cognition. This prior cognition will need to have 
as its predicative content a property which will serve as a delimiting mode of presentation for the
qualifier of the doubly qualificative cognition's qualificand—in Navya Nyāya terminology, the 
prior cognition will be a viśeṣaṇatā-avacchedaka-prakāraka-jñāna. Again, the target of the 
apperception “I am aware of a pot” was the initial determinate perception “That is a pot.” In this 
initial cognition, the pot is presented as the qualificand and the property of pothood is presented 
as the qualifier/predicative content (prakāra). This cognition's predicative content of pothood 
30 This argument can be found in JLVR, 25; see also Bhattacharyya & Potter 2011: 401.
99
will then serve as the mode (avacchedaka) under which the first-order perceptual state comes to 
be cognized in the apperceptive state as being a qualifying attribute (viśeṣaṇatā) of the self. 
Given that cognitions can only be distinguished according to their respective intentional 
contents, an apperception picks out the specific perceptual state in question because of its having 
pothood, and not some other property, as its predicative content; once identified, the first-order 
perception of the pot can itself be cognized as belonging to the self. On the other hand, since a 
nirvikalpaka cognition has no predicative content whatsoever, there is nothing in the cognition's 
content that could be used to pick out the cognition for the purposes of apperceptive 
identification and self-ascription.31 In this way, non-conceptual perceptions remain 
introspectively invisible to the subject.32
31 NSM 58, 433-4: “tathāhi vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhijñānasya pratyakṣaṃ na bhavati ghaṭamahaṃ jānāmīti pratyayāt 
tatrātmani jñānaṃ prakārībhūya bhāsate jñāne ghaṭastatra ghaṭatvam. yaḥ prakāraḥ sa eva viśeṣaṇamiti 
tvucyate viśeṣaṇe viśeṣaṇaṃ tadviśeṣaṇatāvacchedakamityucyate viśeṣaṇatāvacchedakaprakārakaṃ jñānaṃ 
viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyajñāne kāraṇaṃ nirvikalpake ca ghaṭatvādikaṃ na prakārastena 
ghaṭatvādiviśiṣṭaghaṭādivaiśiṣṭyabhānaṃ jñāne na sambhavati....”
32 Although, that is not to say that nirvikalpaka cognitions play no role in the generation of apperceptive states. 
While non-conceptual cognitions are never the targets of apperception, Gaṅgeśa nonetheless posited the 
existence of apperceptive cognitions which are themselves non-conceptual. In the same way that a qualificative 
perception of a cow requires a prior acquaintance with cowhood, the qualificative apperception of a cognition 
requires a prior acquaintance with the property of cognitionhood—otherwise, a regress of qualificative 
apperceptions would result. Gaṅgeśa's full account of anuvyavasāya hence involves extra stages that were not 
elaborated above. First, there is a qualified perception of the pot (C1)—the pot is the qualificand and pothood is 
the qualifier. Then, Gaṅgeśa claimed, the first qualificative apperception (C3) which arises actually takes the 
form, “A pot is being cognized”—the self does not yet enter the picture. This apperception now identifies the 
initial cognition itself in terms of its having the property of cognitionhood. Accordingly, in between the 
perceptual and apperceptive states, there must have been a non-conceptual cognition C2 that cognized the 
cognitionhood of C1, so that C1 may be apperceived as a cognition in C3. Finally, there is an apperception C4 that 
takes C3 as its object, and is expressible in the form, “I am aware a pot is being cognized”; the initial perception 
C1, having been identified as a cognition in C3, is now predicatively ascribed to the self in C4. Though, Gaṅgeśa 
(TCM, 855) also mentions the three-stage model of apperception, where the explicitly self-ascriptive cognition 
arises in the third moment, immediately after the non-qualificative awareness of cognitionhood. See Phillips & 
Tatacharya 2009: 603-7, and Shaw 1996 for more discussion.
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3.2.3 Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa as Subpersonal Perception
I want to argue that, from out of these abstruse details concerning the Navya Nyāya 
rejection of introspective evidence for the existence of non-conceptual cognitions, there emerges 
a significant thesis about the nature of conscious awareness. We can begin to formulate this 
thesis by considering possible responses to the following questions: What would it be like to 
have an experience that you could never notice you was having? What would be the 
phenomenological character of a mental state which is in principle impossible to apperceive and 
report? And most importantly, how could we even find the answers to questions about the 
phenomenological character of such states when we can never introspectively detect their 
presence? Would Gaṅgeśa have agreed with Block that essentially non-conceptual perceptions 
which are introspectively inaccessible to the self are nonetheless phenomenally conscious? 
While the Nyāya tradition generally understood cognitions (jñāna) to be states of 
conscious awareness (caitanya), the content non-conceptualism of Navya Nyāya led to a 
somewhat tenuous accommodation of nirvikalpaka cognitions within their broader account of 
jñāna. These tensions within the Navya Nyāya account may suggest to us that nirvikalpaka 
cognitions might retain its exceptional status when it also comes to their standard identification 
of cognition and conscious awareness. We have already seen that Navya Naiyāyikas had to 
impute non-conceptual cognitions with a distinct type of non-propositional, pre-predicative 
intentionality, and how such a pre-predicative character contributes to their being introspectively 
inaccessible. The non-propositional form of nirvikalpaka cognitions also gave rise to apparent 
incompatibilities elsewhere within the Navya Nyāya taxonomy of cognitions. Perceptual 
cognitions (pratyakṣa) are classified as one of the four types of veridical awareness (pramā),33 
33 TCM, 567: “sā ca pramā caturvidhā pratyakṣānumityupamitiśābdībhedāt.”
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and are further divided into two types: non-conceptual and concept-laden. Yet, the expectation 
that both types of perception are eligible to be states of veridical awareness is confounded by 
Gaṅgeśa's admission that non-conceptual states are not fit to be talked about as being veridical or
non-veridical.34 That is because the veridicality or non-veridicality of a cognition is tied to its 
predicative content; a cognition will be veridical if it predicates a property F to an object when 
the object is in fact F.35 Since non-conceptual cognitions do not possess any predicative content, 
they must therefore fall outside of the scope of veridicality. And given that the standard Navya 
Nyāya classification of cognition admits of just just two types, veridical or non-veridical,36 we 
might be tempted to conclude with Arindam Chakrabarti (2000, 2001) that there should be no 
place in Navya Nyāya for non-conceptual cognition that is neither type. 
Holding this temptation at bay, we might instead interpret the taxonomic difficulties 
presented by nirvikalpaka cognitions as a consequence of Navya Nyāya's attempt at finding a 
place within its framework for subpersonal or subdoxastic mental states.37 Tyler Burge concisely 
describes the level of psychology at which these sorts of mental states are supposed to occur: 
I take the subpersonal level to be a level that is not only not conscious, but is not 
accessible to introspective or reflective consciousness and must be gotten at only 
theoretically. This is true of the basic grammatical structures underlying our linguistic 
competence and the information-processing structures underlying our perceptual 
experience. (2003: 384)
Subpersonal, subdoxastic states are distinct from the beliefs, desires, and experiences that form 
our ordinary mental lives, in that we lack any first-personal, conscious access to them. For 
instance, we don't first-personally experience or form beliefs about the computational states of 
34 Ibid., 438: “nirvikalpakaṃ ca pramāpramābahirbhūtam eva, vyavahārānaṅgatvāt.” 
35 Ibid., 434: “yatra yadasti tatra tasya anubhavaḥ pramā. tadvati tatprakārakānubhavo vā. yatra yannāsti tatra 
tasya jñānaṃ, tadabhāvavati tatprakārakajñānaṃ vā apramā.”
36 TarS, 114: “[sm:ti]bhinnaṃ jñānam anubhavaḥ. saḥ dvividhaḥ—yathārthaḥ ayathārthaśceti.”
37 Many contemporary authors use “subpersonal” interchangeably with “subdoxastic,” though the original 
meanings of these terms were technically distinct; see Drayson 2012.
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early visual processing involved in detecting intensities of light from patterns of retinal 
stimulation. Such states are not directly available to be incorporated into our reasoning, speech, 
and action, nor are they introspectively detectable. Moreover, despite whatever causal 
contribution they make to the phenomenology of conscious visual experience, these subpersonal 
states cannot be said to have a conscious phenomenal character themselves; that is, they are 
normally not states which a subject is ever consciously aware of being in. As for Nyāya, its 
understanding of unconscious mentality was evinced through the theory of manas, which was 
intended to account for unconscious cognitive functions like attention, memory, and self-
monitoring (see also Ganeri 2012: ch. 13). But I would suggest that it is only once Navya Nyāya 
developed a notion of essentially non-conceptual cognition that we find an implicit 
acknowledgment of cognitive states that are distinctly subpersonal and subdoxastic, and for 
which we have no conscious access. Hence, by interpreting nirvikalpaka perceptions as a kind of
subpersonal state, we can make more sense of why these perceptual states had to be specially 
accommodated within a framework that was primarily intended to account for the intentionality 
and veridicality of doxastic cognitive states. More importantly, the subpersonal nature of 
nirvikalpaka perceptions may imply that Navya Nyāya would have also taken non-conceptual 
states to be consciously inaccessible, which would thereby suggest against the possibility that 
essentially non-conceptual perceptions could be phenomenally conscious in the absence of being 
access-conscious. 
In order to shed light on the theoretical link in Navya Nyāya between our conscious 
access to a perceptual state and the conceptual structuring of that state's content, we might 
consider how that same link was understood in the thought of Immanuel Kant, a philosopher who
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notably made much of the connection between apperception and the application of concepts in 
perception. Kant famously argued that the intentional character of perceptual experience is made 
possible by the concept-guided synthesis of sensory inputs into a unified representation of an 
object. Furthermore, these perceptual representations are endowed with a conscious character 
through being further integrated into a single unified experience belonging to a conscious 
subject, a unity known to Kant as the "transcendental unity of apperception." Like the unified 
representation of an object, the unity of apperception is necessarily governed by conceptual 
categories that specify how representations must be synthesized. My claim, then, is that Kant and
Navya Nyāya would be broadly in agreement with the thesis that perceptual states possess 
conscious intentional content by virtue of their conceptual structuring. Both Kant and Navya 
Nyāya hold that concepts are involved in granting perceptual cognition with intentional, object-
directed content, because concepts govern the attribution of predicates to perceived objects—in 
other words, it is through being classified under some concept that an object comes to be seen as 
having, or as being qualified by, a specific property. Furthermore, both accounts take this 
conceptual/predicative structure as a necessary condition for a perceptual cognition's being 
apperceivable. That is, a perceptual cognition must be conceptually structured in order for its 
content to be accessible to other cognitions, and thereby for the cognition to become integrated 
into a subject's conscious experience. We can thus draw from Kant and Navya Nyāya a second 
thesis about conscious perceptual awareness, namely that phenomenality cannot be found apart 
from accessibility. For both Kant and Navya Nyāya, only those perceptual cognitions have a 
subjective phenomenal character whose contents are accessible to, or apperceivable by, other 
cognitions; and it is through being apperceivable that these cognitions can come to have the 
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subjective character of “me-ishness” that is characteristic of the integrated experience of a 
conscious subject. Taken together, the two theses entail that we only have conscious, experiential
access to conceptually structured perceptual cognitions and intentional content—perceptual 
cognitions with essentially non-conceptual, pre-predicative content never phenomenally appear 
in our conscious mental life. If only those perceptual cognitions which bear a predicative 
structure are consciously accessible, then the conscious accessibility of these cognitions must 
somehow implicate the activity of perceptual concepts.
3.2.4 Chadha's Kantian Reading of Navya Nyāya on Perception and Concepts
So far, the most sustained Kantian reading of the Navya Nyāya theory of perceptual 
cognition has been offered by Monima Chadha (2001). Chadha's presentation of Nyāya views 
was met with criticism by Stephen Phillips (2004), and was significantly revised by Chadha 
herself in subsequent essays on both Kant and Nyāya in which she disavows the central claim of 
her original essay—namely, that all perceptual cognition requires conceptualization. By briefly 
considering Chadha's original account, then, we may get a more clear idea as to how Kant's ideas
of apperception and conceptual synthesis may be brought to bear on our interpretation of Navya 
Nyāya. Chadha's essay mainly targets the Yogācāra/Sautrāntika Buddhist view that perception 
amounts to the non-conceptual awareness of bare, propertyless particulars (svalakṣaṇa), and the 
corollary claim that any verbalizable awareness of an object as specified by some generic feature
must instead arise from a mental distortion of what is purely given through the senses. Chadha 
argues that the Buddhist view is untenable, and that if we are to explain the cognitive capacity of 
perception to grant us knowledge of objects, then the contents of perception must be restricted to 
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universal features, rather than bare particulars that are devoid of any properties by which they 
may be identified and recognized. To counter the Buddhist view of non-conceptual perception 
and thereby reinstate the cognitive capacity of perception, Chadha hence advocates a thesis that 
she attributes to Nyāya, namely, “All cognition, and thus perceptual cognition, requires 
conceptualization” (Ibid., 198). Chadha further attempts to undermine the Buddhist view by 
defending the Nyāya thesis in conjunction with the Kantian tenet that “perceptual experiences 
require the cooperative activity of the sense-faculties and the mind” (Ibid.). Prior to this 
cooperation, the initial interaction of the sense-faculties with a particular object can only yield 
sensory impressions, i.e., non-cognitive, physiological states of sensory stimulation. On their 
own, these unstructured sensory impressions cannot enter into our perceptual experience; 
instead, Chadha writes, “The awareness of the impression arises at the subsequent stage as a 
result of the infiltration of concepts, and only this second awareness is, strictly speaking, a 
perceptual cognition” (Ibid., 200). It is further doubtful whether the Buddhist form of non-
conceptual perception could have intentional, object-directed content: Concepts are required not 
only for identifying an object as being of a certain generic kind, but also for distinguishing an 
object as an object. If non-conceptual perceptions cannot conceptually specify an object in any 
way, then they would lack even the basic ability to differentiate between distinct particulars. As a
result, the intentional, object-directed aspect of perceptual cognition would be lost—without 
distinguishing one particular from another, there would be no sense in which a non-conceptual 
perception could be aware of a particular at all. Thus, Chadha concludes, “The very notion of a 
'conception-free cognition of a particular' is incoherent” (Ibid., 201).
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To bolster the idea that all perceptual experience involves “seeing-as,” i.e., the 
classification of objects as being of a certain kind, Chadha invokes the Kantian notion of 
concept-guided synthesis. On their own, the sense faculties cannot identify an object either as 
being the same across time, or as being the same sort of thing as other objects. Instead, it is only 
through the application of concepts by the mind that disparate sensory impressions give rise to 
the perceptual awareness of a unified object; as Chadha explains, “Kant introduces the notion of 
a concept as a principle for unifying or synthesizing discrete sensory impressions. Concepts have
application in experience because they serve to link or combine distinct fleeting sensory 
impressions as different perceptions of the same object” (Ibid., 203). The involvement of the 
mind is specifically required for perceptually recognizing a particular as being of a certain kind, 
because an object's kind-identity or numerical identity can be determined only in reference to 
past representations of similar objects or of the same object.  Since the senses only detect what is
presently given to them, Kant hence posited a mental faculty of imagination, by means of which 
past representations are united with presently given sense impressions to generate a perceptual 
awareness of an identifiable object. Concepts enter into perception through guiding the synthetic 
activity of imagination, in that they set out the rules for how impressions are to be associated 
together in an intentionally structured perceptual cognition. 
Chadha then goes on to suggest that, as imagination for Kant is a necessary ingredient of 
perception, so too must it be for Navya Nyāya. For one, the notions of conceptualization 
(kalpanā) and concepts (vikalpa) prevalent in classical Indian philosophy carried the connotation
that concepts are imaginative constructions or fabrications of the mind, which are either 
superimposed upon or recognized in what is given by perception (Matilal 1986: 314); so, given 
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that Navya Nyāya also accepted a form of concept-laden, savikalpaka perception, it too must 
acknowledge the presence of imagination in perceptual awareness.38 More to the point, while 
Navya Nyāya holds that a purely sensory, non-conceptual perception of cowhood is needed to 
explain how we first come to see a cow as a cow, that non-conceptual perception is not a 
necessary causal condition for every subsequent perceptual encounter with a cow. Once the 
concept of cowhood has been acquired, the mind can abstract from given sensory input a 
structured awareness that immediately recognizes a presently perceived cow as being type-
identical with other previously experienced cows. For Chadha, this perceptual ascription of a 
universal property to a particular object should be understood in Kantian terms, that is, as 
amounting to “no more than the unifying and synthesizing of data by applying concepts to 
generate perceptual experience” (2001: 205). Accordingly, since all perceptual awareness 
involves the identification and recognition of an object's universal features, all perceptual 
awareness will involve the imaginative application of concepts.
38 It may be noted that the textual evidence Chadha offers for her reading of Gaṅgeśa is flawed. She borrows 
Matilal's (1986: 347; see also 1985: 379-80) rendering of an argument offered by Gaṅgeśa's opponent against 
one possible defense of nirvikalpaka perception. The defense under consideration tries to prove that qualificative
cognitions must be caused by a prior non-conceptual cognition of a qualifier, by pointing to cases in which there 
is a viśiṣṭa-jñāna of a qualifying feature such as a color that has just arisen and is being perceived for the first 
time. Matilal illustrates the argument with an example of seeing a disc that has just turned a shade of blue one 
has never seen before: In seeing the disc as qualified by that particular shade, the qualificative cognition could 
not be drawing upon a memory-trace of a color that one has never experienced; hence, the qualifying color must 
instead have been supplied by a non-conceptual perception. And as a non-conceptual perception is the cause of 
the qualificative cognition in this case, so too must it be in other cases, ceteris paribus. (TCM, 860: “atha 
tatkālotpannarūpādiviśiṣṭapratyakṣe saṃskārābhāvena smaraṇābhāvāt pakṣadharmatābalena 
nirvikalpakasiddhau anyatrāpi sāmagrītaulyāttatsiddhiriti.”) Chadha takes Matilal's example to present a case in
which the mind and senses cooperate in the first moment of perception to instantaneously produce a 
“conception-loaded awareness” or qualificative cognition of the particular color of the disc as being blue (2001: 
204). But, the argument as presented in Gaṅgeśa's text and in Matilal's example takes the particular color to be 
the qualifier itself; it would be the disc itself that is seen as qualified by the particular blue tint. The argument is 
further intended to prove that a non-conceptual cognition of the particular color must have preceded the 
cognition of something as qualified by the particular color, and not that the qualificative cognition would arise in
the first moment of perception. This argument is met with a response by Gaṅgeśa's opponent and is thus 
supplanted by another argument for non-conceptual cognition; see Phillips & Tatacharya 2009: 619-20 for 
further discussion.
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However, Stephen Phillips disputes Chadha's Kantian interpretation of Navya Nyāya as 
claiming that all perceptual awareness involves the mental synthesis of sensory data under a 
concept. As Phillips points out, Navya Nyāya did hold that the mind is involved in producing 
those types of concept-laden perception which happen to be informed by the memory of previous
cognitions.39 One type of memory-informed perception is so-called recurrent perception 
(anugata-pratyakṣa), wherein a particular object is cognized as being another instance of some 
previously experienced class of objects (TCM, 611; Phillips & Tatacharya 2009: 340-1). Another 
type involves the perceptual recognition (pratyabhijñā) of an object as being the same across 
time. For example, having just now run into a person named Devadatta whom I had previously 
met some time ago, I become aware that “this is that Devadatta (whom I previously saw)” (“so 
'yaṃ devadattaḥ”); in other words, I now recognize “this” presently perceived Devadatta as 
being identical with “that” Devadatta I remember seeing in the past. The memory-trace 
(saṃskāra) left by my previous perception of Devadatta thus plays a causal role in generating my
current perceptual awareness of him, supplying the current perception with the qualifying 
predicate of “having been seen before,” or what Gaṅgeśa elliptically refers to as the property of 
“thatness” (see TCM 881-7; Phillips and Tatacharya 658-74). An object's having been seen 
39 Other types of memory-informed perceptual cognitions described by Nyāya include perceptual illusion and 
certain cross-sensory perceptions (see Phillips 2012: 36, 47). In the case of perceptual illusion, a memory-trace 
of some property F is mistakenly triggered upon the perception of some object a, leading one to cognize a as 
being F when it is not in fact so. Take the case of seeing a piece of rope as being a snake: According to Nyāya, 
the illusion arises because a memory-trace of snakehood left by one's previous experience of snakes has been 
activated in light of the rope's apparent similarity with snakes; as a result, the remembered property of snakehood
comes to be superimposed onto the perceived piece of rope. As for cross-sensory perceptions, Nyāya holds these 
are cases of veridical awareness in which the memory of one sensory property becomes fused with a perceptual 
cognition stemming from another sense faculty. The typical example given is that of seeing a distant piece of 
sandalwood as being fragrant: The sandalwood is too far away for its fragrance to be smelled, but the visual 
perception evokes one's the memory of sandalwood fragrance such that in the visual experience itself the 
sandalwood is cognized as being fragrant. To account for these and other types of memory-infused perception, 
Nyāya posited a “non-ordinary” (alaukika) form of sensory connection with an object that is specifically 
mediated by a cognition (jnāna-lakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti), memory being the type of cognition involved in these 
cases.
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before is not something that can be detected by the external sense faculties themselves, since the 
senses only make contact with an object in the present. Hence, the mental sense faculty of manas
is taken to be the means by which the identifying feature of thatness can be introduced from 
memory into the content of a perceptual cognition.40  
Aside from such select cases as memory-infused perception, Phillips argues, the auxiliary
causal involvement of manas is not necessary for generating concept-laden perceptions, nor does
its operation ever resemble a Kantian process of imaginative synthesis. According to Chadha's 
interpretation of the Nyāya account, it is because all perception entails an awareness of universal 
features that the mind must be implicated in the production of perceptual awareness. She 
explains,
The cognizing mind synthesizes the immediately presented individual with possible past 
and future individuals of the same kind. The synthesizing activity depends on abstracting 
a universal from the immediately presented non-particular individual. Although the mind 
is implicated in the cognition of non-particular individuals, there is no imposition of 
structure. The indeterminate perception of a non-particular individual is structured in the 
sense that the active mind unites the individual presented on a perceptual occasion with 
possible past and future non-particular individuals of the same kind. (2004: 386)
Yet, to speak of indeterminate/nirvikalpaka perception as involving the mental abstraction of a 
universal from given sensory input is misleading in several respects. For starters, Phillips points 
out the case of perceiving something for the first time: Someone who has never seen a cow 
40 Since thatness—i.e., the property of having been experienced previously—is never present to the external senses,
the question arises of how it can be remembered when it was never directly perceived in the first place. Memory-
traces (saṃskāra) are impressions left by previous perceptions, and thus should draw their intentional content 
from these perceptions. The first perception of Devadatta did not cognize him as having been seen before, so the 
memory-trace left by the first perception should not give rise to a second perception in which Devadatta is now 
recognized as having been seen before. Gaṅgeśa's response to this problem is that an object's being qualified by 
thisness in the first perception, i.e., its being seen in the present, is converted by the memory-trace into being 
qualified by thatness/pastness. The memory of seeing Devadatta will thus have a different intentional content 
(viṣayatā) than the first perception of Devadatta itself, as the memory will now cognize Devadatta as qualified 
by having been seen in the past. The content of memory cognitions is different from the perceptions from which 
they are formed, because memory cognitions carry an implicit grasp of their causal origins in past experience. 
This implicit grasp of pastness in the content of memory cognitions allows us to clearly distinguish memories 
from perceptual cognitions in introspection; we seldom confuse a memory with a direct perceptual experience 
(See TCM 886; Phillips & Tatacharya 671-3).
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before cannot come to identify the cow as being a cow by first comparing the perceived object 
with past individuals of the same kind, to say nothing of comparing the present cow with 
possible cows to be perceived in the future. Because the mind cannot draw on the memory of any
past experience in order to classify the perceived object as a cow, Navya Nyāya instead posits a 
non-conceptual cognition of cowness, which thereby furnishes the predication content for a 
subsequent perception of the cow as qualified by cowhood (Phillips 2004: 392; see also Phillips 
2012: 37-8). Hence, there is at least one instance in which the perceptual awareness of a 
universal feature does not implicate any synthetic activity of the mind. What's more, Navya 
Nyāya also holds that, unlike other types of non-particular individuals such as tropes, universals 
like cowhood are singular entities, so it is further inapt for Chadha to speak of synthesizing non-
particular individuals of the same kind, when there is only one universal throughout. Navya 
Nyāya would therefore not explain the process by which one comes to be non-conceptually 
acquainted with cowhood as involving the mind's actively unifying the perceived cowhood of 
one cow with the distinct but similar cowhood of another. While non-conceptual perception and 
the direct acquaintance with universal features play a role in concept acquisition, mental 
synthesis was not thought to be operative in non-conceptual perception in the way that Chadha 
has claimed.
It is worth addressing some additional points of unclarity in Chadha's reading of the 
Navya Nyāya account of concept acquisition and possession. First, Chadha is mistaken in 
viewing the non-conceptual perception of a universal as being an instance of seeing-as, 
especially since seeing-as is a type of perception which she claims is “conceptually loaded” 
(2001: 203).41 For Navya Nyāya, the non-conceptual perception of a universal could not involve 
41 Chadha also overemphasizes the degree to which Navya Nyāya believed that non-conceptual perceptions have 
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seeing-as, because the perceptual cognition does not identify the universal in any way, lest an 
infinite regress result. Not only is a universal not seen as being the predicate of a particular 
object, but the universal itself is not seen as being the universal that it is; in technical terms, the 
universal such as cowhood is cognized in an unqualified, non-predicative manner, without any 
delimiting mode of presentation. 
Moreover, since non-conceptual perception does not identify its objects in any way, it 
does not seem right to claim with Chadha that non-conceptual perceptions grant us a 
recognitional capacity to re-identify objects. She writes that even animals may unconsciously 
acquire through the non-conceptual awareness of a universal property a behavioral disposition 
for recognizing other instances of that property: “Having smelt cows before, a hungry lion on 
smelling another cow in his vicinity may have a mental flash, ‘Aha, the same smell again’” 
(2009: 241). For one, Chadha's illustration overlooks the unverbalizable and consciously 
inaccessible nature of nirvikalpaka cognitions. More importantly, Nyāya considers only 
savikalpaka cognitions to be capable of generating the memory dispositions (saṃskāra) that 
enable us to recognize and re-identify objects (Mohanty 2000: 12). It is only through 
determinately perceiving some object a as being F that one forms an F-saṃskāra which can then 
causally assist the mind in its perceptual classification of other objects as being instances of F 
(Phillips 2012: 37).
Finally, while Chadha is correct to interpret the prior acquaintance with a qualifier as 
being a necessary prerequisite for the acquisition of recognitional capacities, I would argue that 
her interpreting the exercise of such capacities as being non-conceptual in character does not sit 
only universal features as their objects. See Bhattacharya 1990: 172-6 for a survey of competing views within 
Navya Nyāya on the contents of nirvikalpaka perception. 
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well with Nyāya's saṃskāra-based account of concept possession.42 For Chadha, the ability to 
recognize instances of a property does not entail that one possesses the concept of that property, 
though the converse is true. She holds with most other modern advocates of non-conceptualism 
that concept possession must approach concept mastery, which requires understanding a 
concept's inferential and linguistic relations to other concepts. Hence, non-conceptual perceivers 
like children and animals can see and recognize instances of a property without understanding 
and possessing a concept of that property: “Everyone agrees that pet dogs have the capacity to 
recognize their masters,” she writes, “... but at the very least it is controversial whether the dog 
has the concept of master” (2006: 333; see also 2014: 298). However, Chadha is here implicitly 
assuming a “state view” of non-conceptualism, for which the non-conceptual or conceptual 
character of perceptual content depends on whether a perceiver a possesses the concepts that 
would characterize that content. As we saw in chapter 1, Hanna & Chadha (2011) have forcefully
argued that the state view is ultimately an unviable form of non-conceptualism, especially if the 
distinction between non-conceptualist and conceptualist positions is to remain a non-arbitrary 
one. We have also seen that Navya Nyāya takes a “content view” of non-conceptualism, holding 
that the intentional content of non-conceptual states is essentially different in kind from that of 
conceptual states. Yet in Chadha's example, there is no apparent difference at the level of content 
between the dog's seeing someone as its master, and an adult human seeing the same person as 
the dog's master—both perceptions attribute to someone the property of being a master. 
Moreover, both perceivers would be drawing upon memory traces left by past experiences in 
order to recognize the currently perceived individual as an instance of that property. Assuming 
42 I am indebted to Jonardon Ganeri (2009: 7.1) for the idea that the Navya Nyāya account of memory and memory
dispositions serves as its theory of concept possession.
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Chadha is correct in ascribing the dog with a qualificative perception of its master, Navya Nyāya 
would then consider the perception's qualificative structure as a mark of its conceptual character. 
The distinction Chadha (2014: 298) wishes to draw between grasping a concept and 
merely grasping a corresponding property or universal is not lost on Navya Naiyāyikas; however,
the distinction does not imply for them the account of concept possession that Chadha has taken 
it to suggest. It is true that the grasp of a universal property in a nirvikalpaka cognition falls short
of grasping a concept; the universal is not identified as something which is attributable to an 
object, and hence the cognition lacks a predicative object-property structure. Nonetheless, the 
non-conceptual cognition of universal properties is not exclusive to seemingly non-conceptual 
creatures. Nor are such creatures excluded from grasping the corresponding concept of those 
properties, so long as they too are capable of cognizing a property as qualifying or picking out a 
particular object, and subsequently forming a dispositional capacity for picking out objects of the
same kind. Navya Nyāya would not claim that, in the absence of a more robust linguistic 
competence, possessing these dispositions falls short of concept possession. Rather, they would 
concur with Vācaspati's objection to the Yogācāra Buddhist view that non-linguistic infants and 
animals have proto-linguistic concept-laden cognitions, not by denying that infants and animals 
have concept-laden cognitions, but by rejecting the idea that perceptual concepts must be 
linguistic in nature.43 For Nyāya, the memory-based conceptual capacities involved in 
perceptually predicating and classifying objects are distinct from, and exist prior to, the 
conceptual capacities involved in understanding the words for those objects. Additionally, the 
representational content of concept-laden perception is endowed with a combinatory 
43 See NVṬT, 229: "na tvidriyajavikalpotpādaṃ pratyastyupayogaḥ kaścit śabdasmaraṇasya. anyathā 
bālamūkādīnāṃ nendriyajaḥ syādvikalpaḥ śabdasmaraṇābhāvāt."
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propositional structure that, while being linguistic expressible, is logically distinct from the 
structure of linguistic expressions.
Having disagreed with some details of Chadha's Kantian reading of Navya Nyāya, I 
nonetheless wish to retain one of its insights, namely that the application of concepts to sensory 
inputs is necessary for generating conscious perceptual experience that is endowed with 
intentional, object-directed content. Yet, my own reading goes further than Chadha's in more 
explicitly identifying the necessary connection that Kant and Navya Nyāya drew between the 
conceptual structure and conscious character of perceptual cognitions. We have seen how, 
according to Navya Nyāya, a cognition must be predicatively structured if a subject is to 
introspectively apperceive that cognition and self-consciously ascribe it to one's self. I have 
further suggested that the total inability of non-predicative nirvikalpaka cognitions to be noticed 
or detected by a subject is evidence that these cognitions fail to have any subjective phenomenal 
character, and instead are better understood as subpersonal cognitions occurring outside of a 
subject's conscious awareness. I now will examine how Kant claims to similar effect that the 
conceptual structuring of perceptual cognitions is closely tied to the possibility of their being 
consciously accessed and integrated into a unified experience belonging to a conscious subject. 
Despite the fundamental differences in their philosophical approaches, I wish to show that Kant 
and Navya Nyāya can offer complementary answers to the question of how perceptual 
experience comes to have a subjective phenomenal character. Specifically, Kant's account of 
apperception can help to corroborate the Navya Nyāya view that cognitions with essentially non-
conceptual content are consciously inaccessible, whereas Navya Nyāya's relaxed account of 
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concept possession can help us avoid some of the undesirable consequences that follow from 
Kant's sharp division between sensory intuition and discursive understanding.
3.3 Kant on Concepts and Conscious Perceptual Experience
Kant holds that perceptual experience depends on the operation of two mental capacities
—sensibility and understanding—that seem to be wholly distinct in terms of their function, form,
and content. Sensibility is a merely receptive capacity that passively imbibes sensory inputs and 
directly presents them as intuitions, while the understanding is an active, spontaneous faculty 
that “mediately” presents given representations as being united under concepts, and that further 
unites those concepts into propositional judgments. Similarly, intuitions and concepts themselves
are different in character, the main difference being that intuitions are singular representations of 
objects, while concepts are general representations that refer to objects “by means of a 
characteristic that may be common to several things” (CPR A320/B377). Furthermore, the a 
priori forms of sensibility, or the necessary structures of perception responsible for ordering all 
sensory appearances, are the pure intuitions of space and time, while the a priori form of 
understanding are the categories, or concepts that necessarily serve as predicates for all possible 
judgments. And yet, though sensibility and understanding are definitionally distinct in Kant’s 
system, their functions are inseparable when it comes to our cognitive experience of objects. For 
such experience to be possible, Kant thinks that intuitions must in some sense correspond to our 
concepts and judgment, and vice versa; in other words, when one judges that x is F, one can 
determine whether that judgment is true only by checking the representation of x as it is given in 
intuition to see whether or not x is in fact F. In order for intuitions to be responsive to judgments 
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in this way, the structure and content of intuition must therefore not be incommensurate with the 
structure and content of judgment; indeed, Kant thinks there must be a necessary agreement of 
intuition with the concepts of its presented objects (B166). 
The view that perception must have conceptual content can take Kant’s dictum, “Intuition
without concepts are blind,” as a slogan which expresses the reliance of perception on the 
understanding for its ability to see and discern objects. That is to say, sensibility alone cannot 
furnish us with a full-fledged experience of objects. Kant is clear that the singular representations
provided by the sensibility could not give rise to such experience were these representations not 
synthesized and united, “for cognition,” Kant writes, “is a whole consisting of compared and 
connected presentations” (A97).44 In fact, the object of experience is defined as being just this 
unity of presentations; as Kant puts it, “An object is that in whose concept the manifold of a 
given intuition is united” (B137). Given that the presentations provided by intuition are only 
cognized as objects when they are united under a concept, the responsibility for bringing about 
such a unity through a process of comparing and connecting presentations must lie with the 
spontaneous faculty of understanding. The understanding is defined by Kant as the “power of 
judgment.” Judgments are defined as “functions of unity among our presentations,” where 
“function” refers to the act of arranging different representations under one common 
representation, i.e., concept (A68-9/B93-4). Kant will ultimately claim that if what it takes for an
object to be experienced/cognized is that intuition be arranged or structured into a unity of 
representations under a concept, and if judgments are themselves structured complexes of 
44 Werner Pluhar (CPR bxvii n. 73, p. 22) explains that his translation of Vorstellung as “presentation,” rather than 
as “representation,” is intended to avoid the confusion that perceptions for Kant represent objects of experience 
in the sense of “standing for” those objects, as though the objects themselves figure only indirectly in experience.
My use of “representation” in the Kantian context will be interchangeable with Pluhar's use of “presentation.”
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concepts, then the structure of intuition must be at least parallel to the conceptual structure of 
judgment.
What ensures that the content of perception is parallel to that of conceptual judgment is 
what Kant calls the pure concept of the understanding, which is defined as follows: “The same 
function that gives unity to the various presentations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere 
synthesis of various presentations in an intuition. This unity…is called pure concept of 
understanding” (A79/B105). Elsewhere, Kant argues that everything given in the manifold of 
intuition is necessarily determined by the categories, which are the a priori logical forms of all 
possible judgments (B143). Hence, we see that, owing to their common source of synthetic unity,
the content of intuition must be unified in a way that is akin to the content of judgment. This 
necessary agreement in structure underlies the possibility of all experience of objects, because 
for Kant what it means to perceive objects in the world just amounts to being able to consciously 
judge that the world objectively exists in a certain way. That is to say, insofar as there is a 
“necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects,” (B166), all the possible 
ways in which we can experience/perceive the world must thereby be constrained by the possible
ways in which we can judge the world to be so. Hanna acknowledges Kant in the B-Deduction to
be claiming that “the spatiotemporal intuitional unity of the content of our conscious perceptual 
representations is necessarily also a fully logico-conceptual unity,” which further implies that 
that “the pure concepts of the understanding, as logical forms, would necessarily carry over into 
the objects of experience, as constituting their objective structure” (2011: 11-12). 
The method by which the pure concepts of understanding synthesize the manifold of 
intuitions into a unified representation of an object is what Kant calls “combination.” He 
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unambiguously states that since the combination of the manifold of intuition cannot be given by 
intuition itself, it must be a spontaneous act of the understanding. Again, without this synthesis 
and unification of given representations, there can be no coherent experience of an object as an 
object, i.e., as an entity which exists “objectively” in the world, over and above one’s fleeting 
and disparate sensory impressions of it. He writes, 
Hence all combination is an act of understanding—whether or not we become conscious of
such combination; whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition or of the 
manifold of various concepts; and whether, in the case of intuition, it is a combination of 
sensible or of nonsensible intuition. (B130)
In other words, even at the most basic level of intuition, our representations of intuitions are 
composite; no temporally/spatially extended representation is given that is not composite. But, as
Kant says, the act of giving a composite structure to intuition requires an a priori concept that 
dictates how to construct such a structure. When we represent some determinate space/time, we 
do so by drawing it, that is, by adding units of space/time together to form a unified 
representation. This whole procedure takes place within intuition, in the sense that everything 
being synthesized is an intuited representation. Yet, the process of generating these intuitions 
follows the rules set down by the pure concept. 
Just how, then, do the categories—the a priori logical forms of judgment—combine the 
manifold of intuition and give them a unity that agrees with the unity of judgment? We can begin
to get an idea by looking at how Kant thinks a particular concept informs one’s perceptual 
content. He writes,
All cognition requires a concept, no matter how imperfect or obscure that concept may be. 
A concept, in terms of its form, is always something that is universal and that serves as a 
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rule. Thus the concept of body serves, in terms of the unity of the manifold thought through
this concept, as a rule for our cognition of external appearances. But a concept can be a 
rule for intuitions only by presenting, when appearances are given to us, the necessary 
reproduction of their manifold and hence the synthetic unity in our consciousness of these 
appearances. Thus when we perceive something external to us, the concept of body makes 
necessary the presentation of extension, and with it the presentations of impenetrability, 
shape, etc. (A106)
That is, the concept of body serves as the rule by which given sensory impressions are 
necessarily combined to generate certain perceptual representations of objects in the external 
world. Kant specifically holds the mental faculty of imagination responsible for synthesizing 
sensory inputs and forming a perceptual image that represents an object as falling under a certain
concept. Briefly, the formation of an intentionally structured, object-directed perceptual 
representation is said to involve three types of synthesis (Buroker 2006: 108-111): In the 
synthesis of apprehension (A99), an indeterminate manifold of given sensations is parsed into 
distinct and successive representations of an object's features. But a coherent perceptual image of
the object would not be possible if its successively apprehended features were constantly being 
lost as new features are apprehended (A121). Hence, the synthesis of apprehension is “linked 
inseparably” with a second synthesis of reproduction, whereby the imagination incorporates 
together past and present representations in order to present an object as a unified whole that 
persists across changes in its spatiotemporal parts (A102). Yet, the imagination must not also 
reproduce and associate the representations of an object's parts in a haphazard manner, or else 
our experience of objects would again be incoherent. For instance, one would never understand 
what an external physical body is if one's perception of it were sometimes accompanied by a 
presentation of extension or shape and sometimes not, as though the object fluctuated between 
being extended and extensionless from one moment to the next. Kant thus concludes that the 
ability to recognize an object as being the same across past and present representations of its 
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parts requires that the imaginative reproduction of sensory appearances must be subject to certain
conceptual rules of combination. 
The synthesis of reproduction therefore requires a third synthesis of recognition in a 
concept. Concepts make possible a complex, compositional representation of an object as a 
unified whole because once certain sensory representations are bound together in a rule-governed
way, they can be represented as being identifying features predicated to a temporally and 
mereologically complex individual. Kant illustrates how the recognition of an object under a 
concept entails an awareness of certain representations' being necessarily synthesized together to 
form a unified representation of that object: “Thus when we think of a triangle as an object, we 
do so by being conscious of the assembly of three straight lines according to to a rule whereby 
such an intuition can always be exhibited.... And the concept of this unity is the presentation of 
the object = x, i.e., the object that I think through the mentioned predicates of a triangle” (A105).
The pure concepts of understanding, then, must similarly function as the rules according to 
which sensations are necessarily combined, only that they govern the production of all possible 
perceptual representations, where perception for Kant is defined as a conscious sensory 
representation (A120). Because the categories are the logical forms of all possible judgments, 
they must dictate how the manifold of intuitions should be combined in order to represent the 
world as being structured a certain way, so that our judgments can then take the world as being 
objectively structured in that way. For instance, the logical form of categorical judgments 
involves the relation of a predicate to a subject. The corresponding pure concept is that of a 
substance and its accidents, or the properties it bears. In generating a perceptual image of a 
particular object that conforms with the category of substance, the imagination will thus follow 
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what Kant calls a schema of the pure concept, which translates general concepts into necessary 
rules for synthesizing particular sensory intuitions. Through a schema, the category of substance 
will condition the synthesis of intuition such that a perceptual image of an object conforms with 
the logical form of a categorical judgement “S is P,” that is, with the relation of a subject to a 
predicate. In perceptual terms, such a phenomenally predicative structure will involve the 
presentation of an object as “a substratum which therefore endures while all else varies” 
(A144/B183). 
3.3.1 Conscious Subjective Character and the Unity of Apperception
Yet, Kant goes on to argue that all these various forms of synthesis are not sufficient for 
generating the conscious awareness of a unified object as persisting across time. Rather, it is 
Kant's central insight that the conditions for the possibility of consciously cognizing objects rest 
upon the conditions for the possibility of having a unified conscious experience at all. What Kant
intends to show is that perceptual representations are conscious by virtue of their being 
integrated into a single unified experience belonging to a conscious subject, a unity known to 
Kant as the "unity of apperception," and necessarily established under the influence of 
conceptual categories that specify how representations must be structured and synthesized. 
Recall that mental states are thought to be phenomenally conscious insofar as they essentially 
possess a subjective character, that is, a quality of “me-isheness” that captures what it is like 
undergo such states from within a first-personal perspective. Now, Kant for his part 
acknowledges a distinction between unconscious and conscious mental states, writing in the 
Anthropology that there is an “immense” field of sensory representations of which we are not 
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conscious, whereas there are “only infinitely few points of this field which lie open to 
consciousness; so that as it were only a few places on the vast map of our mind are illuminated” 
(An 7:135). Kant's point will be that the representations which enter into the illuminated field of 
consciousness are just those which can be cognized as belonging to the subject, and hence which 
can appear as being “for me” or “mine.” He argues that a representation takes on a subjective 
character only if it is possible for it to be accompanied by the self-conscious thought, “I think”: 
As he writes, “The I think must be capable of accompanying all my presentations. For otherwise 
something would be presented to me that could not be thought at all—which is equivalent to 
saying that the presentation either would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me” 
(B132). Of the many important claims in this passage, the first to note is that Kant obviously 
does not believe that we are introspectively aware of all our cognitions at all moments. Rather, a 
representation must only be capable of being self-ascribed to a subject, which still allows that it 
can have a conscious character apart from its being accompanied by the thought “I think.” If a 
mental representation is totally incapable of being recognized as my own, then Kant essentially 
argues that there would be nothing it is like for me to have that representation. He suggests two 
ways in which we might think of an unapperceivable representation's phenomenal character: 
either it is comparable to the phenomenal character of an impossible representation—there is 
nothing it is like to experience the image of a square circle, say—or it ends up being a 
representation that is “nothing to me,” i.e., a representation which has no intentional content of 
which I can be conscious (Schlicht 2011: 508; Buroker 2006: 118). Being something of which I 
could never be conscious, it should follow that a representation which is “nothing to me” would 
thus be unconscious. On the other hand, a representation that has a conscious character is one 
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which would be “something for me,” that is, which has an intentional content (“something”) of 
which I am conscious (“for me”). Again, one can be conscious of a representational state without
explicitly thinking of it as such; the thought “I think” need not be associated with the state at the 
time of its occurrence in consciousness. Even if an unapperceived representation is not explicitly 
connected with the thought “I think,” and hence is pre-reflexively conscious, it will only 
represent something “for me” to the extent that it is capable of being cognized along with other 
representations as belonging to a single unified perspective. However, a representation which I 
can never in principle apperceptively identify as my own would be one which is never 
illuminated within the field of my own conscious first-personal perspective. 
What does it mean for apperceivability to be a necessary condition of a mental state's being
“something for me,” i.e., of there being something which it is like for me to experience the 
content of that state? In answering this question, we may first consider how the transcendental 
unity of apperception serves as a fundamental basis for the object-directed character or 
“something-ness” of conscious intentional cognitions. Kant states, 
Now this transcendental unity of apperception brings about, from all possible appearances 
whatever that can be together in one experience, a coherence of all these presentations 
according to laws.... Hence the original and necessary consciousness of one’s own identity 
is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all 
appearances according to concepts—these concepts being rules that not only make these 
appearances necessarily reproducible, but that thereby also determine an object for our 
intuition of these appearances, i.e., determine a concept of something wherein these 
appearances necessarily cohere. (A108)
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Here, Kant suggests that the unity of apperception makes possible the coherent representation of 
a complex object, by allowing representations to be experienced as belonging to a single, 
numerically identical subject. Indeed, the three syntheses laid out in the A-Deduction—
apprehension, reproduction, and recognition—are thought by Kant to presuppose the synthetic 
unity of apperception. That is to say, it would not be possible to produce conceptually unified 
representations of an object as a persisting predicative complex if it were impossible to 
experience those representations together within a unitary persisting consciousness. Kant has 
explained that the synthesis of reproduction must require the synthesis of conceptual recognition 
by writing, “Without the consciousness that what we are thinking is the same as what we thought
an instant before, all reproduction in the series of presentations would be futile” (A103); in that 
same vein, we might say on Kant's behalf that without the consciousness that who is thinking is 
the same as who thought an instant before, all representation itself would be futile. Ultimately, 
there could be no unity of representations if one’s consciousness of being the cognizer of 
preceding representations were lost in each moment. And since cognitions represent objects only 
by means of such unities of representation under a concept, the unity of apperception stands as a 
necessary condition for the intentional object-directness of conscious experience. 
“Consequently,” Kant writes, 
the reference of presentations to an object consists solely in this unity of consciousness, 
and hence so does their objective validity and consequently their becoming cognitions.... 
The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all cognition. 
Not only do I myself need this condition in order to cognize an object, but every intuition 
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must be subject to it in order to become an object for me. For otherwise, and without that 
synthesis, the manifold would not unite in one consciousness (B137-8).
To gloss Kant's argument: A manifold of representations becomes cognizable as an object 
through being unified under a concept; and a concept, in guiding the synthetic act that structures 
the manifold such that it can represent a determinate object, entails a consciousness of the 
necessary unity that this synthesis achieves; but, a consciousness of the synthetic unity under a 
concept “wherein appearances necessarily cohere” can arise only in accordance with the 
transcendental unity of apperception, that is, on the condition that consciousness itself is unified 
and numerically identical. In grounding our consciousness of synthetic unity whatsoever, the 
unity of apperception is hence responsible for the objectivity of representations as such: 
representations can be cognized as (truly or falsely) referring to objects existing apart from one's 
subjective perspective only if they are necessarily structured  in certain ways that remain 
invariant among the flux of fleeting sensory impressions.
Having touched on how the apperceptive unity of consciousness – i.e., the necessary 
combination of representations together into one experience – establishes the conditions for the 
possibility of having cognitions with an objective, intentional character, we can now see how it 
similarly plays a role in granting cognitions with a subjective character as well. Following the 
reading of Tobias Schlicht (2011), we can understand Kant to be claiming that a mental state 
takes on a subjective character if it stands to be integrated into the unified experience of a 
conscious subject. As with the coherent representation of a complex object, the coherent 
phenomenology of being a conscious subject with a unified first-personal perspective is also 
made possible through an act of synthesis, guided by concepts that govern how representations 
126
must be combined. This combination under the transcendental unity of apperception is 
responsible for bringing about the phenomenal unity of consciousness as such, as it allows 
representations to be experienced as belonging to a single, numerically identical subject. Hence, 
in the same way that synthesizing the sensory representations of an object's features is required 
to represent that object as being a unified whole, the synthesizing of all conscious representations
is required for representing the subject as itself being a unified whole. This latter synthesis is 
evinced by the fact that the conscious representations one is experiencing at any given time – 
e.g., the visual awareness of the blue sky, the tactile awareness of grass under my feet, and the 
auditory awareness of the wind rushing through the trees – are typically not felt to be isolated 
from each other, as though each representation belonged to a different subject. Rather, insofar as 
any perceptual representation is conscious, it appears as belonging to “one and the same general 
experience” (A110). Thus, Kant states, “For only by classing all perceptions with one 
consciousness (original apperception) can I say, for all perceptions, that I am conscious of them” 
(A122).
No matter what particular qualitative contents they present, all phenomenally conscious 
states are thought to share a subjective character of being “for me”; indeed, this shared quality of 
occurring “for me,” i.e., for an experiential subject, is supposed to be what makes something a 
phenomenally conscious state at all (Kriegel 2009). What Schlicht's reading takes Kant to be 
suggesting is that two phenomenal states come to share a subjective character of being “for me” 
just insofar as they both can be shared by me under one unified experience. As Kant writes,
For the manifold presentations given in a certain intuition would not one and all be my 
presentations, if they did not one and all belong to one self-consciousness. I.e., as my 
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presentations (even if I am not conscious of them as being mine), they surely must conform
necessarily to the condition under which alone they can stand together in one universal 
self-consciousness, since otherwise they would not thoroughly belong to me. (B132)
For Kant, this sense of belonging to a subject is just what it means for a conscious state to have a 
subjective quality of “mineness”; a state which could never be cognized as belonging to a subject
would be one which lacks anything it is like for me to experience, and so would be unconscious. 
Furthermore, insofar as these states have a subjective character of occurring for me, they also 
may be minimally self-referential, even if only non-intentionally so. That is, conscious states at 
least implicitly present themselves as belonging to one and the same subject, insofar as they all 
appear within “one and the same general experience”; so in bearing a relation to this one 
experience, each state can enable me to be “conscious of the self as identical, as regards the 
manifold of the presentations given to me in an intuition, because I call them one and all my 
presentations that make up one presentation” (B135; Schlicht 2011: 509). Though, phenomenally
conscious representations can have this self-referential quality of “being mine” even without it 
being cognized as a distinct intentional content; the representation can appear as mine, i.e., as 
occurring within my subjective perspective, even though it does not represent my perspective 
itself as its object. For Kant, the synthetic unity of apperception is an “original consciousness” 
that is “given along with (not in)” sensory intuitions (B161); elsewhere, he says that 
consciousness itself is just the “form of presentation” under which representations can appear as 
intentional cognitions (A346/B404). One might only be faintly conscious of this formal unity of 
consciousness as such, and hence not take any notice of the fact that each representation has been
synthesized to form one unified consciousness (A103-4). But though the “illuminated field” of 
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consciousness in which representations appear may itself be only indistinctly or peripherally 
experienced, the necessary synthetic unity of representations that structures this field into a 
unified subjective perspective must nonetheless be present – in Kant's words, “The form of 
experience consists precisely in this thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of perceptions; and this 
unity is nothing but the synthetic unity of appearances according to concepts” (A110). 
In bringing about the coherence of all possible appearances through combining them 
together in one experience, the transcendental unity of apperception can therefore be viewed as 
granting appearances with the self-presenting, “me-ish” quality that essentially constitutes their 
conscious phenomenal character, because this unity is what allows all appearances to be 
phenomenologically shared by, and hence manifest for, a single subject. On the other hand, Kant 
suggests that in the absence of this transcendental unity – that is, were representations not 
necessarily integrated into a unified conscious perspective – experience would as a result become
phenomenologically incoherent: 
The thought that these presentations given in intuition belong one and all to me is, 
accordingly, tantamount to the thought that I unite them, or at least can unite them, in one 
self-consciousness. And although that thought itself is not yet the consciousness of the 
synthesis of the presentations, it still presupposes the possibility of that synthesis. I.e., only 
because I can comprise the manifold of the presentations in one consciousness, do I call 
them one and all my presentations. For otherwise I would have a self as many-colored and 
varied as I have presentations that I am conscious of. (B134)
Here Kant argues that if sensory representations were not integrated together in a necessary 
unity, there would not be a single unified perspective that remains identical throughout all 
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experience; instead, the experiential subject would be different in each moment with each new 
representation. As a result, there would no longer be any subjective quality of “mineness” that is 
shared across all conscious representations, since there would be no subject that can share these 
representations and cognize them as being “one and all mine.” 
Though, an objection may now be raised that although all phenomenally conscious states 
intrinsically share a subjective character, that character does not necessitate that these states have
to be shared by the same subject; leaving aside the existence of other minds, even representations
existing in the same mind could all be phenomenally conscious and thereby subjectively occur 
“for me,” without that “me” needing to be felt as being the same subject from one moment to the 
next. As we have seen, however, the transcendental unity of apperception is also a necessary 
condition not only for the unity of subjective consciousness, but also for the unity of objective 
representation. In other words, Kant has argued that it would be impossible to have a perceptual 
experience of an object as a structured, unified whole, if the representations of the object's parts 
and features were totally isolated from each other and thereby did not belong to the same 
experience. No coherent perceptual image would be generated were sensory impressions not 
associated together in a rule-governed manner, that is, according to concepts. Rather, it is only 
through conforming with the unity of apperception that any representation can be synthesized in 
such a manner. Hence, without a transcendental basis for the unity of synthesis, 
our soul [would] be filled with a crowd of appearances that yet could never turn into 
experience….Although it would be intuition devoid of thought, yet it would never be 
cognition, and hence would for us be tantamount to nothing at all….These perceptions 
would also not belong to any experience, and hence would be without an object; they 
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would be nothing but a blind play of presentations—i.e., they would be less than a dream. 
(A111-12)
Hence, the phenomenological incoherence of intuition “devoid of thought” outstrips the merely 
rational incoherence of dreams. For Kant, dreams are distinguished from perceptual experience 
in lacking any objective reality. The objects presented in dreams don't necessarily obey the 
natural laws (such as causality) that govern external objects (A202/B247; A451/B79); which, 
given Kant's “Copernican turn,” is to say that dreams are not fully determined by the a priori 
rules of synthetic unity that govern our cognition of objects. Yet, dreams are also not fully 
exempt from the pure concepts of the understanding – they have intentional contents, and insofar
as they figure as objects of inner sense, i.e., as subjective mental states in a temporally ordered 
sequence, they are governed by the synthetic unity of apperception (A177/B120; Gardner 1999: 
164). Kant therefore suggests that if essentially non-conceptual intuitions were to be totally 
exempt from the conceptual and categorial unity of apperception, they would have to be exist at 
a level below waking perceptual consciousness and dreaming, where they would not appear as 
consciously presenting objects from within a unified first-personal perspective. These “blind” 
non-conceptual appearances which could never turn into an experience belonging to a conscious 
subject would be best understood as being sub-personal, sub-conscious representations.
3.3.2 Objections From Kantian Non-Conceptualism
At this point, non-conceptualist interpreters of Kant would be quick to object: “Cognition” 
(Erkenntniss), “experience” (Erfahrung), “perception” (Wahrnehmung), “consciousness” 
(Bewußtsein) – these are all terms of art whose meanings in the Kantian context do not 
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necessarily map onto their usages in contemporary philosophical discussions. That being so, the 
conclusions we have drawn about the phenomenological incoherence of non-conceptual 
perception only follow from a misreading of Kant's account. Kant's psychological account in the 
Critique is transcendental rather than empirical; he is concerned with finding the necessary 
conditions for our knowledge claims about the world to be justified, instead of describing how 
the mind actually works. Each of these terms thus have for Kant a more narrow, explicitly 
epistemic connotations, which do not necessarily apply more generally to all conscious 
perceptual states. By the term “cognition,” Kant refers to conscious representations which 
“consist in determinate reference of given presentations to an object” (B137). To explain: 
Cognitions have objective validity insofar as they represent some determinate object. Concepts 
are what determine the reference of a cognition to some object instead of another, insofar as a 
concept determines how representations must be united in order to form a cognition of that 
specific object. Concepts perform their function of classifying representations together by means 
of discursive judgments; as Buroker explains, “[Kant's] point is that concepts have no use other 
than to think of something, an x, as a thing of a certain kind F. But this act of conceiving an x as 
an F is equivalent to thinking the proposition that x is F, which is an act of judging” (2006: 81). 
So ultimately, a cognition bears a determinate relation to an object through being a judgment that
contains concepts for that object and its predicates. The objective validity of cognitions is thus 
grounded in their being judgments with determinate truth values about objective states of affairs. 
Through a cognition, one asserts something about an object itself, rather than about how 
subjective mental states are contingently associated in one's mind. 
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When a cognition determines its object through perception, then we have what Kant calls 
“experience” or “empirical cognition” (A176/B218). Experience specifically arises through the 
connecting together of perceptions under the necessary rule of the categories, with “perception” 
being defined as the empirical consciousness of a sensory appearance furnished by intuition 
(Anschauung) (A120, B160, A320/B376). That raises the question of what Kant means by 
“consciousness,” and whether intuitions as well as perception are equally conscious in the 
ordinary sense of being phenomenal states. Colin McLear points out that consciousness for Kant 
fundamentally involves discrimination, such that the degree to which a representation is 
conscious is determined by how thoroughly it discriminates its object. A representation can be 
conscious and still be “obscure,” if it discriminates its object without a subject being explicitly 
aware of how that representation is distinct from other representations. On the other hand, a 
conscious representation is sufficiently “clear” when the subject can distinguish its object from 
other objects (B415). Finally, a conscious representation can be “distinct” in the sense that all the
parts of its content can be discriminated. Returning to Kant's definition of perception as the 
consciousness of an intuited appearance, McLear claims that the difference between clear and 
distinct representations sheds light on the difference between intuition and perception: “An 
intuition, of itself, is at best conscious in the sense of being clear [klar]. When an intuition is 
apprehended in an act of Wahrnehmung... its content is brought together in such a way that it 
becomes (at least to some degree) distinct [deutlich], and thus a candidate for cognition” (2014: 
786). Summing up, we may say that intuition on its own is conscious to the extent that it involves
the sensory discrimination of some features in the world; perception goes a step further in being 
conscious of those intuited features as the basis for differentiating one object from another; and 
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finally, full-blown experience or empirical cognition amounts to a propositional judgment in 
which one is conscious of an object as a structured complex of features like “the substantiality of
a thing, its causal relations with other beings, and its mereological features, that is, part-whole 
dependence relations,” such features corresponding to the conceptual categories of the 
understanding (McLear 2015: 1.a.i). 
To the defender of Kantian non-conceptualism, it is evident from how Kant has set up this 
trichotomy of intuition, perception, and experience that his account of experience should not be 
confused with an account of perceptual awareness in general. When Kant claims that conceptual 
synthesis and apperceptive unity are necessary conditions of “experience” or “empirical 
cognition,” he is ultimately elaborating the conditions for the possibility of having objectively 
valid thoughts about objects; he is not thereby claiming that these conditions are also required for
the ordinary perception of objects. As Lucy Allais argues, “Since Kant says that by ‘experience’ 
he means empirical cognition (B147), conditions of the possibility of experience are conditions 
of the possibility of cognition, not merely conditions of something like phenomenal 
consciousness. This means that to say that something is a condition of the possibility of 
experience is not to say that it is a condition of the possibility of any kind of conscious 
representational state at all” (2009: 402). Accordingly, Kantian non-conceptualists claim that we 
can have phenomenally conscious perceptual representations of objects in the absence of any 
prior possession or application of relevant concepts. Intuitions for Kant are representations that 
are immediate and singular; so through intuition alone, we can have a direct sensory presentation
of external particulars. Elsewhere in Kant's writings, he clearly acknowledges that certain 
creatures can perceive the world in this ordinary sense of being presented with particulars, 
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without needing to possess concepts for what they see. For instance, he describes how a “savage”
who has no concept of a house would nonetheless see the house through “mere intuition”: “[H]e 
admittedly has before him in his representation the very same object as someone else who is 
acquainted with it determinately as a dwelling established for men. But as to form, this cognition 
of one and the same object is different in the two. With one it is mere intuition, with the other it 
is intuition and concept at the same time” (JL 33, ctd. in Allais 2009: 388). The non-conceptual 
savage may not be able to know that this is a house, and may not be able to see, i.e., perceptually 
judge, the house as a house; nonetheless, through mere intuition he perceives the house all the 
same. 
Since there is no question that the non-conceptual savage consciously sees the house, we 
must therefore re-evaluate what Kant means when he states that intuitions without concepts are 
“blind,” or represent “nothing to me.” The Kantian non-conceptualist contends that this blindness
cannot be intended as a literal blindness or total absence of perceptual representation. Instead, 
mere intuition is “blind” only in the sense that a perceiver who does not possess the concepts 
needed to articulate what is being seen may be unable to form an objectively valid judgment 
about, or have a self-conscious understanding of, the merely intuited object. Giving another 
example of perceiving through mere intuition, Kant writes, “Concepts differ from intuition by 
virtue of the fact that all intuition is singular. He who sees his first tree does not know what it is 
that he sees” (VL 905; ctd. in Allais 2009: 388). Someone who sees a tree for the first time does 
not yet have the concepts needed to categorize or identify what he is seeing, and so, as Allais 
puts it, “Although something is perceived, it is not perceived as having properties, and therefore 
as being an object of a particular kind” (2009: 405, n. 62). She explains that, in lacking the 
135
concepts needed for cognizing an object as being of a certain kind, one lacks an understanding of
the identity conditions that determine what it is for something to be that type of thing. For 
example, each representation of the tree as a tree, or as a birch, or as being tall, would 
respectively entail somewhat different conditions for how an object of that type persists over 
time, or bears certain attributes. At a fundamental level, the a priori categories set out such 
conditions for all objects. So, in the absence of all concepts including the categories, the 
representation of an object would be “nothing to me” to the extent that I could not determine just 
what it is that is being represented. Yet, while determining an object in this way is necessary for 
thinking and reasoning about it, it does not seem to be a prerequisite for that object's being 
directly given to me in perceptual experience (Ibid., 405) – not knowing that one is seeing a tree 
of course does not entail that one is seeing nothing at all.
As with the categories, the Kantian non-conceptualist will argue that the transcendental 
unity of apperception is also not to be taken as a necessary condition for conscious perceptual 
awareness in general. Allais writes, 
What is a condition of the transcendental unity of apperception, i.e., the synthesis 
according to the categories, is a condition of self-consciousness and thought about an 
objective world, which means that it is at least possible that what the Deduction argues to 
be conditions of the unity of consciousness in the experience of an object concern self-
consciouness [sic] only, and are not conditions of having a perceptual consciousness in any
sense. (Ibid., 402)
The self-consciousness that the unity of apperception engenders is a higher-order, self-ascriptive 
representation of one's own mental states. The unity of apperception is necessary for experience 
136
in the robust, epistemic sense, because through making self-ascriptive thought possible, it allows 
a subject to self-consciously conceive of itself as a rational knower set against a mind-
independent, law-governed objective world. And yet, it is obvious that creatures who do not have
any higher-order capacity for introspection, and who cannot attach to their own representations 
the thought “I think,” can still have a phenomenally conscious awareness of external particulars. 
The Kantian non-conceptualist would reject the notion that non-conceptual states which are not 
synthesized according to the unity of apperception must therefore be unconscious or 
phenomenologically incoherent. Rather than being presented with an “an inner display of non-
intentional, raw sensations,” a non-conceptual creature would be able to discriminate, locate, and
track spatiotemporally unified objects from within a three-dimensional, egocentric perspective or
“phenomenal field” (Ibid., 406, 408). Finally, the phenomenological coherence of the creature's 
external perceptions can also extend to the creature's experience of inner subjective states like 
pain, pleasure, hunger, etc. Even though the creature may be totally incapable of introspective 
self-consciousness, it may still have a basic “inner sense,” a form of intuition through which it 
can be directly presented with a temporally ordered series of inner representations. The creature 
can be phenomenally conscious of states in the series without self-consciously understanding 
where certain states lie in the series relative to each other, nor reflexively ascribing the whole 
series as belonging to a unified subject (McLear 2011: 9-11). 
3.3.3 Responding to the Kantian Version of Essentialist Content Non-Conceptualism
 In order to defend the revised conceptualist reading of Kant as claiming that non-
conceptual perceptions do not appear in conscious experience, I will offer several responses to 
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the objections of the non-conceptualist. But first, a concession: In holding that non-rational 
creatures perceive objects without having any concepts for those objects, Kant indeed seems 
committed to a form of state non-conceptualism, i.e., the view that a perceptual state is non-
conceptual when it stands in a concept-independent relation to a perceiver who does not 
possessing the concepts that would articulate the state's content. So, when the non-rational 
savage and rational non-savage both perceive a house, they would ostensibly share the same 
perceptual state – i.e., the same manifold of intuited appearances that represents the house – but 
only the non-savage would be related to the state through possessing the concepts required for 
cognizing the manifold as presenting a house. However, for reasons described in chapter one, 
state non-conceptualist views are not the target of, and do not pose a threat to, the revised 
conceptualism I am advocating. It was shown that state non-conceptualism cannot be a viable 
version of the non-conceptualism thesis, as the distinction between non-conceptual and 
conceptual states becomes trivial or incoherent if non-conceptual and conceptual contents turn 
out not to be different in kind. Robert Hanna and Monima Chadha further accuse state non-
conceptualism of being compatible with what they call “Highly Refined Conceptualism,” a 
position akin to my own which allows that concepts can still be deployed in perceptual 
experience by a perceiver who does not possess a linguistic and/or inferential mastery of those 
concepts (2009: 196, 200).45  It would turn out that even when Kant's savage perceives the house,
he is employing a recognitional capacity for identifying the house and distinguishing it from 
other objects – so his perceptual state could still be concept-dependent. 
45 My own view is that the distinction between deployment and possession is not needed once the conditions for 
possessing a concept are understood in less restrictive, but still non-trivial, terms.
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Hanna and Chadha therefore argue that the content of mere intuition must be essentially 
non-conceptual; that is, intuition must have representational content that is intrinsically and 
necessarily distinct in both structure and function from the content of conceptual judgments. 
They stake out their position in the following way: “What the essentialist content non-
conceptualist is saying... is that there are perceptual contents that cannot be conceptually 
presented because they are inherently non-conceptual in formal constitution or structure.... It has 
to be impossible to give an adequately individuating conceptual specification of an essentially 
non-conceptual content” (2009 195). This intrinsic, necessary difference between intuitional 
content and conceptual content owes to the former's origins in the faculty of sensibility, and 
specifically the pure forms of space and time under which all intuitions must appear. As pure 
forms of intuition, the representation of space and time has a structural unity different than that 
of concepts, in that space and time are unitary wholes which are logically prior to their parts. It 
cannot be as though intuited parts of space-time are combined to form one representation of 
space-time as a whole; rather, parts of space-time are just limitations drawn out of a singular, 
antecedently given space-time (A25/B39; A32/B48). When it comes to concepts, by contrast, the 
logical priority rests with the parts instead of the whole. For instance, although the concept 
“animal” is a component part of the complex concept “mammal,” what it is to be animal can be 
understood without thinking about any mammals; in that way, “animal” is logically prior to 
“mammal” (Buroker 2006: 53). As for the respective functions of intuition and concepts, the 
difference is simple: the function of intuitions is to immediately present objects to the mind, 
while concepts are used for thinking about objects whether or not they are immediately present.46
46 Allais (2009: 390-1) makes the same point about the different functions of intuition and concepts, but does not 
use that point to argue that there must be an essential difference in the structure of intuitional and conceptual 
contents (Ibid., 386).
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One's knowledge of a conceptually represented object is mediated by a description under which 
the object is categorized; one can understand that description without ever having been having 
perceived that object itself. For that reason, Hanna and Chadha characterize conceptual content 
as  “inherently context-insensitive, allocentric or non-egocentric (whether third-personal or 
impersonal), shareable, communicable content” (2009: 202). The non-conceptual content of 
intuition is thus characterized as the opposite; intuitional content is “context-sensitive, 
egocentric, first-personal, intrinsically spatiotemporally structured” content, whose function is to 
locate and track material objects in a 3D Euclidean space (2009: 203). 
At the same time, Kantian non-conceptualists wish to distance intuition from mere 
sensation (Empfindung), which is also a deliverance of the sensibility. Sensation for Kant are 
taken to be unstructured, non-intentional, sensory states of a perceiver.47 These states do not yet 
amount to a perceptual representation of an object, and can play no epistemic role on its own 
(Allais 2009: 398). As Hanna and Chadha acknowledge, representations with non-conceptual 
content cannot amount to unstructured, raw impressions brutely given by the sensibility, as such 
impressions could not serve as reasons which properly justify our beliefs and motivate our 
actions. Lacking a structure, sense impressions cannot be truth-evaluable, and cannot stand in 
epistemic relations to other beliefs. However, genuine non-conceptual representations are proto-
rational and normative, and ground our epistemic practices by ensuring that they successfully 
make reference to objects in the world (2009: 210). So, if intuition is to outstrip sensation in 
having an intentional structure and normative significance, then it must have a source outside of 
sensibility alone, without that source being the understanding. Hanna and Chadha identify this 
47 Sensations may also be understood by Kant as physiological states rather than as conscious mental states; see 
Buroker 2006: 41. 
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additional source as a sub-rational, non-conceptual type of synthesis carried out by the 
productive imagination. Hanna writes elsewhere that the productive imagination introduces an 
active, “lower-level” spontaneity to the passive sensibility, and is responsible for generating 
“representations of static or dynamic spatiotemporal forms, patterns, or shapes” in perception 
(Hanna 2005: 249), such representations presumably being incapable of being yielded by 
sensibility alone. The productive imagination, or what Kant calls “figurative synthesis” in the B-
Deduction (B151), evidently takes over the functions of the first two types of synthesis laid out 
in the A-Deduction, namely apprehension and reproduction. Through this figurative synthesis, 
the imagination generates perceptual images in accordance with a schema that determines how 
some particular intuitions representing an object should be synthesized, so that the perceived 
object may be recognized as falling under a general concept (the most general concepts being the
a priori categories). In organizing sensory intuitions under concepts, schemata are themselves 
inherently sortal, and thereby introduce an element of generality that is absent from the intuition 
itself. As Hanna puts it, schemata “directly encode both sensory and discursive information in a 
phenomenal spatiotemporal structural format,” giving rise to a representation comparable to a 
map which serves as a model or template for what it represents (2005: 267). That being so, he 
admits that schemata are both quasi-intuitions and quasi-conceptual. Nonetheless, he claims that 
as “functions of intuition and intrinsically intuitional in nature,” schemata “are strictly speaking 
only compatible with concepts, and not intrinsically conceptual in nature” (Ibid., 286, n. 51); “it 
follows that the content of imaginational representation is nonconceptual” (Ibid., 267).
Against the Kantian non-conceptualist's claim that perceptual content is essentially non-
conceptual, the first objection we can raise is that the non-conceptualist's reading fails to cohere 
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what Kant says in the Transcendental Deduction (I refrain from assessing its coherence with 
what Kant says across all his works). There, Kant's basic goal is to demonstrate that the pure 
concepts of the understanding are objectively valid, i.e., they necessarily apply to all objects of 
experience. If Kant's intention were to just make the point that the categories are necessarily 
applied only in our thoughts/judgments about objects, then he could not accomplish the 
Critique's larger goal of forestalling Humean skepticism about the truth of these judgments. The 
fact that we invariably think about objects as mind-independent, persisting, substantial, and 
causally related entities does not guarantee that such entities can ever be found to exist in reality;
according to Hume, these notions of mind-independence, causality, etc. have no basis in our 
sensory experience, and the conformity of experience to these notions is at best a contingent 
matter. Kant's response to Hume thus cannot merely be that we must use the categories to think 
about objects of experience – rather, the response must be that we necessarily judge objects of 
experience in the way we do because the a priori concepts underlying our judgments are also the
necessary conditions for our experience of those very objects (see Gomes 2014: 9-15). The non-
conceptualist cannot here reply that by “experience” Kant simply means that the categories apply
to “empirical judgment”; as Thomas Land (2015) points out, such an interpretation of the 
necessary agreement between experience and the categories would have Kant claiming that the 
categories agree with the judgments in which they are employed, rather than with the objects of 
experience themselves – but it is an object, and not a judgment, which is necessarily represented 
as standing in a causal relation, or as being a persisting substance, etc. Perceptual 
representations, and not merely our judgments about them, must be structured in such a way that 
objects themselves appear as conforming to the a priori categories. The sensibility alone is not 
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sufficient for producing such structured representations of an object; Buroker explains, “Our 
intuitive capacities supply us, along with the empirical data, a priori manifolds of spatial and 
temporal data. All data given in intuition, both empirical and pure, are determinable but 
indeterminate. That means that they are not received as discriminated into determinate 
spatiotemporal regions” (2006: 55). So, the Kantian non-conceptualist then tries to argue that the 
perceptual representation of determinate spatiotemporal regions, or of “spatially continuous and 
unified individuals existing outside the subject and located in space” (Allais 2009: 405), is 
generated through a non-conceptual process of figurative synthesis carried about by the 
imagination. But, this sort of move overlooks Kant's claim that the act of figurative synthesis 
which combines the sensory manifold and gives rise to a “determinate intuition,” i.e., the 
perceptual representation of a spatiotemporally bounded object, itself stands as a “synthetic 
influence of the understanding on inner sense” (B154). Ultimately, the concepts of the 
understanding actively shape the content of intuition through the imagination, producing a 
perceptual image in which there is a “determinate coherence of presentations” (A121). The non-
conceptualist reading thus is unsuccessful at isolating a non-conceptual level of synthesis in 
order to secure some lower-level objective validity for intuition. Put more strongly, it seems 
against the spirit of Kant's Deduction for the non-conceptualist interpretation to claim that 
“perception could represent a determinate object in the absence of at least the a priori concepts” 
(Allais 2009: 395, n. 31).
Even the situated spatiotemporal character of Hanna and Chadha’s essentially non-
conceptual content – which marks it off as inherently distinct from conceptual content – is made 
possible through the understanding's synthetic activity. That a unified space-time can figure at all
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in the content of perception is due to the rules of synthesis laid out by the categories and the 
transcendental unity of apperception. This point is captured by Kant’s distinction in his footnote 
at B160 between the space/time as forms of intuition and as formal intuitions. Kant argues that to
have any determinate representation of space/time, we must synthesize the manifold of intuition 
into a unified presentation. Space/time are already the forms of intuition, providing a basic unity 
to intuitions at the level of sensibility. But, Kant argues, the presentation of this unity of 
sensibility presupposes a still more fundamental synthetic unity provided by the transcendental 
apperception. Kant states, “For through this unity (inasmuch as understanding determines 
sensibility) space and time are first given as intuitions, hence the unity of this a priori intuition 
belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of understanding” (B161, n. 305). Though it 
seems as though Kant is here contradicting himself, Buroker explains, “Kant’s point, however, is 
that the manifold as given in sensibility makes it possible to experience one space and one time; 
synthesis by the understanding is required to experience a unified space and time” (2006: 130). 
Put another way, it is only through the pure concepts’ sensible synthesis of intuition that we can 
perceive sensory objects as being spatiotemporal unities in the first place. We can string together 
representations of space/time together through the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction in
imagination, but, “Without the consciousness that what we are thinking is the same as what we 
thought an instant before, all reproduction in the series of presentations would be futile” (A103). 
In fact, not even the “purest and most basic presentations of space and time” would be 
impossible in the absence of the understanding’s synthesis of sensory intuition (A102). That is to 
say, there needs to be a conceptual recognition of objects as being united together in space/time 
in order for there to be any coherent perceptual experience of them. Kant writes, “Consequently 
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all synthesis, the synthesis through which even perception becomes possible, is subject to the 
categories; and since experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are 
conditions of the possibility of experience and hence hold a priori also for all objects of 
experience” (B161). In the last analysis, then, a sharp divide in Kant's account between the 
structure and function of concepts and intuition cannot be plausibly established when concepts 
themselves are taken to a play a central role in the generation of intuition within perceptual 
experience. We ultimately find no evidence in the Deduction for the non-conceptualist's thesis 
that “our cognitive access to the targets of intentionality is not necessarily mediated by concepts 
and in fact sometimes wholly unmediated by concepts” (Hanna and Chadha 2009: 185).
Furthermore, even if we grant that there is within Kant's account a level of pure, 
unsynthesized intuition that is essentially non-conceptual, it is doubtful whether such a level of 
representation would on its own would have a conscious phenomenal character. Hanna himself 
harbors no such doubts, claiming that our pure intuitional representations of space and time are 
“intrinsic phenomenal structures” that “immanently configure, organize, and 'pre-format' all 
phenomenal cognitive content” (2005: 280). Through endowing our phenomenally conscious 
perceptual representations of objects with a spatial orientation and temporal asymmetry, the 
forms of space of time thus frame these representations within a “nonconceptual spatiotemporal 
phenomenal field,” wherein they are manifest to an egocentric point of view (Ibid., 282). Hanna 
therefore argues that the spatiotemporal structure of non-conceptual content is identical with its 
having a phenomenally subjective character:
[F]or Kant the designated formal intuitional spatiotemporal structure of non-conceptual 
cognitive content just is its subjective or 'first-person' character. It is precisely an animal’s 
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unique non-conceptual spatiotemporal perspective or “point of view” that constitutes the 
subjective character of its objective experience, and not the 'unity of consciousness' in the 
Kantian sense of a necessarily conceptual capacity for rationally self-conscious and 
proposition-based unification of a phenomenal manifold of sensory or representational 
content. (Ibid., 282)
But, in response to Hanna's attempt at explaining the subjective character of conscious 
perceptual states in terms of their non-conceptual structure, Schlicht argues that to have an 
egocentric perceptual perspective does not necessarily entail that the representational states 
arising within that perspective have a conscious subjective character of “mineness.” The forms of
intuitions may indeed “pre-format” all perceptual representations, but a representation's 
egocentrically-oriented spatiotemporal structure is not sufficient for its being 
phenomenologically manifest to a perceiver. Schlicht points to cases of “blindsight” patients who
have suffered a lesion to the visual cortex. These patients will insistently report that they do not 
see anything in a certain part of their visual field. However, when forced to judge things like the 
location and orientation of a stimulus present in the blind part of the visual field, the patients are 
able to accurately do so at rates better than chance, even as they claim to be just “blindly” 
guessing. Now, their perception of stimuli in the blind field is evidently spatiotemporally 
structured; the patients are able to perceptually discriminate spatial features of the stimuli from 
their egocentric frame of reference. And yet, this discrimination occurs in the absence of any 
visual phenomenology; there is “nothing it is like” in a phenomenal sense for the patients to be 
perceiving stimuli present in the blind field. So, against Hanna, the subjective phenomenal 
character of perceptual representations cannot be constituted by their non-conceptual 
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spatiotemporal structure, as being so structured does not by itself ensure that the representations 
phenomenally appear to the subject (Schlicht 2011: 506). Within Kant's own account, there is 
also a recognition that the pure forms of intuition are themselves not sufficient conditions for 
giving rise to the conscious perceptual experience of objects; as Buroker summarizes, “Thus the 
suggestion in the Aesthetic that humans can consciously represent objects by intuition alone is 
misleading. What Kant should say is that the sensibility supplies the intuitive data for 
representing objects, but that this data, prior to all intellectual processing, is not yet a 
representation of which we are conscious” (2006: 40).
Still, the claim that “intellectual processing” is required for being conscious of perceptual 
representations would strike many as being wrong-headed, in that it would seem to deny the 
obvious fact that creatures who lack higher-order cognitive capacities can have conscious 
perceptual experience. Indeed, Kant would apparently be in agreement with the non-
conceptualist on this point: Outside the Deduction, he makes many statements to the effect that 
non-human animals (along with human “savages”) lack the intellectual capacities of discursive 
understanding, but nonetheless can have phenomenally conscious sensory intuitions of objects as
well as inner states (McLear 2011). Lacking concepts, animals would fail to be self-consciously 
aware of any necessity in the association of their representations; that is, they would not 
recognize their representations as falling under a concept. Nor can animals entertain the thought 
“I think,” and introspectively ascribe their representations to a unified self-conscious subject; yet 
even for Kant, this lack of self-consciousness does not entail an absolute lack of consciousness 
(Buroker 2006: 94, 119). In reply to this objection, we may offer a revised conceptualist reading 
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of would can be meant by “intellectual processing,” which would extend the capacities for 
discursive understanding to so-called “non-discursive” creatures. 
As a matter of fact, when we take into account what Kant actually means by “discursive,” 
it turns out that not much revision is required. According to McLear, “Kant uses the notion of 
discursivity quite broadly, including not only the application of concepts in judgment but also the
broader 'synthetic' activity of mind in 'running through and gathering together the various 
elements given in perception so that they may be thought (e.g. A99)” (2011: 2, n. 8). Though 
Kant makes claims to the effect that thought is essentially linguistic,48 I would argue that the 
broader sense of “discursive” as the synthetic “gathering together” of representations under a 
concept is perfectly applicable to the cognitive activity of non-linguistic creatures. This is 
especially apparent when we acknowledge the abundance of research showing that non-human 
animals do indeed possess to some degree capacities for long-term memory and future planning, 
symbolic communication, metacognition, social cognition, and creative problem-solving (see 
Andrews 2011) – all capacities which would require in some way the representation of 
generality, i.e., concepts. 
More to the point, these sophisticated cognitive capacities would evidently depend on more
basic perceptual abilities for object identification and recognition, which suggests that the same 
fundamental capacities of synthesis outlined by Kant may also be active in structuring such 
creatures' perceptual representations and enabling them to be taken up in cognition. It is further 
plausible that these acts of perceptual synthesis would still be rule-governed by a core set of 
basic and innate concepts which parallel the Kantian categories (Gennaro 2012: 189-199). For 
instance, studies have found human infant perception to be guided by nascent conceptual 
48 See An 7:167: “... the nature of thought [is] speaking to and of oneself.”
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principles for identifying and tracking objects in a visual scene – or, to invoke Kant, necessary 
rules that guide how given sensory inputs are combined to generate perceptual representations of 
objects. By about four months of age, infants perceptually parse the distal environment in a way 
that evinces an understanding of physical objects as being bounded, coherent, three-dimensional,
moveable and persisting wholes; researchers have thus concluded that infants innately represent 
their environment in accordance with a basic sortal concept object (see Baillergeon 2008, Spelke 
1990). Moreover, infants individuate objects by making use of an object's properties – within the 
first year of life, infants progressively discern the identity of objects on the basis of their 
spatiotemporal location and motion, their features like shape and color, and finally more abstract 
kinds and categories (Xu 1999). 
In this way, the perceptual representations of non-linguistic infants may be said to take on 
an object-property structure under the guidance of perceptual concepts. In Kantian terms, even 
infants have a perceptual understanding in which they are conscious of the unity of 
representations brought about by an act of synthesis. This consciousness of unity is integral to 
the perceptual experience of an object as existing beyond one's transient, subjective sense 
impressions of it; and insofar as non-linguistic creatures are capable of such experience – which 
seems likely, judging by their cognitive and intentional activity – then we may broaden the 
Kantian account to include their perceptual representations as being conceptual in nature. Land 
nicely illustrates what sort of perceptual representation we are speaking of here, how it involves 
a consciousness of unity, and why it would be counted by Kant as conceptual: 
 An object is something that, for instance, can be perceived from a variety of different 
spatial and temporal vantage points, which are, moreover, systematically related to one 
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another. We can express this point by saying that an object exhibits a certain kind of spatio-
temporal unity. If perception is to be of objects, so the Kantian thought runs, it must 
contain a consciousness of this unity. For instance, when I see a tomato in front of me, 
there is a sense in which my sensory impression is confined to the side of the tomato that is
facing me. If what I perceive is indeed a tomato, however, the content of my perception is 
not just a surface. It is a solid, three-dimensional object, which (in the normal course of 
things) existed prior to my perceiving it and will continue to exist afterwards. And this is, 
at least implicitly, part of my perceptual consciousness. In perceiving the tomato, we might
say, I am aware of perceiving a three-dimensional object with a temporal history. I do not 
take myself to be perceiving a mere surface. When Kant characterizes an intuition as the 
singular representation of an object and distinguishes intuitions from mere sensations, this 
point, suitably elaborated, is what he has in mind. (2011: 203-4) 
In the detailed descriptions of the three-fold synthesis and the activity of the imagination, we 
have seen how, on the Kantian account, concepts are necessarily involved in the process of 
transforming intuitions into something which exceeds mere sensations. Here, Land reveals the 
end result of that process, namely the conscious perceptual experience of a unified, three-
dimensional object existing beyond one's momentary view. Through taking such an object as its 
content, intuition becomes a type of allocentric, object-centered representation. As we have also 
seen, allocentric representations are precisely the type of representation considered by Hanna and
Chadha to have conceptual content, that is, to be excluded from counting as essentially non-
conceptual. We now see that essentially non-conceptual content does not capture the full content 
of conscious perceptual experience. In the next chapter, we will provide a more detailed account 
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of how allocentric perceptual representations arise in part through accessing the ventral stream of
the visual system, which plays a large role in object-recognition and conscious visual 
phenomenology.
3.4 Conclusion: Apperception, Attentional Access, and Consciousness
The aim of this chapter has been to show how Navya Nyāya and Kant converge on the idea
that conscious perceptual experience of objects implicates the activity of perceptual concepts. 
Both arrive at this conclusion through claiming that essentially non-conceptual content would be 
apperceptively inaccessible to a conscious subject. To this claim, however, one may object that 
their characterization of apperception would put conscious perceptual experience out of the reach
of non-linguistic creatures. That is to say, both Nyāya and Kant view the apperceptive awareness 
of a cognition as a judgment which takes the form, “I think” or “I am aware.” Infants and non-
linguistic creatures, on the other hand, presumably have conscious perceptual experience despite 
being unable to make apperceptive judgments; so, apperceptibility has no bearing on whether a 
perceptual state with essentially non-conceptual content is conscious or not. In response, a 
revised Nyāya-Kantian conceptualism would make three points: First, we should reiterate that 
being apperceived is not the mark of a representational state's being consciously aware; Nyāya 
and Kant readily allow that most conscious cognitions go unnoticed by the subject. Yet, on their 
accounts, essentially non-conceptual states do not just happen to pass unnoticed; rather, these 
states are impossible to notice – a subject is never in a position to be aware of the state's 
occurrence. Second, the Nyāya-Kantian claim about the connection between an essentially non-
conceptual state's being inapperceivable and its lack of a subjective phenomenal character 
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becomes broader in scope once we acknowledge that even non-linguistic creatures can have 
capacities for apperception, even if their apperceptive cognition doesn't take the form of a 
verbalized self-ascriptive judgment. At its core, the capacity for apperception is a capacity for 
metacognition, i.e., an ability to be aware of and monitor one's own cognitive states – 
“metacognition” in that respect offers another potential translation of “anuvyavasāya.” Though 
Kant himself thought that animals cannot not be self-consciously aware of their own mental 
states, in the sense that they cannot reflectively take their own states as the objects of their 
thoughts, we can retain the essential thrust of Kant's view while discarding his prejudices, as we 
did in the case of animals and concept possession. There are numerous studies which have found 
non-verbal, behavioral indications that animals and human infants possess self-reflective 
metacognitive abilities (Goupil, Romand-Monnier & Kouider 2016), particularly when it comes 
to understanding the quality of their own epistemic states. Through their behavior, non-human 
animals and infants show that they can self-monitor as well as express to others the degree of 
uncertainty or confidence they have regarding the accuracy of their responses to some task (see 
also Andrews 2011: 4.2.3; Gennaro 2012: 243-5). Additionally, the capacities for attentional 
control and self-regulation which form the basis of higher-order metacognitive skills are 
developed at an early stage in the development of human infants; through intersubjective 
interactions in which an infant and adult are mutually attending to each other or to some third 
object, the infant begins to move from monitoring the emotions and attention of another to more 
actively monitoring their own emotional responses and attentional states (Brinck & Liljenfors 
2013). Having thus broadened our understanding of apperceptive abilities beyond the formation 
of explicitly self-ascriptive judgments, we can thereby acknowledge that for a wide array of 
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creatures, these abilities would be grounded in a conscious awareness of a unified subjective 
perspective from which they engage the world. Put another way, there is a spectrum of ways in 
which creatures can demonstrate an awareness of an underlying unity of consciousness, i.e., the 
unified perspective which Kant calls the synthetic unity of apperception.  To again cite Kant, 
such a unified perspective “consists precisely in this thoroughgoing and synthetic unity of 
perceptions; and this unity is nothing but the synthetic unity of appearances according to 
concepts” (A110).
In the next chapter, we will attempt to give a naturalized account of the processes of 
conceptual synthesis and structuring that Kant and Navya Nyāya identify as making perceptual 
cognitions available to consciousness in the first place. These conceptually modulated processes 
allow cognitions to be integrated into a subject's overarching perceptual experience, and to be 
poised for employment in further cognition and action. Chief among these processes is the 
operation of attention, which acts to bind sensory information together into a stable, coherent 
perceptual representation. As we have already suggested, the predicative binding of features to 
objects by attention grants perceptual representations with a structure that can be understood as 
conceptual in nature; what we will see in the next chapter is how this activity of predication is 
also cognitively penetrated, or influenced by memory-based perceptual concepts. Kant and 
Navya Nyāya allow that an early enough stage of visual processing, there may be perceptual 
representations with pre-predicative, essentially non-conceptual contents. But, they ultimately 
claim that it is through the joint intervention of attention- and memory-based capacities that these
representations give way to the conceptually constituted representations of conscious visual 
experience. As a result, their accounts, when bolstered by empirical studies of visual processing, 
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can mount a defense against philosophers who predominantly employ phenomenological 
arguments defending the existence of essentially non-conceptual perceptual content—instead, I 
will try to show that by the time a perceptual representation is phenomenologically accessible 
and capable of being integrated into the perceptual experience of a conscious subject, it has 
already been endowed with conceptual content.
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Chapter 4
Undercutting Buddhist Non-Conceptualism
In this chapter, I will examine how both contemporary and classical Buddhist non-
conceptualists appeal to a shared set of phenomenological intuitions in defending the thesis of 
Perceptual Non-Conceptualism, namely that it is possible to perceive the world without 
possessing any concept of what one perceives. As evidence for this thesis, non-conceptualists 
cite a number of phenomenological intuitions that become evident through proper reflection on 
our perceptual experience. One such intuition cites the “richness” of perception, that is, the fact 
that, at any given moment, you are perceptually aware of many more objects and sensory 
features than what you can think about or verbally describe. Compare for instance your visual 
experience of a sunset with what is conveyed by the thought, “I see the sunset”: Even if the 
thought is true, it conveys a much smaller amount of information than your perceptual 
experience itself, which acquainted you with an innumerably rich array of sensory features. 
A second intuition points to the “fine-grained” character of perception: Even if you are 
perceiving just one sensory feature rather than a rich array, that feature can still be presented at a 
more determinate level than any of my corresponding concepts. Focusing on a single shade of 
reddish orange color in the clouds, you might think “That is orange-red”; but the concept 
orange-red is less determinate than the specific shade – one among the many shades of orange-
red –  that you actually perceive. In the next moment, the light may change such that a new shade
of orange-red appears, but the concept orange-red is insufficient for identifying that new shade 
in its full determinacy, or recognizing that it is different from the previous shade of orange-red. 
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Nonetheless, both shades have a distinct and fully determinate perceptual appearance, hence 
showing that perception discriminates objects at a more fine-grained level of detail than 
conceptual thought.
Finally, whereas these first two intuitions suggest in different ways that perceptual 
experience acquaints you with more information than what you can capture with the concepts 
you possess, another intuition would suggest that in some respects perception contains less 
information than conceptual thoughts. At a sensory level, your experience of the clouds at sunset 
shouldn’t be fundamentally different than how a one-year old infant sitting right next to you 
would perceive the same sunset. Of course, you are able to make all sorts of perceptual 
judgments that about the sunset that the infant cannot entertain – e.g., “The sunset is beautiful”; 
“That’s a cumulonimbus cloud,” and so on. What this shows is that concepts introduce new 
details into your experience of the sunset beyond what is genuinely perceived. Given that you 
and the infant share the same sensory experience of the sunset, but only you can judge that you 
are seeing a beautiful sunset or cumulonimbus cloud, your judgment must be non-sensory in 
nature – the concepts beauty, sunset, or cumulonimbus cloud are nowhere to be found in your 
sensory experience itself. Rather, they must be superimposed onto what you are actually seeing. 
In this way, concepts add more to our experience than what is presented by the senses.
Of special interest in this chapter will be how Dignāga and Dharmakīrti used these sorts 
of phenomenological intuitions to offer even stronger versions of two central arguments given by
contemporary non-conceptualists, namely the Richness Argument and the Fineness of Grain 
Argument. Both of these arguments proceed from intuitive facts about our perceptual 
phenomenology to claim that the plethora of determinate sensory objects and qualities present in 
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perceptual experience must be represented non-conceptually, that is, without requiring any prior 
possession of relevant concepts. For their part, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti offer analogous 
versions of these arguments to show that the representational contents of conscious perceptual 
experience must be essentially different from that of conceptual states. According to them, 
perceptual contents are essentially non-propositional, pre-predicative, and linguistically 
inexpressible. In section 1 of this chapter, I will frame this Buddhist position as being a type of  
“essentialist content non-conceptualism,” which Robert Hanna and Monima Chadha (2009) have
argued is the only defensible version of perceptual non-conceptualism. In section 2, I show how 
the Richness and Fineness of Grain arguments can be read out of the Buddhists' 
phenomenological account of perceptual experience, and also how this account coheres with 
Christopher Peacocke’s (1992) description of non-conceptual representations in terms of 
“scenario content.” 
Then, to motivate counter-arguments against the Buddhist position, I consider in section 3
another Indian account of perceptual non-conceptualism offered by the Navya Nyāya 
philosopher Gaṅgeśa. While Gaṅgeśa agrees with the Buddhist characterization of non-
conceptual perception as lacking predicative content, he uniquely asserts that there is no 
phenomenological evidence for the existence of such perception – that is, there is no perceptual 
awareness which we can introspectively notice or point to and truly say, “I'm having a non-
conceptual perception.” This stance is thus at odds with the non-conceptualist’s 
phenomenological claim that proper reflection on our experience reveals we are having non-
conceptual perceptions all the time. 
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To settle the dispute between the Buddhists and Gaṅgeśa, I will look in section 4 to recent
psychological models of the stages of visual processing. Interpreting Gaṅgeśa’s account of 
perception in light of these models suggests a significant thesis about perceptual consciousness, 
namely that if the intentional, object-directed content of a perceptual cognition is to have a 
conscious phenomenal character, then that content must not be essentially or exclusively non-
conceptual. The conscious perceptual experience of stable, mind-independent objects, of the sort 
that non-conceptualists reflect upon in making the richness and fineness of grain arguments, is 
actually made possible through the visual classification and predicative structuring of perceptual 
contents, that is, the visual attribution of properties to objects. According to Gaṅgeśa and current 
psychological models of visual processing, this structuring takes places through the joint 
operation of attention and memory, which I take to be the means by which conceptual/cognitive 
capacities intervene in the perceptual process. These capacities can be activated without our 
realizing it, before a fully conscious percept emerges into view. Through showing that conceptual
capacities, suitably understood, are active in generating conscious perceptual representations, I 
argue that Navya Nyāya and empirical research on vision can be used to undercut the 
phenomenological intuitions undergirding the Buddhists' essentialist non-conceptualism. I 
propose instead that the availability of intentional content to conscious perceptual experience 
presupposes a conceptually modulated process of object identification and recognition. As a 
result, we can draw on both Navya Nyāya and vision science to undercut the Buddhists’ 
perceptual non-conceptualism and its underlying phenomenological intuitions: Whereas 
Dharmakīrti would claim that conscious perceptual experience must be essentially non-
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conceptual in nature, I will show that conceptual capacities are involved in constructing that very
experience.
4.1 The Buddhists’ Essentialist Non-Conceptualism
The version of the non-conceptualist thesis I’ll be focusing on is known as content non-
conceptualism, which holds that the representational content of perception is different in kind 
from the content of conceptual states like beliefs and judgments. The “content view” can be 
contrasted with the so-called “state view,” which maintains that a perceptual state is non-
conceptual or not depending on whether a perceiver possesses the concepts that would 
characterize its content (see Heck 2000). The state view allows in principle that the 
representational content of perception can be identical with the content of a judgment – for 
instance, an infant can see a tall palm tree without knowing what it is seeing, while an adult can 
see the same tree and, by virtue of possessing the requisite concepts, judge that she is seeing a 
tall palm tree.
Yet, several contemporary defenders of perceptual non-conceptualism have argued that 
the state view is problematic on any construal that allows the infant’s perception to share the 
same content as the adult’s judgment. If the judgment’s content is glossed in Fregean terms, i.e., 
as being a complex of the concepts “tall” and “palm tree” toward which the adult takes a 
propositional attitude in light of her possessing those concepts, then the infant will have to bear a
concept-independent relation to a complex of concepts it does not possess. If concepts are 
construed as cognitive abilities that are employed whenever a subject entertains some mental 
content that contains those concepts, then the state view would entail that the infant, in 
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entertaining the same representation as the adult, would have to exercise cognitive abilities 
which it does not possess. If the judgment’s content is instead construed in Russellian terms, that 
is, as being structured out of objects and properties themselves, then there is nothing to 
differentiate the infant’s perception from the adult’s judgment if both states represent the exact 
same object and properties. However, we should think that perception generally represents the 
world differently than a judgment does – for example, there is a robust phenomenological 
character to sensory representations of the world that a mere verbal judgment about the world 
obviously lacks. If the attribution of representational contents to the infant perceiver and the 
adult thinker did not reflect how they grasp the world in different ways, then the notion of 
representational content would lose its explanatory power. For these reasons, the state view alone
is not a viable option for defending a coherent and non-trivial version of the non-conceptualist 
thesis. The difficulties facing the state view can be removed only by admitting that a subject's 
concept-independent or concept-dependent relation to some mental state is indicative of a 
difference in the kind of content that state has, in which case state non-conceptualism would 
actually entail content non-conceptualism (Heck 2007, Bermúdez 2007, Toribio 2008, Hanna and
Chadha 2009; see also Speaks 2005). Accordingly, I will disregard in this chapter the non-
conceptualist accounts of both early Buddhist and Nyāya thinkers such as Vasubandhu and 
Vātsyāyana, who can be plausibly read as articulating a state view of non-conceptual perception.1
1 To summarize the discussion from chapter 2, early Ābhidharmika Buddhism as well as early Nyāya can be 
understood as making a distinction drawn by state non-conceptualists between the non-conceptual perception of 
an object and the concept-laden state of “perceiving-that” the object is of a certain type. This distinction is 
evident in a canonical statement found in the Sarvāstivāda text Vijn!nak!ya of Devaśarman, which was often 
cited by Buddhists in justifying their respective views on non-conceptual perception: “The visual consciousness 
can only apprehend a blue colour (n#lam), but not ‘it is blue’ (no tu n#lam iti). Mental consciousness can also 
apprehend a blue colour. [But] so long as it is not yet able to apprehend its name, it cannot apprehend ‘it is 
blue’. When it can apprehend its name, then it can also apprehend ‘it is blue’” (Dhammajoti 2007: 108). That is, 
while both the perceptual awareness and the mental or cognitive awareness apprehend the same object, the latter
is distinguished by its linguistic classification of that object. Though, the prevailing view among Abhidharma 
Buddhists up to Vasubandhu seems to be that even perceptual awareness is inevitably accompanied by 
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The version of the non-conceptualist thesis that I take as my target here is what Robert 
Hanna and Monima Chadha (2009) have termed “essentialist content non-conceptualism.” 
Hanna and Chadha forcefully argue that the only plausible way to interpret the non-conceptualist
position, as well as to make the debate over non-conceptualism more than merely terminological,
is to take the view that non-conceptual states “have representational content whose semantic 
structure and psychological function are necessarily distinct from the structure and function of 
conceptual content” (2009: 188). Part of their motivation in casting the non-conceptualist thesis 
in these terms is to remove the threat posed to the state view by some version of what they call 
“Highly Refined Conceptualism.” On the standard Neo-Fregean view of concepts that has been 
accepted by both sides of the contemporary non-conceptualism debate, concepts are the semantic
constituents of propositions. Concepts serve to determine what those propositions express, and 
what it would mean for that proposition to be true. So, if I possess the concept horse, then I know
what it is for something to be a horse, and thus I can grasp what propositions about horses are 
referring to, understand sentences about horses, make inferences about horses, and so on. This 
standard view about concepts and concept possession has led conceptualists like John McDowell
(1994) to insist that experience is conceptually structured only when a perceiver possesses the 
ability to self-consciously and linguistically articulate the normative significance of that 
experience for the broader epistemic practices of belief-formation and reason-giving. In 
conceptual identification (saṃjn!), or by some inherent tendency to hypostatize fleeting sensations into stable 
objects (svabh!vavikalpa). Hence, Vasubandhu will say that sensory awareness is non-conceptual (avikalpaka) 
despite containing this inherent and rudimentary form of conceptualization. Full-blown conceptual awareness is 
marked for him by the presence of two more robust cognitive activities, namely recollection (anusmaraṇa) and 
linguistic categorization (abhinirūpaṇ!) (see Poussin 1991: 96-8). As to our main point, these Buddhists 
distinguish non-conceptual and conceptual states according to the presence or absence of attendant cognitive 
activities, rather than according to a difference in content. Regarding early Nyāya, Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara
did not explicitly distinguish between non-conceptual and conceptualized perceptions. But, they too adopt a 
distinction between seeing and seeing-that, while claiming that the two states fundamentally share the same 
perceptual content. The only difference is that a linguistically competent perceiver can additionally associate the
perceived object with a name for the sake of communicating to others (see Mondal 1982).
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response, state non-conceptualists will of course raise the objection that creatures who lack these 
higher-order cognitive abilities surely have conscious perceptual experiences.
However, Hanna and Chadha acknowledge that it is still possible for deniers of 
essentially non-conceptual content to respond to the above objection by adopting a more refined 
account of concept possession, one will allow that the perceptual states of even ostensibly non-
conceptual creatures can count as conceptual in one of two ways: 1) the representational content 
of such states is conceptually structured even without a perceiver’s self-conscious possession of 
the relevant concepts; and 2) even creatures who cannot articulate the semantic value of a 
concept can still evince in their intentional behavior a dispositional ability for deploying that 
concept to identify and recognize relevant objects (2009: 196, 200). Hanna and Chadha therefore
claim that the non-conceptualist thesis can be secured only if there are perceptual states whose 
content cannot be characterized as conceptual even under a Highly Refined Conceptualism. The 
thesis now under consideration is that conscious perceptual experience contains representational 
content that is essentially non-conceptual, and necessarily unconceptualizable.
Among Buddhists following after Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, we see that the adoption of 
an essentialist content non-conceptualism was also accompanied by an acknowledgment that the 
purposive behavior of non-linguistic creatures is driven by conceptual cognitions. These 
creatures may not explicitly apply a verbal name to an object, which is what Dignāga primarily 
took conceptualization to consist in. Yet, they clearly evince the cognitive abilities of object 
identification and recognition that are necessary for intentional activity with respect to that 
object. Therefore, in order to exclude even those seemingly non-linguistic cognitions from 
counting as perceptual, Dharmakīrti offered in his Ny!yabindu another definition of kalpan!: 
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"Conceptualization is that awareness which has a phenomenal representation that is fit for 
association with words" (NB 1.5, 25). In stating that a cognition is conceptual if it simply is "fit" 
for being associated with words, Dharmakīrti's definition will count as conceptual even those 
cognitions in which a word and object do not appear as associated; in that case, even a newborn 
infant, who has no obvious mastery of language, and is specifically ignorant of the linguistic 
conventions that govern how certain words are supposed to signify and name certain objects, 
could have conceptual cognitions. In his commentary on the Ny!yabindu, Dharmottara reasons 
that a newborn infant would not know to stop crying and place its mouth on a breast it is seeing 
for the first time were it not for a recognition, based on its previous experience in past lives, that 
this presently perceived breast is identical in kind with that past breast which was a source of 
nourishment (see NBṬ 1.5, 26). The infant obviously displays the capacity for re-identifying 
different instances of the same type of object, where the type in question is also sufficiently 
abstract—not only would it be identifying a previously and presently perceived physical object 
as being the same, but it would also be abstractly classifying that object as a source of 
nourishment or as being desirable. 
As implausible as the invocation of past lives to explain the infant’s behavior may now 
seem, this example is significant because it shows how the Buddhists, as well as the Nyāya 
thinkers following after them, put forward a theory of concept possession based on the operation 
of memory and recognitional capacities, rather than on the overt presence of linguistic or 
inferential mastery. That being so, Buddhist and later Nyāya thinkers would not accept the 
common-place contemporary view that infants and non-human animals are non-conceptual 
creatures, or the non-conceptualist argument that since we, adult humans, must share some 
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perceptual experiences with these creatures, we too must be having non-conceptual perceptions 
(see Peacocke 2001). The more capacious understanding of concepts offered by Buddhists and 
Naiyāyikas thus allows that conceptual abilities do not necessarily amount to linguistic abilities, 
and that perceptual content can be conceptually structured independently of having an explicitly 
linguistic structure. Rather, the conceptual abilities implicated in perceptual experience can be 
construed as capacities for identifying an object through the visual predication and classification 
of that object's properties, capacities the exercise of which need not be verbally mediated. As we 
will see, such an understanding bears more fidelity to the way that concepts are understood in 
psychological literature on the relation between perception and cognition, and discussions of 
how “top-down” cognitive influences like knowledge, expectations, and memory influence 
perceptual processing.
If Dharmakīrti will count as conceptual any cognition whose content can be potentially 
expressed in language, then non-conceptual perception must accordingly be inexpressible and 
essentially unconceptualizable. For Dharmakīrti, this essentialist content non-conceptualism is 
ultimately tied to their metaphysical view that the only real entities in the world are unique, 
propertyless particulars (svalakṣaṇa), which exist only for a moment and lack spatiotemporal 
parts. Only non-conceptual experience has these particulars as its object, being that only 
perceptual cognitions are directly caused by them. Conceptual cognitions, on the other hand, 
inevitably distort reality by hypostatizing momentary particulars into persisting objects, and 
imaginatively attributing to them abstract class characteristics (s!m!nyalakṣaṇa). Conceptual 
cognitions also cannot have momentary particulars as their object because these cognitions are 
not directly produced by particulars – that is why I can think about an object without its being 
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spatiotemporally proximate to my senses, whereas the same is not true for the perception of an 
object. The link is also indirect in the case of pseudo-perceptual conceptual judgments, because 
memory intervenes between the reception of stimuli by the senses and the production of a 
conceptual cognition. Drawing from past memory impressions, we are able to make a number of 
erroneous conceptual judgments about the particulars we see: For example, “This table is the 
same table that I saw earlier”; or “This table is the same kind as the tables in the other rooms”; or
“This table is white.” These are all propositional judgments that falsely identify a perceived 
particular as enduring, as not being utterly distinct from anything else, and as possessing 
properties. All of these judgments require mentally pinning down an ultimately momentary 
object long enough to examine it and compare with other objects that are not presently perceived.
But by the time I come to judge the object I saw, it no longer exists – so conceptual judgments 
always have unreal objects as their contents. 
Thus, Dharmakīrti and his followers believe that non-conceptual perception and 
conceptual cognitions are essentially different. As Hanna and Chadha require, the Buddhists 
view the two types of cognition as having different functional roles: Given the direct causal link 
between sense-faculties and the presence of objects, the perceptual cognitions produced by the 
senses serve to phenomenally represent objects in an intrinsically spatiotemporal manner, 
whereas conceptual cognitions can think about objects in a manner that is untethered to their 
actual spatiotemporal location.2 Finally, there is an essential difference between perception and 
conceptual cognitions at the level of content – so much so that the objects of perception can 
2 Dharmottara (NBṬ 1.5, 26-7) speaks of perceptual representations as having a phenomenal content which is 
fixed or determined by the spatiotemporal proximity of a particular object (niyatapratibh!sa). The unique 
particulars (svalakṣaṇa) of which we are aware in perception are themselves defined by Mokṣākaragupta as 
being restricted in terms of their spatiotemporal location and form (deśak!l!k!raniyata; MTaBh 21). In contrast,
neither conceptual cognitions nor their objects are so restricted. See also Hanna and Chadha 2009: 202-10 for 
more discussion of the intrinsically spatiotemporal character of non-conceptual representations.
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never be the objects of conceptual cognitions. Perception neither classifies its objects under 
general categories, nor predicates to them abstract properties, such categories and properties 
ultimately being constructions of the mind and fictions of language. Accordingly, the Buddhists 
claim that the content of perception is fundamentally non-propositional, pre-predicative, and 
insulated from any influence by cognitive and conceptual processes.
4.2 The Phenomenological Intuitions of Buddhist Non-Conceptualism
Though it owes much to the background assumptions of Buddhist metaphysics, the 
essentialist content non-conceptualism of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti is also motivated by several 
of the same phenomenological intuitions motivating contemporary formulations of the non-
conceptualist thesis. In particular, the Buddhists offered their own versions of two key arguments
for non-conceptualism that appeal to evident facts about perceptual experience – namely, the 
richness argument and the fineness of grain argument. By considering both the metaphysical and 
phenomenological implications of the Buddhists’ arguments, we can better reconstruct the type 
of essentially non-conceptual content which they are purporting to establish. I will suggest that 
the Buddhists again converge with contemporary non-conceptualists by understanding perceptual
phenomenology as being grounded upon what Peacocke (1992/2001) calls “scenario content,” 
i.e., a richly determinate, pre-predicative image of a perceptual scene filled out by spatially 
located point-instances of sensory qualities.
The richness argument, which can be traced to Heck (2000), asserts that our perceptual 
experience is quantitatively rich in sense of representing many more details than we can hope to 
capture with our repertoire of concepts. Looking up from this page, you can reflect on your own 
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experience now, realize the vast amount of visual detail that is simultaneously present to you – 
the plethora of shapes, colors, and objects in view – and find that you simply don't have the 
conceptual vocabulary to describe everything that you are seeing. The conclusion drawn from 
such reflection is that perceptual experience has non-conceptual content. However, as even 
several non-conceptualists have noted, the richness argument falls short of proving that 
perception is essentially non-conceptual. To experience perceptual contents with more 
representational detail than you can currently describe does not show that it is necessarily 
impossible to give what Hanna and Chadha call an “adequately individuating conceptual 
specification” of those contents (2009: 195). It might take an unusually long and complex 
propositional representation to specify what is seen, but the perceptual content can be 
conceptually specified nonetheless.3
The Buddhist version of the richness argument doesn’t rely on assumptions about a 
perceiver’s limited conceptual repertoire, and so may seem to avoid the flaws of Heck’s 
argument. Dharmakīrti and his followers point out that at the same time you are having a 
conceptual cognition – say, you are thinking about what you are reading, or what you'll have for 
dinner tonight – there are objects which are vividly perceived even though you were surely not 
thinking about them. In this way, perception outstrips conceptual cognition.4 If you might insist 
that you could also be having a conceptual cognition of a perceived object at the same time that 
you are thinking about something else, then you would run afoul of a principle accepted by both 
sides of the Indian non-conceptualism debate, namely that one cannot have two conceptual 
cognitions at the same time. The Buddhists took conceptual cognitions to be ultimately linguistic 
3 Similar criticisms of the richness argument are made by Speaks 2005, Matthen 2005a, and Schmidt 2015.
4 See PV 3.175, 267; TSP 1242-44, 1248; MTaBh, 8. See also Taber 2005: 34.
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– that is, objects appear in a conceptual cognition as associated with a name. So, if you are 
thinking about the name of one thing or a set of things, you aren't thinking about the name of 
another. Thus, the Buddhists are arguing that a conceptual cognition can simultaneously coexist 
with, and yet be outstripped by, perceptual cognition, which shows that perceptual awareness is 
necessarily distinct from conceptual awareness. Even if a perceiver possesses a vast enough 
number of concepts to describe and name every single thing she sees, it will always be the case 
that as she employs one of those concepts to name something she sees, there will be consciously 
perceived objects which remain unnamed. Hence, absent the omniscient ability to name at once 
every perceived object and felt sensation that is simultaneously present in a single moment of 
experience, our conscious awareness always contains an unconceptualized layer of perceptual 
content.
Still, the Buddhist richness argument does not succeed in establishing the existence of 
essentially unconceptualizable perceptual content. Even if some things are inevitably perceived 
without being thought of, there is nothing in the argument to rule out the possibility that when I 
attend to the unthought object, I can adequately describe it with the concepts in my possession. 
We will see how the Buddhists respond to this objection with the fineness of grain argument; but 
for now, we can also cast doubt on the phenomenological picture endorsed by both versions of 
the richness argument, namely that there are unconceptualized perceptual contents which vividly 
figure in my experience even while my mind and attention are drawn elsewhere. As Nyāya 
thinkers recognized, the phenomenon of inattentional blindness gives us reason to doubt that 
unattended objects are still uniformly and vividly present in perceptual experience.5 Inattentional 
5 For instance, see NS 3.2.7, 817: “apratyabhijn!naṃ ca viṣay!ntaravy!saag!t”; “Non-apprehension [of some 
object] is due to the fixation [of attention] on a different object.” Also see NBhu, 185: “kiṃ ca 
suptavy!saktamanas!ṃ cendriyasaṃnikrṣs!rthasy!pyapratibh!san!nna manonirapekṣasyendriyasy!pi 
vy!p!ra6 saṃbhavati.”; “The operation of the external sense organs independent of the mental sense faculty is 
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blindness occurs when a perceiver is unaware that certain obvious changes have taken place in 
the visual scene, because these changes failed to draw the perceiver's attention (see Simons and 
Chabris 1999, Simons 2000). That we can often fail to notice large and obvious changes in a 
visual scene suggests that conscious perceptual experience does not actually acquaint us with a 
richly detailed visual scene in which objects are simultaneously present and uniformly 
determinate even when our minds and attention are drawn elsewhere. Rather, objects and their 
features are represented in stable, vivid detail as long as they figure in focal attention (Rensink 
2000). In addition, the range of objects that figure in our conscious experience depends on the 
visual system's perceptual load, or the cognitive capacity-limits which constrain attention's 
ability to process information. In cognitively and attentionally demanding situations, there will 
be less residual attention available for distribution to task-irrelevant stimuli, making these stimuli
less likely to enter into conscious awareness (Lavie 2006, Hine 2010). Thus, we can call into 
question the seemingly self-evident phenomenology supporting both contemporary and Buddhist
versions of the richness argument. As I will further argue below, the quantitative richness of 
experience depends in part upon the conceptually modulated operation of attention and memory.
There is also empirical evidence that conceptual, semantic information can be 
unconsciously registered even prior to being overtly attended, in which case the Buddhists 
shouldn’t conclude that unattended objects of perception must be unconceptualized. In tests of 
inattentional blindness where an unexpected stimulus is semantically related to an attended, task-
relevant stimulus – as, for instance, when during a task where a subject is to recognize an animal 
from among a set of pictures in a briefly flashed display, the word "cat" appears in the display – 
not possible, since, for those whose mental sense faculties are fixated or asleep, there is no phenomenal 
appearance even of an object that is in contact with an external sense organ.”
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the unexpected stimulus is much more likely to be detected than a semantically unrelated 
stimulus. The takeaway from these tests is that perceived stimuli can be conceptually classified 
even prior to being attended and consciously detected. Additionally, the semantic content of a 
perceiver’s cognitive states can bias which stimuli enter into conscious perceptual awareness. 
Thus, even though there is at some level more to what we see than what we directly attend, let 
alone think about, the richness argument doesn’t on its own prove that the perceptual 
representation of unattended stimuli must be non-conceptual in nature.
At this point, though, non-conceptualists can reply by offering the fineness of grain 
argument, and citing phenomenological cases in which perceptual detail qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively outstrips our conceptual capacities (see Peacocke 1992, Kelly 2001). For instance, 
imagine being presented with two nearly indistinguishable shades of red color – call them red18 
and red19. Even though you might only possess the general concept “red,” you still may be able 
to perceptually discriminate between these two shades – certainly the visual system discriminates
them insofar as the shades have subtly different phenomenal appearances. But when you 
subsequently go to the paint store, you may be unable to reliably reidentify which shade is red18 
and which one is red19. Absent this ability for reidentification, non-conceptualists will claim that
you lack concepts corresponding to the shades that you can perceptually discriminate, and hence 
that fine-grained perceptual contents cannot be captured by your conceptual capacities.
However, as Hanna and Chadha point out, the fineness of grain argument as stated still 
hinges on the issue of concept-possession, and so does not directly establish that perceptual 
content is necessarily incapable of being conceptually specified (2009: 196). Leaving aside 
questions of whether concept possession requires the ability for re-identification at all (see 
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Speaks 2005 and Chuard 2006 for critical discussion), the refined version of conceptualism being
targeted by the Buddhists would allow that if one can attend to red18 and have a cognition 
expressible in the form, “This shade of red,” “This is different than that,” or even just “This,” 
then one’s cognition has conceptual content. Accordingly, the Buddhists radicalize the fineness 
of grain argument by claiming that conceptual judgments fail even to identify unique particulars 
in the first place, let alone re-identify them across time. Being momentary, the objects of 
perception no longer exist by the time a conceptual judgment can arise that purports to identify 
them. And being propertyless and unique, the objects of perception cannot be captured by 
general concepts or names. Finally, given that conceptual cognitions are causally removed from 
real particulars, arising several moments after an object has produced a perceptual awareness that
in turn awakens latent memory traces, the Buddhists declared in Humean fashion that conceptual
cognitions present their objects in a fainter, less phenomenally vivid manner as compared to the 
phenomenal character of perceptual contents.6 For these reasons, the fine-grained quality of 
perceived objects can never be adequately specified by concepts, making the content of 
perception essentially distinct from the content of conceptual judgments.
The Buddhists’ dual commitments to phenomenalism and atomism further inform their 
construal of perceptual experience as being unconceptualizably fine-grained. In reducing the 
reality of middle-sized physical objects to more fundamental atomic constituents, and further 
construing these atomic constituents in terms of the sensory experiences they produce in us, the 
Buddhists came to understand perception as presenting us with an array of minima sensibilia. 
Ultimately, we do not actually perceive ordinary objects like tables, chairs, or even other people, 
6 See NBṬ 1.11, 40: “sphus!bhatv!deva ca nirvikalpakam…. tadasadrūpaṃ vastuno grhṇad 
asannihit!rthagr!hitv!d asphus!bhaṃ vikalpakam. tata6 sphus!bhatv!nnirvikalpakam.” 
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such objects being merely convenient conceptual fictions constructed by the mind.7 Instead, to 
the extent that we have experiential access to an external reality at all, perceptual representations 
acquaint us with aggregates of atomic sensory qualities like color and shape.8 
Thus, the Buddhists offer another reason to think that perceptual content is essentially 
non-conceptual – not only do perceptual representations have a fineness of grain or sharper 
resolution than what can be captured by coarse-grained concepts, but perceptual contents have a 
totally different type of structure and format than conceptual content. If perception presents 
neither stable, property-possessing objects nor their shareable properties, then perceptual content 
would seem to lack the propositional, subject-predicate structure that characterizes the 
propositional content of conceptual thought and language. Lacking such structure, perceptual 
content has thus been taken by contemporary non-conceptualists to have an iconic and imagistic 
format. As with pictorial representations like maps or photographs, perceptual representations are
not decomposable into semantically significant constituents in the way that propositions are 
(Fodor 2007, Heck 2007). Being a mere spatial array of sensory qualities, there is no way to 
“carve up” or individuate parts of a perceptual representation according to whether they are 
semantically more significant or not. Unlike the sentence, "There is a yellow square," where 
"square" is a more semantically central part of the sentence's content than "a," and “yellow” is 
predicated of “square,” the parts of an image of a yellow square are all equally images of the 
7 In PSV 1.7cd, Dignāga classifies the awareness of conventionally real objects as one type of inherently 
erroneous cognition: “Cognition of empirical reality (samvrti-saj-jndna) is not a true perception because it 
superimposes something extraneous upon things which are only empirically true (samvrti-sat), and thus 
functions through the conceptualization of forms of these [extraneous things]” (Hattori 1968: 28).
8 Different Buddhist schools take different stances regarding the metaphysical status of that composite objects 
that purport to appear in perceptual experience. Physical objects may be reducible to atoms which themselves 
have sensory qualities like color or shape (the Vaibhāṣika view); or, objects are reducible to atoms which can be 
represented as having sensory qualities only when aggregated together (the Sautrāntika view); or, both physical 
objects and atoms may actually be unreal, so that we are only acquainted with internal mental representations 
that we mistakenly take to present external objects (the Yogācāra view). See Chu 2006 for more discussion of 
these three camps.
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square-parts – no part of the image is any more central in determining the representation's image-
content. As a result, the image itself does not require that it be understood as being a 
representation as of yellow square, or as of a hundred adjacent yellow rectangles, etc. – such a 
“representation as” would only arise through a concept-guided interpretation of the image. 
In describing the phenomenology of non-conceptual perception as representing to us a 
holistic array of atomic sensibilia, the Buddhist account of non-conceptual perceptual content 
can therefore be seen as anticipating what Christopher Peacocke (1992) has called "scenario 
content" (see also Ganeri 2012a). To briefly summarize, a perceptual representation with 
scenario content involves the egocentric mapping of a visual scene through specifying the 
location of sensory features at minimally discriminable points or pixels in visual space. This 
viewer-dependent visual scenario is filled out by determining at each point the presence of 
rudimentary sensory features such as color, basic aspects of two-dimensional shape, luminance, 
orientation, and motion. Additionally, as Austen Clark (2004) argues, scenario content represents 
these features as being indexed to spatial locations, and not to enduring, property-possessing 
objects. Scenario content is non-conceptual because its point-by-point specification of sensory 
features is not constrained by the concepts that a perceiver possesses, nor are concepts 
constituents of this sort of representational content. Thus, scenario content is essentially non-
conceptual in both its structure and function: it is iconic and non-propositional, and it acquaints a
perceiver with an egocentric map of sensory features in the absence of any conceptual 
classification or predication of these features to objects. It bears a close resemblance to how 
Buddhists would portray the representational content of perception as acquainting us with 
momentary and unique point-instances of sensory qualities (svalakṣaṇa). For the Buddhists, then,
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this essentially non-conceptual content exhausts the objective intentional content of conscious 
perceptual experience.
4.3 Concepts, Attention, and Conscious Visual Experience: Clues from Gaageśa
The model of perception offered by Gaṅgeśa provides an illuminating contrast with that 
of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and the Buddhists. Nyāya philosophers disagreed with Buddhists on 
just about everything, but Gaṅgeśa and several Naiyāyikas before him did adopt Dignāga's 
definition of non-conceptual perception (nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa) as being devoid of 
conceptualization (kalpan!poḍha), where conceptualization amounts to the mind's attribution of 
properties to particular things (n!maj!ty!diyojan!) (TCM, 857). Like the Buddhists, Gaṅgeśa 
believes that non-conceptual perception does not classify or attribute features to objects at all; 
consequently, the content of non-conceptual cognitions can be said to lack the predicative, 
propositional structure of concept-laden perceptual cognitions (savikalpaka pratyakṣa). Of 
course, the Buddhists think that the notion of “concept-laden perception” is an oxymoron – 
perceptual awareness is necessarily non-conceptual. That aside, Gaṅgeśa and the Buddhists both 
believe that there is an essential distinction between the intentional content of non-conceptual 
and concept-laden states: the structure of the former’s representational content is pre-predicative 
and non-propositional, whereas the content of the latter is predicative and propositional. For 
Gaṅgeśa, concept-laden perception involves the predicative binding of properties to objects, and 
seeing both property and object as such – in other words, objects are seen as having certain 
properties, and properties are seen as qualifying or identifying their objects. To give an example, 
the concept-laden perception of a red apple involves seeing red color as being predicated to the 
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apple, and seeing the property of redness as qualifying the particular red color inhering in the 
apple. The representational content of this perceptual awareness is neither identical with an 
abstract proposition – the perceptual contents are the objects themselves – nor is the vehicle of 
this content a linguistic expression (e.g., “This is a red apple”). Nonetheless, the content of this 
perceptual awareness is analyzable into the compositional, object-property structure that is 
typical of propositional content.
Yet, as far as the representational and phenomenal content of non-conceptual perception 
is concerned, there are two fundamental points of disagreement between Gaṅgeśa and the 
Buddhists. First, keeping in line with Nyāya’s realism about composite substances and 
universals, Gaṅgeśa and other Navya Naiyāyikas hold that non-conceptual perception directly 
acquaints us with such objects and the relations that link them. Indeed, it is in order to maintain a
direct causal link between the mind and the world that non-conceptual perception is taken by 
Gaṅgeśa to involve the pre-predicative acquaintance with an object and its properties, albeit 
without cognizing that object as having properties.9 The object and qualifying property are 
separately registered, as it were – e.g., the non-conceptual state perceptually represents the red 
color and the apple, but the red color is not yet represented as being a predicate of the apple. It is 
only later in the perceptual process, when the non-conceptual state gives rise to a concept-laden 
state, that the object and qualifying property are integrated together to form a coherent perceptual
experience of a red apple. Still, Gaṅgeśa’s contention against the Buddhists is that non-
9 If an object is perceived only by virtue of being conceptually classified according to some qualifying property, 
then it must be explained how that qualifying property became a content of that perception; requiring that the 
perception of that qualifier be itself conceptually classified according to some qualifying property would lead to 
an infinite regress. This connection further ensures that even when one experiences a perceptual illusion like the 
case of seeing a rope as a snake, this still tethered to a real object in the external world – the illusory experience 
arises due to the mind’s mistaken attribution of snakehood to the real and perceived rope. See Phillips 2011: 35-
44 for more discussion of non-conceptual perception and perceptual error in Nyāya.
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conceptual perception does not merely present us with a holistic and imagistic array of sensory 
features. Whereas the Buddhists would claim that any grouping of sensory features into a unitary
object must be the product of conceptualization, Gaṅgeśa asserts that there is already a form of 
non-conceptual object individuation, which further grounds the compositional, object-property 
structure of a subsequent concept-laden perception.10
Most importantly, Gaṅgeśa breaks from both previous Buddhist and Nyāya accounts in 
arguing that we have no phenomenological or introspective evidence for the existence of pre-
predicative, non-conceptual perceptions. In particular, essentially non-conceptual cognitions are 
said to be imperceptible (at#ndriya), because their presence cannot be detected by the mental 
sense faculty of manas, i.e., the faculty of attention and introspection. A concept-laden 
perception of the red apple can in principle be perceived by a second-order apperceptive 
cognition expressible in the form, “I see the red apple.” But, non-conceptual cognitions can 
never be the target of such an apperceptive awareness. Beyond the fact that we never seem to 
10 Matilal (1986: 351) misleadingly asserts that only the qualifying property is cognized in a non-conceptual 
awareness, and that the qualificand becomes cognized only in a subsequent concept-laden perception. Instead, 
the Navya Nyāya view is that the qualifier and qualificand must both be presented in a non-conceptual 
cognition, if not also the relation that links them (see Bhattacharya 1990: 172-6). Still, a non-conceptual 
perception is known as being a cognition of a qualifier (viśeṣaṇa-jn!na) because it is in virtue of cognizing a 
specific qualifier that it produces a qualificative cognition in which the previously cognized qualifier identifies a
particular object. Jayadeva (TCMA, 813) points out that relations are to be described in terms of the qualifying 
relata, not the relata which is qualified, nor both relata (i.e., a sambandha is pratiyogi-nirūpya, not anuyogi-
nirūpya or ubhaya-nirūpya). So, in order to be properly structured, a qualificative cognition which takes a 
relation as its object (i.e., a cognition which is vaiśiṣsya-avag!hi) will be causally generated by a prior cognition
of the qualifier. For example, the inherence relation binds a color-trope to the substance; by inhering in the 
substance, the color is the qualifying relata of the inherence relation. The qualificative cognition which takes 
that inherence relation as its object will cognize the substance as possessing that color through the property of 
inherence (e.g., “rūpav!n”; “the substance has a color”). This qualificative cognition should therefore be 
produced by a prior cognition of its qualifying relata (pratiyogin), i.e., the color. If it were the case that a prior 
cognition of the qualified relata (anuyogin) is what generates a qualificative cognition, then we would see the 
color as possessing a substance (“dravyavad rūpam”; “the color has a substance”), which is absurd. (Behind 
these technicalities, I think there is a prescient insight which militates against Buddhist phenomenalism and 
other sense-data theories of perception, namely that the object-property structure is deeply embedded into 
perceptual awareness, and is what explains why we form perceptual beliefs like “the umbrella is orange,” and 
not “the orange is umbrella-shaped.”) Still, it must be admitted that the qualificand also figures in a prior non-
conceptual awareness of a qualifier, even if Naiyāyikas do not admit that the cognition of a qualificand serves a 
causal role in generating a subsequent qualificative cognition (see chapter 3, fn. 1).
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have phenomenological reports of the sort, “I see the red and the apple, but separately,” or “I see 
the red color and redness, but separately,” there are at least two principled reasons why the 
Navya Nyāya account could not allow non-conceptual cognitions to be introspectively 
accessible. To briefly summarize the arguments discussed in chapter 2:
First, non-conceptual states occur at too early a stage in the perceptual process. Basically, 
the non-conceptual perception of an apple and redness must first give rise to an integrated, 
conceptually structured awareness of a red apple before there can be an introspective awareness 
of seeing the red apple. Because of Nyāya’s prior commitments about the duration of cognitive 
states, Gaṅgeśa will argue that by the time an introspective awareness can arise, the non-
conceptual cognition will have already gone out of existence.
Second, the representational content of non-conceptual perception lacks the type of 
structure required for introspective identification and self-ascription. In the apperceptive 
cognition, “I see the red apple,” I am identifying myself as having a cognition of the red apple. 
That cognition itself is further identified according to its objective content, i.e., the object which 
has been perceptually classified as being a red apple. In Nyāya terminology, the predicative 
content (prak!rat!) of the first-order cognition will serve as the mode of presentation 
(avacchedaka) under which the cognition appears within the apperceptive awareness as a 
qualifying feature of the self. Now, cognitions for Nyāya can only be distinguished according to 
their objective contents – cognitions themselves are diaphanous otherwise. A second-order 
apperception thus can identify the first-order perceptual cognition in question because the first-
order perception has a red apple, and not something else, as its predicatively structured content. 
But, since a nirvikalpaka cognition has no predicative content whatsoever, its content cannot be 
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used to pick out the cognition for the purposes of apperceptive identification. In this way, 
Gaṅgeśa maintains, non-conceptual perceptions remain introspectively invisible to the subject.
I would argue that this invisibility of non-conceptual perception suggests on behalf of 
Gaṅgeśa a thesis about perceptual consciousness that runs counter to that of Perceptual Non-
Conceptualism: namely, that only perceptual representations which are predicatively and 
conceptually structured are conscious. Now, we may pause to consider what licenses us to think 
that Gaṅgeśa would actually support this thesis, and would conclude that the introspective 
inaccessibility of non-conceptual perceptions is proof of their unconscious nature. Admittedly, 
Gaṅgeśa does not state outright that non-conceptual perceptions are unconscious; nor does he 
seem to offer in his work a theory of consciousness as such. Yet, while Gaṅgeśa did not explicitly
make use of the sorts of distinctions central to current discussions of consciousness – e.g., 
representational vs. phenomenal contents, phenomenal consciousness vs. access consciousness, 
qualitative vs. subjective phenomenal character – his views concerning consciousness can 
nonetheless be reconstructed with these distinctions in mind. Moreover, by pointing out where 
Gaṅgeśa would concur with previous Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika accounts of consciousness, we can better 
highlight how his unique stance regarding the introspective invisibility of non-conceptual 
perception suggests some departure from previous accounts. 
First, as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika articulated what would now be known as an “intentionalist” or 
“representationalist” theory of consciousness (see also MacKenzie 2007). Both contemporary 
representationalists and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers claim that the fundamental function of 
conscious states is to (correctly or incorrectly) represent objects and states of the affairs in the 
world; in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika terms, cognitive states (jn!na) are conscious and essentially 
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intentional just to the extent that they have the power to “illuminate” objects.11 Additionally, 
Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika shares with some recent representationalist accounts of consciousness (e.g., 
Harman 1990; Tye 2002) the intuition that experience is transparent or diaphanous – that is, the 
qualitative features of conscious experience are ultimately just the features of the objects being 
experienced. Put another way, conscious representations lack any proprietary phenomenal 
character of their own; instead, we “see through” these representations to the represented objects 
themselves. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika defends this intuition by arguing that cognitive states are nir!k!ra, 
or “without a phenomenal form” of their own, which to say that cognitions present their objects 
directly, rather than through the medium of a phenomenal form or mental image that purports to 
resemble the cognized object.12 Because they do not carry any phenomenal form apart from the 
objects they illuminate, cognitions can only be distinguished according to their objective 
representational contents.13 Still, the distinction between phenomenal and representational 
contents is not totally alien to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers – apart from their speaking of as 
cognitions “illuminating” objects, they used standard terms that straightforwardly denote 
phenomenal appearances as such, i.e., what appears or is made manifest to the mind.14 
Nonetheless, unlike the Buddhists, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would hold that such appearances are 
11 For instance, see NL, 812-4: “jn!natve cecch!divy!vrttasvabh!vasya viṣayapravaṇatvam apekṣitam iti”; TBh, 
218: “arthaprak!śo v! buddhi6.” The Sanskrit terms most straightforwardly translated as “consciousness” – 
“cit” or “caitanya” – are generally understood in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts as being linked with the terms “jn!na” 
and “buddhi,” which denote discrete, transitory states of cognition. The Ny!yakośa accordingly defines 
consciousness/caitanya as the property of possessing cognitions/jn!navatva (NKo, 282). Consciousness for 
Nyāya, then, just amounts to having states of awareness that illuminate or reveal intentional objects.
12 TBh, 219: “sarvaṃ ca jn!naṃ nir!k!ram eva. na tu jn!ne ’rthena svasy!k!ro janyate.”
13 NKu 4.4ab: “arthenaiva viśeṣo hi nir!k!ratay! dhiy!m.”
14 These terms primarily include nouns such as “avabh!sa,” “nirbh!sa,” and “pratibh!sa,” which are all derived 
from the verb root “bh!s,” meaning “to shine/appear.” Used in the context of denoting the contents of cognitive 
states, these nouns and their corresponding verb forms typically have the sense of specifying what is present to 
awareness. Though, it is another question as to whether, when used especially by Navya Naiyāyikas to describe 
the contents of non-perceptual states like inferential knowledge and testimonial knowledge, verbs like “bh!sate”
literally connote that the objects of such states have a non-perceptual/cognitive phenomenal character.
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ultimately reducible to a cognition’s intentional content, or viṣayat! – the cognition itself has no 
phenomenal form or appearance apart from that of its intentional content.15 Thus, there is ample 
reason to think that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would concur with the central thesis of intentionalism, 
namely that the representational content of a particular conscious experience determines the 
phenomenal character of that experience; or, as Byrne (2001: 204) puts the thesis, “There can be 
no difference in phenomenal character without a difference in content.”
Nyāya’s uniform adherence to the above thesis would therefore suggest that if there is an 
essential difference between the viṣayat! of non-conceptual and concept-laden cognitions – 
which Gaṅgeśa and later Naiyāyikas believed – then there would be a corresponding difference 
in their respective phenomenal characters. As our surveys of Vācaspati and Kumārila in chapters 
1 and 2 showed, once non-Buddhist accounts of non-conceptual perception caught up to the 
Buddhists in distinguishing between nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka states at the level of content, 
they also came to view this content-level distinction as entailing some corresponding differences 
at the level of phenomenology. Specifically, these states were thought to differ in terms of the 
structure of their content: While non-conceptual and concept-laden perceptions can both cognize 
the same set of objects and properties, non-conceptual states lack a predicative structure insofar 
as they do not clearly differentiate an object from its properties, and therefore fail to identify 
those properties as being predicated to that object. Accordingly, Kumārila and Vācaspati viewed 
non-conceptual perceptions as presenting their objects in an unclear or confused manner 
(saṃmugdha/saṃk#rṇa). Whereas Jayanta was at pains to argue against the Buddhists that 
concept-laden perceptions directly cognize objects and so should not be understood as being less 
15 The Ny!yakośa (NKo, 627) gives “viṣayat!” (“intentional content/intentionality”) as a definition of “bh!sana” 
(“phenomenal appearance/manifestation”).
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phenomenally vivid (spaṣsa) copies of non-conceptual perceptions (NM 224, 240), Kumārila in 
particular offered several examples which suggest that non-conceptual perceptions may actually 
be less phenomenally vivid than their concept-laden counterparts. For instance, he likens non-
conceptual perception to the temporary blindness immediately experienced when one goes from 
the sunny outdoors to a dark room indoors, or to how a novice musical listener inchoately 
experiences a song without being able to clearly recognize its distinct notes. Of course, we 
should not place too much emphasis on Kumārila’s examples – suggestive as they are, he 
ultimately would claim that the enhanced clarity or determinacy of concept-laden perceptions is 
discursive in nature, rather than being purely phenomenal. For Kumārila, both non-conceptual 
and concept-possessing perceivers experience the same objects, but only the latter possesses the 
linguistic mental capacities necessary to form determinate perceptual judgments about the 
identity of those objects (see Taber 2005: 100-1, 143-4). Still, whether Kumārila or Vācaspati 
would characterize the clarity of concept-laden perceptions as being genuinely sensory as 
opposed to being merely discursive or cognitive, the point is that they believed there is some sort
of experiential and introspectible difference between non-conceptual and concept-laden 
perceptions in virtue of how their perceptual contents are differently structured.
Thus, when Gaṅgeśa and later Naiyāyikas go further in claiming that non-conceptual 
states differ from concept-laden states in having a different kind of intentional content (viṣayat!) 
altogether, we should similarly expect that there should be some corresponding difference 
between these states at the level of phenomenology. However, if Gaṅgeśa were to admit such a 
difference, then he would have no introspective basis for doing so, given that non-conceptual 
perceptions are supposed to be introspectively invisible. Other than direct introspection, another 
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presumptive source of first-personal evidence concerning the existence and character of non-
conceptual perception would be subjective report (i.e., vyavah!ra); but, Gaṅgeśa also denies that 
non-conceptual states can be subjectively reported because, not only do subjects lack 
introspective access to them, but verbal reports in the first place can only be generated by 
conceptually structured cognitions.16 Indeed, Gaṅgeśa considers the sort of phenomenological 
report which Kumārila and Vācaspati might cite as illustrating the experiential difference 
between non-conceptual and concept-laden perceptions – e.g., “I didn’t clearly discern this object
previously, but now I clearly discern it” – only to deny that such reports demonstrate the 
existence of essentially non-conceptual perception: The indistinct character of the previous 
perceptual awareness is better explained in terms of its having fewer qualifiers as its predicative 
content, rather than having no predicative content at all.17 Prior to acquiring the concept cow, I 
may perceive a cow in what Kumārila would consider to be an indistinct or confused manner, 
that is, I may just see the cow itself without realizing what it is I am seeing – I don’t perceptually
identify the cow as being a cow, or as possessing a property of cowness that it shares with other 
cows. Nonetheless, Gaṅgeśa’s point is that even this indistinct perception is not purely non-
conceptual – though I may not yet see the cow as being a cow, let alone as being a jersey cow or 
a mammal, my perceptual awareness could still identify the cow as at least being an object, as 
16 TCM, 857: “na ca vyavah!ra6, tasya savikalpakas!dhyatv!t.” As Bhattacharya (1991: 8) points out, the reason 
non-conceptual states cannot generate verbal reports is that, according to Navya Nyāya, words refer to an object 
by means of some qualifying property (see also Phillips 2012: 87). Non-conceptual perceptions, on the other 
hand, are directly acquainted with their objects, and do not cognize them under a qualifier or identifying feature.
Consequently. the objective content of non-conceptual perceptions cannot be linguistically reported; only 
concept-laden states can bring about the linguistic communication of their contents. Aside from subjective 
reports, Gaṅgeśa would also likely rule out objectively observable behavior as a possible source of evidence for 
the existence of non-conceptual perceptions, since both Buddhists and non-Buddhists generally came to accept 
that intentional behavior is caused by concept-laden cognitions. E.g., see DhPr, 49: "y! niyamavat# pravrtti6 
kvacitpr!ṇina6, s! vikalpapūrvik!6”; TA, 103: “naiy!yikamate pravartakaṃ viśiṣsajn!nam...”
17 TCM, 857: “n!p#daṃ na vivecitaṃ pūrvamadhun! vivecay!m#tyanubhavapram!ṇak!locanavikalpau, 
bahuviśeṣaṇajn!n!jn!n!bhy!ṃ tadupapatte6.”
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being brown, or being larger than the calf next to it, etc.18 So, the subjective report of an 
indistinct, indeterminate perceptual awareness still does not provide for Gaṅgeśa any evidence 
for what it is like to experience an essentially non-conceptual perception.
If Gaṅgeśa thinks it is impossible to have any first-personal knowledge of non-conceptual
perception, then there are two interpretative options for understanding how, on his intentionalist 
account, the phenomenal character of non-conceptual perceptions is supposed to differ from that 
of concept-laden perceptions. First, we could read Gaṅgeśa as believing that non-conceptual 
perceptions have a conscious phenomenal character that is uniquely unavailable to subjective 
report; following Ned Block, we could hence construe nirvikalpaka states as cases of 
phenomenal consciousness that occur in the absence of access consciousness. At first glance, 
Gaṅgeśa would seem to be fine with such a construal, since he and other Naiyāyikas accept a 
version of first-order representationalism (e.g., Dretske 1995), i.e., the view that mental states 
can be conscious without a subject’s being conscious of those mental states themselves. Nyāya 
believes that conscious states illuminate objects, not themselves; as Gaṅgeśa would put it, 
18 Contemporary defenders of conceptualism adopt a similar strategy in responding to purported examples of 
perception which seem to outstrip a perceiver’s conceptual repertoire (see Gennaro 2012: 176-82). In the case of
seeing two fine-grained shades, a perceiver might not fully possess the concepts for specific shades like red18 
and red19, but one could still deploy comparative concepts like lighter than and darker than to identify what 
one sees. Another case typically offered by non-conceptualists is associative visual agnosia: Due to a brain 
injury (typically to the left temporal lobe), patients lose the ability to recognize certain types of objects despite 
their visual perception of those objects still seeming to be intact, as evidenced by their ability to accurately draw
what they are seeing. So, a patient may accurately draw a stethoscope upon seeing it, but fail to recognize the 
object as being a stethoscope – thus showing that we have conscious perceptual experience prior to, and 
possibly in the total absence of, the deployment of relevant concepts. In one researcher’s words, associative 
agnosia involve the experience of a “normal percept stripped of its meaning” (Teuber 1968). This form of 
agnosia ostensibly supports the non-conceptualist claim that one can see an object in the absence of 
conceptualization. However, conceptualists can respond by pointing out that, while patients may be unable to 
deploy high-level concepts like stethoscope, they can still capture what they see in terms of low-level concepts 
like long and round which remain at their disposal: An agnosic may hence describe seeing the stethoscope as 
seeing a “long cord with a round thing on the end” (Rubens and Benson 1971: 308-9). Moreover, it is not clear 
that associative agnosics still experience a “normal” percept albeit shorn of any conceptual meaning, given the 
various respects in which associative agnosics still suffer perceptual impairments and abnormalities (see Bauer 
2012: 284-252). In particular, associative agnosics may to varying degrees be unable to perceptually integrate 
objects-parts into a higher-order shape or gestalt (Farah 2004: 77-8).
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conscious states are experienced as just having objects in the world as their content – these states
are not themselves experienced as being part of that content.19 One instead becomes self-aware of
having a conscious first-order state (vyavas!ya) only when one has a higher-order state that takes
the first-order state as its object, which on the Nyāya account involves having an introspective 
apperception (anuvyavas!ya) of the first-order state. Presumably, then, one could also 
consciously experience nirvikalpaka perceptions without their having to be accessed by higher-
order states involved in introspection, action, or communication.
Of course, it is not just non-conceptual perceptions that can occur in the absence of 
higher-order states – concept-laden perceptions can equally occur without being the object of a 
higher-order state. But whereas we have every reason to think that concept-laden perceptions are 
conscious, given that they can generate all the sorts of subjective and objective markers of 
uncontroversially conscious awareness, the prospect of having a non-conceptual perceptual 
experience which is both phenomenally conscious and totally impossible for one to ever notice 
that one was having remains dubious both as a theoretical possibility within Gaṅgeśa’s account, 
and on independent grounds. 
For one, not even Gaṅgeśa’s dialectical opponents would go so far to admit that there are 
contentful, object-directed mental states which are both phenomenally conscious and which one 
could never in principle realize that one was having. While Dignāga and Dharmakīrti argue that 
essentially non-conceptual perceptual content necessarily outstrips the conceptual capacities 
involved in thought, memory, speech, and action, perceptual awareness for them is also 
intrinsically self-aware. So with perceptual awareness also taking itself as its own object, there is
19 TCM, 847: “vyavas!yasy!rthaviṣayatvam!tramanubhūyate na tu svaviṣayatvamapi, gauraveṇa tasya 
svaviṣayabh!natay! pravrttyahetutv!t.”
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some basic sense in which one must always realize that one is experiencing that perception. The 
vehicle of this basic realization isn’t an introspective judgment; unlike the account of reflexive 
self-awareness given in Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā (see Ram-Prasad 2007: 71-4), the Buddhists are 
not claiming that as you are having a perception, you are also having the introspective awareness
that “I am having a perception.” Nonetheless, even the Buddhists don’t think that essentially 
non-conceptual perceptions are fundamentally inaccessible to introspection; in fact, they also 
argue that the self-aware aspect of perceptual experience is what makes it possible to 
subsequently introspect or remember that experience’s subjective phenomenal appearance, along 
with the object experienced (Kellner 2010; Ganeri 2012: ch. 9).20 Moreover, to the extent that 
Buddhists (along with Advaita Vedāntins – see Ram-Prasad 2007: 74-83) acknowledge the 
existence of rarefied states of meditative consciousness that are self-aware, non-conceptual, and 
totally unavailable to ordinary cognitive processes of introspection, memory, or speech, they 
would also assert that such states of consciousness do not have any intentional, representational 
content. However, Gaṅgeśa would not take recourse to either of these routes for establishing the 
subjective phenomenal character of essentially non-conceptual perception. He denies that mental 
states are reflexively self-aware and that awareness can be contentless, in which case he couldn’t 
20 Ganeri (1999: 472; 2012: 170-1) claims that in positing every conscious awareness of an object to also have a 
subjective aspect or appearance of itself (sv!bh!sa), Dignāga is not trying to attribute conscious states with a 
phenomenal character or “what-it’s-likeness” that is totally separable from the state’s objective intentional 
content. Still, although Block and others may speak of phenomenal consciousness as being intrinsically non-
representational, we need not restrict the notions of “what-it’s-likeness” or phenomenal character in this way 
when explaining the notion of sv!bh!sa. As Ganeri points out, the subjective aspect is better described as being 
the objective content’s mode of presentation: “Given that a mode of presentation is itself a constituent of 
intentional content,” he writes, “the full intentionality of the state will therefore consist in both the object-aspect 
and the subject-aspect” (2012: 171). A helpful analogy is that of a photograph: A photo can pictorially represent 
the Eiffel Tower, say, but it also has its own qualities like brightness, saturation, and contrast, which are not 
qualities of the Eiffel Tower itself. But, it is through having these qualities that the photograph represents its 
object (Ganeri 1999: 470).
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resort to claiming that the presence of reflexive self-awareness or contentless awareness would 
ensure that even non-conceptual perceptions have an unmistakably conscious character.
With no plausible way of attributing to Gaṅgeśa the view that nirvikalpaka perceptions 
are phenomenally conscious despite their inherent invisibility to a perceiving subject, I would 
argue that we should instead view Gaṅgeśa as claiming that essentially non-conceptual 
perceptions are unconscious. In the final section, I examine how this claim, and the 
corresponding claim about the conscious character of predictively structured perceptual content, 
can be made plausible in the terms of contemporary vision science. Indeed, I will show that 
empirical models of visual processing are broadly consistent with Gaṅgeśa’s account of 
essentially non-conceptual perception, and his reasons for thinking that non-conceptual 
perceptions lack any detectable phenomenal character. Like Gaṅgeśa, these models posit that 
pre-predicative perceptual representations arise in the early stages of unconscious visual 
processing. 
Moreover, both Gaṅgeśa and the models of visual processing take certain forms of 
attention and memory to be involved in transforming the unconscious, pre-predicative 
representations of early vision into the integrated, coherent representations of mind-independent 
objects that populate conscious perceptual phenomenology. According to the Nyāya account of 
perception, concept-laden perceptual cognitions are generated with the joint assistance of 
memory and attention, which can be understood as capacities involved in the visual classification
and predication of properties to objects. A refined conceptualism informed by both Nyāya and 
vision science will thus understand these attention- and memory-based capacities as the means 
by which concepts are involved in structuring the content of conscious perceptual 
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representations. If such a refined conceptualist account of perceptual processing is on the right 
track, then it would be the case that by the time that an intentional representation enters into the 
stream of perceptual experience such that one could phenomenologically analyze it and report its
seemingly fine-grained non-conceptual character, the visual system has carried out a 
conceptually modulated process of visual predication and classification. And so, if Gaṅgeśa is 
right that we can never have any phenomenological evidence for the existence of essentially non-
conceptual, pre-predicative perceptual representations, then we can cast doubt on the very 
evidence that Buddhist and contemporary non-conceptualists cite in arguing that such 
perceptions exists. 
4.4 Attention and Memory in the Stages of Visual Processing
I will now briefly describe the two basic stages of visual processing – early vision and 
late vision – and the types of perceptual representations that are generated therein. Early vision 
roughly takes place during the first 100 ms after a stimulus is received by the retina, during 
which information is directly extracted from retinal input by specialized receptors in the primary 
visual cortex. These receptors separately detect the presence of rudimentary surface and spatio-
temporal features such as color, shape, texture, spatial location, orientation, and motion. This is 
the stage at which scenario content may arise, where features are separately represented without 
being predicated to objects. However, the early visual system goes beyond generating a holistic 
array of features, by further segmenting the visual field into so-called "proto-objects," or sensory 
representations that allow the visual system to directly individuate objects and track them as 
persisting across space and time. The representations of proto-objects are fleeting, unstable, and 
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viewpoint-dependent, as they are constantly updated or overwritten by subsequent sensory 
information brought about with each new eye movement, and hence are never stored in memory. 
The representation of a proto-object is non-conceptual in nature because, in primitively 
individuating an object from a background scene and from other objects, this representation 
uniquely and demonstratively refers to an object in the world without identifying it as having 
certain properties, or as being a member of some category. The demonstrative visual index 
assigned to a proto-object does not retain information about the object's features precisely in 
order to track that object across changes in its features, as well across the movement of both the 
object and the eyes. Being unconsciously generated by cognitively impenetrable causal 
processes, these "featureless" proto-objects are distinct from the stable, three-dimensional, 
observer-independent objects found in conscious perceptual experience (Raftopolous 2009: 212, 
244).
The conscious experience of stable object-representations arises in the stages of 
intermediate and late vision, at about 150-200 ms after stimulus onset. It is at this point that the 
activity of selective attention transforms the contents of early vision into the stable, structured, 
three-dimensional representations of external objects and their properties. Out of the welter of 
sensory information directly retrieved from a visual scene, and the primitive parsings of this 
information into multiple and competing proto-objectual representations, attention selects certain
relevant stimuli for further processing by the cognitively penetrable stages of "late vision," and 
by higher-order cognitive processes. Once attention is applied to a certain proto-object, that 
object-representation takes on a spatio-temporal coherence and stability that allow the object to 
be seen as being viewpoint-independent, that is, as persisting across, and existing apart from, 
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changes in the perceiver's perspective. Furthermore, in selecting visual features for further 
processing, attention encodes these features into a predicatively structured object representation, 
thereby enriching the organization of perceptual content beyond the rudimentary, proto-objectual
binding of spatio-temporal information in early vision. In other words, properties like color and 
shape now become visually attributed to an external spatio-temporal source; an object itself is 
hence seen as having these properties, or as being a token instantiation of these properties 
(Kanwisher 2001: 107-8). 
It is in the predicative structuring of object-representations that attention is guided by the 
concepts and categories stored in memory. Through being transferred into visual working 
memory, the object-representation selected by attention becomes stable enough that it can be 
matched against similar representations stored in long-term memory. The presently perceived 
object with property F is compared with the mnemonic traces of previously perceived 
instantiations of F, experienced either in different objects or in the same object perceived at a 
different time, and thereby becomes visually identified as a member of a class. Moreover, so that 
an object's properties can themselves be perceived as instances of F, attention forms a "higher-
level" visual representation of these properties that draws on abstract categories supplied by 
visual memory (Hollingworth 2005).
What's more, the conceptualization of perceptual contents in late vision serves as a 
precondition for not only the arising of verbalizable perceptual beliefs, but also for the robust 
phenomenology of perceiving the three-dimensional shape of objects with inevitably occluded 
parts. As Raftopoulos (2009) points out, the perceptual experience of an object as having hidden 
features could not be generated purely by the "bottom-up" processes of early vision, since the 
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retinas themselves only receive information from the visible surfaces of objects, and obviously 
receive no sensory input from the parts of an object that are out of view. Accordingly, early 
vision can ultimately give rise only to what Marr (1982) has called the 2½-dimensional sketch, 
or a viewpoint-centered array of surface features, textures, and contours, and the respective 
distances of these surfaces relative to the perceiver. However, when it comes to seeing the visual 
scene as being comprised of the three-dimensional objects that we ordinarily find in the world – 
this visual stage being referred to by Marr as the 3D sketch – late vision cannot rely on a 
retinotopic array of bounded surfaces alone. Instead, the perceptual identification of some 
segment of the surface array as being an object, and particularly one with a specific three-
dimensional shape and structure that can remain constant in spite of changes in perspective and 
surface features, requires that the visual system augment the data of early vision with top-down 
information about specific objects stored in memory. Once there is a match detected between 
perceived representation and a generated memory representation, the input representation is 
strengthened in visual memory, and the perceiver goes on to experience seeing the object in 
conscious visual awareness (Kosslyn and Sussman 1994: 1036-7). 
4.5 Conclusion – A Naturalized Ny!ya Conceptualism
I take this psychological account of late vision to have several philosophical implications 
for the debates over non-conceptual perceptual contents as waged in both classical Indian 
philosophy and contemporary philosophy of mind. First, I want to suggest that the psychological 
model of attention's role in structuring conscious perceptual content is anticipated in broad terms 
by the classical Nyāya account of manas as involving the attentional integration of external 
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sensory stimuli. On the Nyāya view, the attentional selection of particular sensory inputs is 
responsible for determining which objects present in the visual scene will be cognized in 
conscious perceptual experience. Indeed, it is through both the synthesizing and distinguishing 
functions of unconscious mental processes that a successive stream of stimuli can come to figure 
as the single intentional object of a perceptual cognition (Ganeri 2012b: 262-3). Moreover, the 
same faculty of selective attention is also taken to retrieve information stored as memory-traces 
(saṃsk!ra). Ultimately, what it means for a perception (or any cognition) to be concept-laden is 
that the cognition's intentional object is presented under some qualifying property/mode of 
presentation supplied by memory. We can therefore we can conclude with Ganeri (2009: 7.1) that
Nyāya offers its theory of memory as its theory of concept-possession. Furthermore, through 
drawing parallels with contemporary theories of perception that link together selective attention, 
memory, and concept-possession (cf. Matthen 2005b, Raftopoulos 2010), we can elaborate 
Nyāya's own theory of concept-possession in naturalistic terms, citing the specific psychological 
mechanisms by which memory-based concepts and categories structure the conscious intentional
content of perceptual cognitions.
Second, while the Buddhist non-conceptualists have offered phenomenological arguments
to show that scenario content is the only legitimate form of perceptual content, the evidence 
offered by psychological studies of vision suggests that we must locate essentially non-
conceptual scenario content outside of the perceptual representations to which we have ordinary 
phenomenological access. Moreover, scenario content will have to be distanced even further 
from the contents of conscious perceptual experience, since the representations of early vision 
that are eligible to be selected by attention are those that index sensory features to persisting 
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spatio-temporal objects (or object-files), rather than to spatial point-locations, as contemporary 
and Buddhist non-conceptualists would have it (see Matthen 2004/2006, Pylyshyn 2007). As a 
result, the conscious visual experience of a panoramic, uniformly fine-grained sensory layout of 
spatial locations, which non-conceptualists purport to capture with the notion of scenario content,
belies not just the involvement of object-identification in late vision, but also of object-
individuation and tracking in early vision. The pre-attentive, non-conceptual parsing of the visual
scene into distinct, persisting objects would especially compromise the Buddhist brand of non-
conceptualism, which views the apparent experience of persisting, numerically identical objects 
as a conceptual falsification of one's consciously direct acquaintance with momentary particulars.
To sum up, according to both Nyāya and contemporary psychological models of 
perception, attention predicatively structures conscious perceptual cognitions by activating in the
perceiver's mind the memory traces of previously perceived objects, which in turn causes the 
perceived object to be categorized and visually attributed with some qualifying property. To the 
extent that Buddhist and contemporary defenders of essentialist content non-conceptualism must 
treat scenario content as the sole content of conscious perceptual awareness in order to explain 
the fine-grained character of ordinary perceptual phenomenology, they overlook the involvement
of concept- and memory-guided object identification in generating this phenomenology.
As a more programmatic conclusion, I want to claim that we can actually make 
philosophical progress in current debates over non-conceptualism and perceptual content by 
taking as our starting point a naturalized version of the Indian theory of concepts. A naturalized 
approach also allows us to acknowledge both the promise and perils of phenomenology as a 
philosophical method in general, and as a tool for doing comparative philosophy in particular. 
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Finally, we can see how a broader project of naturalizing classical Indian theories of perception 
and consciousness gives us new frameworks with which to interpret Indian views and to see their
contemporary philosophical relevance.
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Chapter 5
Concepts and Attention in Skillful Perception and Action
The account of vision developed in the previous chapters has presented several ways in which 
perceptual concepts are involved in the structuring the representational content of conscious visual 
experience. In particular, we have seen how the contents of memory influence the attentional selection 
of sensory features and their integration into a coherent perceptual representation. In this chapter, I 
wish to show how perceptual concept deployment is not merely a passive, unconscious process that 
takes place outside of a perceiver's control; rather, perceptual concepts can also be understood as 
abilities that a perceiver actively and skillfully exercises in experience. The active exercise of these 
conceptual abilities, I would suggest, relies upon the trained allocation of one's attention to a visual 
scene. Attentional allocation is a skill which is developed and refined as one acquires perceptual 
expertise, or an ability to perceptually recognize and categorize objects of a certain domain. Whether it 
is for recognizing tumors on an x-ray, birds in a forest, or faces in a crowd, one acquires the ability to 
perceptually classify an object – i.e., one acquires a perceptual concept for an object – in large part by 
learning to attend to those features of a stimulus which are indicative of an object's membership in 
some relevant category, and learning to disregard those features which are not. Through granting a 
perceiver with certain attentional skills, perceptual concept acquisition improves a perceiver’s 
knowledge and epistemic status: Through learning how to properly attend to an object, a perceiver 
comes to know which object-features are category-diagnostic, where one needs to look to find such 
features, and how to track those features across their different instantiations. In turn, these skills of 
allocating attention to relevant features in turn enable a perceptual expert to more efficiently and 
accurately categorize perceived stimuli than an untrained novice. What's more, not only will the expert 
be able to recognize an object faster than a novice; the expert will also be able to extract more 
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information out of given stimuli than a novice, seeing patterns, structures, and subtle differences that 
are inaccessible to the untrained eye. I will argue that the exercise of attentional skills leads the 
experience of a perceptual expert to have content which is not available to the perceptual novice. The 
novice will not see an object as the expert does, given that it does not yet possess the skill of attending 
to an object's identifying features in the right way.
Furthermore, it is on the basis of skillfully attending to perceptual objects that we can skillfully 
act in response to them. By explaining perceptual concepts as entailing abilities for skillfully directing 
one's attention, we come to understand how perceptual concepts play an indispensable role in the 
causal chain between the reception of sensory information and the ultimate initiation of an intentional 
action. Intentional bodily actions rely on perceptually categorizing the objects being acted upon; an 
object must be seen as being of a certain type in order for a subject to perform the action in a way that 
is appropriate to objects of that type. One's intentions for acting disposes one to focus on specific 
action-relevant stimuli. For instance, if I intend to open a door, my past experience with doorknobs will
lead me to attend and visually select those object-features present in my visual field – e.g., some 
protuberance of a certain shape, location, and color – which are relevant to identifying the object as a 
doorknob. Moreover, there is a specific subset of the doorknob's properties which is directly relevant to
the intended action, and which must be selected in particular – the color of the doorknob is not directly 
relevant to the intended action, and hence should be deprioritized in the process of attentional selection.
Having attended to the functional properties of the doorknob, I can subsequently execute the intended 
motor responses of stretching out my arm, grasping, and turning my hand. Visually selecting the 
appropriate object of action is necessary because, in the absence of a selecting the proper target of 
action, the intended motor response will miss its mark; reaching out and grasping the door itself or the 
deadbolt lock will fail to accomplish my goal of opening the door. Through structuring how attention is
directed to objects and their features, then, perceptual concepts are integral to the perceptual guidance 
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of intentional actions (Wu 2008).
Part of the philosophical upshot of establishing a link between perceptual concepts and skillful 
perception and action is that we can find a middle ground in the noted debate between Hubert Dreyfus 
and John McDowell over the extent of the mind's involvement in experience. We have seen in chapter 
one that, according to McDowell, experience can represent the world as being a certain way only if it is
suffused with the operation of rational capacities required for knowing the world, namely those 
capacities required for the normative practices of articulating and evaluating reasons for belief and 
action. Dreyfus (2007a/b, 2013) on the other hand argues against McDowell that perceptual experience 
is non-conceptual; but unlike other content non-conceptualists, he rejects the idea that notions of 
representation or intentional content have any role to play in explaining our experience of the world in 
its most primary form, that is, at the level of fully absorbed coping with objects. For Dreyfus, notions 
of representation and rationality introduce a gap between the mind and the world that he thinks does 
not exist for our ordinary experience. We are normally immersed in an environment of attractive and 
repulsive affordances, which solicit intentional actions without our having to conceptually judge or 
think about what it is we are responding to or what it is we are doing. Our absorbed coping with these 
environmental forces is guided by a non-conceptual, non-propositional, and non-linguistic background 
understanding or skillful know-how, which is operative before we come to employ concepts in 
rationally judging and evaluating the world as a totality of propositionally structured facts. So, in 
Dreyfus's estimation, reaching for a doorknob requires no conceptual capacities even at the perceptual 
level: “… when I go out the door I needn’t attend to the doorknob (be mindful of it), see it as a 
doorknob, least of all see that it affords opening the door” (2007a: 361).
As a way of responding to the impasse between Dreyfus and McDowell, and continuing our 
exploration of classical philosophical resources for the sake of reconfiguring contemporary debates, I 
will show how a skill-based account of perceptual concepts can be rooted in the insights of Classical 
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Chinese epistemology, as developed most fully in the thought of Mòzĭ (5th cent. BCE) and Xúnzǐ (3rd 
cent. BCE). Chinese epistemology helps to fill a gap in our revised account of perceptual 
conceptualism left by Nyāya. While the Nyāya memory-based account of concept possession framed 
our understanding of how concepts are operative in structuring perceptual representations, their answer 
to the question of how we acquire concepts is constrained by their broader commitment to the direct 
perception of universals. For them, one's acquisition of the concept “cow” is ultimately derived from a 
direct perception of cowness. There is no explicit acknowledgement in Nyāya that coming to perceive a
cow as a cow may be a developmental process whereby one gradually acquires a skill to perceptual 
classify an object as a cow. Such a developmental account of perceptual concept acquisition is much 
more at home in the context of Chinese epistemology, a guiding assumption of which is that knowledge
is intimately tied to action – one has knowledge of a thing to the extent that one can skillfully perform 
an action appropriate to that thing. Accordingly, perceptual knowledge consists in a skillful ability as 
well, namely an ability to properly discriminate and categorize relevant features of objects on the basis 
of observed resemblances with conceptual models. Xúnzǐ in particular suggests that perceptual 
discrimination is properly understood as a skill whose exercise rests on the application of attention, in 
that the correct categorization of patterns of stimuli in the world involves attending in the right way to 
an object and its features. Hence, in order to highlight the practical significance of the interrelation of 
perception, attention, and concepts, I wish to use Chinese epistemological insights into the skill-based 
nature of perceptual knowledge to frame a discussion of the phenomena of perceptual learning and 
expertise, and of how concepts are crucial for guiding the development of skillful abilities for 
recognizing and attending to visual patterns.
Coupling empirical research on perceptual expertise with the skill-based account of perceptual 
knowledge in classical Chinese epistemology, we can arrive at alternative answers to some of the 
important questions that arise in the wake of the Dreyfus-McDowell debate: To what degree is our 
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basic interaction with the environment devoid of or pervaded by “mindedness”? Must we exclusively 
identify this mindedness or intelligence with the exercise of higher-order conceptual capacities, as 
McDowell and Dreyfus do? Are we then left to conclude with Dreyfus that our absorbed engagement 
with the world is fundamentally non-rational? Or, is there a form of practical rationality to be found in 
the sorts of skillful activity that Dreyfus considers to be “mindless”? Does Dreyfus overlook the extent 
to which conceptual capacities are necessarily involved in the perceptual guidance of seemingly 
mindless skillful activity? And, can perception itself be counted as one of these skillful activities? In 
this chapter, the path to answering these questions will take us first through an overview of classical 
Chinese epistemology. Specifically, I will highlight how perceptual knowledge was considered in the 
Chinese tradition to be a form of actively exercised know-how, resting on concept-guided skills of 
attentional selection. I then consider the challenge of Dreyfus's non-conceptualist account of absorbed 
coping, and show that it fails to capture the involvement of memory- and attention-based conceptual 
capacities in skillful activity. Finally, I examine contemporary studies of perceptual expertise and visual
object understanding, in order to establish that perception itself is an activity which is both skillfully 
absorbed and conceptually minded.
5.1 Perceptual Knowledge in Classical Chinese Epistemology
The philosophers of the Warring States period in China (475-221 BCE) developed their 
accounts of perceptual knowledge while operating under a rather different philosophical framework as 
compared to their Indo-European counterparts. For instance, the reality of the external world as we 
ordinarily perceive it was never brought into serious question by Chinese epistemologists; unlike the 
Western tradition following from Plato, and a number of Indian traditions which followed from the 
Upaniṣads and the Buddha, there was not a prevalent sense in classical Chinese philosophy that our 
experience of the world and ourselves might instead be an illusory veil of appearances concealing a 
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more fundamental, transcendent reality.1 This is not to say that Chinese epistemologists were unaware 
of the possibility that our senses can be deceiving, or that we can be mistaken about how the world 
actually is; as we will see, Xúnzǐ and the Mohists had much to say about the types and causes of 
perceptual error. Robust epistemological skepticism was also developed in Daoist philosophy, 
particularly in the Zhuāngzǐ. The Zhuāngzǐ's brand of skepticism was devoted to pointing out the 
fallibility of our inherently limited epistemic perspectives, and the mistaken reification of our 
contingent conceptual conventions as being objective, universal, and unchanging – and yet, even the 
Zhuāngzǐ did not countenance the possibility that sense perception fails to acquaint us with an objective
world at all.2 Scholars such as Jane Geaney (2002: 13, 30-35) and Chris Fraser (2011) have argued that 
the absence in classical Chinese philosophy of deep skepticism about our knowledge of the external 
world, or the absence any sustained metaphysical/epistemological dispute between direct realist and 
idealist views, can be traced in part back to a philosophical context in which no distinction was drawn 
between a world of phenomenal appearance knowable through the senses, and the world of noumenal, 
transcendent truths knowable through super-sensory means. 
More importantly for our concerns, Geaney and Fraser further claim that the lack of a sharp 
metaphysical distinction in the Chinese tradition between appearance and reality can be correlated with 
the development of a non-representational theory of mind and perception. Representations are here 
being thought of as certain mental entities which mediate our experiential contact with reality, and 
whose contents truly or falsely depict that reality.3 But if an inevitable gap between how things seems 
to us and how they actually are in reality is not taken to be a serious possibility, then one's 
epistemology need not rely on representations to bridge such a gap. Accordingly, taking our direct 
1 Starting points for further discussion of Chinese metaphysics and its unique presuppositions can be found in Hall and 
Ames 1998, and the essays in Li and Perkins 2015.
2 See for instance the interpretations of Hansen 1992: 285-92, and Fraser 2009.
3 Fraser (2011: 130 n. 7) acknowledges that representations do not necessarily have to be construed as indirect 
intermediaries, and that there can be theories of mental representation which cohere with the stance of Chinese 
epistemology.
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contact with the world to be a given, classical Chinese epistemology understood knowledge (zhī 知) in 
a way that prioritized the optimal pragmatic engagement with the world over the merely correct 
representation of it. As Fraser argues, classical Chinese philosophy understood knowledge to consist in 
the ability to correctly and reliably recognize things as being classed under some category or kind (lèi 
類). Merely understanding that a certain object is denoted by a certain name is not sufficient for having 
knowledge; instead, one is properly said to have knowledge when one actively displays the ability to 
pick out that object in a practical context. A passage from the Mòzĭ illustrates: 
Our master Mòzǐ said, “Now the blind say, ‘What’s bright is white, and what’s dark is black.’ 
Even the clear-sighted have no basis for changing this statement. But place white and black 
together and make the blind select among them, and they cannot know them. So as to my saying
the blind do not know white and black, it is not on the basis of their naming; it is on the basis of 
their selecting.” (Mòzĭ 47/23–24; trans. Fraser 2011: 133)
Though the blind can understand at a linguistic level the distinction between white and black, they are 
said to lack knowledge of white and black to the extent that they cannot in practice reliably distinguish 
between white and black things. The Mòzĭ is thereby suggesting that knowledge is grounded upon a 
perceptually-guided ability to appropriately discriminate between objects on the basis of their category 
membership. Discrimination, or bi%n 辨, forms the heart of Mohist epistemology, logic, semantics, and 
ethics – Mohists took all types of reasoning, judgment, and debate to rest on the proper drawing of 
distinctions between similar and dissimilar things (Fraser 2013). Thus, being linked through this 
common activity of discrimination, skills for perceptual pattern recognition and categorization would 
be epistemically continuous with all other cognitive practices; we might say then that perceptual 
recognition or “knowledge-of” need not be set apart from the propositional “knowledge-that” of 
conceptual thought.
Classical Chinese theories of sense perception took the sense organs themselves to be engaged 
in the activity of discrimination/distinguishing (bi%n 辨) and differentiation (yì 異). Regarding the 
visual sense, the Xúnzǐ for example says, “The eyes distinguish between light and dark, beautiful and 
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ugly” (Hutton 2014: 27); elsewhere in the text, it is stated that “form, color, and pattern are 
differentiated by the eyes” (Ibid: 238). For Geaney, the Xúnzǐ's description of the senses as 
distinguishing and differentiating their respective objects implies an understanding of perception as 
being akin to what has come to be known, following Ludwig Wittgenstein (1998: sec. 129), as “aspect 
perception,” or “seeing-as.” Geaney takes the notion of aspect perception to account for a kind of 
perception which cannot be explained by sense-data theories of perception, theories which, to crudely 
summarize, construe our perceptual experience of the world as involving the conscious presentation of 
subjective sensory impressions whose objective significance must be conceptually interpreted or 
inferred. In the case of aspect perception, however, interpretation is evidently woven into the percept 
itself. The phenomenon of seeing aspects is well illustrated by the example of Jastrow's duck-rabbit 
figure:
The same figure can seen under different “aspects,” either as a picture of a duck or as a picture of a 
rabbit. Indeed, the figure can surprisingly shift in our experience from looking like a duck to looking 
like a rabbit, and vice versa – all without any change in the actual figure itself, or in the stimuli which 
are presented to the eyes. The lesson to be drawn from the phenomenon of aspect perception most 
relevant for Geaney's purposes is this: The sudden shift in a perceptual aspect, and the corresponding 
change in the intentional and phenomenal content of the perceptual state, indicates that aspect 
perception “is not a kind of seeing that is followed by thinking and then drawing an inference about 
what is seen” (2002: 32). In other words, we are not first passively presented with a neutral sensory 
image that we must then deliberately interpret and classify in a certain way. Rather, perceptual 
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experience is imbued with significance from the moment the perceptual aspect dawns upon us. 
Accordingly, when the Xúnzǐ says that the eyes themselves distinguish and discriminate their objects, it 
too can be read as implying that the eyes do not present us with a raw, undifferentiated array of sensory 
impressions. Instead, Geaney claims that the acts of looking and listening are understood as 
“organizational”; she writes, “To look and listen is to organize things, in the sense of taking a certain 
attitude toward them. This is particularly obvious in certain uses of the terms. That is, shi  視 (look) can 
function as 'to consider something to be something,' and ting  聽 (listen) can function as 'to judge'…. 
Because shi functions as visually 'consider' and ting functions as aurally 'judge,' looking and listening 
involve deeming things in a certain way” (2002: 43).
The Xúnzǐ intimates in several places that there is already some measure of classification and 
evaluation present at the sensory level. First, it identifies the senses as being the source for our 
awareness of similarity and difference, along with our corresponding linguistic conventions for using 
names to group and distinguish objects: “So then on what grounds do we deem things similar or 
different? I say: On the grounds of the sense organs. As to any creatures of the same kind, with the 
same affects, how their sense organs detect things is similar. So they converge in how they model 
things as resembling each other” (Xúnzǐ 1966: 1966: 22/14-16; trans. Fraser 2016: 300). On Chad 
Hansen's reading of this passage (1992: 325), objects are perceptually categorized together within a 
similarity space that is contributed by the sense organs themselves. And since creatures of the same 
species generally share the same sense organs, they will share in common a perceptual similarity space 
that enables them to distinguish the similarities and differences between sensory features in a uniform 
way, thereby providing a shared basis for their linguistic categorization and communication. As for the 
evaluative function of the senses, the Xúnzǐ speaks of the sense organs as loving (hǎo 好) and desiring 
(yù 欲) their respective objects.4 The evaluative aspect of vision can also be read out of the eyes' ability 
4 See Xúnzǐ chs. 11 and 23 (Hutton 2014: 104, 248, 250). The notion that the senses themselves desire or are attracted to 
their objects was common among classical Chinese texts as well; see Geaney 2002 for references.
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to discriminate between beauty and ugliness.
That said, the Xúnzǐ also acknowledges the integral role that the mind (xīn 心) plays in the 
production of perceptual knowledge.5 In one passage, the mind is said to apply the function of zhēng 
zhī  徵知 to the inputs of the “natural officials” (tiān guān天官), i.e., the sense faculties: 
心有徵知。徵知，則緣耳而知聲可也，緣目而知形可也，然而徵知必將待天官之當簿其
類然後可也；五官簿之而不知，心徵之而無說，則人莫不然謂之不知，此所緣而以同異
…也。然後隨而命之 . (Xúnzǐ 1966: 22/19-21)
The heart [xīn 心] has the power to judge its awareness [zhēng zhī 徵知]. If it judges its 
awareness, then by following with the ears it is possible to know a sound, and by following 
along with the eyes one can know a form. However, judging awareness must await the Heaven-
given faculties to appropriately encounter their respective kinds and only then can it work. If the
five faculties encounter them but have no awareness, or if the heart judges among them but has 
not persuasive explanations [for its judgments], then everyone will say that such a person does 
not know. This is what one follows and uses to distinguish the same and the different. Only after
doing this does one then follow it up by naming things. (Hutton 2014: 238)
I've used Hutton's translation as a starting point because it gives a relatively neutral rendering of zhēng 
zhī 徵知, namely as “judging awareness.” Still, we might narrow in on the Xúnzǐ's intended meaning by
noting several of the other ways in which this phrase has been interpreted. Dan Robins suggests 
translating zhēng zhī  徵知 as “sending knowledge,” in the sense that the mind dispatches the sense 
organs to gather knowledge of objects (2007: 9). John Knoblock (1994: 337) notes that the 9th century 
commentator Yang Liang interprets zhēng zhī 徵知 to mean “summoning knowledge,” in that the mind 
has the power to summon up any object into its ken and know it. The summoning power of the mind is 
to some extent suggested by the mind's being described in the Xúnzǐ as the “natural ruler” (tiān jūn 天
君; Xúnzǐ 1966: 17/12) in charge of the lower officials qua sense organs. Though the translation of 
zhēng as “summoning” was rejected by other commentators (see also Cua 1985: 31), we can 
understand at least one respect in which it is apt, particularly if we follow the translation of Lin Chung-
5 Though I here translate xīn  心 as “mind,” many scholars have instead have preferred the translation “heart-mind” as 
being more apt. The term literally refers to the physical heart, which was considered by the Chinese to be an organ that 
performs both cognitive and affective functions. Though the connotations of the term “mind” in English may side more 
toward the cognitive as against the affective, my own use of the term in the Chinese context should be understood as 
encompassing the affective dimension of cognition.
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I (2011: 319), who translates zhēng zhī as “attention.” According to Lin, the Xúnzǐ is here referring to 
an active exercise of a capacity for perceptual selection, whereby a perceiver directs her attention to 
some sensory stimuli for the sake of further cognitive processing (2011: 319-20). 
We should also note with Lin (Ibid.) that the Xúnzǐ takes the mind qua faculty of attention as 
having some part to play in a perceptual stimulus's rising to the level of awareness. In the passage 
quoted above, the Xúnzǐ notes that one condition for having perceptual knowledge is that there be 
awareness (zhī 知) of what the senses register (bù 簿). Elsewhere in the text, we find examples 
mentioned where, because the mind is not applied to the senses, one fails to perceive what should 
otherwise be very salient objects: “If the heart does not apply itself to the eyes, then black and white 
can be right in front of you and the eyes will not see them. If the heart does not apply itself to the ears, 
then drums and thunder can be right at your side and the ears will not hear them” (Hutton 2014: 224).6 
A mind which is distracted by anxiety and fear may similarly fall prey to inattentional blindness: “If the
mind is anxious and afraid, then the mouth may be filled with fine meats without being aware (zhī 知) 
of their taste; the ears may hear bells and drums without being aware of their sound; the eyes may see 
fine embroidered emblems without being aware of their shape; and the body may be wearing light, 
warm clothing and resting on a fine bamboo mat without being aware of their comfort.7
In addition to taking the mind's function of zhēng zhī as bound up with the activity of attentional
selection, other scholars have pointed out that zhēng zhī also amounts to a cognitive capacity for 
verifying or recognizing the identity of perceived objects. This aspect of verification and recognition is 
reflected in some of the other translations offered for zhēng zhī. Taking zhēng as a noun, John 
Knoblock translates the phrase as the “awareness that the mind has of the defining characteristics that 
distinguish things” (1994: 129), thus suggesting that the mind, after it is presented with an object by a 
6 Xúnzǐ 1966: 21/4-5: “心不使 …焉，則白黑在前而目不見；雷鼓在側而耳不聞 .”
7 Ibid: 22/80-81: “心憂恐則口銜芻豢而不知其味，耳聽鐘鼓而不知其聲，目視黼黻而不知其狀，輕煖平簟而體不
”知其安。
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sense organ, becomes aware of that object's identifying features. Taking zhēng as a verbal adjective, 
Fraser translates zhēng zhī as the “verifying knowing,” zhī being translated as “knowing” in part to 
draw an analogy with the Lockean or Kantian faculty of understanding (2011: 134 fn. 15). Antonio Cua
takes zhēng zhī to be “the confirmatory function of the mind with respect to knowledge” (1985: 32), by 
which he means that the mind confirms or establishes the identity of a perceived object by recognizing 
it on the basis of past experience as belonging to a certain class. Further resonances with Kant's account
of the understanding can be found in Cua's elaboration of zhēng zhī as an “intellectual function of the 
mind that enables human beings to obtain reliable empirical knowledge. And, acknowledging the 
conceptual character of this activity,” he continues, “we can accept the view of some recent scholars 
that cheng-chih embraces distinction, classification, selective judgment, or, more broadly analogy, 
analysis, and synthesis, to which we may add extension and specification of the uses of concepts” 
(1985: 34). Like Kant, then, the Xúnzǐ holds that sensory input must first be selected, classified, and 
synthesized by the mind before it can attain the status of perceptual knowledge. And as Cua 
acknowledges, these activities are essentially conceptual in character.
The final feature of the Xúnzǐ's description of zhēng zhī and its role in perceptual knowledge is 
that one cannot be said to have such knowledge unless the mind's activity of zhēng zhī is accompanied 
by “explanation” (shu0 說). Lin (2011: 320) further mentions “justification” and “reason articulation” 
as additional meanings for shu0 in this context. The Xúnzǐ here seems to be claiming that perceptual 
knowledge requires an ability to explain why one has classified or judged a perceived object in the way
that one has. Moreover, this discussion comes in the chapter of the Xúnzǐ explicitly concerning the 
proper use of names (zhèng míng正名), so what is being called for here is likely that a perceiver should
be able to explain how her perceptual classifications of an object cohere with the socially 
acknowledged standards governing that object's linguistic classification. In other words, if one cannot 
apply the correct name to an object upon perceiving it, and cannot explain why one's perception 
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justifies the application of that name, then one cannot be said to have perceptual knowledge of that 
object (Fraser 2011: 138). Fraser hence claims that Xúnzǐ would agree with contemporary thinkers such
as Wilfred Sellars and Donald Davidson that perceptual knowledge is “inherently linguistic and 
conceptualized” (2016: 301).
This necessity of explanation for perceptual knowledge evidently brings Xúnzǐ's account into 
close alignment with the conceptualism that John McDowell develops in the wake of Sellars and 
Davidson. As Lin (2011: 321) points out, shu0  說 is fundamentally an activity of reason-giving; so, if 
zhēng zhī must be accompanied by shu0 in order to have perceptual knowledge, then one would need to
be in a position to give reasons for one's perceptual discriminations. McDowell argues that only types 
of mental states which support the activity of reason-giving are those which have conceptual content. 
These are the only types of states that can be drawn into the “logical space of reasons,” and that can 
have normative significance for our broader web of beliefs. According to McDowell, non-conceptual 
states can at best stand in a causal, rather than rational, relation to our set of perceptual beliefs and 
judgments; such states can only offer exculpations, rather than justifications, for why we have the 
beliefs that we do (1994: 13). Xúnzǐ would seem to concur, insofar as he thinks that we should reserve 
knowledge for only those who are in a position to not only conceptually classify perceived objects, but 
also rationally evaluate those classifications. If this evaluation is to be tied up with assessing whether 
one's perceptual experience licenses the application of certain names to the objects experienced, then 
shu0 is essentially a discursive social practice taking place among members of a linguistic community 
(Lin 2011: 322). The absence of an ability to justify and articulate the reasons for one's actions more 
broadly may be why the Xúnzǐ claims that when animals communicate – e.g., when one horse neighs 
and the other responds – they do so only without knowledge (zhī 知); instead, they act in such a way 
just out of being naturally inclined to do so (shì rán 勢然).8 For Xúnzǐ as for McDowell, the knowledge
8 Xúnzǐ 3/25: “ ”故馬鳴而馬應之，非知也，其勢然也。
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(zhī 知) that the senses and mind jointly furnish, and the actions that such knowledge enables, are 
responsive to reasons and must thereby go beyond being merely blind reflexes to stimuli (see also Sung
2012: 370 fn. 3).
Still, while classical Chinese epistemologists ultimately took perceptual knowledge to entail a 
practical competency for applying names to perceived objects in accordance with socially governed 
linguistic conventions, they nevertheless understood the application of names to be grounded upon the 
activity of perceptually discriminating and recognizing the real similarity relations between objects. It 
is the joint activity of the sense faculties and the mind that enables us to distinguish between similarity 
and dissimilarity (tóng yì 同異) – and it is only once objects are established as being similar or 
dissimilar that we have reason to employ names for the sake of grouping or differentiating them. 
Mohist epistemology delineates the general process by which we can identify an object as belonging to 
some category (lèi 類): We make reference to a conceptual standard, prototype, or paradigm (fǎ 法), 
and take some aspect (yīn 因) of that standard as a criterion for the relevant respects in which an object 
should resemble the standard and hence be included the same category (Liu, Seligman, and van 
Benthem 2011: 66-68). For instance, a horse may be classified as blind if its eyes are blind, but we 
shouldn't say that a horse is big just because its eyes are big; blindness and largeness as categories thus 
take different aspects of the horse to be relevant for determining whether it belongs to these categories 
(Ibid: 67). The Mohist Canons identify three types of prototypical standards or models used for 
classifying objects. One such standard can be a mental idea (yì 意) – for example, one comes to 
recognize an object as a circle by its resemblance with one's idea of a circle. Though yì  意 is construed 
as something mental, we should view such mental concepts, as with the Nyāya notion of concepts 
(Ganeri 2014: 7.1), as being constructed out of objective entities or patterns rather than as subjective 
fabrications. That is because mental models for the Mohists are on a par with literally objective models 
like instruments of measurement such as a compass (guī規), or a circle itself (yuán 員); all three may 
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provide reliable standards of comparison in identifying something's being similar to, and thus 
identifiable as, a circle (Liu, Seligman, and van Benthem 2011: 66). 
In the case of perceptual recognition, the aspect of resemblance relevant for determining an 
object's category membership is its visual appearance – literally, its shape and surface characteristics 
(xíng m%o 形貌) (Fraser 2011: 135). Since there is potentially an indefinite number of ways in which 
objects are similar, appropriate object recognition will involve a set of abilities for selecting and 
applying an appropriate conceptual model, and then discerning the features of a particular object that 
are appropriate for judging whether it resembles or “matches” (hé 合) the model. These abilities are 
exercised through the activity of selective attention: One recognizes an object as being of a certain kind
through attending to the object in the right way, that is, through perceptually selecting its category-
relevant features, and thereby disregarding those features which are category-irrelevant. The Mohist 
Canons give an example of classifying someone as dark-skinned on the basis of an appropriate aspect 
or criterion (yīn 因) – to perceptually recognize someone as dark-skinned, one would need to 
attentionally select a person's dark skin color, and disregard dark color of the person's pupils or hair. 
Similarly, one must perceptually disregard incisors and tails if one is going to perceptually distinguish 
between oxen and horses, as these features are shared by both animals (Ibid: 136). We may thus 
conclude that for the Mohists, knowledge that an object belongs to a certain category rests on knowing 
how to properly discriminate that object under a certain aspect, and that this sort of perceptual know-
how is in turn grounded upon our ability to selectively attend to that aspect.
Finally, we can further understand the role of attention in classical Chinese accounts of 
perceptual knowledge by understanding its role in perceptual error. The Xúnzǐ discusses at length the 
factors that may potentially thwart the acquisition of knowledge; what it finds these factors to share in 
common is that they all involve “fixation” or “obscuration” (bì 蔽). Errors occur when one improperly 
fixates on some particular element of something and thereby loses sight of the “overall pattern” (d% lǐ 
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大理) (Xúnzǐ 1966: 21/1). Fraser thus describes the Xúnzǐ as putting forth a part-whole theory of error: 
Perceptual and cognitive errors arise when a knower fixates on an unrepresentative or irrelevant aspect 
of a situation and thereby acquires only a partial, one-sided understanding of the situation as a whole. 
In this way, the Xúnzǐ's account bypasses the possibility of global skepticism; as Fraser writes, “[Error] 
is due not to subjective misrepresentation of the mind-independent world, nor to a gap between 
appearance and reality, but to fixing our attention in the wrong direction, such that we consider only 
some factors rather than all those relevant to discrimination” (Fraser 2011: 138). This improper fixation
of the attention, the Xúnzǐ claims, ultimately disrupts our ability to “class” (lún 倫) things in the right 
way.9 
Selectively attending to an object in the wrong way is liable to occur due to a number of factors.
Some are internal – the mind may be distracted, beset by personal biases, or disturbed by negative 
emotions. These internal perturbations of the mind are like mud at the bottom of a pan of water: When 
the pan is upright and undisturbed, the mud sinks to the bottom and you can then clearly make out the 
detailed reflection of your face on the surface. Yet when the mud is stirred up from the bottom, the 
clarity at the surface is disturbed and you can't make out the reflection of even the general outline of 
your face. In the same way, a mind that is internally “slanted” or biased (nèi qīng 內傾) won't be able to
determine even the gross patterns of things.10 Additionally, there can be external factors such as 
darkness, distance, or drunkenness which make one's sensory observations unreliable – in such cases, 
external objects won't appear clearly (qīng 清) to a mind which is internally unsettled or unstable, and 
which is further unable to clearly deliberate, in spite of those factors, about what is actually the case 
and what is not.11 Examples given by the Xúnzǐ include a person walking in the dark who sees a stone 
laying on its side as a crouching tiger, or a tree standing upright as someone following him; a drunk 
9 Xúnzǐ 1966: 21/7: “是故眾異不得相蔽以亂其倫也 ”。
10 Ibid: 21/54-58. For more discussion of the many facets of the analogy between the mind and a reflective pan of water, 
see Cline 2008.
11 Ibid: 21/67-68: “ ”凡觀物有疑，中心不定，則外物不清；吾慮不清，則未可定然否也。
209
person who mistakes a wide gorge for a narrow ditch; and someone standing at the top of a mountain, 
to whom the trees below appear like chopsticks. 
Yet, though the senses may be operating under deceptive conditions, a perceiver who knows 
what the Xúnzǐ (21/28) calls the “arts of the mind” (xīn shù 心術) won't herself be deceived. Fraser 
explains that “Xúnzǐ regards the use of the heart to discriminate things and guide action as a field of 
skill or technique.... As with any skill or art, performance in discrimination can be improved through 
training and conscientiousness” (2011: 141). Cultivating the “arts of the mind” specifically allows a 
perceiver to avoid the attentional fixations and biases that disrupt the ability to class and categorize 
objects appropriately, and that subsequently motivate incompetent action. A cultivated mind will 
instead maintain an “attentive equilibrium” wherein, like the undisturbed pan of water, it reflects the 
world clearly (Ibid.). In spite of deceptive external factors, a conscientious perceiver will still attend to 
the “overall pattern” present in a situation, and won't jump to act on the basis of misleading partial 
similarities like those which may make a stone look like a tiger in the dark, or those which may make 
trees look like chopsticks from a distance. By taking a holistic rather than blinkered view, a skilled 
perceiver can discriminate the other relevant features of a situation that would reveal these partial 
similarities to be misleading or irrelevant, and can then compensate for the deceptive circumstances in 
order to still act appropriately.
To sum up, classical Chinese epistemology offers a skill-based account of perceptual 
knowledge: To have knowledge of an object through the senses is to have an ability for reliably 
classifying that object under an appropriate category. The Xúnzǐ suggests that this classification takes 
place through the joint activity of the senses and the mind qua faculty of attention – objects are 
registered within a sensory similarity space, and are brought to awareness, recognized, and categorized 
through a process of attentional selection. The Mohists specify how conceptual standards determine 
which object-features are to be selected as relevant for identifying an object's category membership. 
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Perceptual knowledge hence consists in a set of abilities for attending to, recognizing, and responding 
to patterns in the right way. With cultivation, one can exercise these abilities more skillfully and 
reliably. So at base, perceptual knowledge in classical Chinese epistemology is to be understood as a 
kind of skillful know-how. The exercise the attention-based abilities of classification and appropriate 
action grounds our skillful epistemic engagement with the world.
5.2 Dreyfus's Non-Conceptualism
However, for all its emphasis on perceptual knowledge as non-representational and skillful 
know-how, the classical Chinese epistemologists are not likely to be received amiably by Dreyfus, for 
as we saw, there is a “McDowellian” streak to the conceptualism of Xúnzǐ and Mòzǐ (or vise versa?). 
Their account of perceptual knowledge is framed within a general account of knowledge as entailing 
the practical ability for correctly applying general terms to objects; as a result, one attains knowledge 
through skillful perceptual discrimination to the extent that one can describe objects appropriately on 
the basis on perceiving them. Indeed, this is how the Mohist Canons characterizes perceptual 
knowledge – one knows something through perceptual contact when one can pass by an object and 
have the ability to describe it.12 The appropriateness of one's perceptual descriptions and the responses 
they guide are determined by their coherence with social norms as much as by the categorical features 
of the objects themselves. And as the Xúnzǐ claims, one does not have perceptual knowledge unless one
can explain the reasons why one's perception of an object licenses the application of a certain 
description or name to it.
McDowell, for his part, believes that rationality or “mindedness,” which is supposed to be 
pervasive throughout both the experience and activity of human adults, consists in a responsiveness to 
reasons “as such.” When a non-rational animal flees from danger, there is of course a good reason why 
12 Canon A5: “知，接也。知也者：以其知過物而能貌之。(若見。)” (Johnston 2010: 376). See also Fraser 2017: 5.1.
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it does so; nonetheless, such an animal is not able to hold its inclination to flee at arm's length, and 
raise the normative question of whether it should flee, that is, whether it has a good reason for its being 
so inclined. Rational humans, on the other hand, have the conceptual capacity to step back from their 
experience and intentional activity, and assess whether their reasons behind their beliefs and actions are
warranted. Obviously, we do not always exercise this capacity and self-consciously deliberated about 
the reasons guiding our absorbed experience and activity; but it is enough for this experience and 
activity to count as rational that we could exercise it. For McDowell, conceptual capacities are 
“actualized” in experience and activity even when they are not actively exercised. Additionally, it is 
because the conceptual capacity actualized in perceptual experience can be the same capacity which is 
exercised in discursive judgment that perceptual experience entitles us to form a belief about the 
content of perceptual experience (McDowell 2009: 127-133). Finally, the conceptual capacities which 
allow one to rationally assess the content of experience are coeval with language; it is through initiation
into a language that one has the capacity for responding to reasons as such (Ibid: 168). 
The involvement of conceptual capacities in absorbed experience and action can best be 
appreciated through McDowell's account of a chess master's absorbed activity in playing lightning 
chess (2013: 45-51). McDowell would claim that even in the flow of playing a move every few 
seconds, the chess master's conceptual capacities are actualized, giving him an implicit self-knowledge 
of the reasons why he makes each move. The chess master of course does not articulate those reasons 
as he is playing; if he were stopped and asked why he made the move he did, his state of flow would be
broken. Nor does he have time to deliberately reflect in a self-conscious and detached manner on the 
reasons behind his moves. And yet, the chess master would not be drawn to make the moves he does 
without the functioning of a “cultivated rationality.” If the chess master were stopped during the game, 
he would likely be able to explain without hesitation why he responded to a certain position on the 
board, and what his overall strategy may have been at the time. McDowell thus concludes that the 
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chess player must be having knowledge during the flow of play of why he's acting in the way that he 
does – in short, he must be knowing what he is doing as he is doing it. So, the same conceptual – which
is to say rational – capacities that the chess master draws upon in explaining his moves are continuous 
with the conceptual capacities that are operative in his playing the game itself. 
Conversely, Dreyfus is adamant that our primary engagement with the world in the form of 
absorbed coping need not have anything to do with language, concepts, or rationality. He would claim 
against McDowell (and Xúnzǐ) that the conceptualist account of perceptual knowledge starts the story 
of our interaction with the world “too late” – perceptually guided coping activity is both 
developmentally and logically prior to our acquiring a conceptual ability for discursively articulating 
and appreciating the epistemic role of our sensory classifications in grounding beliefs and actions. 
Since McDowell and Xúnzǐ take perceptual knowledge to entail such a conceptual ability, much of our 
perceptual experience would fall short of counting as knowledge in their view, and so the scope of their
conceptualist accounts would be greatly limited; McDowell in particular would be wrong to claim that 
rational/conceptual mindedness pervades our lives. 
We can see how the conceptualist account falls short in Dreyfus's eyes by considering again the 
example of the chess master. Dreyfus expressly denies that the chess master's moves are guided by 
reasons or knowledge; the master's rapid play would be no more rational than the non-rational animal's 
flight from danger. As a matter of fact, it is a special precondition for his being a master that he does 
not self-consciously act according to reasons, becoming instead “absorbed into a field of attractive and 
repulsive forces that directly draw him to cope” (Dreyfus 2013: 33). Dreyfus claims that, when reasons 
for his moves are demanded, all the chess master would offer as an explanation is, “I made the move 
because I was drawn to make it” (Ibid: 35) – in effect the master is saying that rather than being 
motivated by a rational thought within his mind, his moves were solicited by the world itself. Were the 
chess master to eventually articulate a more detailed explanation for his play after the fact, he would be
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doing so only on the basis of a “retrospective illusion created by reflection” that he was acting for 
reasons rather than responding directly and unthinkingly to the concrete forces of the situation (Ibid: 
34). Dreyfus's ultimate point is that we too are like the chess master when it comes to the vast array of 
mundane skills we unthinkingly exercise in our basic bodily comportment to the world. Skillful 
absorbed coping in all its forms involves an immersion within a field of attractive and repulsive forces, 
in which our actions are not motivated with even an implicit knowledge of what we are doing. “For 
there to be knowledge,” Dreyfus writes, “the propositional structures in the mind must correspond to 
the propositionally structured facts in the world” (Ibid: 17) – but bringing in such a notion of 
correspondence inherently introduces a gap between the mind and world that does not exist in absorbed
experience. Immersed in the field of forces, the world does not stand before us as a set of facts to be 
known in propositional thought. 
To be sure, our mindless coping with the objects around us does rely upon a certain “know-
how,” which Dreyfus speaks of as a holistic understanding of norms and practices that imbues the 
world with meaning and enables it to solicit responses from us. This understanding operates in the 
background of our absorbed activity, and in fact can only be operative insofar as it remains in the 
background as unthought. In that sense, the background field of forces within which unthinking activity
takes place is itself unthinkable – these forces cannot themselves become objects of thought within our 
absorbed experience. These forces include the physical objects that populate our world, as well as the 
sociocultural norms that guide our interaction with those objects. To illustrate our background 
understanding of the “perceptual/social” field of normative forces, Dreyfus draws upon an example 
from Heidegger of walking into a familiar lecture hall, starting with the simple act of reaching out to a 
doorknob and pushing the door to enter. We don't entertain the thought that the door affords opening, or
even see the door as a door in order to appropriately respond to what the door affords us; to 
pragmatically engage with the door, “we needn’t apprehend the door at all,” where apprehension 
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evidently refers to taking something as an object of deliberate thought (Ibid: 18). Then at some point, 
the professor starts writing on the blackboard (which is presumably on wheels) and says unreflectively, 
“The board is badly positioned.” Dreyfus and Heidegger would claim that behind this simple assertion 
is a background understanding of the lecture hall's social context, and all the human perspectives and 
purposes which constitute it: The board is badly positioned relative to the students in the audience who 
want to see what's being written; it's badly positioned relative to the professor writing on it who wants 
the students to see what is being written, and so on. Our background understanding of this meaningful 
context is fundamentally skill-based – “built up through our attending and giving lectures over the 
years” – and stands as the condition for the possibility of the lecture hall's manifesting to us as 
affording a set of possibilities for action, including the action of judging that the blackboard is 
misplaced. “It is this know-how,” Dreyfus writes, “that orients us in the lecture room and enables us to 
deal with the things in it” (Ibid: 20). 
Dreyfus goes further in characterizing this know-how as non-propositional and hence 
essentially non-conceptual in structure. It is not simply a contingent fact that we know how to cope 
with the door or blackboard without apprehending them in conceptual thought; rather, the background 
know-how underlying our absorbed activity in the lecture hall, and everywhere else, necessarily 
escapes apprehension in thought, being that it is essentially immune to propositional articulation. 
McDowell would claim that the absorbed activity of a rational agent is conceptual in nature because 
there are capacities present in the activity which allow the agent to articulate and deliberate about the 
reasons motivating its activity – he writes, “That is what it means for capacities to be conceptual in the 
relevant sense: they are capacities whose content is of a form that fits it to figure in discursive activity” 
(2013: 42). Conceptual capacities are thus responsible for granting experience and activity with the 
same sort of intentional content as discursive conceptual thought; and this commonality of content is 
what makes experience and activity themselves rationally evaluable.
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Absorbed coping, however, is directly guided by forces or affordances, not reasons – so there is 
nothing in absorbed coping for discursive judgments to rationally evaluate. These forces are normative 
and meaningful, but their meaning outstrips the expressive capacities of language. As Dreyfus writes, 
“The familiar forces we are absorbed in when we make the judgment that the blackboard is badly 
placed are not made up of propositional structures to which we can affix bits of language” (2013: 20-
21). To the extent that absorbed coping experience and activity has intentional content, it is not the kind
of content which can figure in discursive, propositional judgments. Dreyfus instead claims, following 
Merleau-Ponty, that absorbed coping involves motor intentional content, or an embodied form of 
intentionality through which our actions are purposively directed toward, and normatively responsive 
to, affordances in the world, without the mediation of conceptual thought. Propositional contents have 
binary conditions of accuracy or satisfaction – the content can be either true or false; the world satisfies
or does not satisfy a representation. Motor intentional content, on the other hand, is characterized as 
having conditions of improvement, entailing a continuum on which our bodily coping is moving closer 
to or further from an optimal state of engagement with the world (Ibid: 31). Thus, since the motor 
intentional content of absorbed coping is non-conceptual, non-propositional, non-linguistic, and non-
rational, there must be no sense in which conceptual capacities are even implicitly present in our 
absorbed coping.
5.3 Montero and the Conceptual Character of Expertise 
A number of objections can be raised against Dreyfus's characterization of absorbed experience 
and activity as being essentially non-conceptual. To start, it is worth noting Barbara Montero's (2016) 
refutation of Dreyfus's model of expert-level activity within a state of flow as being non-rational and 
totally devoid of thought. Though she concedes that everyday activities like opening doorknobs and 
climbing stairs may be mindless in Dreyfus's sense of the word, she claims that expert activity – i.e., 
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the kind of activity which is mastered through years of effortful exertion and training – is thoroughly 
rational and conceptual. 
We can grasp the gist of her argument by looking at her specific response to Dreyfus's 
interpretation of expert-level chess play. Dreyfus believes that the mark of the chess player's mastery is 
his ability to act mindlessly and non-rationally, i.e., without having to pay attention to or focus on what 
he is doing, consult conceptual rules to help decide what moves to make, or deliberately think about 
possible alternative moves. Through consulting psychological studies of chess play and interviewing 
chess masters themselves, Montero mounts a response against each aspect of Dreyfus's depiction. 
Concerning attention, Dreyfus claims that an expert at any skill has to pay attention to what she is 
doing only when things are going wrong and her flow state is broken; when the expert is in the flow 
and performing at her best, she responds to objects without attending to their solicitations (2007b: 374).
Montero allows that attention to what one is doing isn't necessary for performing rote skills like 
walking up stairs or carrying a glass, and may in fact impede performance; yet, when it comes to 
complex skills like playing chess, she argues that attention – specifically, an intense and sustained focus
– is necessary to performing well. In studies where expert players during a game are given distracting 
tasks that interfere with their attention, their play is diminished; this suggests that experts don't perform
at their best in the absence of attending to what they are doing (Montero 2016: 214-5). As for whether 
experts consciously entertain rules when acting, Montero asserts that while an expert chess player's 
grasp of basic rules may remain unconscious, experts often consciously consult advanced heuristic 
rules in judging board situations and seeking justifications for the moves they choose to make in 
response (Ibid: 218-9). Lightning chess masters also claim to deliberate about possible moves to make; 
the few seconds they have to make a move may afford them the chance to calculate only a few moves 
ahead, but they are deliberating nevertheless; and when asked, these players can articulate their in-
game thought process out loud. So, rather than being employed only when the state of flow is broken 
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due to something going wrong, deliberation and calculation are undertaken by the expert within the 
flow of rapid play (Ibid: 223-5). 
Part of the reason why Dreyfus may have thought deliberation and calculation to be absent in 
expert chess play is because he associates them with the approach that computers take to playing chess.
Computer programs play master-level chess using brute computational force, calculating millions of 
possible moves in seconds, whereas Dreyfus thinks that expert humans have a more holistic ability for 
immediately “zeroing in” on whichever possibilities are most optimal. Dreyfus speaks of this ability as 
the “intuition” which artificial intelligence lacks: Instead of calculating millions of possibilities every 
turn, human experts rapidly cut through those possibilities by perceptually recognizing the similarities 
that a current situation shares with situations they've previously experienced. Sizing up the whole 
situation, identifying a pattern which bears relevant similarities to previously experienced patterns, and 
zeroing in on the available responses which are most appropriate – all this takes place within the 
expert's instantaneous intuition. Direct intuition further separates masters from novices, who have a 
smaller set of stored patterns to draw upon, and cannot identify the similarities between patterns as well
as masters can. While the expert player, having zeroed in on a set of possibilities, might go on to 
deliberate about the opponent's possible responses and calculate their relative benefits, Dreyfus argues 
that these conceptual activities presuppose the non-rational, non-conceptual activity of intuition. 
Still, even if Dreyfus is right that expert chess players are able to intuit a set of possible moves 
faster and more effectively than merely competent players, Montero argues that he is wrong to interpret
intuition as being non-conceptual and non-rational. For one, chess experts are able to zero in on 
possible moves precisely because they are able to conceptualize the pieces on the board under some 
category; that is, they see a position as being of a certain type. Far from it being the case that “there is 
no reason to think that one could name or point to what it is about a position that makes it the type of 
position that requires this particular response” (Dreyfus 2005: 55), chess masters by and large know the
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names for a vast array of positions which they can they recognize instantly; and knowledge of these 
situations is what allows them to point to what it is about a situation that requires a certain response. To
show the difference it makes for an expert player's perception of board positions to be conceptualized, 
Montero (2016: 230) cites a study in which master players were asked to briefly glance at positions on 
a board and then set up the same positions on a different board from memory. When it was evident that 
the displayed position was from the middle of a well-played game, chess masters were almost perfect 
in recreating the displayed position; however, when the pieces were scattered randomly, the experts' 
advantage over novices in recreating the displayed position was reduced. 
One conclusion of such research has been that the experts' superior memory of non-randomly 
placed pieces stems from their “chunking” the board into meaningful patterns: It is because the experts 
could immediately recognize the position of the well-played game as belonging to a certain type that 
they could better retain the position in memory (Ibid.). Montero allows, as do I, that this ability to 
perceptually categorize and re-identify meaningful patterns counts as a form of conceptualization, even 
if within the flow of play it typically goes unexpressed in words (Ibid: 233). The expert player's 
intuition of the board as affording certain optimal responses can thus be understood as being grounded 
in a conceptual ability, and thereby as being integrated within the player's rational activity. Hence, 
while absorbed and automatic activities like walking up stairs or opening a door may fail to leave 
memory-traces for subsequent recall and reasoning, the play of expert chess players does. Expert 
players have long-lasting memories of the thought processes present in their play; and there would only
be something to remember if their play itself was conceptualized from the outset. 
Montero ultimately claims the same to be true about expert action in general, extending beyond 
chess to refute Dreyfus's caricature of all expertise as having to be essentially non-conceptual, non-
rational, and unthinking. According to Montero, Dreyfus fails to recognize the disanalogies between 
ordinary activity and the skilled activity of highly trained experts – in short, the former may often be 
219
mindless, but the latter is thoroughly mindful. She focuses especially on how trained experts constantly
rely on concentration, thought, deliberation, and willpower in the course of exercising their complex 
skills even within a state of automatic flow, and not just when things go wrong as Dreyfus believes. 
And unlike McDowell, she is unafraid to claim that conceptual capacities are explicitly exercised rather
than just implicitly actualized in the absorbed activity of high-level experts.
5.4 The Revised Conceptualist Response to Dreyfus: Concepts, Attention, and Memory in Expert 
Intuition
I would further extend beyond Montero's criticism of Dreyfus, and argue that the perceptual 
intuition essential to all skilled coping is concept-involving. Dreyfus acknowledges that becoming a 
master in most any domain involves the acquisition of skills for perceptual pattern recognition, while 
denying that what the master has acquired are concepts. He writes that what masters learn through 
practice “are not critically justifiable concepts but sensitivity to subtler and subtler similarities and 
differences of perceptual patterns. Thus, learning changes, not the master’s mind, but his world” (2013:
35). Dreyfus elsewhere states that this acquired sensitivity grants an expert a “rich perceptual repertoire
– the ability to respond to subtle differences in the appearance of perhaps hundreds of thousands of 
situations – but it requires no conceptual repertoire at all” (2005: 58). Such a non-conceptual repertoire 
of perceptual abilities is drawn upon in the practice of “refined skills” such as chess, jazz 
improvisation, athletics, and so on, as well as “everyday skills” like cooking, crossing a busy street, or 
having a conversation (Ibid.). For Dreyfus, the know-how embodied in these perceptual skills must be 
essentially non-conceptual: experts don't possess context-independent, abstract concepts or rules for 
expressing the thousands of situations that are perceptually intuited, especially given that these 
situations aren't supposed to be nameable or thinkable at all. 
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However, the revised conceptualism I am advocating would take Dreyfus's perceptual repertoire
of skills for pattern recognition and classification as being precisely a sort of conceptual repertoire. So, 
Dreyfus considers the expert's intuitive pattern recognition to be non-conceptual, whereas I claim it to 
be conceptual in nature – is the dispute merely terminological, then? I don't think so, because there are 
certain facts about expert intuition that Dreyfus's non-conceptualism fails to adequately address, and 
which are better captured by accepting that intuition is not isolated from an expert's 
cognitive/conceptual capacities, and particularly from those memory- and attention-based capacities 
which are central to the revised conceptualist account of perceptual experience. 
These capacities, it turns out, are also central to a revised conceptualist account of absorbed 
skillful activity. Dreyfus's non-conceptualist theory of expertise is based in large part of the claim that 
memory and attention play no role at all in the expert performance of skills. In the next two sections, I 
will show that this claim is implausible. The perceptual ability for directly intuiting a proper course of 
action is in fact highly dependent on an expert's possession and retrieval of abstract, conceptual 
representations from memory; the representations may be retrieved automatically, and may lack any 
association with words, but they are vital in conditioning how an expert perceptually categorizes a 
current situation as affording a certain response. Dreyfus also rejects the involvement of attention in 
absorbed expert activity, claiming that if experts are to be performing at their best in a state of flow, 
then they cannot be attending to what they are doing or the objects they are acting upon, since attention 
is a form of conceptual mindedness that is incompatible with the non-conceptual mindlessness of 
absorbed coping. But, Dreyfus is wrong on this score as well: Though attention may be counted as a 
form of conceptual mindedness, that doesn't preclude the exercise of attention from playing an integral 
role in the perceptual-cognitive-motor process of expert intuition. In the third and final section, I will 
examine how, in line with the approach of classical Chinese epistemology, perception itself can be a 
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form of expertise, the exercise of which depends on skillfully deploying the cognitive/conceptual 
capacities of memory and attention.
5.4.1 Memory and Expert Intuition
Consider Dreyfus's belief that the expert's ability for recognizing an innumerable number of 
situations cannot entail that the expert is retrieving mental representations for these situations. 
According to him, there is no evidence within the phenomenology of absorbed coping for such a 
retrieval process; nor would the rapid performance of skillful action allow any time for retrieval to take 
place. Returning yet again to the case of chess, Dreyfus is skeptical of theories which hold that expert 
players recognize types of board positions by drawing upon the memory of basic chunks, that is, typical
groupings of pieces which are further associated with condition-action rules stating that if the grouping 
is present, then a certain response is optimal. Because Dreyfus links the reliance on these simple rules 
with being a non-expert, he claims that the expert must be recognizing the board position as a whole, 
rather than as made up of component chunks (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1988: 34). So too with all expertise:
The expert's perceptual repertoire of holistic, unchunked situations isn't stored as memory 
representations in the mind; instead, it is “stored” as bodily dispositions for directly responding to 
perceived situations without the mediation of memory (Dreyfus 2002: 374). 
Yet, Dreyfus's characterization of the perceptual/non-conceptual repertoire is implausible in 
several ways. There is of course a bodily, kinesthetic memory of habitual routines and reflexes, which 
is presumably what Dreyfus would think the expert employs in “letting the body take over” the 
performance of some skill. Nonetheless, expert intuition in a wide variety of domains – including those 
primarily involving physical skills – has also been shown to rely on chunking, or the formation of 
meaningful information-patterns encoded in, and retrievable from, long-term memory. These cognitive 
representations, learned through extensive training, can guide both perceptual intuition and motor 
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responses to produce the sort of absorbed coping activity that Dreyfus claims to be non-conceptual and 
fundamentally mindless. One illustration of the relation between the relation between expert cognition, 
perception, and motor skills comes from a study of indoor rock climbing experts versus non-experts 
(BlVsing et al. 2014). First, both expert and non-expert groups were shown pictures of various types of 
indoor climbing grip-holds. While each grip-hold had a disparate visual appearance, expert climbers 
easily categorized the holds into four groups based on the types of standard grasping actions they 
afford. The non-experts, on the other hand, classified the grips according to superficial similarities in 
color and shape. This experiment suggests that the experts' acquired physical mastery of types of grips 
– e.g., sideways pulls, crimp grips, pocket grips, etc. – has also endowed them with corresponding 
cognitive categories for those grips, which are stored in long-term memory. And in turn, these cognitive
representations enable experts to perceptually categorize distinct grips as equally affording a particular 
type of motor response.
Dreyfus would likely respond that the experts' cognitive representations of grip-types are not 
only derivative of their non-cognitive motor skills, but that such cognitive memory-traces would not 
intervene in the expert climber's automatic sensorimotor responses to environmental solicitations. Here,
the 2nd experiment in BlVsing et al.'s study is relevant, in that it sought to measure how the visual 
perception of grip-holds primes the activation of grasping postures, and determine whether this priming
is in fact occurring at a cognitive level. Both expert and non-expert groups were presented with a 
certain grip hold for 100ms, and were then presented with a target picture in which an arm is shown 
making a certain grasping posture. With their accuracy and reaction times being recorded, subjects had 
to determine as quickly as possible whether the grasping posture in the target picture was congruent or 
incongruent with the grip-hold presented as a prime – for example, if the prime picture was of a crimp 
grip-hold and the target picture showed an arm making the crimp grip posture, then the subject would 
judge that the pictures were congruent. The study observed that the climbing experts had much faster 
223
response times when presented with congruent pictures than when presented with incongruent pictures 
(e.g., a crimp grip-hold prime and a target picture of a sideways pull), whereas the non-expert group 
displayed no such congruency effect. 
BlVsin et al. conclude that the locus of this priming effect could not be purely perceptual. The 
pictures of grip-holds did not bear any relevant visual similarity with the target pictures of arms making
grasp postures, so the observed congruency effect in the expert group can't be attributed to the 
processing of strictly visual appearances. Nor could this priming effect be taking place at a motor level.
That is, the presentation of a crimp grip-hold is priming subjects to press a button on a keypad, rather 
than to make a crimp grip or sideways pull themselves – so the more rapid processing of congruent 
pictures, and the more delayed processing of incongruent pictures, could not be due to the direct 
activation of a corresponding motor response on the part of the subjects. By process of elimination, 
then, BlVsin et al. infer that the observed congruency effect must be tied to a cognitive level of 
processing – the rapid detection of congruency must be due to the priming of a cognitive representation
relevant to the presented prime. The categorical perception of certain object-features (e.g., the visual 
shape of a crimp grip-hold) prime the activation of corresponding action-relevant cognitive 
representations (e.g., the knowledge of how to make a crimp grip), as well as the inhibition of non-
corresponding action-representations. In an actual climbing scenario, the cognitive activation of a 
relevant action-representation would ultimately result in the expert climber's selection of an appropriate
motor response, and would influence the subsequent perceptual categorization of motor affordances.
For our purposes, the results of this study serve to vitiate two of Dreyfus's reasons for claiming 
that expert intuition must be non-cognitive, namely that intuition is (1) automatic, and (2) does not rely 
on chunking and the storage of categorical representations in memory. Now, it is true that the expert 
climber's intuition of the appropriate grasping posture is automatic, and takes place without reflective 
thought: The expert climber does not have to spend minutes strenuously holding a grip on the wall 
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while self-consciously deliberating about which posture should be chosen for the next hold (Ibid: 10). 
However, the expert climber's intuition does not bypass cognitive processing, that is, it does not 
proceed as Dreyfus suggests from a sensory input straight to an automatic motor response, without 
drawing upon representations of past experiences stored in memory (Dreyfus 2002: 374).13 It is instead 
clear that the instantaneous and automatic nature of the perceptual-cognitive-motor process which 
Dreyfus calls “intuition” is enabled in large part by the accessing of categorical memory 
representations or chunks, which, following Zeitz (1997), may be dubbed as “Moderately Abstracted 
Conceptual Representations.” The combination of component representations into a single meaningful 
unit or “chunk” undergirds the rapid and efficient retrieval of task-relevant information from long-term 
memory – basically, information is more easily recalled when it is associated and condensed together 
within a single meaningful pattern. 
Moreover, the chunking of representations together into more complex and abstract patterns 
enhances the expert's ability for perceptual pattern recognition: Experts recognize relevant patterns in 
more cases than novices not only because chunking allows for more information to be stored within the
constraints of working memory, but also because the abstract character of chunking makes stored 
information more relevant to a greater number of cases. For instance, one's climbing expertise would be
severely limited if one could only recognize green grip-holds as affording a crimp grip posture because 
one's memory of crimp grip-holds only includes green instances. Instead, by mnemonically grouping 
13 Dreyfus is not claiming that past experience has no effect on how we presently perceive and act; past experience, he 
admits, does shape our perception of affordances. But he considers affordances to exist as part of the world, rather than 
as representations located in the mind; hence, he speaks repeatedly of expertise and bodily know-how as effecting 
changes in the expert's world, rather than in the expert's mind (e.g., Dreyfus 2013: 35). A further motivation for 
Dreyfus's circumscribing of the mind may stem from the traditional phenomenological view that mental acts cannot be 
genuinely unconscious (see Moran 2002: 9). Overall, Dreyfus's denial of the role that memory representations play in 
expert intuition seems to be motivated by the presumption that if such representations did play a role, then it would 
have to follow that experts must be consciously conjuring discrete memory representations in the midst of their 
absorbed activity. Yet, while it is true that the access to memory representations within expert intuition need not be 
explicitly conscious, we need not share Dreyfus's overly restrictive theoretical prejudices in accounting for what 
memory representations are, and how they influence perceptual intuition. We may instead conclude with Vicente and 
Wang's broad survey of psychological research on expertise that “memory recall performance on meaningful stimuli has
almost always been found to be correlated with domain expertise” (1998: 33).
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together many visually disparate grip-holds as affording the same type of crimp grip, an expert climber 
is able to automatically perceive useful similarities and disregard superficial similarities or differences 
in intuitively selecting an appropriate response. In sum, the automatic intuition that characterizes 
expertise is ultimately entwined with the chunking of representations in memory (Feltovich, Prietula 
and Ericsson 2006: 58).14
5.4.2 Attention and Automaticity
Dreyfus is further led by the automaticity of intuitive expert activity to conclude that experts 
must not pay attention to what they are doing. He seems to view the exercise of attention as a form of 
conceptual mindedness that involves taking a self-conscious stance of monitoring one's own experience
and activity – being mindful of one's actions in Dreyfus's idiom just is the experience of oneself as a 
monitoring subject or ego (2007b: 373).15 But within the flow of absorbed coping, he insists, there is 
not even a trace of the “I”, nor any minimal awareness of oneself (2007b: 374). The need to monitor or 
pay attention to one's actions only arises when something has disrupted one's intuitive response. In such
14 Dreyfus made several objections against the initial formulation of chunking theory by Chase and Simon 1973. Chunks, 
he claimed, are too simple to support an expert chess player's rapid and holistic processing of a board situation. Also, 
several chunks may be recalled by the same perceived situation, and may each prescribe competing responses, which 
would obstruct the expert from automatically intuiting an appropriate course of action. Responding to these and other 
objections to chunking theory, Gobet and Simon (1996) have developed a theory of “templates,” in which low-level 
chunks are hierarchically structured into higher-order templates which also have slots open for variable information. 
Whereas low-level chunks are fixed to basic, concrete representations, templates are schema-like structures which can 
be encoded at a higher level of conceptual abstraction. For more discussion of template theory and expert intuition, see 
Gobet and Chassy 2009.
15 Though Dreyfus is ostensibly set against McDowell on the issue of mindedness, McDowell insists that Dreyfus has 
mischaracterized his views at least when it comes to the issue of whether attention and monitoring are involved in 
minded agency. McDowell's general claim is that, just like experience and the Kantian “I think,” activity implicitly 
takes the form of the representation “I do.” Yet, it is possible for such a first-personal avowal to accompany a minded 
agent's absorbed activity because, even without taking a detached stance of reflection, deliberation, or indeed 
monitoring, the agent nonetheless knows what it is doing. Though McDowell attributes an expert coper with implicit 
self-knowledge, he nonetheless agrees with Dreyfus that there is no room within absorbed activity for a stance of even 
minimal self-monitoring (McDowell 2013: 45). Just as an experiential subject does not typically pay attention to how 
perceptual experience puts her in a position to know how things are, an agentive subject does not typically pay attention
to the way in which her activity puts her in a position to know what she is doing. I will show how McDowell has 
conceded too much on this point – absorbed expert activity can involve attentive monitoring of what one is doing as one
is doing it. Totally excising attentive monitoring may lead an expert to become “asleep at the wheel,” thereby becoming 
less responsive to changing circumstances and more susceptible to performance errors.
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a case, paying attention to a solicitation one is acting on will cause one to regress from expertise to 
mere competence, which is a stage of skill-acquisition characterized by deliberate rule-following 
(2007a: 361; 2002: 369). Taking a step back and deliberating about the relevant rules for action may be 
necessary when facing interruptions or obstacles to one's absorbed activity. Nonetheless, Dreyfus 
writes, “If the expert coper is to remain in flow and perform at his best, he must respond directly to 
solicitations without attending to his activity or to the objects doing the soliciting” (2007b: 374). 
The deeper reason why an expert coper cannot employ attention is that attention not only 
disrupts absorbed coping, but also brings about a “radical transformation” of its content. Being a form 
of conceptual mindedness, the content of attentive experience is propositionally structured, and hence 
is essentially different from the non-propositional content of absorbed experience. Dreyfus asserts that 
it only when attention is directed to the affordances present in absorbed coping that we can then 
experience a world of stable objects with abiding properties, or the sorts of objects about which we can 
rationally form propositional beliefs, judgments, and inferences. Attention thereby conceals the level of
non-conceptual perception and coping at which the world is primordially given (Dreyfus 2005: 61; 
2007a: 363). 
And yet, like in the case of memory, Dreyfus is here taking a skewed and restrictive view of 
attention that inevitably mischaracterizes its role in absorbed activity. Paying attention is not contrary 
to automatic and intuitive coping; in fact, it is when the processes of perceptual recognition, cognitive 
access, and motor response take place automatically that attentional/cognitive resources can be freely 
re-allocated to the contextual demands of a situation, and to other higher-order functions like planning 
and self-monitoring (Geeves et al. 2013: 3; Feltovich, Prietula and Ericsson 2006: 53). Sutton et al. 
propose that the relation between attention and automaticity can be understood within the framework of
“Applying Intelligence to the Reflexes,” or “AIR” (2011).16 Though much expertise involves mastering 
16 In more recent work that clearly lays out the theoretical space of debates on automaticity and cognition in skilled action,
Christensen, Sutton and McIlwain (2016) have called their approach a “mesh” theory, proposing that cognitive and 
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skills to the point of being automatic habits, experts often perform in unpredictable contexts with a 
great number of dynamic variables – in these contexts, totally automatic, inflexible responses will be 
sub-optimal. So, the AIR model posits that experts can access their seemingly unconscious, automated, 
stably chunked patterns of behavior and reconfigure them into conscious and flexible responses (Ibid: 
96). 
This approach to attention and automaticity is also evident in the research of Chaffin et al. 
(2002, 2009) on Western classical music performance. They theorize that expert musicians select a 
certain set of “performance cues” from among a vast range of musical features, features which are 
classified as structural (i.e., the movements, sections and subsections of a piece), expressive (the 
musical feelings to be conveyed), interpretative (phrasing, dynamics, tempo), and basic (motor 
techniques, patterns of notes). Through extensive practice, all of these features will have been chunked 
both in long-term declarative memory as part of a conceptual “road map” of the music, and as part of 
automatic motor sequences. Performance cues, then, are those musical features to which the musician 
deliberately attends during performance, without disrupting the automaticity of their practiced skills. 
These cues serve as “landmarks” on the musician's mental road map that, when attended to, allow for 
the conscious monitoring and control of otherwise automatic motor routines (Chaffin and Logan 2006: 
115). Extending the AIR model beyond Chaffin's paradigm of cues as fixed patterns automatically 
retrieved from long-term memory, Geeves et al. argue that, during a performance, the expert's mental 
road map can be reconstructed in light of the demands that emerge from new situational contingencies. 
That is, there are performance cues which cannot be encoded beforehand in memory or as automatic 
routines – e.g., audience reaction, spontaneous improvisation, ensemble performance, audio quality, 
etc. Attention must hence be directed to these cues in order for them to be incorporated on the fly 
within the musician's cognitive framework. If this process goes smoothly, then the performer may 
attentional control is highly integrated with automatic motor processes.
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indeed feel like “a mindless Dreyfusian expert,” even though actually “the performer is mindfully 
engaging in both paying attention to the demands of a particular performance moment and the most 
efficient way in which to retrieve chunked material in order to effectively meet these demands” 
(Geeves et al. 2013: 10).
Now, Dreyfus's suspicion that attention disrupts presumably mindless expertise is not totally 
without support, as there is a substantial amount of evidence suggesting that attending to otherwise 
automatic motor routines does lead to performance breakdowns, or what is commonly known as 
“choking” and getting “the Yips.” To take just one example, Beilock et al. 2002 found that the shots of 
expert golfers who are told to focus on the swing of their club are more inaccurate than the shots of 
experts whose attention is distracted by an unrelated task (the opposite was true for novices). Similar 
research concludes that expert athletes should direct their attention outward to some external focal 
point rather than to their own bodies (see Wulf 2013; Christensen, Sutton, and McIlwain 2015 for 
review). That being said, experts may also switch their attention internally to kinesthetic cues to ensure 
the proper execution of bodily movements. Expert golfers may cue themselves with “swing thoughts,” 
or reminders to focus their attention on the club position at the top of their backswing, or the position of
their right elbow, etc. (Toner, Montero, and Moran 2016: 309-10). Long-distance runners will regularly 
monitor their technique for subtle inefficiencies, and pay attention to various muscles as a way to 
consciously relax them (Breivik 2013: 101). Dancers may pay attention to kinesthetic feedback not 
only to mindfully monitor or improve the execution of a difficult move, but also to simply relish and 
enjoy the execution of that move (Montero 2016: 179-82).
It should be added that while it is possible for experts to direct their attention to low-level 
aspects of movement such as fine-grained motor mechanics, more often their attention is tracking 
higher-level patterns of feedback which are more relevant to their movement's practical success. So for 
example, skilled mountain bikers will monitor their handlebar grip for the kinesthetic feeling of “light 
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hands,” in order to avoid placing excessive pressure on the front wheel and giving their bodies a higher 
center of gravity. They may become aware of this feeling not by focusing on the minute motor features 
of their hand grip – say, how each finger is wrapped around the handlebars – but instead by focusing on
a higher-level, abstract property of their grip (Toner, Montero, and Moran 2016: 306). We may follow 
Richard Shusterman (2008) in speaking of this mode of conscious, proprioceptive introspection, 
whereby we are mindfully aware of our bodies and can reflectively monitor how our attention is being 
deployed to the body, as what he calls “acutely attentive somatic self-consciousness,” or “somaesthetic 
reflection.”
Leaving aside the question of how experts might attend internally to their bodily movements 
without disrupting their automatic motor routines, Dreyfus is still wrong to claim that experts respond 
to external solicitations without attending to the objects doing the soliciting. If taken literally, the claim 
is highly implausible; as one meta-analysis of research on the perceptual-cognitive abilities of expert 
athletes puts it, “All sport contexts require athletes to focus attention on the most appropriate cues so as
to perform effectively” (Mann et al. 2007: 458). In the next section, we will have more to say about 
about the attentional strategies involved in perceptual expertise, or the perceptual side of the 
perceptual-cognitive-motor process that is expert intuition. For now, we may note that not only do 
expert athletes pay attention to environmental solicitations, but that experts are distinguishable from 
novices in part by how they attend to environmental cues and extract meaningful information from 
them. For instance, experts locate information-rich, action-relevant areas of a scene more efficiently, 
fixating their attention in fewer locations but for longer durations; novices, on the other hand, attend to 
more locations for shorter durations, showing that they are less effective than experts in locating 
relevant cues (Memmert 2009: 123; see also Reingold and Sheridan 2011). The larger point is that 
expertise entails the presence of refined attentional skills, rather than the lack of any attention at all.
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To Dreyfus's claim that attending to objects interferes with an expert's response to them, a 
wealth of research shows just the opposite – both expert and novice athletic performance is improved 
by adopting an external focus of attention, or focusing attention on the effect of one's movement on the 
environment. To mention just a few examples: Basketball players are more accurate free-throw 
shooters when they focus attention on the basket; darts players throw more accurately when they focus 
on the bullseye; and swimmers who were instructed to focus on pushing water back had faster swim 
times than swimmers who focused on the movement of their limbs. Rather than disrupting skilled 
motor routines, it turns out that adopting an external focus of attention actually speeds up their 
automatization and makes them more resistant to disruption (Wulf 2013). 
Dreyfus might raise the objection that his claim is not targeting the sort of externally focused 
attention which conduces to automatic motor responses; instead, it is deliberate and conscious attention
which disrupts activity. In response, we may cite Haber and Haber's (2002) study of low-altitude 
combat aviation, which involves flying at speeds close to the speed of sound at just a few hundred feet 
above ground level in unstable jet fighters that change velocity and altitude unpredictably. It's the sort 
of activity that could be expected to highly exemplify Dreyfus's characterization of expert agency as so 
absorbed that the mind shuts off and the body takes over – the flow of solicitations is so rapid that the 
pilot must have no time to think about how to respond. Consider how Dreyfus describes an expert 
automobile driver as operating purely on mindless feel:
The expert driver, generally without any attention, not only knows by feel and familiarity when 
an action such as slowing down is required; he knows how to perform the action without 
calculating and comparing alternatives. He shifts gears when appropriate with no awareness of 
his acts. On the off ramp his foot simply lifts off the accelerator. What must be done, simply is 
done. (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2004: 253) 
How much more so, we might think, for the highly trained fighter pilot flying upside-down a few feet 
over a ridge at close to 500 m.p.h.
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And yet, Haber and Haber's study finds that because automatic perceptual processes cannot 
reliably discern velocity and altitude in conditions of low-altitude combat flying, pilots must override 
these processes with cognitive effort and conscious attention, a conclusion that directly contradicts 
Dreyfus's own claim that an expert fighter pilot, like all other experts, “can cease to pay conscious 
attention to his performance and can let all the mental energy previously used in monitoring his 
performance go into producing almost instantaneously the appropriate perspective and its associated 
action” (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1980: 14).17 Automatic perceptual processes like seeing scene contrast 
and optic flow (i.e., the appearance of objects as they move past an observer), or the vestibular sensing 
of G-forces, become deceptive at high speeds. Pilots must therefore deliberately employ controlled 
perceptual processes like consciously monitoring their instruments; looking for clues such as the 
17 We may note that Dreyfus mischaracterizes another recurring aviation-related example of his, namely that of “flying the
beam” (2007a: 353; 2013: 30). In the early 20th century, before the invention of radar, pilots flying in low-visibility 
conditions would navigate towards an airport or orientation point with the help of radio towers that would emit Morse 
code signals over a certain range. One tower would emit an “A” signal (“dot-dash”) in one direction, and another tower 
would emit an “N” signal (“dash-dot”) in another direction. The towers were oriented such that when a pilot was flying 
on the correct course (the “beam”), the two radio signals would merge and would be heard on the pilot's radio as a 
single unbroken sound. If the aircraft deviated off the beam to one side or the other, the corresponding “A” or “N” 
signal would become more distinctly audible, indicating that the pilot was falling off course. Once on the beam, the 
pilot would follow it into a “cone of silence” directly above the transmitting station where the radio signals could not be
received, and would thus know his location relative to a fixed reference point. 
These details are relevant because Dreyfus speaks instead of flying on the beam in terms of a pilot who follows an 
airport radio beacon that only gives a warning signal when the pilot goes off course; when the pilot is “in the flow” of 
flying on course, he would hear nothing at all. Presuming that to be so, Dreyfus is then able to say, “Thus there is no 
experience of being on the beam. Rather, when the pilot is on the beam there is no experience at all, but the silence that 
accompanies being on course doesn't mean the beacon isn't continuing to guide the plane” (2007a: 353). Dreyfus is 
claiming that since the pilot would not be consciously perceiving any positive sign of his being on-course, he need not 
have any conscious mental representation of his activity in order for it to be successful. In other words, it is the absence 
of any conscious auditory representation that indicates the pilot is proceeding toward his goal. Dreyfus's version of 
staying on the beam therefore serves as a fundamental illustration of how absorbed copers are supposed to act in the 
flow without any self-conscious knowledge of what motivates their action: “… the absorbed coper behaves like a pilot 
following a landing beacon. For the pilot there need be no representation of a goal. When things are going well, the 
beacon is silent” (2013: 30). 
But, we can see how the real practice of flying on the beam would be amenable to a totally different picture of expert 
activity. The pilot would have to pay constant attention to the beeping and buzzing of the radio signals; classify the 
signals he is hearing as more of an “A” or “N” to judge his location and direction; compare these auditory signals with a
navigational map of the signal ranges; coordinate his flight adjustments with the auditory balance of the signals until a 
steady pulse was heard; and constantly evaluate the auditory quality of the pulse. This is to say nothing of the need to 
compensate for signal distortions and fluctuations due to weather and geography. Clearly, then, it would be inaccurate to
say that a pilot flying on the beam “has no experience at all.” I would instead submit that the expert absorbed coper can 
indeed be analogized to the pilot flying on the beam, in that such coping can often involve the complex integration of 
attentional, cognitive, and motor skills.
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plane's shadow on the ground in order to estimate elevation; and counting the number of seconds it 
takes an object to pass a fixed distance on the canopy in order to judge its distance from the plane. 
These perceptual skills, Haber and Haber claim, never become automatic. They instead lay out the 
controlled, non-automatic processes a pilot must undertake: “First, he has to consciously override 
automatic processes when they potentially provide him with incorrect information; second, he has to 
consciously remember to refer to his instruments or other sources for that information; and third, he has
to process the alternative sources of information, using focused attention” (Ibid: 46). Because 
maneuvering at high speeds and low altitudes always presents the prospect of misleading perceptual 
information combined with the threat crashing into the ground, these conscious cognitive and 
attentional processes must constantly be engaged.
Cases like low-altitude high-speed flight place in stark relief the fact that failures in the 
execution of skilled activity are more often caused by inattention to what one is doing and what one is 
acting upon. Various sorts of performance errors arise due to an over-reliance on automatic responses in
the absence of conscious, attentive awareness (Reason 2009; Toner, Montero and Moran 2015). We 
have already canvassed a number of ways in which attentional monitoring aids the execution of skilled 
motor routines, and so we can imagine how lapses in monitoring may lead to erroneous execution for 
everyone from the chess player to musician to mountain biker. Apart from errors in execution, another 
type of error involves mistakenly selecting which sort of action-plan or problem-solving method will be
most successful. For experts, this error often arises when, on the basis of their prior knowledge, they 
automatically produce a familiar response that is nonetheless an inappropriate solution for a current 
problem. Though having such knowledge is part of what distinguishes an expert from a novice, it can 
still lead to mistakes when an expert applies that knowledge unthinkingly. The “Einstellung effect” 
occurs when a problem automatically triggers certain cognitive states and habitual responses that 
prevent one from detecting a better solution. Bilalic et al. (2008) studied the occurrence of this effect 
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among expert chess players, by presenting them with a board situation where checkmate could be 
reached through a familiar five-move sequence or an uncommon three-move sequence. The experts 
easily found the five-move sequence; but even when they reported that they were still looking for 
another solution, they were observed through eye-tracking technology to still be focusing on the 
features of the problem that were relevant to the solution they had already given. The conclusion drawn
was that the problem activated a memory-schema which directs the experts' attention to the features 
relevant to the familiar sequence, thereby distracting them from the features that would be relevant to 
another, more simple solution. 
Another example of automaticity impeding optimal response-selection comes from Furley et al. 
(2010) and their study of inattentional blindness in basketball players. Subjects were shown a video 
from a first-personal perspective of moving teammates and opposing defenders, and had to decide 
which teammate to deliver a pass to. In each scenario, one teammate was always unguarded, and a pass
to that player would represent the most optimal response to the situation. Subjects were also given an 
attention-demanding task, such as identifying whether their own defender was near or far away. For the
players that failed to notice the unguarded teammate, Furley et al. concluded that the attention-
demanding task triggered in those players the automatic application of a strategic rule familiar to most 
basketball players, namely that if one's own defender is near, then dribble to the basket; if one's own is 
far, then look to shoot the ball. As this rule is drawn into working memory, it automatically induces an 
“attentional set,” or a certain prioritization of task-relevant stimuli; in this case, the unguarded 
teammate is not prioritized within the subject's attentional set, and consequently fails to enter into the 
subject's awareness.
For our purposes, the lessons to be drawn from these studies is that the automatic application of 
attention may lead to sub-optimal response-selection when one's attentional capacities cannot be 
flexibly altered in light of unanticipated contingencies. There is a kernel of truth in Dreyfus's claim that
experts do not act by following cognitive rules, in the sense that such rules may have to be abandoned 
when they are poorly suited for responding to a dynamically changing situation. Yet, Dreyfus is wrong 
to suggest that experts must therefore be exercising inattention or, on a charitable interpretation, 
automatic attention. Rather, experts will be better able to respond to changing circumstances by taking 
endogenous, top-down control of their attentional processes. Through maintaining attentional and 
cognitive flexibility, experts can inhibit potentially inappropriate automatic responses, ignore 
distracting stimuli, and direct their attention to monitoring relevant external or internal cues, all without
disrupting performance fluency. Toner, Montero, and Moran (2015: 439) liken this flexibility to a form 
of mindfulness, of the sort fostered through meditative awareness of the present moment. Just as 
mindfulness meditators flexibly monitor their thoughts without being unduly fixated on any single 
thought, mindful performers can maintain a flexible awareness of whether their actions are adequate for
achieving a desired outcome in a changing environment, without being unduly fixated on a certain 
stimulus or habitual response. In recognizing how conscious, attentive awareness is necessary for 
transforming automatic routines into flexible, adaptable responses, the mindfulness approach to expert 
activity thus offers a plausible alternative to Dreyfus's fundamentally “mindless” paradigm of expertise.
5.5 Concepts, Memory, and Attention in Perceptual Expertise
Though I have criticized Dreyfus's non-conceptualist account of absorbed coping for divorcing 
skillful motor responses from attention- and memory-based cognitive capacities, we nonetheless agree 
about the centrality of intuition to expert activity, whether exercised in mundane or rarefied forms of 
skill. Dreyfus speaks of expert intuition as involving the ability to discern subtler similarities and 
differences in the appearances of a vast array of perceptual patterns. My goal in this section is to show 
that this ability is also necessarily integrated with, and influenced by, an expert's conceptual/cognitive 
abilities – to again use Dreyfus's phrasing, the perceptual repertoire does indeed require a conceptual 
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repertoire. Under my revised conceptualism, the repertoire of perceptual concepts active in expert 
intuition should be understood as consisting of abilities for recognizing and categorizing perceptual 
objects. Following the classical Chinese account of perceptual knowledge as a form of skillful know-
how, possession of the perceptual concepts can be viewed as entailing the appropriate exercise of skills 
for attentional allocation – a perceptual expert who possesses the skillful ability for recognizing a 
certain type of object will know how to attend to those of the object's features object which are 
diagnostic of its identity and category membership. This skill of selectively attending to relevant 
features ultimately enables a perceptual expert to categorize perceived objects more efficiently and 
accurately than an untrained novice. Object recognition is an essential stage of expert intuition, i.e., the 
ability to “zero in” on a proper response to environmental solicitations. Against Dreyfus's non-
conceptualist account of the expert's enhanced perceptual capacities, we will show how semantic 
memory categories and top-down attention are inextricably involved in visual expertise, a fact which, 
as Assaf Harel (2016: 97) puts it, “provides a reminder that vision is intrinsically linked with higher-
order processes….”
Dreyfus does have one recourse for defending his view that experts learn to discern subtle 
perceptual similarities and differences in a way that bypasses the conceptual/cognitive mind. He could 
point to the phenomenon of perceptual learning, in which practice and experience at performing 
specific perceptual tasks lead over time to changes in how sensory systems process information. 
Through repeated exposure to a certain task or stimulus, perceivers gain an enhanced ability for 
performing that task or processing that stimulus. This improved perceptual sensitivity is thought to 
leave little to no cognitive trace, though it produces long-term adaptations in the parts of the brain 
responsible for low-level sensory processing. In contrast to declarative learning, which involves 
acquiring knowledge of facts and events that can be consciously recalled and verbally described, 
perceptual learning is an implicit process which occurs outside of the perceiver's conscious awareness, 
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with the perceiver not having any explicit, reportable sense of what has been learned. In terms 
amenable to Dreyfus's account, Fahle (2002: x) writes that, “Perceptual learning leads to implicit 
memory, to 'knowing how,' to a 'memory without a record' and is often very specific for rather low-
level attributes of the stimulus learned.”
Basic discrimination tasks like vernier acuity tests provide examples of how repeated 
experience can produce acute improvements in low-level visual sensitivity. Vernier acuity refers to the 
minimum degree of misalignment between two line segments that can be reliably discriminated. 
Subjects are presented with the task of judging whether one horizontal segment is slightly above or 
below another segment. The minimum amount of displacement that untrained subjects can detect is 
already extremely small, less than the aperture size of a single retinal photoreceptor cell. And yet with 
extended practice, the threshold for subjects to detect a difference can become six times smaller 
(Saarinen and Levi 1995). Similar improvements have been observed in tasks such as discriminating 
visual textures and gratings, motion direction, and stereoscopic depth (see Lu et al. 2010). The 
performance of these sorts of tasks is thought to be determined by the earliest stages of visual 
processing; EEG evidence of the changes in performance due to perceptual learning have accordingly 
been detected within 100 ms after stimulus onset, likely before higher-level visual processes would be 
able to exert any top-down influence (Goldstone and Bygre 2015: 816-7). Additionally, the effects of 
low-level perceptual learning are highly specific to particular retinal locations and stimuli: For instance,
enhanced vernier acuity discrimination for horizontal lines won't transfer over to a task in which the 
lines have been rotated 90 degrees (Fahle 2002: xii). A trained increase in sensitivity among neurons in 
one part of the visual field won't transfer to untrained neurons in another part, suggesting again that the 
learning effect takes place in the earliest parts of the visual cortex where neurons are still 
retinotopically organized (Karni and Sagi 1995: 96). Low-level perceptual learning is thus cited in 
support of the claim that early vision is immune to cognitive penetration, since the areas of the visual 
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system in which the learning effects take place operate independently of the cognitive systems 
responsible for semantic memory and object recognition (Pylyshyn 1999, Raftopolous 2001, Arstila 
2016).
Whether or not low-level perceptual learning is evidence that early vision is cognitively 
impenetrable18, it is clear that perceptual learning as a passive, stimulus-driven process is insufficient 
for developing the sort of expert intuition that is supposed to support absorbed coping in Dreyfus's 
account. Granted, there is a parallel between perceptual learning and how Dreyfus views the expert's 
acquisition of an increased sensitivity to perceptual patterns through repeated practice in the absence of
declarative learning – but the similarity ends there. It is clear that even rudimentary forms of absorbed 
coping, like the act of reaching out and turning a doorknob, are too complex to be guided solely by the 
kinds of perceptual skills acquired through low-level perceptual learning. A learned ability for 
discriminating a certain low-level feature can't be generalized across retinal locations or even 
minimally altered stimuli; and yet, we are able to perceptually categorize objects in spite of large 
differences in viewpoint and perceptual appearance. As we have seen, perceptual categorization is 
necessary for intuiting an appropriate response – a climber must categorize a perceived grip as being of
a certain type in order to intuit the proper grasping posture to adopt; a chess player must categorize a 
perceived board position as being of a certain type in order to intuit the proper move in response. If 
perceptual categorization were restricted in the sorts of ways that low-level learning effects are 
purported to be, then even slight variations in, say, the retinal location of a stimulus would prevent the 
climber or chess player from recognizing what they are seeing. The perceptual ability invoked in expert
intuition is hence one of object recognition, which necessarily abstracts away from variations in 
sensory features that aren't relevant to an object's category membership. The representations formed in 
early vision, however, are highly sensitive to such variations – thus, object recognition must draw upon 
18 Defenses of the claim that perceptual learning is cognitively penetrated can be found in Cecchi 2014, and Newen and 
Vetter 2017.
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higher-level areas of vision beyond those affected by purely low-level perceptual learning.19 As these 
higher-level areas are more directly influenced by “top-down” cognitive influences like semantic 
memory and attention, they are the points at which a perceiver's conceptual repertoire becomes 
especially relevant to the perceptual process.
Accounting for Dreyfusian intuition, then, shifts us from a consideration of low-level perceptual
learning to perceptual expertise, understood as the enhanced ability to perceptually recognize and 
distinguish between similar instances of the same class. Examples of real-world perceptual expertise 
include: the radiologist's ability to diagnose a condition on the basis of subtle perceptual cues in an x-
ray; the sommelier's ability to distinguish subtle tastes and odors of wine; the ability of a bird-watcher 
to rapidly recognize a species of a bird in a dense forest; and the musician's ability to differentiate two 
musical tones of similar frequency. In addition, though these examples may give the impression that 
perceptual expertise is the province of highly specialized experts who have undertaken years of 
deliberate training, most adult humans have enough practice to be perceptual experts in at least two 
domains, namely face recognition and fluent reading. For all of these domains of expertise, experts will
consistently outperform novices in relevant perceptual categorization tasks. Whereas a novice makes 
basic-level categorizations (e.g., “bird,” “dog”) faster than subordinate-level categorizations (e.g., 
“robin,” “terrier”), experts can perceptually categorize objects at both levels equally rapidly. Though, in
some tasks where it is more important to identify a basic category rather than differentiate between 
instances of the same category – e.g., expertise in reading will demand that one can identify the same 
19 It is further debatable whether perceptual learning is at all a purely low-level phenomenon occurring only at the earliest 
stages of vision. While the highly specific and non-transferable nature of basic discrimination skills acquired through 
perceptual learning has been taken to show that perceptual learning effects changes in early visual cortical areas, 
Kellman and Garrigan (2009: 72-5) point out that this evidence for the limited transfer of learned sensory acuities is 
inconsistent and highly variable from task to task. There is also little evidence that perceptual learning brings about 
structural changes in the early visual cortex. Additionally, performance on low-level perceptual tasks is intertwined with
top-down attention and a perceiver's task engagement. Wang et al. 2016 also find evidence for the transferability of 
basic discrimination skills, and argue that these skills are acquired through the interaction between visual areas and top-
down influences.
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basic letter regardless of variations in font size or style – experts will also perform basic-level 
categorizations faster than novices (Palmeri and Gauthier 2004: 297; see also Harel et al. 2011). 
The advantages that perceptual experts have over novices in perceptual categorization have 
been attributed in part to how experts parse visual stimuli differently than novices. In turn, these 
differences have been linked in part to activity in the fusiform face area (FFA), located in the ventral 
stream of the visual cortex. The FFA has been in implicated processing stimuli across a wide range of 
domains beyond just facial recognition – expert performance in visually recognizing cars, birds, 
butterflies, artificial, novel computer-generated objects, chess positions, and x-rays all have been 
correlated with increased activity in FFA (see Bilalic 2016). What all these types of stimuli have in 
common is that they have been found to be processed by experts in a holistic manner – that is, whereas 
novices selectively attend to a few parts of an object in order to categorize it, experts will attend to the 
object as an integrated whole. Members of a certain category – such as human faces or chess positions 
– often share a prototypical configuration of parts, so it makes sense that an enhanced ability for 
identifying and discriminating between category members would rely on attending to multiple parts 
and the configural relations between them. A novice who, for instance, is looking for a certain plant in 
the woods, may have to categorize objects by deliberately following rules – e.g., “look for smooth, 
non-serrated leaves with an elongated oval shape” – and scanning parts individually. Expert 
categorizers, however, may shift to holistic processing, which parses complex visual patterns by 
binding together features into larger configurations that get encoded as a single meaningful unit, in a 
manner akin to memory-based chunking (Goldstone and Bygre 2015: 821). Unitizing stimuli in this 
way facilitates expert object recognition, as it allows for an increased amount of perceptual information
to be compared with category-exemplars or templates retrieved from memory, a process which is less 
deliberate and attention-demanding than explicit rule use (Palmeri and Gauthier 2004: 300). 
Accordingly, it seems that perceptual expertise is what Dreyfus has in mind when he speaks of the 
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expert's perceptual repertoire: Perceptual experts have an increased sensitivity to subtle similarities and 
differences between perceptual patterns; this sensitivity is directly tied to both low-level and high-level 
areas of visual processing; and this processing seems to be holistic, rapid, automatic, unconscious, non-
deliberative, and minimally attention-demanding.
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that, especially for real-world forms of perceptual 
expertise, the differences in how experts and novices visually notice and extract meaningful patterns of 
information are also tied to differences in their respective levels of knowledge. Knowledge is tied up 
with a number of top-down cognitive factors that influence visual processing in expert object 
recognition, including task-relevant expectations and goals, semantic memory, and endogenously 
controlled attention. Real-world domains of perceptual expertise often require years of practice to 
acquire the requisite knowledge for making split-second perceptual categorizations, as well as 
recognizing perceptual cues that novices fail to detect. Though holistic processing is often 
characterized as a bottom-up, stimulus-driven process, its use in real-world domains of expertise 
clearly relies on knowledge and other top-down factors. Unlike novices, expert radiologists can 
immediately locate an abnormality on an x-ray without having to analytically search the image, and 
often report an accompanying sensation of “knowing” that the image contains a lesion before being 
able to locate it (Drew et al. 2013: 264). In using holistic processing to obtain a gist or gestalt 
impression of the x-ray, experts are implicitly drawing upon their past experience with hundreds of 
thousands of normal and abnormal x-rays, stored as chunks and templates in memory; the immediate 
detection of an abnormality stems from the rapid comparison between the perceived image and 
memory representations. Novices will not have amassed such a store of representations, leaving them 
instead to scan the image more haphazardly and inefficiently. 
Even if Dreyfus (or McDowell) were to object that stored memory chunks/templates cannot be 
counted as knowledge or as part of the conceptual repertoire – a move that revised conceptualism 
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would reject, and a point to which we will return – it is still evident hat explicitly conceptual 
knowledge is operative in expert recognition. Though the extensive exposure to x-ray images may 
seem like a method of low-level perceptual learning, a radiology student will also acquire, in 
conjunction with that exposure, a vast amount of straightforwardly conceptual knowledge about 
anatomy, diseases, and so on. The same sort of knowledge-acquisition is integral to developing 
perceptual expertise with respect to birds (James and Cree 2010), cars (Gilaie-Dotan et al. 2012), chess 
(Gobet 2005), wine (Hughson and Boakes 2002), and more. Part of the importance of knowledge for 
perceptual expertise is that the features relevant to making a correct categorization might not be readily 
identifiable unless one knows certain pertinent information. For example, knowing that a patient is a 
gymnast, hurdler, or long jumper, and knowing that subtle pelvic fractures are common injuries for 
such athletes, a radiologist can better detect these fractures on an x-ray; otherwise, they may pass 
unnoticed because they are not themselves visually salient (Donovan 2010: 120-1). And even if a 
stimulus has been detected, knowledge is necessary for properly classifying it – knowing a patient's 
case history, facts about anatomy, and even whether the x-ray was underexposed are all important for 
determining whether a white spot on an x-ray indicates the presence of a lung tumor, a bone, or just a 
byproduct of the imaging procedure (Wisnewski and Medin 1994: 228). 
Another way in which knowledge exerts a top-down influence on perception is through the 
generation of contextual expectations and predictions. Not only do the features of a certain kind of 
object appear together in typical configurations, but objects themselves can appear in typical 
configurations with other objects that tend to be found in the same context. The objects we encounter in
everyday experience are seldom perceived in isolation; instead, they are often located in environments 
in which they bear a semantically coherent relation to other objects – e.g., a microwave is typically 
seen in a kitchen; a hairdryer is typically seen in a bathroom. With an understanding of the contextual 
associations between objects, we come to form sets of expectations about the kinds of objects we may 
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perceive in a given scene, as well as where they may be located, how they may be oriented relative to 
each other, and so on (Bar 2004: 619). These contextual expectations facilitate the process of object 
recognition – for instance, when presented with a familiar scene such as a kitchen, subjects more 
rapidly recognized a contextually related object like a loaf of bread than an incongruous object like a 
mailbox or drum (Palmer 1975). Context also plays a role in resolving perceptual ambiguities: The 
same amorphous shape may be identified as a car on the street or as someone's shoe, depending on the 
scene in which the shape is presented, and the expectations one would have about what sorts of objects 
would be typically found there (Oliva and Torralba 2007; Bar 2004). Overall, contextual expectations 
facilitate object recognition by helping to manage the complexity of the visual environment – using 
knowledge of what sorts of objects are typically found in a certain complex scene, the visual system is 
better able to group and segment elements of that scene into identifiable objects (Gilbert and Li 2013). 
Coming now to the skills involved in perceptual expertise, the neural underpinnings of our 
knowledge about contextual associations indicate how expectations exert a top-down influence on both 
the holistic extraction of gist and the rapid recognition of objects. As we have seen, part of the 
advantage that experts have over novices is that experts, based on their past experience with and 
knowledge of a certain domain, can form a global impression of a scene that provides a rapid 
assessment of its overall meaning. Holistic processing thus can give experts a shortcut to recognizing 
individual objects in the scene, as it helps to form a prediction about what sorts of objects may be 
present and where they may be located. Research by Moshe Bar and others (Bar et al. 2006; Kveraga, 
Ghuman, and Bar 2007) offers a model of how the brain extracts the gist of a scene and forms 
predictions to guide object recognition. This process is initiated by the extraction of low spatial 
frequency information from a stimulus, which does not represent distinctly individuated objects in 
sharp detail.20 This information is projected from early visual areas directly and rapidly – at about 130 
20 Spatial frequency roughly refers to the amount of detail in a given part of a visual stimulus. Images with high spatial 
frequencies will have abrupt spatial changes like edges, and generally represent the configuration of distinct features in 
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ms after stimulus onset – to the prefrontal cortex (PFC), and specifically to the orbitofrontal cortex, via 
the magnocellular pathway of the dorsal visual stream.21 Notably, only meaningful stimuli, i.e., those 
stimuli resembling objects associated with category- and identity-relevant semantic memories, were 
found to activate the orbitofrontal cortex; no activation was found for meaningless visual gratings 
presented with low spatial frequency (Chaumon et al. 2013). 
Signals are then projected from the prefrontal cortex to the inferior temporal cortex (ITC), a 
high-level area of the ventral stream which contains the fusiform gyrus and is associated with 
representing the complex, viewpoint-invariant structures of perceived objects. Once stored concepts 
and contextual associations are activated in PFC, they are projected down to ITC so as to provide an 
initial interpretation of the scene context, as well as predictions about the most likely identities of the 
objects present therein. These projections reach the ITC around 50 ms before fine-grained, high spatial 
frequency information arrives from the early visual cortex (Bar 2004; Bar et al. 2006). There are also 
corresponding projections to ITC from the retrosplenial cortex and parahippocampal cortex (PHC), 
regions of the medial temporal lobe associated with the long-term storage of memory chunks 
(Campitelli et al. 2007) and scene-relevant contextual associations (Aminoff, Kveraga, and Bar 2013). 
Increased activity in PHC has been detected among perceptual experts as compared to novices in 
several domains, indicating that experts draw upon non-visual associative knowledge about scenes and 
contexts – e.g., a birder's knowledge of a painted finch's habitat and what its calls sound like, or a 
radiologist's knowledge of anatomical relations – in order to better recognize objects (see Cheung and 
Bar 2012: 151-161). 
fine-grained detail. Images with low spatial frequencies are more coarse-grained, and represent more general features of
shape like orientation and proportion (Bar 2004: 621).
21 The orbitofrontal cortex has been associated with a wide range of cognitive functions, the most relevant for our 
purposes being the processing of affective value and reward, decision-making, guessing and hypothesis-testing, and the 
formation of expectations. The relation of these functions to the rapid detection of coarse-grained gist and the formation
of top-down predictions about object-identities may be suggested by the possible survival-related benefit that gist 
detection would have particularly in dangerous situations. It would greatly benefit an organism to have the ability for 
quickly determining the probable identity of an object on the basis of low spatial frequency information, just like in the 
analogous case of recognizing objects in peripheral vision where visual acuity is low (see Bar et al. 2006: 453). 
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The effect of these top-down signals is to bias the competition between competing 
interpretations of bottom-up visual information, promoting those object-interpretations which are more 
likely to be accurate given the context, and suppressing unlikely and irrelevant interpretations. These 
effects are also transferred all the way down to earliest stages of perception: Bottom-up responses in 
V1 that are incongruent with prior expectations are suppressed, resulting in enhanced or “sharpened” 
representations with increased information content of expected stimuli (Kok, Jehee, and de Lange 
2012). Additionally, prior expectations have been found to evoke a feature-specific pattern of activity in
V1 corresponding to the detection of a certain stimulus, even when that stimulus is unexpectedly not 
present (Kok, Failing, and de Lange 2014). The upshot of these findings is that, by restricting the set of 
possible interpretations that the visual system has to consider, top-down context predictions lead to 
more refined and rapid object recognition than what could be achieved in the absence of prior 
knowledge.
5.6 Against a Dreyfusian Account of Perceptual Expertise
Now, it is true that Dreyfus's account also posits the existence of a background, contextual 
understanding that orients expert coping: The professor's familiarity with the context of a lecture hall 
orients his recognition of the blackboard as out of place; Dreyfus's familiarity with the context of his 
office orients his recognition of a chair as affording him a seat for his work (Dreyfus 2013: 30). But 
this background familiarity underlying expert coping is thought by Dreyfus to be essentially non-
conceptual, being characterized as both non-propositional in nature and mindless in operation. Should 
the contextual knowledge we've identified as facilitating holistic gist processing and object 
identification be counted as part of a non-conceptual background? While there is some merit to how 
Dreyfus would characterize the knowledge that governs high-level object recognition, we can still 
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reject the implication that this knowledge, along with the perceptual skills that it enables, are 
essentially non-conceptual.
Consider first the claim that the skilled familiarity underlying perceptual expertise must be non-
conceptual because it is mindless, that is, it operates in an unreflective or even unconscious manner.22 
For Dreyfus, the fact that some activity is automatic and unthinking suggests that the motivating forces 
driving the activity are unthinkable, and hence non-conceptual. Perceptual expertise can viewed as just 
such an automatic and unthinking activity, being that the processes underlying expert object recognition
largely occur outside of the expert's conscious awareness. In the same way as a tennis player's body 
unconsciously responds to the familiar solicitation of an incoming serve, the expert radiologist's eyes 
unconsciously responds to the familiar solicitations of an x-ray; the radiologist herself may have no 
awareness of how her eyes automatically saccade across an image and immediately fixate on a target 
(Reingold and Sheridan 2011). In fact, similar to how chess experts who fall pray to the Einstellung 
effect do not reliably report how their attention is actually being deployed, expert radiologists' reports 
of their own visual search methods often diverge from how their eyes are actually scanning an x-ray 
(Ibid.: 534). Experts may also fail to be consciously aware of what they actually recognize. For 
instance, studies of radiologists have found that the most common form of false-negative error, where 
an abnormality on an image fails to be reported, was one in which the radiologists' eyes fixated on the 
abnormality for a relatively long duration – suggesting that the abnormality was being recognized – and
yet the radiologists consciously decided that no abnormality was present. (Ibid.: 540).
Does the automaticity and unconscious character of expert eye movements entail that they, 
along with object recognition in general, are guided by unthinkable, non-conceptual forces? Prima 
facie, a positive answer seems unwarranted in light of the many cognitive factors that guide expert eye 
movements. As John M. Henderson helpfully summarizes, “Human eye movement control is ‘smart’ in 
22 See Dreyfus 2013: 38 n. 43 for his equation of fully mindless coping with unconscious action, akin to that of a 
sleepwalker.
246
the sense that it draws not only on currently available visual input, but also on several cognitive 
systems, including short-term memory for previously attended information in the current scene, stored 
long-term visual, spatial and semantic information about other similar scenes, and the goals and plans 
of the viewer” (2003: 501). Here, the question facing Dreyfus is two-fold: Would his absorbed-coping 
account of perceptual expertise acknowledge the existence of such top-down cognitive factors? And if 
so, would he be warranted in assimilating these factors into an expert's background perceptual 
repertoire? The lines of debate again threaten to become merely stipulative: Revised conceptualism, 
along with most psychological literature, would view these factors as clearly conceptual/cognitive, 
whereas Dreyfus would take most of the top-down factors listed to be non-linguistic, non-propositional,
unavailable to thought, and hence non-conceptual. However, as was the case with expert motor activity,
we can nonetheless side-step the apparently stipulative nature of the debate by showing that Dreyfus's 
account, being constrained by its extreme anti-cognitivism, would independently fail to capture several 
important aspects of perceptual expertise.
It would be true to form for Dreyfus to claim that expert object recognition does not simply play
a part in enabling the unmediated bodily responsiveness to environmental affordances which defines 
absorbed coping; rather, object recognition is itself is a form of absorbed coping which is responsive to 
environmental affordances. Accordingly, a Dreyfusian understanding of perceptual expertise will be 
closely tied to his understanding of affordance perception. To explain how the environment can directly
solicit an absorbed coper's responses, Dreyfus invokes J.J. Gibson's (1979) ecological theory of direct 
perception, which basically holds that the information required for a perceiver to experience and 
engage with the world is entirely contained within the “ambient optic array,” or the structured patterns 
of light that are received from the environment by the retina. Gibson's theory is notably set against 
traditional theories of perception which claimed that the retinal image array, being sparse and two-
dimensional, is alone insufficient for generating our experience of stable three-dimensional objects, and
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hence must be supplemented by information from cognitive processes internal to the mind. Gibson, on 
the other hand, argued that the experience of three-dimensional objects is not constructed by the mind 
or mediated by imagistic representations inside one's head. This experience arises instead through the 
direct detection of perceptual invariants, or spatiotemporal patterns of stimulation that remain constant 
while other parts of the optic array change due to the perceiver's bodily movement. These invariant 
patterns are thus taken by the visual system to directly indicate the presence of stable and persisting 
objects in the environment. One type of perceptual invariant is an affordance, which refers to the 
various possibilities for action that objects in the environment offer to a perceiver. Gibson's notion of 
affordances is thus useful to Dreyfus because it can take the place of reasons in an explanation of action
– different situations reliably elicit a common pattern of response from agents not because they 
uniformly provide a set of cognitively appreciable reasons for action, but because they share 
perceptually available invariant structures to which agents can respond without the mediation of 
reasons.
It is a central tenet of Dreyfus's non-conceptualism that an expert can directly detect and 
respond to affordances without their being represented by the mind. He illustrates the perceptual 
system's “mindless” interaction with environmental affordances by using a model of “feedforward 
simulated neural networks” (2002: 374-7; 2005: 54-55). The idea is that these networks may exemplify 
how a perceiver can reliably respond to the environment without the brain's having to associate 
perceptual inputs with particular memory representations or conceptual rules. Theoretically, the 
simulated neural network would be comprised by multiple layers of feature detectors, organized 
hierarchically in increasing degrees of abstraction. Nodes in each layer are responsible for detecting the
presence of certain patterns among the input from lower-level nodes. The highest level of the network 
could be abstract enough to detect those features in the ambient optic array that indicate the overall 
semantic significance of a situation. The network's final output would correspond to the response that 
248
the situation solicits. Dreyfus's claim is that such a network could learn to discriminate between certain 
stimuli without being given a set of rules for how to do so, or for what input features are relevant for 
discrimination. The network will produce random responses at first, but, through repeated practice and 
the reinforcement of its correct responses, it can learn to reliably produce the appropriate response. The
fact that the network can learn shows for Dreyfus how perception is informed by past experience 
without needing to be associated with specific memories. The network does not store particular 
memory representations with which current perceptual representations are compared and associated. 
The influence of past experience on present perception would instead be realized through strengthening
the connections between neural nodes, such that certain inputs and outputs become more tightly paired 
together – no mental representations needed. Through a process of what is called Hebbian learning, 
where the activity of one node or neuron becomes increasingly synchronized with the activity of 
another, similar inputs will come to produce the same or similar output. 
Though the learning process so far seems akin to the passive conditioning associated with low-
level perceptual learning, Dreyfus also acknowledges that a network must have the capacity for 
generalization in order for it to approach the real-world expertise of humans. If a class of similar inputs 
is going to reliably yield a set of similar or identical outputs, then there must be some way for the 
neural network to detect relevant similarities across inputs. Given that everything is similar to 
everything else in some respect, the problem facing both networks and humans is that of placing 
constraints of relevance on possible generalizations in a way that is still tethered solely to the 
information available in the ambient optical array. Dreyfus alludes to just a few ways in which 
disparate inputs may be processed as relevantly similar for producing a certain output response: There 
could be innate, non-cognitive gestalt structures that group inputs together; the temporal order and 
frequency of inputs could come to signify a shared relevance for a certain output-response, like how 
nearby objects which afford a reaching response would be detected more early and often than things 
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which do not afford reaching; and inputs could be grouped as similar according to whether they tend to 
produce a practically satisfactory response.
Whatever way in which a neural network or an embodied human perceiver ultimately comes to 
detect practically relevant similarities among the invariant features present within an ambient array, 
Dreyfus's overarching point is these features need not be available to the mind. The nodes in the neural 
network responsible for directly picking high-order invariants such as affordances remain hidden from 
the view of the perceiving agent. There may even be nodes tuned by past experience which serve the 
function of top-down expectations and background knowledge, but they too are hidden from view – all 
an agent observes is that a certain input solicits a certain response. The agent is unable to consciously 
represent, name, or think of those invariant features which are detected by the brain in soliciting that 
response. With invariant input features and output responses becoming associated together through 
situational trial and error, there is no need for the network to be guided by context-free conceptual 
rules. As Dreyfus summarizes, “Gibson’s account of our direct pick-up of affordances as high order 
invariants in the optic array, and neural net considerations as to how the brain might detect such 
invariants, suggest that expertise does not require concepts. Indeed, the basis of expert coping may well
be the sort of features that the expert could not be aware of and would not be able to think” (2005: 58). 
Being unthinkable and unconscious, these invariant features cannot be brought into a McDowellian 
“space of reasons,” that is, they cannot be taken as reasons for justifying how the perceptual expert 
categorizes what is seen. Perceptual experts have no conscious access to the abstract, higher-order 
features that ground their skillful recognition of objects. Even more than Dreyfus's expert chess 
players, Dreyfus's perceptual experts would be unable to even retrospectively reconstruct the reasons 
why they categorize the objects in the ways that that they do – for Dreyfus, this inability makes 
perceptual expertise, along with all expert coping, not even an implicitly rational activity.
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Yet, even while granting that a perceptual expert's neural network is subconsciously attuned to 
detecting abstract features relevant for the rapid categorization of objects, we must acknowledge that 
perceptual expertise is not exclusively a passive, unconscious, ineffable, bottom-up and feedforward 
process. While Dreyfus's model captures the sense in which the neural underpinnings of expertise are 
invisible to an agent, it seems designed to exclude the possibility that expert coping can consciously 
guided through agent-directed attention. According to Dreyfus, all that the agent would be consciously 
aware of is the end-result of the stimulus detection process, namely the response that is issued on the 
agent's behalf. Nowhere in his feedforward network of feature detectors is there room for a conscious 
agent who can actively influence of the process of stimulus detection, nor does there seem to be a 
functional analogue for endogenous selective attention. As with most other forms of absorbed coping, 
perceptual expertise is an active process that can involve conscious and cognitive top-down control. 
Dreyfus is averse to acknowledging the conscious and cognitive aspects of expert activity, as doing so 
would not square with his account of absorbed coping as being fundamentally mindless, non-cognitive, 
and non-representational. We have already canvassed the inadequacies of Dreyfus's “mindless” account
of physical skills, particularly with respect to its inability to explain how experts may need to 
consciously, mindfully monitor their activity, and actively pay attention to what they are acting upon. 
The same basic inadequacies can also be found in Dreyfus's “mindless” account of perceptual 
expertise, which is also a form of expertise that requires active attention.
One striking way in which a perceiver can consciously influence the visual processing of 
objects is by adopting a certain task-relevant intention. This sort of influence is evident in a study by 
Assaf Harel and colleagues (Harel, Kravitz, and Baker 2014), where subjects were each given a variety 
of different perceptual identification tasks to be performed while viewing the same stimulus. The tasks 
were related to either conceptual characteristics of the object or the physical characteristics of the 
image: For instance, in one trial, subjects would be presented with a picture of a cow and would have to
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answer whether a cow is a man-made or natural object; in another trial, the same cow would be 
presented and subjects would be asked whether the image of the cow was tilted clockwise or counter-
clockwise. What the study found was that there were different patterns of activation in the ventral 
temporal cortex – specifically the posterior fusiform gyrus (pF) – and the lateral prefrontal cortex 
(LPFC) that corresponded with each task. That is to say, it was not as though the same object-image 
generated a consistent, bottom-up pattern of activation in the high-level areas of vision, regardless of 
the task. Rather, the response of these high-level areas to a single object-image varied across each task. 
The representations in these areas were task-dependent to the extent that, by varying the task context, 
the ability to decode which object was being perceived from the corresponding pattern of activation in 
the pF and LPFC was significantly reduced.23 By contrast, the patterns of activation in the early visual 
cortex (EVC) were relatively task-independent, in the sense that the same object-information would be 
present across different tasks – in other words, which object was being seen could be determined from 
the pattern of activation in the early visual cortex regardless of which task was being performed. Still, 
the neural response in EVC responded to a given task context by increasing in magnitude, though that 
increase was linked only with tasks which were relevant to the physical features of the image, and not 
with the conceptual tasks. On the other hand, the increase in response magnitude was relatively greater 
for the conceptual tasks in pF and LPFC.
Among the implications of Harel et al.'s study, the most relevant for our purposes is the finding 
that object representations in the visual stream can be modulated by conscious, personal-level states of 
the observer. Unlike past knowledge or context associations, which may passively influence perceptual 
experience at a subpersonal level without a perceiver's having some say in the matter, a given task 
23 Harel et al. add the qualification that “in all visual regions it was still possible to decode object identity across tasks, 
suggesting that although representations are perturbed, they are not completely changed” (2014: 968). We might say, 
then, that the top-down influence of behavioral goals or observer intent do not construct an object representation out of 
whole cloth – they may penetrate the visual processing of visual object representations, but (at least in non-
hallucinatory cases) they do not fully replace the bottom-up object information delivered from the early visual cortex.
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context prompts a perceiver to deliberately adopt a corresponding intention or behavioral goal. These 
consciously selected intentions and goals in turn shape the patterns of neural activation in the visual 
system. Dreyfus's account of absorbed coping, however, views the conscious representation of goals on
the part of an agent as anathema to skillful performance. Goals are not consciously represented by the 
absorbed coper, nor are they unconscious representations which the coper could possibly entertain in 
conscious thought (Dreyfus 2002: 377-8). Nonetheless, we see in Harel et al.'s study that a perceiver 
must be consciously adopting the goal of correctly responding to a given identification task, which in 
turn has a direct effect on how both low-level and high-level stages of the visual system respond to the 
perceived stimulus. 
Dreyfus might object that answering questions about an image falls short of being a form of 
skillful expertise; as a result, even if a perceiver's conscious intent or adoption of a behavioral goal for 
answering such questions comes to influence perceptual object processing, those sorts of conscious 
states would not influence the bottom-up operation of the absorbed expert's neural network and her 
genuinely mindless performance of skill. In that vein, research on perceptual expertise has tended 
toward the view that the holistic processing characteristic of expert identification, particularly for 
objects like faces, is an automatic and passive, stimulus-driven process. Several researchers have 
claimed that, as a result of long-term perceptual learning which tunes the response of neurons in the 
visual cortex to trained stimuli, perceptual experts can't “turn off” their holistic processing of those 
stimuli (e.g., Tarr and Gauthier 2000; Richler, Wong, and Gauthier 2011). 
While such a claim would accord well with Dreyfus's mindless, feedforward model of 
perceptual expertise as extended to perception, it is undermined by competing research which shows 
perceptual expertise can be agent-driven rather than stimulus-driven, and that the conscious states of an
expert perceiver can activate the skills involved in perceptual expertise. Harel et al. (2011) tested the 
visual recognition abilities of car experts as compared to novices. Subjects were presented with a rapid 
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series of face, car, and airplane images, and were tasked with detecting whether the same image 
repeated twice in a row. (Notably, successive car and airplane images were to be judged the same if 
they both showed the same make and model of car or airplane – e.g., “Honda Civic” – regardless of 
whether the images differed in color, orientation, or even year of production.) In the first experiment, 
car experts were predictably much more accurate than novices in recognizing identical cars, whereas no
significant difference in accuracy was observed for airplane images. Moreover, fMRI scans of the car 
experts' brains revealed widespread, car-selective activation that was distributed across neural areas 
within and outside of the visual system. When experts recognized cars, increased activity was not only 
observed in the early visual cortex and high-level regions of the ventral stream that are responsive to 
visual objects, semantic categories, and scene-contexts (e.g., the lateral occipital complex, fusiform 
gyrus, and parahippocampal cortex); there was also activity found in parietal areas such as the 
precuneus and intraparietal sulcus, as well as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These regions are 
together implicated in the fronto-parietal dorsal attention network, which is thought to be responsible 
for the top-down, voluntary, and goal-oriented allocation of attention (see Corbetta and Shulman 2002).
The results of the first experiment lend support to the hypothesis that the neural basis of perceptual 
expertise for cars extends across a wide range of non-visual areas in the brain, rather being restricted 
solely to face-selective visual areas like the fusiform face area. Additionally, the activity of the fronto-
parietal attentional network suggests that top-down attentional allocation was underlying the perceptual
engagement of car experts with the objects of their expertise.
Harel et al. employed a second experiment to test the hypothesis that the neural activity 
underlying the perceptual expertise of car experts could be controlled in a top-down fashion. Car 
experts and novices were again presented with a rapid series of car and airplane images, and had to 
respond when they recognized that the same image was immediately repeated. This time, however, 
subjects were directed to attend only to car images for one half of the trials, and to airplane images for 
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the other half. Now, if it were true that perceptual expertise is an automatic and stimulus-driven skill, 
then the same patterns of neural activation which car experts evince in detecting pairs of repeated and 
identical car images should be triggered by those pairs even when cars were not task-relevant, i.e., 
during trials in which the experts were told to attend only to airplane images. Yet, researchers found the
opposite of what would be predicted under the hypothesis that perceptual expertise is automatic and 
purely stimulus-driven. In the trials where cars were not task-relevant and hence were not the subject of
experts' top-down attentional engagement, experts did not display the sorts of car-selective patterns of 
neural activity that were observed in the first experiment; in fact, their neural responses to the task-
irrelevant cars were nearly identical to that of novices. This finding suggests that the widespread neural 
activity characteristic of perceptual experts – activity which undergirds their enhanced abilities for 
object recognition – is only found in conjunction with the intentional allocation of attention to objects 
in their domain of expertise. When perceptual experts aren't actively attending to these objects, their 
perceptual expertise remains inactive. 
We can now contrast Harel's findings about the role of top-down attention and explicit intention
in perceptual expertise with Dreyfus's claim that such personal-level, agent-driven states should impede
an expert's skillful performance. This claim should hold true for the skills of perceptual experts as well 
– if an expert consciously intends to recognize objects in one's domain of expertise by voluntarily 
attending to them, then the expert's advantage over a novice perceiver should be degraded. Dreyfus 
hence seeks to explain the expert's perceptual/non-conceptual repertoire of recognitional abilities in 
such a way that renders conscious control over these abilities unnecessary, if not impossible. Grounding
expert perception on the model of a feedforward neural network gives Dreyfus a way to show how a 
perceptual expert could skillfully respond to stimuli without the help of conscious representational 
states. Since the network is exclusively feedforward, there would be no role for top-down feedback 
from higher layers of the network to lower layers, or from non-perceptual parts of the brain to the 
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perceptual network itself. Dreyfus does acknowledge that there is a feedback loop between the 
network's output responses and the environment, which allows the network to passively learn from past
experiences in a process of trial-and-error reinforcement. Still, not only does the feedforward model 
lack any mechanism by which personal-level states could directly modulate the operation of the 
perceptual network, but the information that the network processes, and the manner in which it 
produces skillful responses as a result, cannot be consciously represented to a subject; as Dreyfus 
writes, “Obviously, the sort of knowledge such a system embodies could not be something one was 
conscious of and so could not be understood as a conscious or unconscious representation” (2002: 383).
However, the dependence of expert object recognition on the voluntary allocation of selective 
attention gives us further reason to reject a Dreyfusian account of perceptual expertise. Rather than 
degrading perceptual expertise, Harel's studies have shown that personal-level, agent-driven states like 
intention and attention actually enable the patterns of neural activity that underlie skillful object 
recognition. When experts do not actively engage their attention in response to the demands of a 
specific perceptual task, the patterns of activity exhibited in both low- and high-level visual areas do 
not differ from those of novices – a finding which would not be predicted if Dreyfus were right that 
attention should play no role in perceptual expertise, and that expert object recognition is a totally 
mindless, automatic skill exercised outside of a perceiver's control. 
Moreover, in failing to find a place for a controlled deployment of selective attention, Dreyfus's 
feedforward model of perception would further fail to account for another aspect of real-world 
perceptual expertise, namely the flexibility with which perceptual experts can access domain-specific 
knowledge in order to categorize objects at varying levels of specificity. A number of studies have 
suggested that perceptual experts automatically process objects at a subordinate level (Gauthier et al. 
2000; Tarr and Gauthier 2000); stating this conclusion in terms of Dreyfus's model, once an expert's 
neural networks have been passively sensitized to detect more fine-grained categories, the expert can't 
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help but effortlessly recognize and discriminate objects under these categories. It is true that 
subordinate and sub-subordinate category judgments are much easier for perceptual experts to make – 
for instance, a novice to intermediate birdwatcher might see a bird and think to classify it as a wren, 
while an expert might see the same bird and think to classify it as a Carolina wren. But, it is not as 
though in acquiring expertise for at least real-world object domains, perceptual experts are tuned to 
automatically make subordinate- rather than basic-level judgments, as Dreyfus's model might have it. 
Otherwise, if subordinate categories replaced basic categories as the default level of judgment for 
experts, and their subordinate judgments were now automatic, then an expert birdwatcher would make 
subordinate judgments more efficiently and rapidly than basic judgments – in other words, it would be 
easier for an expert birdwatcher to see a bird as being a Carolina wren than as simply being a bird (see 
Johnson and Mervis 1997: 264). Accordingly, in a wide-ranging study of birdwatchers by Johnson and 
Mervis, experts were found to be equally efficient in perceptually identifying objects at a basic, 
subordinate, or sub-subordinate level, depending on task demands (Ibid.: 267). 
The equal facility of experts with each of these levels of categorization suggests that they can 
skillfully respond to perceptual tasks by flexibly drawing upon multiple sources of information, drawn 
in large part from the vast category-relevant knowledge stored in semantic memory. Different 
information will be pertinent for different levels of classification – e.g., the features which distinguish a
white-crowned sparrow from other sparrows would not be sufficient for distinguishing sparrows in 
general. Perceptual experts will thus have to access different sorts of category-relevant information in 
order to know which distinguishing features they should attentionally select as being most relevant to 
an intended level of classification. For forms of real-world perceptual expertise, the knowledge of 
category-relevant information will also include knowledge of more abstract features as well as features 
from other sense-modalities. A birdwatcher in the field will often classify some bird not only to 
according to available visual cues, which may be rather limited in places like a forest, but also with the 
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help of knowledge like where in a forest the bird is most likely to be found, and what its song sounds 
like. Through efficiently accessing these perceptual and conceptual sources of information, experts are 
able to deploy their attention to subtle perceptual features that would otherwise not figure as 
perceptually salient in the absence of that access (Ibid.: 274). 
There are several lessons to be drawn for Dreyfus's feedforward model of perceptual expertise. 
First, perceptual expertise need not be based upon an automatic, mindless recognition of objects at a 
fixed level of specificity. Real-world experts are instead capable of flexibly responding to various 
perceptual tasks that each require objects to be classified at different category-levels. The fact that 
experts can draw upon multiple forms of knowledge and information in making perceptual category 
judgments suggests that they exert some conscious control over the process of object recognition, and 
further that the knowledge embodied in their recognitional skills is not wholly inaccessible to conscious
awareness. 
Second, a purely feedforward model of object recognition would fail to explain the top-down 
influence of selective attention on visual object processing. Over time, a purely feedforward neural 
network could become attuned to the subtle perceptual patterns that experts rely upon in making visual 
classifications; through Hebbian learning, the connections between the nodes that detect domain-
specific features would be strengthened, and the connections between irrelevant feature-detecting nodes
would become inhibited. Even so, what a purely feedforward model misses is how top-down attention 
actively places a thumb on the scales of visual processing through a mechanism which Robert 
Goldstone (1998: 588-9) calls “attentional weighting”: Selective attention can not only strengthen or 
amplify the processing of category-relevant features, but can also reconfigure the dimensions along 
which features are processed as belonging to the same category. In acquiring an ability for perceptual 
categorization, perceptual experts often learn to ignore sensory features which are otherwise 
perceptually salient, and focus on more subtle features that are better predictive of category 
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membership. Together with the development of other top-down influences like expectations and 
semantic memory, learning to preferentially attend in a certain way leads to the re-weighting of neural 
responses in visual areas to category-relevant and irrelevant features (Gilbert and Li 2013). In turn, 
attentional weighting contributes to the reshaping of perceptual similarity space, and the sharpening of 
perceptual category distinctions. By attending to stimuli within the same category (e.g., color), the 
perceptual features on that dimension will become stretched relative to features on the unattended 
dimension (e.g., shape), meaning that their differences from the features on the irrelevant, unattended 
dimension will become sensitized. As a result, selective attention contributes the development of 
categorical perception effects whereby intra-category similarities and inter-category differences 
between stimuli become more perceptually salient (Goldstone and Byrge 2015: 820; see also Nosofsky 
1986; Smith and Heise 1992). Ultimately, the power of selective attention and cognitive factors to 
reweight the neural responses of perceptual systems gives us further reason to think that perceptual 
expertise cannot be encapsulated within a purely feedforward network, immune to conceptual and 
conscious influence. As Goldstone and Byrge conclude, “We humans do not simply base our categories
on the outputs of perceptual systems independent of feedback. Instead, our perceptual systems become 
customized to the task-useful categories that we acquire…. [The] fast and widely prevalent recurrent 
connections from higher to lower cortical regions makes it difficult, sometimes impossible, to identify a
‘forward-volley’ stage of sensory processing that is uninfluenced by attention” (2015: 821).
In sum, we have shown that concepts, memory, and attention – the three things which Dreyfus 
claims should not be involved in “mindless” expertise – are in fact integral to real-world perceptual 
expertise. A central part of Dreyfus's non-conceptualism is the view that expert intuition rests on a 
purely perceptual repertoire of abilities for discriminating a vast array of stimuli and situations; yet, we 
have seen how the model of perception which is supposed to instantiate these abilities is fundamentally 
flawed. The neural activity underlying perceptual expertise is widely distributed in the expert 
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perceiver's brain, extending beyond purely perceptual areas and into areas associated with cognition, 
memory, and top-down selective attention. Moreover, this distributed activation does not simply 
indicate that perceptual nodes are passing along their outputs to higher, abstract levels in the network – 
rather, conceptual information from cognitive areas shapes the outputs of perceptual areas. In contrast 
to previous accounts which have suggested, in a Dreyfusian vein, that expert object recognition is 
localized in higher-level areas of the visual stream like the fusiform face area, the work of Harel and 
others have offered strong evidence that visual areas are the site at which bottom-up and top-down 
signals are integrated, and where processes underlying both conceptual and perceptual expertise come 
to overlap. As Thomas James and George Cree suggest, “If, as we argue, objects are not just processed 
using visual information, but also conceptual knowledge associated with the object, then perhaps the 
fusiform gyrus does not represent a purely perceptual stage in visual processing, but instead represents 
a conceptual stage of object processing” (2010: 348). Against Dreyfus, then, we may conclude that 
perceptual expertise ultimately relies a great deal on the expert's conceptual repertoire. This repertoire 
contains elements which may be uncontroversially recognized as concepts; skillful perceptual 
classification requires that experts have learned and stored in semantic memory a vast amount of 
knowledge concerning their domains of expertise. This repertoire can also incorporate top-down 
cognitive factors like expectations, context associations, and task-relevant intentions. Finally, on the 
revised conceptualism being defended, the repertoire can include perceptual concepts, i.e., the skillful 
abilities for attentional allocation that an expert exercises in knowing how to look at objects in the right
way.
260
5.7   Conclusion: A Final Objection  
Though Dreyfus's “mindless” account of expertise may not be rescuable from its failure to 
account for the fundamental role that attention, memory, and other cognitive factors play in perceptual 
expertise and expert intuition more broadly, a defender of Dreyfus might still mount a final objection 
that again raises the charge of arbitrariness against my revised conceptualism: Even if it is granted that 
expert object recognition cannot be a purely feedforward process, why should we think that the 
influence of attention and memory should be attributable to the expert's conceptual repertoire? In other 
words, is it legitimate to identify a perceptual expert's attentional skill as being a kind of conceptual 
capacity? If the answer is negative, then my revised conceptualist account of expert perceptual intuition
would be even more susceptible to the charge of triviality that Dreyfus holds over McDowellian 
conceptualism. Recall that Dreyfus's non-conceptualism is deeply opposed to McDowell's claim that 
conceptual capacities pervade the experience and action of rational agents. According to McDowell, the
presence of conceptual capacities serves as a transcendental condition for the possibility of treating our 
perceptual and bodily responses to the world as having rationally evaluable content, allowing us 
thereby to take a step back from these responses and assess their epistemic and normative status. For 
Dreyfus, however, the phenomenology of absorbed coping shows us a realm of experience and action 
which is fundamentally immune to rational articulation, thus casting doubt on the pervasiveness of 
conceptual capacities throughout even a rational agent's experience. Furthermore, even if our account 
of conceptuality is somehow weakened such that we count as conceptual the background understanding
of cultural norms that unconsciously conditions our absorbed coping practices, this understanding is not
still rationally evaluable within the sphere of absorbed coping itself. Hence, this understanding would 
not serve the role that concepts are supposed to serve for McDowell, which is to explicitly ground our 
judgments and beliefs on a foundation of reasons, in a self-conscious activity of “adjusting thinking to 
experience” (McDowell 1994: 47). Dreyfus therefore writes, “It seems that, when a transcendental 
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requirement runs up against phenomenological counterexamples, saving the pervasiveness claim 
requires weakening that claim until what remains of it need have nothing to do with the job – in this 
case justifying judgments – for which it was allegedly required” (2013: 19).
Do the attention- and memory-based capacities that underlie expert perception and action play 
any role in justifying judgments, such that they may satisfy Dreyfus in grounding a non-trivial account 
of conceptuality and its pervasiveness? I think that we can answer in the affirmative, provided we 
adjust some of the underlying assumptions that constrain the terms of the McDowell-Dreyfus debate. 
Here, we can draw inspiration from the skill-based account of perceptual knowledge offered in classical
Chinese epistemology. For Xúnzǐ and the Mohists, having perceptual knowledge pragmatically entails 
that one can skillfully exercise an ability for appropriate perceptual classification, which further entails 
that one knows how to properly attend to an object in such a way that facilitates the recognition of its 
membership under some conceptual category. If, together with the Chinese epistemologists, we can 
understand perceptual conceptualization as involving the active exercise of attentional skills, then we 
have a way of demonstrating how these skills can begin to play the epistemic role that Dreyfus requires
of concepts. Furthermore, if we leave aside the internalist epistemological presumptions that have 
constrained the McDowell-Dreyfus debate, according to which the mark of conceptuality is the 
capacity to self-consciously and discursively articulate the epistemic warrant that experience provides 
to our beliefs and actions, then we can appreciate how attentional skills support the perceptual 
judgments of experts, and undergird their privileged epistemic status.
At the same time, we would make more plausible a revised version of the pervasiveness claim, 
which holds that conceptual capacities, construed now as attention- and memory-based skills for 
perceptual classification, can be present throughout absorbed action and perception. Insofar as attention
and memory contribute to the predicative structuring of perceptual experience, they give rise to a form 
of representational content that can stand in epistemic relations with a subject's other cognitive states. 
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The relation is also bi-directional, in that an array of cognitive states contribute to the top-down 
influence that attention and memory exert on perceptual processes. Dreyfus was wary of allowing 
attention and memory to figure in his account of expert activity for just this reason, as their 
involvement is supposed to be the first step toward transforming the non-conceptual experience of 
absorbed coping into an object of detached conceptualization or discursive reflection. We have seen, 
however, that attention and memory can be employed automatically in expert activity, or can be 
intentionally controlled in such a way that better facilitates the skillful performance of absorbed activity
– either way, the exercise of attention- and memory-based capacities does not inherently expel an 
expert from the immersive realm of absorbed coping, and in fact may play a necessary role in keeping 
the expert flexibly responsive to the world. In drawing upon a variety of conceptual abilities, attentive 
awareness within the flow of perceptually guided action makes our experience of the world both 
mindful and rationally minded.
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Conclusion – Summary and Implications
The overall goal of this dissertation has been to develop a revised account of perceptual 
concepts and their involvement in structuring the contents of conscious visual experience. This 
sort of account has been largely absent from prominent contemporary debates over the existence 
of non-conceptual content. Within these debates, concepts have been variously understood as 
being abstract constituents of propositional thoughts, or concrete representations of such 
constituents in the mind, or abilities for understanding and recognizing these constituents’ 
semantic value. Yet, regardless of whatever metaphysical theory of concepts we adopt, both 
parties to the non-conceptual content debate have presumed that the possession conditions for 
concepts entails that a subject has the ability to form relevant propositional thoughts that are 
compositional and satisfy the Generality Constraint, express those thoughts in language, and 
appreciate the inferential links between those thoughts and other related thoughts. By presuming 
this model of concept possession to be true, it is no wonder that conceptualists like John 
McDowell have been met with obvious and compelling objections from defenders of the claim 
that it is possible to perceptually represent the world without possessing any relevant concepts 
for what one perceives. Perceiving the world is a manifestly different activity from thinking 
about the world, and there are many creatures who can have robust perceptual experiences of the 
world despite lacking higher-order linguistic and inferential abilities. Indeed, if the arguments of 
some Buddhist and contemporary non-conceptualists are correct, then the above objections don’t 
go far enough: Perceptual contents represent the world in a way that is necessarily incapable of 
being articulated by any concepts that one can possess.
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Chapter 1 of this dissertation thus defends a more capacious account of perceptual 
conceptualization which recognizes that visual perception can indeed generate representations 
whose content is propositionally and predicatively structured, and which satisfy a limited version
of the Generality Constraint, thereby avoiding the charge that such an account renders the non-
conceptual content debate merely terminological. The perceptual concepts involved in both 
generating and grasping conceptually structured contents need not be linguistic in nature; 
instead, they are grounded upon more fundamental abilities for identifying objects through the 
perceptual predication and classification of their features. The chapter discusses how these 
abilities can count as genuinely conceptual in nature, and offers several criteria for perceptual 
concept possession. With these criteria in view, it becomes clear that non-linguistic creatures can 
possess and exercise conceptual abilities in their intelligent responses to their perceived 
environment. 
Chapter 2 surveys how both Buddhist and Nyāya thinkers came to similarly develop a 
refined account of conceptualization which distinguishes the conceptual abilities involved in 
perceptual classification from those involved in overt linguistic competency. These thinkers look 
instead to the activity of attention and memory for explaining how subjects can possess abilities 
for perceptually grasping sensory features as predicating or qualifying an object. The chapter 
also shows how Buddhist and Nyāya theories of non-conceptual perception evolved from state 
views to content views, culminating with the postulation by Buddhists that perception is aware of
essentially different objects than and conceptual cognition, and by Naiyāyikas that non-
conceptual content has an essentially distinct structure from conceptual content.
265
In chapters 3 and 4, I develop an argument against classical Buddhist and contemporary 
non-conceptualism to show that essentially non-conceptual perceptual contents do not enter into 
the field of conscious perceptual experience. Chapter 3 proposes a reconstructive reading of 
Immanuel Kant and the Navya Nyāya philosopher Gangeea, which extracts from their theories of
perceptual concepts and apperception a claim to the effect that intentional, object-directed 
perceptual representations must be conceptually structured in order to have a subjective 
phenomenal character. Kant and Gangeea allow that at an early enough stage of visual 
processing, there may be perceptual representations with pre-predicative, essentially non-
conceptual contents. But, they ultimately claim that these representations give way to the 
conceptually structured representations of conscious visual experience. Their respective accounts
ultimately suggest that the conceptual structuring of perceptual representations is closely tied to 
the possibility of their being integrated into a unified experience belonging to a conscious 
subject. 
Chapter 4 reframes my particular reading of Gangeea in naturalized terms, showing how 
perceptual contents arise through the conceptually modulated activity of attention and visual 
memory. At a stage of early vision, sensory features are separately registered across different 
retinotopic maps; additionally, there is the unconscious, non-conceptual individuation of proto-
objects, which fix the reference of subsequent visual predication and categorization. In the 
subsequent stages of intermediate and late vision, attentional selection stabilizes the binding of 
sensory features to proto-objects, such that these features can be encoded as the identifying 
predicates of the selected object, and the selected object can now be perceived as a token 
instantiation of its features. Categorical and semantic information stored in memory further 
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exerts a top-down bias on attentional selection and predicative classification. Together, attention 
and memory help transform the fleeting, unstable, proto-objectual representations of early vision 
into the conscious experience of stable, coherent, mind-independent objects. As a result, 
Gangeea’s account, when bolstered by empirical studies of visual processing, support a revised 
conceptualist defense against those non-conceptualists, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti included, who 
employ phenomenological arguments for the existence of essentially non-conceptual perceptual 
content. Against such arguments, I claim that by the time a perceptual representation has a robut 
phenomenal character and is capable of being integrated into the perceptual experience of a 
conscious subject, that representation has already been structured by a conceptually modulated 
process of object identification and predication.
Finally, chapter 5 shifts to a discussion of classical Chinese epistemology and 
psychological studies of expertise. Whereas the previous chapters have largely characterized 
perceptual concepts as attention-based and memory-based capacities that operate prior to the 
arising of conscious experience, the fifth chapter additionally characterizes perceptual concepts 
as capacities for allocating attention that can also be actively and skillfully exercised in 
experience. By taking a skill-based account of perceptual concepts, we can come to understand 
perception itself as an activity which is both skillfully absorbed and permeated with rationality. 
There are several salutary implications of the revised conceptualism defended throughout 
the dissertation. One main upshot is that, through disentangling perceptual concepts from 
linguistic abilities, we can recognize that the visual system itself can encode sensory 
representations with semantic, categorical content as well as a predicative format, making these 
representations fit to be taken up by higher-order cognitive and motor intentional states. 
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Perceptual concepts hence enable visual perception to provide reasons for belief and action in the
way that conceptualists have demanded. At the same time, once we acknowledge that perceptual 
contents can have a conceptual/semantic structure that is realized independently of being 
linguistically/syntactically structured, we can broaden the space of reasons beyond its previously 
set boundaries. It is not necessary that a perceiver be able to self-consciously articulate the 
normative significance of their perceptual experience; instead, both humans and non-humans 
alike can evince their recognition of that significance through their ability to carry out intentional
activity on the basis of their experience. As McDowell originally argued, it is through being 
informed by concepts that perceptual content can attain a level of abstraction and stimulus-
independence which enables perceivers to take a rational stance and assess how they ought to 
respond to their environment, rather than be passively impelled by perceived stimuli in a fixed 
and unflexible manner. We need not attribute any conceptual grasp of redness to a sensor that 
merely detects whether something red is present – concepts or other types of mental states like 
belief and intention are superfluous for explaining such an evidently mindless activity. But, if a 
bear can distinguish between ripe and unripe wild raspberries according to whether they are red, 
then attributing to the bear a perceptual concept of redness is warranted. And, if the bear can 
distinguish between ripe red raspberries and unripe red blackberries, then we can further attribute
it with the ability to perceptually identify the more abstract kind raspberry. Improving upon 
McDowell’s account, then, a revised conceptualism more plausibly explains how a certain level 
of abstraction and (relative) stimulus-independence required for recognizing and acting upon 
perceptual reasons can already be present from the onset of conscious perceptual experience, and
also for creatures who fall outside of the space of language.
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More speculatively, it is tempting to draw broader metaphysical implications from a 
revised conceptualism, specifically concerning the reality of universals and the substances which
instantiate them. The fact that a wide variety of animal intelligence is grounded upon abilities for
perceptual classification and predication could suggest that these abilities evolved in response to 
the real existence of abstract kinds and substantial property-bearers. This suggestion would 
cohere with, and perhaps lend some credence to, the commonsense realism of Nyāya-Vaieeṣika. 
On the other hand, it is also possible for Dvaita Vedāntin nominalists to interpret the evolutionary
prevalence of perceptual concepts as supporting a metaphysical realism about similarity, rather 
than universals. Even though they reject universals, Dvaita philosophers are even more staunch 
defenders of concept-laden perception than Navya Naiyāyikas; whereas the latter posit non-
conceptual perceptions in part to secure a direct causal relation between concept-laden states and 
world, the former dispense with non-conceptual perceptions altogether, while still maintaining 
that concept-laden perceptions are themselves directly arise from sensory contact with the world. 
Appealing to evolution thus won’t settle the debate between these competing realisms, 
particularly perceptual classification can take place either in terms of categorizing stimuli under 
discrete kinds or within an ordered similarity space (Matthen 2010).
What’s more, Buddhist anti-realists could point out that appeals to evolutionary 
considerations could actually be counterproductive for either form of realism. Evolutionary 
fitness is the primary driver of adaptation, and so it is an open possibility that abilities for 
perceptual conceptualization were adapted by organisms for the pragmatic and non-epistemic 
purposes of survival, rather than for tracking truth – a view which would dovetail nicely with the 
Buddhist view that all the ways in which we conceptually carve up the world ultimately stem 
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from our pragmatic interests, rather than from the reality of natural kinds. Still, short of adopting 
this debunking strategy wholesale, we might adopt as a compromise the sort of “pragmatic 
realism” promoted by Dewey and Putnam, according to which our interaction with reality is 
fundamentally constrained by our given conceptual schemes. Or, more to the point as far as 
perception is concerned, we could adopt Matthen’s (2005) stance of “pluralistic realism,” which 
holds that our systems of perceptual classification can accurately or inaccurately correspond with
reality, while also acknowledging that different species have different perceptual apparatuses 
which are adapted for tracking and classifying different types of features in the world.
Whatever metaphysical commitments we wish to adopt concerning the nature of the 
features that perceptual concepts pick out, it is clear that the deep reach of these attention- and 
memory-based capacities into the process of vision has significant epistemological implications. 
If the conceptually modulated activity of attention and memory is responsible for structuring the 
contents of conscious visual experience, then the acquisition of new perceptual concepts stands 
to enrich the trained perceiver’s phenomenal awareness with new properties. It could be said that
as one’s conceptually-guided skills of attention become more sophisticated, one is 
correspondingly able to experience more sophisticated perceptual contents, beyond just 
rudimentary sensory classes. Indeed, perceptual experts exhibit remarkable abilities for 
classifying and differentiating objects in their respective fields of expertise. A more robust skill-
based account of perceptual knowledge could capture how the exercise of abilities for attentional
allocation and cognitive access are responsible for the perceptual expert’s enhanced epistemic 
status and enriched phenomenal experience. Conversely, our epistemic standing could be 
downgraded when pernicious cognitive and attentional biases penetrate our perceptual 
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experience. A revised conceptualist account could therefore suggest the regaining of top-down 
control of attention and the explicit revision of one’s implicit cognitive biases as points of 
intervention in the perceptual process, whereby a perceiver could reshape their experience to 
more accurately reflect the world as it is.
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